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Thesis summary 
This thesis explores the significance of the transnational movement for food 
sovereignty, in the context of three key intensifying tensions in global and national 
food systems: namely over-production, inequality, and ecological degradation. Using 
the synthesised methodology of a neo-Gramscian political ecology, the thesis asks 
whether the engagements to date of the Food Sovereignty movement with these 
tensions are deep and constructive. It does this by using the device of a hypothesis, 
within the framework and method of a Gramscian theory of politics: is the Food 
Sovereignty movement a counter-hegemonic movement, vis-à-vis the globalising 
capitalist food system as a hegemonic power formation in global politics?  
Thus, the substance of the thesis is a ‘balance of forces’ assessment, conducted in 
order to determine the existing ‘effective reality’ as between the forces of food 
sovereignty and those of the globalising capitalist food system. The form of the thesis 
takes accordingly a ‘double-movement’ character. The first movement is where the 
context, being, respectively, the political-institutional, and economic-ecological, 
framework and conditions of the globalising capitalist food system, is discussed and 
analysed in depth. Here the theoretical resources of political ecology, and supportive 
Marxist-informed political economy approaches such as regime and food regime 
theory, and theories exploring the dynamics and historical evolution of globalising 
capitalism across time and space, are marshalled in order to probe the manner in 
which the hegemony of the globalising capitalist food system has been constructed and 
maintained over time, and to understand the ways in which that hegemony is being 
renegotiated in the context of the contemporary ‘global food crisis’. 
The second movement analyses the responses by key actors within the Food 
Sovereignty movement to the political-institutional, and economic-ecological, context. 
This movement draws on the empirical work undertaken for the thesis, in the form of 
two case studies: the development of food sovereignty at the transnational level by 
the peasant and family farmer organisation La Via Campesina; and two elements of the 
local food movement in Australia, namely on the Coffs Coast region of New South 
Wales, and the Food Connect social enterprise in Brisbane, Queensland. Particular 
attention is focused on the efforts devoted by La Via Campesina to the securing of a 
new United Nations Declarations on the Rights of Peasants; and to the development of 
a hybridised version of community-supported agriculture in Australia by Food Connect.  
The thesis concludes that the Food Sovereignty movement is a potential counter-
hegemonic movement, and accordingly that its engagements with the tensions of the 
globalising capitalist food system are deep and constructive. This positive conclusion is 
tempered with a number of qualifications regarding the lack of coherence, in certain 
respects, of the food sovereignty alternative, which are, in my assessment, impacting 
its political effectiveness. At the same time, these limitations represent opportunities 
for the further theoretical and political development of food sovereignty, which in 
turn will further enhance its transformative potential.   
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Introduction 
Let Food be thy Medicine; and Medicine be thy Food 
Hippocrates, 460-370 B.C. 
 
 
This thesis concerns what many consider to be a defining terrain of political-economic 
and political-ecological contestation in the 21st century: the organisation of the 
production, distribution and consumption of food. Very broadly speaking, we can 
divide the field of contestation into two camps. On the one hand, there are significant 
political and economic actors – the governments of the industrialised North and of 
some nations of the ‘developing’ South, transnational agri-food corporations, and 
international financial institutions, both intergovernmental and private - that wish to 
consolidate and further the advance and expansion of the capitalist modernisation of 
food and agriculture. On the other, there are growing numbers of social actors in the 
North and South – transnational agrarian movements, local food activists, and some 
environmental non-governmental organisations - who believe that such a course would 
be highly detrimental to the prospects of a dignified quality of life for the mass of 
humanity and for the integrity of much of the world’s ecosystems. 
 
For the purposes of the thesis, I regard the first set of actors as the embodiment of 
what I term the ‘globalising capitalist food system’. The second set I have grouped 
together under the broad umbrella of the ‘Food Sovereignty movement’. The basic 
context for my argument is as follows:  
 
 the globalising capitalist food system is a hegemonic power formation in the 
global political economy 
 that system is characterised by three, closely related, key tensions: over-
production, the generation and intensification of inequalities, and ecological 
degradation, all of which are linked through the capitalist ontology of 
alienation 
 the Food Sovereignty movement has emerged in response to those tensions 
 
The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is: how effective are the Food 
Sovereignty movement’s responses to the complexities of the key tensions in the 
globalising capitalist food system? The answer that I am seeking to defend is that the 
Food Sovereignty movement is engaging deeply and constructively with the system’s 
key tensions, based on its ontology of connectedness. This assessment comes with 
some important qualifications, most especially the failure to date of the Food 
Sovereignty movement to respond positively and constructively to the needs and 
priorities of workers in the food system, as distinct from the needs and priorities of 
farmers. Using my method of a ‘neo-Gramscian political ecology’ as elaborated in 
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Chapter 2, I propose to defend this answer by testing a hypothesis, namely that the 
emerging Food Sovereignty movement embodies the potential of a counter-hegemonic 
political force, and therefore has the capacity to effect transformative change in the 
globalising capitalist food system.  
 
My aim in this introductory chapter is, first, to set out the broad context for the 
thesis: the reasons why food is important; the key tensions of the globalising capitalist 
food system; how its hegemony is constituted; and the emergence of the Food 
Sovereignty movement in response to the intensification of the key tensions of the 
globalising capitalist food system. Secondly, I set out the structure of thesis argument. 
Next, I conceptualise the key terms of the thesis - namely the basic nature, tendencies 
and constitutive actors of the globalising capitalist food system, and then the Food 
Sovereignty movement: its nature as a movement, some of its key themes, its principal 
actors, and its main strategies and actions. Finally, I briefly outline the development 
of the argument as it will unfold through the remaining chapters of the thesis.  
Broad context 
Food is basic to human existence for a number of intricately interconnected reasons. 
On the biological level, food provides the nutrients and minerals essential to cellular 
maintenance and repair, which, cumulatively and collectively, sustains – or, as the 
case may be, according to what one eats and in what quantities, impairs – the healthy 
functioning of the individual human organism: the person. At the social and cultural 
level, food (and practices associated with different foods) embodies a wide array of 
traditions through which social collectivities – families, members of ethnic, religious 
and tribal groups, and nations - obtain shared meaning, history and identities.  
Economically, the complex of activities around food and agriculture constitutes a very 
significant sector of economies both national and global. In particular, in recent 
decades, the growing commodification of food and agricultural products as a sector of 
international trade, and the processes and practices by which this has taken place 
have been profoundly destabilising for large numbers of people in many countries.  
Politically, the compact between a society’s rulers and the mass of ordinary ‘citizens’ 
or ‘subjects’ has at its foundation the securing of the essential material elements for 
life, food foremost among them.1 When food becomes scarce, such as when it is priced 
out of the reach of ordinary people, this compact comes under strain and at times can 
be at risk of fracturing.  
Finally, the production and consumption of food, and the question as to what becomes 
of the ‘wastes’ generated at all steps along the way, are central to the relationship 
between humanity and the natural world of which we form part. There is, accordingly, 
a fundamental ecological dimension, which any critical exploration of food and 
agriculture must account for.2 As will be discussed later in the thesis, the set of human 
                                                          
1 ‘Since the industrial revolution, ensuring a stable food supply has come to be a key source of legitimacy 
for both capitalist and socialist states alike’: Guthman, J., 2011, Excess Consumption or Over-Production? 
US Farm Policy, Global Warming, and the Bizarre Attribution of Obesity in Peet, R., Robbins, P., and 
Watts, M., (eds), 2011, Global Political Ecology, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 51-66, 54. 
2 Waste, especially in the form of packagaing, has become an integral feature of the globalising capitalist 
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practices that collectively constitute ‘agriculture’ have profoundly altered landscapes, 
changed the composition of waterways, and influenced the stability of the Earth’s 
climate.3 While these alterations have been taking place over millennia, their scale 
and pace in the past century has been unprecedented, with impacts that we are only 
now beginning to appreciate.4 
It is therefore little exaggeration to say that food and agriculture lie at the root of all 
that we are as individual living beings, and a great deal of what we do as social 
creatures.5 The interconnectivities across the various spheres outlined above should 
not be underestimated. ‘Well-fed’, well-nourished individuals are likely to be healthy; 
they are likely to participate fully and actively in society, and they are less likely to be 
motivated to seek substantive political or economic change. Conversely, under-
nourished individuals are more likely to be ill and therefore less likely to participate 
actively in society; and when large numbers of individuals experience this status, 
political stability can, at certain times and places, become threatened. Further, it is 
now quite clear that we can undertake agriculture in ways that are broadly 
sympathetic with the goal of ecosystem maintenance and functionality; or we can 
conduct it in ways that are antithetic to this goal. Again, both outcomes can 
potentially have political consequences for prevailing power formations, particularly in 
an era when what we might term ‘ecological consciousness’ is becoming more salient.6  
It is clear then that food and agriculture, in one way or another, span virtually every 
sphere of human life and endeavour. While it is obviously impossible in the course of a 
single thesis to deal exhaustively with all its aspects, I will remain sensitive to the 
multi-dimensional and multi-functional nature of food and agriculture, as well as to its 
various interconnectivities across the various spheres of social life. This is captured in 
what I term the Food Sovereignty movement’s ontology of connectedness, which I 
juxtapose to globalising capitalism’s ontology of alienation.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
food system: Moore, S., 2011, Global Garbage: Waster, Trash Trading, and Local Garbage Politics in Peet 
et al op cit., 133-144, 136; Stuart, T., 2009, Waste: Uncovering the Global Food Scandal, Penguin Books, 
London. 
3 Manning, R., Against the Grain: How Agriculture has hijacked civilization, North Point Press, New York, 
Pearce, F., 2007, When the Rivers Run Dry: Water – The Defining Crisis of the 21st Century, Beacon Press, 
Boston, MA. 
4 United Nations, 2005, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, Millennium Ecosystems 
Assessment, http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf, accessed 31.10.08. 
5 See Counihan, C., Williams-Forson, P., 2011, Taking Food Public: Redefining Foodways in a Changing 
World, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, for a recent substantive anthology examining food from the 
perspectives of production, consumption, culture and politics.  
6 Recognising this multidimensional character of food, Philip McMichael (2000, ‘The Power of Food’, 
Agriculture and Human Values,17(1), 21-33) states that:  
For the majority of the world’s population food is not just an item of consumption, it’s actually a way of life. It 
has deep material and symbolic power. And because it embodies the links between nature, human survival and 
health, culture and livelihood, it will, and has already, become a focus of contention and resistance to a corporate 
takeover of life itself: 31-32.  
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Context for the thesis 
When we first begin to look at the system and its impacts, what confronts us appears 
to be a bewildering and proliferating array of problems and ‘crises’.7 We see, for 
example, persistent malnutrition and the so-called ‘obesity pandemic’ affecting, 
cumulatively, in the region of 1.5 billion individuals.8 At the social level, there appears 
to be a generalised rural crisis, which is claimed to be the result of the widespread 
dispossession of large numbers of small and peasant farmers, in the wake of the 
expansion of large-scale, industrialised capitalist agriculture, and liberalised 
commodity trade, into many countries.9 Economically, this globalising food system 
seems to be characterised in many of its sectors by concentrations of power and 
resources into a small coterie of transnational corporations. Many critical 
commentators describe the system as oligopolistic.10  
Politically, critics argue that the expansion of the system has been substantially 
predicated on the dismantling of domestic agricultural sectors in many countries of the 
South, often achieved, so it is claimed, through the imposition of conditionalities 
attached to the so-called ‘structural adjustment’ and ‘stabilisation’ loans overseen by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.11 Critics say further that this loss 
of domestic productive capacity is a fundamental reason why many poor populations in 
the South have been exposed to steep rises in the prices of basic grains in recent 
years.12 As food prices have risen, so, it would appear, has political instability, with 
riots in numerous countries in 2008, and the overthrow of some regimes in North Africa 
                                                          
7 The idea of ‘converging crises’ has gained much currency recently amongst the activists and ‘organic 
intellectuals of the Food Sovereignty movement. For example, Peter Rosset writes: “In the contemporary 
world we are facing a systemic crisis where multiple dimensions converge. There is a convergence of an 
economic, a financial, a climate, an energy and a food crisis, and all are manifestations of medium-to long-
term trends in global capitalism. Underlying this is a long-term crisis of access to land by food producing 
rural people…and the recent surge in land grabbing by foreign capital”: Rosset, P., 2011, ‘Food Sovereignty 
and Alternative Paradigms to confront Land Grabbing and the Food and Climate Crises’, Development, 
54(1), 21-30, 21. For a recent wide-ranging exploration of the current global food crisis, see Campbell, H., 
Stock, P., and Rosin, C., (eds.), Food Systems Failure: The Global Food Crisis and the Future of 
Agriculture, Earthscan, London.  
8 Patel, R., 2007, Stuffed and Starved: Markets, Power and the Hidden Battle for the World Food System, 
Black Inc., Melbourne. 
9 “The root causes of the food crisis lie in a skewed global food system that has made Southern countries 
and poor people everywhere highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shock. This vulnerability 
springs from the risks, inequities and externalities inherent in food systems that are dominated by a 
globalized, highly centralized industrial agri-foods complex”: Holt-Giménez, E., and Patel, R., 2009, Food 
Rebellions: Crisis and the Hunger for Justice, Pambazuka Press, Cape Town, 20.  
10 “[T]here has been a long-term trend toward the reproduction of the oligopoly structure of the United 
States and European markets on a global scale”: Wilkinson, J., 2010, The Globalization of Agribusiness and 
Developing World Food Systems, in Magdoff, F., and Tokar, B. (eds), 2010, Agriculture and Food in Crisis: 
Conflict, Resistance and Renewal, Monthly Review Press, New York, 155-169, 168; also Holt-Giménez 
and Patel 2009 op cit., 20.  
11 Bello, W., 2009, The Food Wars, Verso, London, 40-2.  
12 “The policies of structural adjustment promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
combined with global trade liberalization under the auspices of the World Trade Organization have been the 
greatest contributors to the current food crisis…[There has been] a swath of destruction that adjustment 
programs have cut through different regions of the globe.”: ibid., 17. See also Patnaik, U., 2010, Origins of 
the Food Crisis in India and Developing Countries, in Magdoff, F. and Tokar, B. (eds) 2010 op cit., 95; also 
Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009 op cit., 20.  
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in early 2011.13 It is, perhaps, for this reason, amongst others, that ‘food security’ has 
emerged as a major issue on national and global political agendas in the past decade.14  
Nor has the trend passed unnoticed in academia, with the launch of a new cross-
disciplinary journal, Food Security, by the Springer group in February 2009.15 In his 
editorial that accompanied this launch, Norman Borlaug, regarded as the ‘father of the 
Green Revolution’ for his work in developing high-yielding hybrid varieties of wheat, 
commented that 
[Since 1998] the challenge of global food security has sharpened greatly. I said in 2005 that 
we will have to double the world food supply by 2050. Meanwhile the term food security 
has passed into ordinary vocabulary. In recent months, hardly a day passes without the 
media focusing on the availability of food, the price of food, food safety and so on, in a 
global context.16 
The manner in which one frames and thereby understands the food security debate 
strongly shapes the nature of the responses that one considers appropriate to address 
the underlying human need for sustenance. For example, the late Professor Borlaug 
and many others argue that the biggest challenge is an increase in production, building 
on the claimed successes of the Green Revolution in quadrupling global grain yields 
and thereby staving off the threat of global famine. Alternatively, fierce critics of the 
Green Revolution like Dr Vandana Shiva argue that its techno-productivism and 
centralisation in fact proved a disaster rather than a boon; and that a lasting exit from 
the contemporary ‘global food crisis’ requires instead a thorough transformation in 
social, economic, ecological and political relations around food and farming.17  
 
Since the advent of the Green Revolution, capitalist agriculture has turned increasingly 
in the direction of monoculture cropping, which at times can reach very large scales; 
and which is generally dependent on irrigation and the constant addition to the soil of 
agri-chemicals.18 Paraguay, for example, has seen a 300% increase in the acreage 
devoted to the growing of soybeans for export as animal feed, to 6.5 million acres by 
                                                          
13 Lagi, M., Bertrand, K.Z., and Bar-Yam, Y., 2011, ‘The Food Crises and Political Instability in North 
Africa and the Middle East’, Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910031, accessed 12.9.11; Hendrix, C., Haggard, S., and Magaloni, B., 2009, 
‘Grievance and Opportunity: Food Prices, Political Regime, and Protest’, Paper for presentation at the 
International Studies Association Convention, New York, February 15-18, 2009, available at 
http://www.kent.ac.uk/brussels/conference/documents/Food_prices-protests.magahaggahendrix_isa.pdf, 
accessed 12.9.11; Natsios, A.S., and Doley, K.W., 2009, ‘The Coming Food Coups’, Washington Quarterly, 
32(1), 7-25; Patel, R., and McMichael, P., 2009, ‘A Political Economy of the Food Riot’, Review, 32(1), 9-
35. Political instability linked to rising food prices is not a recent phenomenon, of course: see Walton, J. 
and Seddon, D., 1994, Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment (Studies in Urban 
and Social Change), Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA.  
14 Essex, J., 2010, ‘Sustainability, Food Security and Development Aid after the Food Crisis: Assessing Aid 
Strategies across Donor Contexts’, Sustainability, 2(11), 3354-3382; Naylor, R., 2010, ‘Expanding the 
Boundaries of Agricultural Development’, Food Security, 3(2), 233-251.  
15 http://www.springer.com/life+sciences/agriculture/journal/12571, accessed 12.9.11.  
16 Borlaug, N., 2009, ‘Foreword’, Food Security, 1(1), 1. 
17 Shiva, V. 1991, The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics: 
Ecological Degradation and Political Conflict, Zed Books, London. 
18 McMichael, P., 2010, The World Food Crisis in Historical Perspective, in Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 58-
9; also Rosset, P., 2010, Fixing our Global Food System: Food Sovereignty and Redistributive Land Reform 
in Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 191.  
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2008.19 Meta-analyses, most notably the United Nations-sponsored Millennium 
Ecosystems Assessment, have documented how such practices frequently entail major 
changes in landscapes and waterways, such as de-forestation and increasing soil 
salinity, thus compromising the integrity of eco-systems.20 This eco-system degradation 
takes multiple forms, including a loss of biodiversity brought about through the 
homogenisation of ecosystems and an anthropogenic acceleration in the rate of species 
extinction ‘by as much as 1,000 times over background rates typical over the planet’s 
history’.21 Further, industrialised monoculture agriculture has made possible the rapid 
expansion in the past fifty years of ‘concentrated animal feed-lot operations’: CAFOs, 
also known as ‘factory farms’.22 The negative social and environmental impacts of such 
operations are well-documented..23 They are compounded by the lax regulatory 
regimes under which such facilities typically operate.24  
 
It therefore appears that this system ripples with tensions and ‘crises’ at every level. 
La Via Campesina, the global farmer movement and principal protagonist of food 
sovereignty, speaks of ‘multiple, converging crises’:  
In the current global context, we are confronting the convergence of the food crisis, 
the climate crisis, the energy crisis and the financial crisis. These crises have common 
origins in the capitalist system and more recently in the unrestrained de-regulation in 
                                                          
19 Howard, A., 2010, The Battle for Sustainable Agriculture in Paraguay in Magdoff and Tokar op cit. 
2010, 176-7. The soy monoculture in Paraguay forms part of the so-called ‘Republic of Soy’ that spans tens 
of millions of acres across Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, and is associated with numerous forms of 
violence and dispossession. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6.  
20 United Nations, 2005, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, Millennium Ecosystems 
Assessment, http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf, accessed 
31.10.08... 
21 Ibid.,4. One example of biodiversity loss with serious implications for the food supply generally is the 
collapse in honey bee populations in many regions. The United States for example, had an estimated 2.4 
million beehives in 2006, ‘less than half [the number recorded] in 1950’: Kosek, J., 2011, The Natures of 
the Beast: On the New Uses of the Honeybee in Peet et al op cit., 227-251, 227. Kosek, who documents 
both the decline of the honeybee as well its instrumentalisation for military purposes by the US 
government, argues that ‘we are facing the most serious crisis of the honeybee in its / our millennia-long 
relationship’: ibib., 243.  
22 Safran Foer, J., 2009, Eating Animals, Hamish Hamilton, Camberwell, Vic.; Emel, J., and Neo, H., 2011, 
Killing for Profit: Global Livestock Industries and their Socio-ecological Implications, in Peet et al 2011 
op cit.,67-83.  
23 Ibid; also Guthman (2011 op cit.) who notes that the tremendously polluting nature of factory farms 
‘would not have been possible if the costs of feedlot husbandry had not been effectively ‘externalised’ by 
lax regulation of the meat industry’: 62. Emel and Neo state the the ‘livestock industry is responsible for 
generating between 4.6 and 7.1 billion tons of greenhouse gases each year, or between 15 and 24 percent of 
total GHG emissions measured as CO2 equivalents’, mainly as a result of ‘deforestation, enteric 
fermentation and manure’: 2011 op cit., 71. As demand for meat is forecast to continue rising, ‘these 
emissions are expected to grow rapidly’: ibid. 
24 Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 77-8. John Kinsman, President of the US Family Farm Defenders, wrote in 
early 2012 that while the US Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration authority are 
notorious for their ‘light-touch’ approach to drug residue and other food safety violations endemic in 
factory farmed livestock operations, these and ‘various state agricultural agencies are squandering millions 
in scarce taxpayer dollars to criminalize small family farmers who are at the forefront of providing healthy 
and nutritious fresh food to their communities’: Kinsman, J., 2012, ‘If You Want More Local Food, Stop 
Criminalizing Family Farmers’, 10.1.12, available at: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2012/01/10-0, 
accessed 12.1.12.  
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various spheres of economic activity, as part of the neo-liberal model, which gives 
priority to business and profit…25 
The challenge is to make sense of these multiple and apparently multiplying tensions 
in a systematic and coherent way. The way in which I propose to do this is to focus on 
what is specific and particular about this system, and what differentiates it from 
other previous and possible forms of food system.  
 
Key tensions of the globalising capitalist food system 
What then, is specific and particular about this system? First, and most importantly, it 
is a capitalist system. Capitalism, as a form of organising human societies, has certain 
core characteristics and tendencies, which manifest in a particular way when applied 
to the production, distribution and consumption of food. Since it is in the nature of 
capitalism to organise human productive activities to further the basic goals of capital 
accumulation and the generation of profit, these become the main goals of a food 
system organised on capitalist principles. Amongst other consequences, the application 
of capitalist principles to food production has, as most critical commentators 
emphasise, generated a dynamic of over-production of food, in particular of basic 
grains such as corn, soy and wheat.26  
The over-production of these basic grains has facilitated and sustained the expansion 
of the fast and processed food and beverage industries, as well as the factory farming 
system.27 These industries have in turn contributed substantially to the obesity 
pandemic that states worldwide, and in particular the United States itself, are 
seemingly powerless to stop or even significantly slow down.28 In recent years, health 
professionals and others have launched campaigns, seeking the greater regulation of 
these industries. One key demand is the prohibition of the advertising of their products 
to young children; another is a more transparent and easily understandable system of 
labelling.29 The capacity to date of agri-business corporations to have resisted 
successfully any effective regulation speaks to the extent of their political influence 
and power.30 The dynamic of over-production is inherent within the capitalist 
organisation of production. In its current form, it is also a direct consequence of the 
                                                          
25 La Via Campesina, 2008, ‘Declaration of Maputo: V International  Conference of La Via Campesina’, 
available at: http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/our-conferences-mainmenu-28/5-maputo-2008-
mainmenu-68/declarations-mainmenu-70/600-declaration-of-maputo-v-international-conference-of-la-via-
campesina, accessed 22.2.13.  
26 Guthman 2011 op cit, 52.  
27 Patel 2007 op cit. 
28 Swinburn, B.A., Sacks, G., Hall, K.D., McPherson, K., Finegood, D.T., Moodie, M.L., and Gortmaker, 
S.L., 2011, “The Global Obesity Pandemic: Shaped by Global Drivers and Local Environments”, The 
Lancet, 378(9793), 804-814. 
29 For example, the Obesity Policy Coalition (OPC) was formed in 2006 by major charities such as the 
Cancer Council (Victoria) and Diabetes Australia (Victoria), as well the Victorian Government’s 
Department of Health (VicHealth) and the World Healthy Organization Collaborating Centre for Obesity 
Prevention at Deakin University, in order to ‘identify, analyse and advocate for evidence-based policy 
initiatives to reduce overweight and obesity, particularly in children, at a local, state and national level’: 
http://www.opc.org.au/whoweare.aspx, accessed 12.9.11..  
30 The United Nations General Assembly has for the first time ‘convened a special summit on non-
communicable diseases (NCDs)…to be held in New York on 19-20 September [2011]’: Cohen, D., 2011, 
‘Will Industry Influence derail UN Summit?’ The British Medical Journal, 343 (5328), available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d5328.full, accessed 12.9.11..  
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evolution of the political-economy of food and agriculture in the United States and the 
European Union during the 20th century, notably the practice of paying hundreds of 
billions of dollars in subsidies annually to the larger commodity producers.31 The result 
is that the over-production of food is concentrated in the core capitalist states, which 
in turn has generated a complementary dynamic of the under-production of food for 
domestic consumption in many regions of the South.32  
Secondly, the system is globalising; that is, it is expanding geographically, absorbing 
more and more regions of the world within its orbit. At one level, this spatial 
expansion is a function of the system’s capitalist nature. Since capitalism’s basic drive 
is the endless need to accumulate further capital, it is of necessity an expansionary 
system.33 It will continually seek out new opportunities for capital accumulation, be 
they products or services, markets, resources, technologies or regions of production 
where labour is cheaper and more ‘flexible’.34  
At another level, however, the system has also been part of the global projection of 
the power of the United States, as a hegemonic actor in the world system of nation-
states in the post-World War II era. The United States (and its allies such as the UK, 
Australia, Canada and the European states) has, according to a critical perspective, 
consciously and consistently sought to organise global economic and political relations 
in ways that benefit primarily its own citizenry, and in particular the richer sections of 
that citizenry.35 There is, in this view, a global hierarchy of states and peoples based 
on asymmetric spatial relations; and for the last century or more the United States 
(and its allies) has sat atop that hierarchy, absorbing a disproportionate amount of the 
world’s resources and wealth, and generating a disproportionate amount of the 
world’s waste and pollution.36  
As it results in the transfer of wealth and resources from one set of countries to 
another, globalising capitalism, according to a critical perspective, necessarily 
                                                          
31 Guthman 2011 op cit. The historical evolution of the system is discussed and analysed by Philip 
McMichael and Harriet Friedman in their ‘global food regimes’ thesis, as outlined in Chapter 2.  
32 Van der Westhuizen, C., 2009, ‘Food for 12 Billion. So why did 854 million go without?’ 
http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=38372, accessed 12.9.11.  
33 In his most recent study of capitalism, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism (2010, Oxford 
University Press, New York), David Harvey elaborates some ‘geographical principles’ by which we can 
grasp the seemingly chaotic development of capitalism over time and space. The first such principle is ‘that 
all geographical limits to capital accumulation have to be overcome’, based on Marx’s insight (Grundisse) 
that capital ‘must strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange and conquer the 
whole earth for its market’: 155. In this sense, imperialism is not ‘a particular stage of capitalism, but one 
of its constant features since its earliest stages’: Duménil,G., and Lévy, D., 2004, ‘The Economics of US 
Imperialism at the Turn of the 21st century”, Review of International Political Economy, 11(4), 657-676, 
660. 
34 As Harvey puts it, ‘the conquest of space and time, along with the ceaseless quest to dominate nature, 
have long taken centre stage in the collective psyche of capitalist societies’: ibid. 
35Gabriel Kolko, 2006, The Age of War: The US Confronts the World, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 77.  
36 Quoting what he calls Adam Smith’s ‘vile maxim of the masters of mankind: All for ourselves, and 
nothing for other people’, Noam Chomsky describes this as the ‘single standard’ which has consistently 
guided US foreign policy, and increasingly domestic policy, for all of the 20th century. (2006, Failed States: 
The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 5, 263). As regards 
the generation of waste, the United States is both largest producer of municipal solid waste in the world, 
generating more than 222 million tons per year, and the third largest per capita producer of waste, at nearly 
800 kg per person per year: Moore 2011 op cit., 135-6.  
10 
 
produces inequalities between states. Further, because all societies are stratified 
internally according to social categories such as class, gender, race, ethnicity and 
religion, these inequalities are differentially experienced across time and space. In 
other words, there are not only inequalities between states; there are also inequalities 
within states. This applies equally to countries and regions in the core capitalist bloc 
(what we might call the North) and countries and regions outside it (the South).37 In 
addition, in the contemporary era of the financialisation of capitalism (what is 
commonly referred to as ‘neoliberalism’), these inequalities have become more 
pronounced, particularly in the core, Anglo-American, states.38 
In the context of the globalising capitalist food system, inequality manifests in diverse 
forms. Thus, the food-price volatility that has resulted from the wholesale 
commodification and globalised trade of food produces, on the one hand, record 
profits for agri-business corporations and multi-million dollar remuneration packages 
for their senior executives.39 On the other, it subjects growing numbers of poor people 
in the South and, increasingly, the North, to hardship, food insecurity and 
malnutrition. The rise in rates of obesity disproportionately impacts lower socio-
economic groups in the North, while the consumption of the foods that cause obesity 
generates healthy profits for the major food and beverage manufacturers.40 The rapid 
growth of the global factory farm system has, as noted, led to increasing amounts of 
land being cultivated to produce grain for animal feed.41 To make this possible, in 
several places, notably the so-called ‘Republic of Soy’ and its ‘green deserts’ in the 
                                                          
37 It should be noted that while the division between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ has historically 
corresponded to geographical demarcations, with the North consisting primarily of the what Samir Amin 
(e.g. 2011, ‘The Trajectory of Historical Capitalism and Marxisms’s Tricontinental Vocation’, Monthly 
Review, 2010; ‘Exiting the Crisis of Capitalism or Capitalism in Crisis?’ Globalizations, 7(1-2), 261-273), 
terms ‘the Triad’ of North America, Western and Central Europe, and Japan, and the South embracing the 
great bulk of Africa, Latin America and Asia, these geographical lines have become more blurred in recent 
times. A growing middle and especially rich and super-rich class in countries such as India, Brazil and 
China have meant that the ‘North’ is now assuming a demographic as well as a geographic character.  
38 As documented in numerous quantitative studies, compiled in a meta-analysis by Pickett 2009, The Spirit 
Level. Some neo-Marxist scholars have argued forcefully that neoliberalism is, at its core, a class project 
whose explicit purpose – thus far achieved, it would appear, very successfully - has been to restore the 
wealth, power and privileges of the ruling elites, following a period of relative decline in the era of welfare-
state Keynesianism that commenced shortly after World War II and ended in the late 1970s: see 
Duménil,G., and Lévy, D., 2001, ‘Costs and Benefits of Neoliberalism: A Class Analysis”, Review of 
International Political Economy, 8(4), 578-607; see also Harvey, D., 2005, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.. 
39 Cargill, the world’s largest grain processing and meat-packing corporation, provides one example of this 
dynamic. Cargill’s sales have more than doubled since 2000, while its profits rose 500% to $US2.6 billion 
in 2010. The 2010 figure is a near 50% fall in profits from the $US3.95 billion it earned in 2008, at the 
height of the last round of extreme food price volatility. To September 2011, its profits are up nearly 50% 
on the 2010 figure, once again taking advantage of the sharp rises in commodity prices: Whitford, D., and 
Burke, D., 2011, ‘Cargill: Inside the Quiet Giant that Rules the Food Business’, Fortune Magazine, 
27.10.11, available at: 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/24/news/companies/cargill_food_business.fortune/index.htm?iid=EL, 
accessed 12.1.11. 
40 Julie Guthman notes how the rapid expansion of cheap synthetic inputs have both enhanced profitability 
and the intensity of flavours of snack foods, contributing to the trend of compulsive snacking which is 
linked to the prevalence of obesity: 2011 op cit., 62. 
41 As documented in the 2009 short film made by La Via Campesina and Friends of the Earth, ‘The Killing 
Fields: The Battle to Feed Factory Farms’, available at http://www.foei.org/en/what-we-
do/agrofuels/global/2009/10/22/featured-video-killing-fields, accessed 12.9.11.  
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southern cone of South America, indigenous and peasant communities have been 
dispossessed, often violently, from their lands and homes.42 When inequalities are 
experienced in extreme forms such as rapidly escalating food prices they can, as 
discussed above, generate severe political instabilities.  
The third key tension takes the form of the encountering of certain ‘ecological’ or 
‘planetary boundaries’ to the system’s further growth and expansion.43 Accelerating 
anthropogenic climate change is one such boundary; depletion of non-renewable 
resources such as oil is another. As discussed in Chapter 2, these boundaries are said 
to be manifestations of an ‘ecological rift’ that the expansion of the capitalist system 
generally, and capitalist agriculture in particular, has been said to produce in the 
‘natural metabolic relation’ between humanity and nature.44 While these tensions are 
analytically separate, they are at the same time closely intertwined and mutually 
reinforcing. Again, the Republic of Soy provides a good example. The vast 
monocultures of the soy ‘green desert’ widen the ecological rift, in the form of de-
forestation, biodiversity loss, and soil degradation; because they involve violent 
dispossession of indigenous and peasant communities, they also intensify inequalities. 
These monocultures feed the expanding factory farming system, with all its attendant 
social and ecological impacts. And because this mode of production is ‘efficient’ and 
profitable, the incentives are for production to continue to expand. Soy, and the 
factory-farmed meat it feeds, is being over-produced, at the expense of a diverse 
range of food crops for the local rural populations.  
What unites the three key tensions is the concept of alienation, which, as Marx 
explained at length, is foundational to capitalism.45 Capitalism is premised on so-called 
‘primitive accumulation’: the separation of the peasant-producer from the land and 
her conversion to a wage labourer; and on the separation of the wage-labourer from 
the product of her labour. The ecological rift, itself constitutive of capitalist 
production, further reveals the alienation of humanity from nature. Such separations 
being ontological to capitalism, over-production is only to be expected, because the 
driving imperatives of production are not the satisfaction of human need or the 
respecting of ecological boundaries, but rather the ceaseless accumulation of capital 
and generation of profit.  
 
Just as alienation forms part of the capitalist rationality in an ontological sense, it is 
connectedness which lies at the core of the food sovereignty rationality, which is 
aimed at healing the ecological and social rifts. In its practical manifestations to date, 
                                                          
42 Noting how the volume of agricultural exports from the US to the South, and vice-versa, doubled after 
1950, Gabriel Kolko argues that these exports ‘emerged as the single most important cause of the people’s 
poverty and displacement’: 2006 op cit., 35. Peasant farmers in Latin America were dispossessed to 
facilitate the expansion of export commodity industries such as cotton and beef cattle, and the doubling of 
the volume of beef exports from Central America to the US from 1957-1980 coincided with the tremendous 
growth of the US fast food industry during these years. Rates of urbanisatation and rural poverty in Latin 
America rose 40% over the same period: ibid.  
43 Foster, J.B., Clark, B., and York, R., 2010, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, Monthly 
Review Press, New York. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See Mészáros, I., 1970, Marx’s Theory of Alienation, available at: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/meszaros/works/alien/index.htm, accessed 12.1.12.  
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I regard food sovereignty as constituted by three foundational ‘pillars’, namely: 
redistributive agrarian reform, agro-ecological methods of production, and (re-
)localised and democratised food systems. Each in its own way contributes to the 
healing of the ecological and social rifts; and integrated as a whole they express the 
ontology of connectedness.  
 
Hegemony of the globalising capitalist food system  
As explained in Chapter 2, hegemony is used here in the Gramscian sense, to mean the 
maintenance of political power through a mixture of coercion and consent, with the 
emphasis on the latter. As part of the context for my argument, most critical 
commentators agree that political, economic and cultural relations around food and 
agriculture are structured in such a way as to benefit certain countries in the 
international system, as well as certain organisations and groups of people. Those 
organisations and groups hold and exercise a certain form of political-economic power; 
and they consciously work to maintain a global food system that is favourable to the 
preservation of that power and, where possible, its expansion.46 The preservation, 
exercise and expansion of this power take different forms and combinations of forms, 
of coercion and consent.  
In the first instance, there are, consistent with the capitalist nature of the system, 
what Ellen Meiksins Wood terms ‘purely economic forms of coercion’; in other words, 
market compulsions, which are consequent upon the growing commodification of the 
necessities of life, the spread of wage labour relations, and of the private property 
form.47 Secondly, these economic forms are supported by what Wood calls ‘extra-
economic’ forms of coercion. Such forms include, for example, the use of legislative 
and judicial power to enforce intellectual property rights, and at times the use of 
police and military power to evict peasant farmers from land sought by transnational 
agri-business.48  
For the globalising capitalist food system to be hegemonic in the Gramscian sense, 
however, it cannot be purely, or even primarily, reliant on forms of coercion, whether 
economic or extra-economic. Rather, according to this perspective, it must be based in 
a certain type of consent that exists amongst and within subordinate social classes. By 
‘subordinate’, I simply mean those classes – the great majority of most societies - 
typically excluded from the exercise of political-economic power in the contemporary 
world; those classes who are the objects, rather than the subjects, of the exercise of 
such power.49  
                                                          
46 A recent example of this form of social intentionality was documented in papers published in the medical 
journal The Lancet in September 2011. These papers examined the ways in which the major food and 
beverage manufacturing corporations had assiduously exercised their lobbying power on delegates from the 
United States and European nations, with the aim of watering down any commitment from the United 
Nations on restrictions of advertising of nutrient-dense, energy-rich food products to children: Swinburn et 
al op cit. 
47 Wood, E.M., 2003, Empire of Capital, Verso, London.  
48 Ibid.  
49 As Vicki Birchfield states, “Gramsci saw society as comprised of a small but dominant centre and a large 
body of ‘emarginati’ – marginalized people at society’s periphery who are never allowed to penetrate the 
traditional power structure. That vision laid the foundation for his ‘politics of inclusion’…which had as its 
primary goal the erosion of the boundaries dividing the centre and the periphery”: Birchfield, V., 1999, 
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Further, in order to sustain the system’s hegemony on a global scale, it is not 
necessary for this consent to exist universally amongst all subordinate classes, 
wherever they might be. Indeed, in an asymmetric world the hegemony of the system 
in general, and of the globalising capitalist food system in particular, is primarily 
sustained by ‘consent’ amongst subordinate groups in the countries of the North, the 
United States in particular.  
To say this is not to discount the possibility or the existence of effective counter-
hegemonic agency in the South, or diminish its significance. As my case studies show, 
it is precisely in the South, Latin America in particular, that such agency has been, and 
is being, exercised most often and with greatest effect. Rather, the working basis of 
the approach taken in this thesis is that if the hegemony of the system – as a 
globalising system - is to be effectively challenged, then it must be challenged above 
all from within the system’s core.50 It follows from this that any movement that has 
pretensions of being a counter-hegemonic political force at the global level needs to 
pay careful attention to this feature of the system, and concentrate its resources 
accordingly. I now turn to consider the key issue of the ‘common sense’ of the system 
with a particular focus on how this plays out amongst the consuming populations in the 
North.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the ‘consent’ that underpins a hegemonic formation does 
not mean formal, conscious and explicit acceptance. Rather, it takes the form of a 
generalised ‘saturation of the consciousness’, to paraphrase Raymond Williams, so that 
the existing state of affairs is, for large numbers of people, naturalised as constituting 
in effect the limits of what is possible or desirable.51 What I am introducing here is the 
Gramscian conception of the ‘common sense of the age’, juxtaposed by David Harvey 
to a critically-developed ‘good sense’ in these terms:  
Common sense is constructed out of long-standing practices of cultural socialization often 
rooted deep in regional or national traditions. It is not the same as the ‘good sense’ that 
can be constructed out of critical engagement with the issues of the day. Common sense 
can, therefore, be profoundly misleading, obfuscating or disguising real problems under 
cultural prejudices.
 52
 
It is this ‘good sense’, which, following Harvey, must form a foundational pillar of an 
effective counter-hegemonic political project; and the elements of food sovereignty 
arguably constitute such a ‘good sense’. However, Harvey’s emphasis here on the 
‘construction’ of common sense, whilst clearly accurate to an extent, only captures 
                                                                                                                                                                             
‘Contesting the Hegemony of Market Ideology: Gramsci’s ‘Good Sense’ and Polanyi’s ‘Double-
Movement’’, Review of International Political Economy, 6(1), 27-54, 41. 
50 As social commentator and scholar-activist Naomi Klein points out, in conversation about the 
significance and potentialities of the Occupy movement that emerged in 2011, ‘[N]obody knows how to do 
what we’re trying to do. You can point to Iceland or something that happened in Argentina. But these are 
national struggles, somewhat on the economic periphery. No movement has ever successfully challenged 
hyper-mobile global capital at its source…’: Klein, N., and Marom, Y., 2012, ‘Why Now? What’s Next? 
Naomi Klein and Yotam Marom in Conversation About Occupy Wall Street’, 9.1.12, available at: 
http://www.thenation.com/article/165530/why-now-whats-next-naomi-klein-and-yotam-marom-
conversation-about-occupy-wall-street, accessed 10.1.12.  
51 Williams, R., 1973, ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, New Left Review, 87, 3-16, 8. 
52 Harvey 2005 op cit., 39.  
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part of what Gramsci intended by this term. Rather, the power of the prevailing 
common sense in grounding the consent that sustains the hegemony of ruling elites 
over significant periods of time, rests not so much in its intentional and explicit 
‘construction’ by intellectuals and institutions, even though that obviously takes place, 
as in its regular affirmation through lived experience.  
Thus, as regards food and agriculture, the prevailing common sense is, in the global 
North, affirmed and reproduced through the typical daily or weekly experience of the 
consumption of a seeming abundance of ‘cheap’ and ‘tasty’ food in supermarket aisles 
and fast-food restaurants. This lived experience reinforces the ‘common sense’ of the 
globalising capitalist food system, namely that the food system is robust; that it 
delivers plentiful and cheap food; and that our role as ‘ordinary’ people is as end-
consumers in the food chain, who typically make, and should make, purchasing 
decisions according to the criteria of price, and price alone.53  
Another powerful element of the prevailing common sense is a change in the social 
aesthetic environment. This relates both to the aesthetics of the human body, and to 
the appearance of food. As regards the former, what is perceived as a ‘normal’ body 
size and weight has changed significantly in recent decades.54 In terms of food 
appearance, the aesthetic standards of supermarkets, enforced through vertically-
integrated supply chains, have substantially shifted the perceptions as to what is 
‘normal’ amongst the buying public. Contemporary consumers, it seems, want (or have 
been conditioned into wanting) their food to look perfect and unblemished, regardless 
of more qualitative elements such as taste, as a long-time banana grower from the 
Coffs Harbour region explains:  
[T]he supermarkets want every banana looking the same. Bugger the people, whether 
they’ve got any flavour – the Queensland bananas are like eating rubber, no flavour, 
too big to eat…55 
This privileging of form over substance, and the disconnection from quality, neatly 
captures the extent to which the capitalist ontology of alienation has ‘saturated the 
consciousness’ of large segments of the population. Further, the common sense of the 
system is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to take into account the shopping 
preferences of ‘ethical’ consumers, so that ‘organic’, ‘fair trade’, ‘free range’, 
‘hormone-free’ and other similar items are conveniently available within the same 
daily supermarket shopping experience. As I discuss in Chapter 2, this also brings into 
consideration what Gramsci termed processes of trasformismo, or co-optation, where 
potentially renegade political and / or economic tendencies are successfully 
                                                          
53 Indeed the production of people as consumers is central to the successful functioning of contemporary 
capitalism: ‘as Veblen pointed out long ago, one of the primary tasks of business propaganda is the 
“fabrication of consumers”, a device that helps induce “all the classic symptoms of state-based 
totalitarianism: atomization, political apathy and irrationality, the hollowing and banalization of purportedly 
democratic processes, mounting popular frustration, and so forth”: Dawson, M., 2003, The Consumer Trap: 
Big Business Marketing in American Life, University of Illinois Press, Illinois, 154, quoted by Chomsky 
2006 op cit., 221.  
54 Bert Boffa, Interviewed on The World Today, Radio National, 14.9.11, 
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011/s3317285.htm, accessed 19.9.11. 
55 Interview with Bill O’Donnell, 15.2.11.  
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‘domesticated’ and brought back within the dominant circuits of capitalist production 
and circulation.56  
At the global level, a key part of the common sense of the system, and one which is 
claimed to underpin its legitimacy and the further expansion of technologies such as 
genetically modified organisms, is that only this system is capable of delivering ‘food 
security’ for a growing world population.57 This claim is in turn founded on the oft-
repeated statement that global food security fundamentally depends on the doubling 
or near-doubling of global food production.58 This claim is contested59; yet, as with 
other forms of common sense, it appears to be reinforced, not only through the 
associated discourse around ‘food security’, but also through lived experience, albeit 
in this case indirect and mediated, such as the portrayal of modern famines on 
televisions screens.60  
More generally, the globalising capitalist food system sits within, and forms part of, 
the contemporary globalising capitalist economy. Since the ascendancy of recognisably 
‘neoliberal’ governments in the form of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in 
the US and UK respectively at the end of the 1970s, the common sense of that 
economy has taken a particular and distinctive form. It has been founded in the 
powerful and intentional linkage between the ‘compelling and seductive ideals’ of 
‘human dignity and individual freedom’ with the ‘free market’, ‘free enterprise’ and 
‘free trade’, such that the latter are understood as the best, if not the only, means by 
which the former can be achieved on a real and lasting basis.61 
                                                          
56 For example, the ‘marketing of fair trade coffee draws on ethics and values as part of commoditizing 
marginalized producers and ends up producing a new consumer fetish – a fetish that perhaps emphasizes 
rather than hides the conditions of production, but still a fetish that capitalism can also benefit from’: Eden, 
S., 2011, The Politics of Certification: Consumer Knowledge, Power, and Global Governance in 
Ecolabeling in Peet et al op cit., 169-184, 179, citing Goodman, M.K., 2004, ‘Reading Fair Trade: Political 
Ecological Imaginary and the Moral Economy of Fair Trade Foods’, Political Geography, 23, 891-915. 
57 Such a claim is implicit in the words of Norman Borlaug, cited above.  
58 Ibid. While Borlaug claimed that food production would need to double by 2050, the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations put the necessary increase at 70% by 2050 in 2009: FAO, 
‘2050: A Third More Mouths to Feed; Food Production will have to increase by 70 percent’, 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/35571/, accessed 12.9.11.  
59 Amongst other things, the statement about the need to double the amount of food produced globally has 
been flatly contradicted by the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean 
Zeigler, who stated in 2009 that the world produces enough food now to feed 12 billion people: see . The 
global food system therefore appears to be characterised by a ‘paradox of plenty’, in which hundreds of 
millions suffer malnutrition because they lack ‘effective demand’ (i.e. income) to purchase food. As Julie 
Guthman notes, this same paradox existed in the form of widespread hunger experienced in the US during 
the 1930s even as grain stocks were high: 2011 op cit., 56-7.  
60 It is very easy, even ‘natural’, to think when confronted with iconic images of a starving child, ‘That 
child needs food; the world needs more food’. It is much more complicated to take the time to unravel the 
reasons why and how – as discussed above and throughout the thesis – the conditions for famines to 
continue in the 21st century have been created and sustained: Alcock, R., 2009, Speaking Food: A 
Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security, dissertation presented in order to fulfil the requirements of a 
Master in Science, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol Working 
Paper No.07-09, available at: www.bristol.ac.uk/spais/research/workingpapers/.../alcock0709.pdf, accessed 
12.9.11. 
61
 Harvey 2005 op cit., 5, 7. Indeed, in the formulations of the ‘founding fathers’ of neoliberalism such as 
Frederick von Hayek and Milton Friedman, the institutions and basic logic of a largely or entirely 
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Karl Polanyi argued that liberal utopianism – the idea that the only unrestrained 
capitalism could ensure ‘freedom’ - was ‘doomed’ because ultimately it ‘could [only] 
be sustained by force, violence, and authoritarianism’.62 As governments across the 
global North turn in varying degrees to the ‘extra-economic coercion’ of police force 
and judicial heavy-handedness to repress social and political protests against austerity 
budgets imposed in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis that began in 2008, it seems 
that Polanyi’s forecast will be tested over the next few years. For my purposes, the 
significance of these developments is that, to the extent that they mean that the 
common sense of contemporary globalising capitalism (and thus its hegemony) – what 
Vicki Birchfield terms, ‘the market ideology of neoliberal globalisation’ - is 
increasingly being called into question, this also creates opportunities for the common 
sense (and the hegemony) of the globalising capitalist food system to be likewise 
interrogated.  
Emergence of the Food Sovereignty movement  
The Food Sovereignty movement, in a formalised and institutional sense as a 
recognisably distinct social movement, was formally articulated as coming into 
existence at a specific point in time – 1995 – and at the instigation of a particular 
social movement actor: La Via Campesina, the global small farmer, peasant and 
indigenous peoples’ movement.63 Since then, diverse expressions of this movement – 
some oppositional, some propositional - have proliferated at the local, national and 
global levels. These expressions of food sovereignty share the recognition that the 
further spread and intensification of the globalising capitalist food system is deeply 
problematic in the 21st century, and the firm belief that the alternatives which they 
claim food sovereignty embodies are necessary, desirable and feasible.64 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
unrestrained capitalist system are entirely conflated with ‘human freedom’, as Karl Polanyi explained 
towards the end of World War II:  
Planning and control are being attacked [by liberal utopianism] as a denial of freedom. Free enterprise and private 
ownership are declared to be essentials of freedom. No society built on other foundations is said to deserve to be 
called free. The freedom that regulation creates is denounced as unfreedom; the justice, liberty and welfare it 
offers are decried as a camouflage of slavery. 
 
 Polanyi, K. 1944, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, 256-8, quoted in Harvey 2005 op cit., 
37. Friedman and von Hayek were among the founders of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, which was the 
theoretical and ideological well-spring of neoliberalism: Harvey 2005 op cit., 20. 
62 As paraphrased by Harvey 2005 op cit., 37.  
63 Nettie Wiebe, former President of the National Farmers Union of Canada, and one of the key initiators of 
La Via Campesina: interview with the author, September 2010. See also Desmarais, A.A., 2007, 
Globalization and the Power of Peasants: La Via Campesina, Fernwood Publishing, Halifax, 34. Peasant 
‘movements’ – whether formalised as such or not – and acts of rebellion and resistance, in the assertion of 
local autonomy and soverignty, have of course existed throughout the history of capitalism: see Hilton, 
R.H., 1953, ‘The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism’, Science and Society, 17(4), 340-351; 
Ylikangas, H., 1991, ‘The Historical Connections of European Peasant Revolts’, 16(1-2), Scandinavian 
Journal of History, 85-104; Clark, P., 1976, ‘Popular Protest and Disturbance in Kent: 1558-1640’, The 
Economic History Review, 29(3), 365-382. 
64 See William Schanbacher (2010, The Politics of Food: The Global Conflict Between Food Security and 
Food Sovereignty, Praeger, Santa Barbara, California) for a recent discussion of the emergence of food 
sovereignty as an alternative paradigm to food security (53-76).  
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As I discuss further in Chapters 2 and 3, the launching by Via Campesina (and 
subsequently other civil society actors) of food sovereignty as a key strategic plank of 
contemporary transnational agrarian activism draws on a millennia-long lineage of 
peasant rebellion and revolt in diverse agrarian societies and cultures around the 
world. Many of the demands of the Food Sovereignty movement are informed by what 
James Scott termed ‘the moral economy of the peasant’, whilst also including new 
demands (especially around ecological sustainability) that arguably give the movement 
a somewhat ‘Janus-like’ character.65 
Detailed statement of the thesis argument  
To recap, the context for the argument is, first, that the globalising capitalist food 
system is riven by three key tensions: over-production, intensifying inequalities, and 
the encountering of ecological boundaries. Secondly, that system is a hegemonic 
power formation in the broader globalising capitalist political economy. Thirdly, the 
Food Sovereignty movement emerged in response to the intensification of the key 
tensions of the globalising capitalist food system. My argument is that the Food 
Sovereignty movement is engaging deeply and constructively with some of the key 
tensions of the globalising capitalist food system. I propose to defend this argument 
via the detailed testing of a hypothesis, namely that the Food Sovereignty movement 
is a potential counter-hegemonic political force that is capable of effecting 
transformative change in the aforementioned system. The argument itself can be 
broken down into two principal ‘moments’, as outlined below, which culminate in the 
assessment as to whether, and to what extent, the Food Sovereignty movement can be 
regarded as a counter-hegemonic political force; and thus, in turn, whether the 
movement is engaging deeply and constructively with the key tensions of the capitalist 
food system. 
First, the Food Sovereignty movement prima facie has the characteristics of a 
counter-hegemonic movement, vis-à-vis the globalising capitalist food system. Leading 
thinkers within the Food Sovereignty movement have strongly engaged with the 
‘common sense’ of that system by identifying some of its key tensions, recognised 
their nature and significance, and developed their critiques accordingly. In political-
institutional terms, the alternatives proposed by the Food Sovereignty movement have 
substantive normative content, are capable of mobilising significant political 
constituencies, are capable of being institutionalised at different levels of governance, 
and in some cases are being institutionalised. Anticipating the Gramscian analysis, 
food sovereignty advocates are developing its principles into an emerging ‘good sense’ 
that is beginning to undermine the ‘common sense’ on which the capitalist food 
system’s hegemony rests. In socio-economic terms, the practices of the Food 
Sovereignty movement, such as community gardening, farmers’ markets, and 
community-supported agriculture, challenge the primacy and the compulsion of 
impersonal capitalist market exchanges, and ‘expand the realm of the possible’. 
 
                                                          
65 Moore, Barrington Jr., 1966, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press; Scott, J.C., 1976, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: 
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Wolf, E.R., 1969, 
Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper and Row. 
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Secondly, there are limitations and weaknesses in the critiques and alternatives 
developed by the Food Sovereignty movement, which call into question its status as a 
counter-hegemonic movement. These limitations assume multiple dimensions. In the 
first instance, there is a privileging of the voice of farmers at the expense of 
developing cross-class and cross-sectoral alliances, which will be required if the 
expressly stated goal of transformative change is to succeed. This has meant that little 
attention has been paid to the needs and priorities of workers in the food system; and 
more generally, there has been a failure to integrate the theoretical development of 
food sovereignty with the emerging fields of economic democracy and the commons. 
Secondly, there is a common tendency (which has diminished over time) to phrase 
critique largely or exclusively in terms of ‘neoliberal globalisation’, without taking into 
account the underlying dynamics of the globalising capitalist system and its broader 
historical development. Thirdly, there is potentially a misplaced allocation of 
resources and effort in securing institutional change within the United Nations human 
rights system, having regards to the well-founded doubts about human rights and legal 
mechanisms as an effective avenue for transformative political and economic change. 
Fourthly, a key policy demand of food sovereignty takes the form of greater protection 
for farmers, especially small farmers. There is a risk that, in an era of apparent 
economic contraction that potentially bears comparison with the 1930s, this call for 
protection for one sector of the economy may become conflated with a more 
generalised call for protectionism, which could substantially impede any campaigns for 
social justice. Finally, and related to this fourth point, food sovereignty has expressly 
aligned itself with movements for greater localisation of the food system; indeed, as I 
indicated above, food localisation is the third foundational ‘pillar’ of food sovereignty. 
Within the politics of the ‘local’, there are risks of parochialism, chauvinism, 
xenophobia and autarky, any one of which would clearly militate against the greater 
global solidarities, and more direct and participatory forms of democracy, that food 
sovereignty also calls for.  
Is the Food Sovereignty movement an actual, or potential, counter-hegemonic 
political force? This is the key assessment that the thesis requires. I undertake it via a 
Gramscian ‘balance of forces’ analysis that I outline in Chapter 2. The aim of this 
analysis is to discover whether, and to what extent, the Food Sovereignty movement is 
shifting the previously existing disposition of political, economic and cultural forces 
around food and agricultural systems, so that transformative change in these systems is 
taking place, or at least can be said to be reasonably likely in the foreseeable future. I 
undertake this assessment by reference to the criteria that I establish in Chapter 2.  
Counter-hegemony involves analysis, critique, reflection, strategizing and action. It is, 
quintessentially, political praxis: the dynamic and reflexive combination of theory and 
political practice.66 Further, just as the maintenance of hegemony involves explicit 
intentionality as to its fundamental purpose, so effective counter-hegemonic politics 
requires, in this argument, the quite deliberate formation of a conscious intention to 
make redundant – over time - the key constituent elements of a hegemonic power 
formation. In the context of the globalising capitalist food system, this requires 
                                                          
66 Johnston and Goodman 2006, ‘Hope and Activism in the Ivory Tower: Freirean Lessons for Critical 
Globalization Research’, Globalizations, 3(1), 9-30.  
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replacing the common sense of the system with the new good sense of food 
sovereignty, and thereby normalising and naturalising an ontology of connectedness in 
place of the prevailing ontology of alienation.  
Hence a central terrain of the political contestation that counter-hegemony entails 
must be over the prevailing ‘common sense’ that underpins the hegemonic power 
formation. Effective counter-hegemonic politics thus requires the sustained critique of 
this common sense and its replacement with a new ‘good sense’, which can form the 
basis of a coherent and compelling political vision and program that is capable of 
appealing to, and mobilising, broad numbers of people in the ‘universal interest’.  
My argument is that the Food Sovereignty movement is a potential counter-hegemonic 
political force precisely because it has done, and is doing, this dual work of critique 
and elaboration of a political vision, as well as the practical construction of political 
economic alternatives in diverse sites. In particular, food sovereignty proponents are 
in the process of articulating a new ‘good sense’ around food and farming. According 
to this good sense, humanity is capable of living in balance with the Earth’s 
ecosystems, but that to do so requires that we make two fundamental changes. First, 
we must adopt a less ecologically exploitative approach to the production of food and 
the other necessities of human life; and secondly, we must adopt less exploitative 
forms of social relations amongst people, in the form of much greater levels of 
equality. 67 These changes respond directly to the intensification of key social and 
ecological tensions within the globalising capitalist food system. They speak to the 
emerging counter-hegemonic potential of the Food Sovereignty movement, and 
therefore to the depth and effectiveness of its engagements with the tensions of the 
capitalist food system.  
A distinctive feature of the food sovereignty vision and politics is the location at its 
centre of the role of small family and peasant farmers as ecological stewards, and the 
people who both currently feed the majority of the world’s population and can do so 
well into the future. In this imaginary, the main political-economic actors of the 
globalising capitalist food system – the transnational agri-business corporations – are 
pushed to the very margins of the global food and farming, with the firm expectation 
that over time they will most likely disappear from view altogether. In the campaign 
slogans of La Via Campesina, small farmers both ‘feed the world’ and ‘cool the planet’ 
thereby simultaneously offering lasting resolutions to the ‘food crisis’ and the ‘climate 
crisis’.68  
 
                                                          
67 Thus, Raj Patel, one of the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the Food Sovereignty movement, claims that there is 
a ‘radical egalitarianism’ at its ‘core’; in the new society that food sovereignty envisages, he says, the 
‘equality-distorting effects of sexism, patriarchy, racism and class power [will] have been eradicated’: Patel, 
R., 2010, What Does Food Sovereignty Look Like? in Wittman et al 2010 op cit., 194. 
68
 Connant, J., 2012, ‘“Peasant Farming Can Cool Down the Earth”: An Interview with Chavannes Jean-
Baptiste, Executive Director of Mouvement Paysan de Papaye, Durban South Africa, December 2011’, 
Global Justice Ecology Project, 9.1.12, available at: http://climate-connections.org/2012/01/09/peasant-
farming-can-cool-down-the-earth-an-interview-with-chavannes-jean-baptiste-executive-director-of-
mouvement-paysan-de-papaye-durban-south-africa-december-2011/, accessed 13.1.12. 
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Conceptualisation of key terms 
I turn then to the conceptualisation of the key terms in this thesis. As explained in 
Chapter 2, this is actually the first step in the development of my method, a ‘neo-
Gramscian political ecology’. The process of conceptualisation necessarily involves a 
process of abstraction; inasmuch as the purpose of the inquiry is ontological – that is, 
to ascertain the nature of the objects under consideration - the researcher must 
identify the essential characteristics of the objects and their relationships to each 
other in order to 'conceptualis[e] their combined effect'.69 For the purposes of this 
thesis, since it is not part of my argument to develop a fully formed theorisation of any 
of the concrete events or objects under consideration, it is sufficient to isolate and 
describe those attributes that are essential to the making of my argument regarding 
the purported counter-hegemonic character and actions of the Food Sovereignty 
movement. 
The food system; and food systems thinking 
The idea of a ‘food system’ is a relatively recent conceptual innovation, and to an 
important extent reflects thinking that has emerged out of the local and alternative 
food movements – in other words, one part of the global Food Sovereignty movement - 
in North America in particular. It draws on systems theory, and what it seeks to do is to 
capture in as holistic and integrated a manner as possible all the components of food 
and agriculture from ‘paddock to plate’, or ‘seed to spoon’, and back again. Its 
emergence was motivated to an important extent by the recognition that conventional 
thinking around food and agriculture was both linear and fragmented, with agriculture 
and ‘primary production’ seen as separate from other ‘downstream’ sectors such as 
processing, distribution, retail and waste. This reflects the capitalist ontology of 
alienation.  
 
What differentiates food system thinking then is that it seeks, consistent with an 
ontology of connectedness, to integrate the five sectors of production, processing and 
manufacturing, distribution and retail, consumption, and waste and recycling, into a 
single system. Figure 1 below represents one approach to food systems thinking.  
 
                                                          
69 Sayer, A., 1992, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, London, Routledge, 86-7. Thus, Sayer 
speaks of ‘the understand[ing] of concrete events or objects [as] involv[ing] a double movement: concrete 
to abstract, abstract to concrete...’: 87.  
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Fig [1]: Food system sectors (California Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education 
Program)
70 
To date, the food systems approach has been largely confined to what are regarded as 
‘community food systems’; that is, smaller-scale, locally- or regionally-oriented 
activities, as contrasted with the larger industrial scale of ‘big’ agriculture and agri-
business. However, there is no reason in theory or principle why the food systems 
approach cannot be applied to describe and analyse the globalising capitalist food 
system as a whole. Despite the massive differences in scope and scale, and the 
different nature of the actors and logics involved, suggesting the existence of layers of 
‘food systems’ is an analytical move.  
 
Hence in this thesis I use ‘food system’ to describe all those activities around food and 
agriculture that together constitute an integrated whole, consisting of the five sectors 
as outlined above. What differentiates a ‘community food system’ from the 
‘globalising capitalist food system’ is that the former self-consciously sees itself as a 
single system in which each sector is regarded as mutually interdependent. There is, 
for example, a conscious recognition of the need for waste products to be recovered in 
the form of compost, so that nutrients can be recycled back to the land to sustain the 
fertility of soils. The globalising capitalist food system, by contrast, acknowledges only 
a more limited form of interdependence between a few of the sectors: above all, the 
need to close the circuits of production with consumption, so that investments can be 
recovered and the capital accumulation process can continue.71 Conversely, there is in 
                                                          
70
 SAREP, 2011, ‘Defining sustainable community food systems’, http://asi.ucdavis.edu/sarep/sfs/def, 
accessed 12.9.11. 
71 This explains, for example, why such large sums are now spent by food and beverage manufacturing 
companies in advertising and promoting their products, including to young children, as documented by US 
academic nutritionist Marion Nestle (2002, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Health and 
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this system little or no recognition of the need to close the nutrient cycle, with the 
result that the tremendous wastes generated by the system typically become toxic 
pollution rather than potential sources of renewed soil fertility.72  
 
The food systems approach represents a theoretical advance in terms of 
conceptualising food and farming in an integrated and holistic way; and as such 
explicitly forms part of the new ‘good sense’ being articulated by the Food Sovereignty 
movement in this field. In beginning to naturalise an ontology of connectedness, this 
approach shifts our ‘mental map’ of this part of the social world; and thus ‘expands 
the realm of the possible’ in terms of how we perceive the organisation of food 
production, distribution and consumption, and our own relation to such organisation.  
The globalising capitalist food system 
The capitalist and globalising features of this food system give it certain logics and 
tendencies, specifically towards capital accumulation and profit, and geographical 
expansion. The adjective ‘capitalist’ simply means that the system is organised 
according to a particular, historically specific logic, based around capitalist relations of 
production and exchange. Adopting for this purpose the historical materialist analysis 
of Michael Howard and John King, capitalism is characterised by a combination of 
certain key features that distinguish it as an economic and social system from 
historically previous (for example, feudalism and mercantilism) and 
contemporaneously alternative (for example, variants of socialism and communism) 
systems..73 Howard and King identify six core properties, as follows:  
i. The employment contract, which above else is a ‘contract for obedience’, as 
reflected in the defining feature of ‘managerial prerogative’: the employer’s 
right to command and control the employee;  
ii. Highly refined institutions of private property under which ‘[p]eople have 
control over what they own to an unprecedented degree’; 
iii. Impersonal markets, in which the primary ‘economic bond is the cash nexus’, 
and there is ‘substantia[l] free[dom] of restrictions imposed by family, kin and 
community’; 
iv. Substantial levels of market dependence, ‘so that self-provisioning by 
individual households or by small groups shrinks significantly’; 
v. The promotion of individual acquisitiveness and the associated rationalisation 
of productive enterprises towards this goal (capital accumulation and profit-
maximisation, as expressed institutionally in the company and corporate 
forms); and 
vi. An ‘infrastructural role’ for credit and banking systems, in the sense that the 
provision of money and credit is ‘necessary for all productive activity’.74 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nutrition, Berkeley: University of California Press.), amongst others. 
72 Stuart 2009 op cit.  
73 These key features, or ‘core properties’, are those which ‘underpin the unique productivity of 
capitalism...they are not purely contingent similarities, but are characteristics essential for generating the 
rapid economic growth with which capitalist systems are associated’: Howard, M., and King, J., 2008, The 
Rise of Neoliberalism in Advanced Capitalist Economies: A Materialist Analysis, Palgrave MacMillan, New 
York, 43. The ‘historical materialism’ of Howard and King is a ‘mongrel variety’, based on Marx’s 
‘canonical statement’ but modifying it in key respects: ibid., 21-41..  
74 Ibid., 43-49.  
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Properties (i)-(iv) above can be conceptually grouped around the concept of 
‘commodity’ and historical processes of ‘commodification’ (of labour, land, etc.). A 
central historical hallmark of capitalism as a hegemonic system – one that marks the 
passage from feudalism to capitalism - is that the majority of a population living 
within it must sell their labour for a wage in order to purchase what they need to 
survive.75 As discussed below, ongoing processes of commodification and de-
commodification are central to the conceptualisation of the Food Sovereignty 
movement. 
 
In addition to these core properties, capitalism is also characterised by a number of 
tendencies, or imperatives, that shape how it is operationalised in practice and 
experienced by persons living within the system. While the actual nature of how 
capitalism is experienced varies greatly across time and space, these tendencies can 
be observed, generally speaking, as historical features of the system from the second 
half of the 20th century onwards. In his recent work integrating an analysis of 
capitalism with the contemporary global food and agricultural system, Robert Albritton 
formulates these tendencies abstractly and historically as follows:  
 
i. time intensification – increasing the speed of production and labour 
productivity, emphasising quantity rather than quality; 
ii. spatial expansion and ‘homogenization of natural and built environments’, as 
seen for example in agricultural monocultures and the spread of ‘big box’ out-
of-town shopping centres; 
iii. a tendency towards under-consumption, as manifested in the contradiction 
between the imperative for the endless expansion of production, and the 
limited physical and monetary consumption capacity of workers, resolved inter 
alia on a temporary basis through the production of desires (via marketing and 
advertising, and the key technology of television) as well as, in the neoliberal 
era, the greatly expanded use of debt and credit, and the continuation of the 
cheap food complex;  
iv. the tendency towards concentration of capital in larger units, leading to 
monopolies and oligopolies – a trend clearly observable in global agribusiness 
and food retailing; and 
v. the production of individual subjectivity tending towards ‘extreme possessive 
individualism’ and atomization, undermining social and communal ties and 
bonds.76  
From these core properties and historical tendencies we can see emerging what it is 
about the nature of the globalising capitalist food system that causes it to be 
generative of the tensions described above. The combination of increasing 
                                                          
75 Esping-Andersen, G., 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 35.  
76 Albritton, R., 2009, Let Them Eat Junk: How Capitalism Creates Hunger and Obesity, Pluto Press, 
London, 23-49. Albritton also includes as factors the privileging towards the maximisation of short-term 
profits, leading to a disregard (externalisation and indifference to 'use-value') of longer-term social and 
environmental considerations, and also the commodification of labour power, both of which were 
mentioned as core properties in Howard and King's list.  
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commodification, market dependence, capital concentration and inherent drives 
towards spatial expansion and profit maximisation help explain, for example, why this 
system produces malnutrition and obesity simultaneously. The ways in which this has 
been observed to occur will be dealt with in Chapters 4 and 6, as part of the context 
for the main argument of the thesis.  
A further historical feature of capitalism, consistent with its ontology of alienation, is 
that societies organised according to capitalist principles in the North – liberal 
democracies - are almost always characterised by a formal separation between 
political and economic power.77 This formal separation has historically been important 
in terms of securing and sustaining the legitimacy of the system as a whole. The 
durability of that legitimacy also depends however on whether the economy is 
perceived to be delivering material benefits and ‘progress’ for the majority of the 
population.78  
The globalising character of the food system brings into play questions of spatial 
expansion, as noted earlier. Globalising indicates that the system involves both the 
regular and systematic movement of food products and agricultural commodities 
across international boundaries, as well as increasing scales of the international 
movement of these products and commodities over time.  
In terms of the the principal actors of the globalising capitalist food system, I have 
classified these into five main sets. In the first instance, the governments of the North 
play a central role, as discussed in Chapter 4, in setting the institutional and political 
framework within which the system can function and expand in terms of production, 
distribution and consumption. In particular, these states play a decisive role within the 
intergovernmental financial and trade institutions, notably the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation, that have in the past thirty 
years set and enforced the normative framework under which the system has 
expanded. Governments generally also play a role in absorbing and socialising the 
costs of production and consumption which the system presently externalises, such as 
the costs of the obesity pandemic.  
Secondly, there are, what we might collectively term the workers, without whose 
labour the system would not function. In this group there are the farmers who as 
primary producers provide the raw materials on which every other aspect of the 
system depends; as well as food system workers who pick, pack, process, transport, 
distribute and sell food.79 It also needs to be said at this point that farmers are also 
                                                          
77 Wood 2003 op cit. As Vicki Birchfield states, ‘it is the capitalist wage relation that necessitates the 
conceptual separation of economics and politics, respectively, into private and public spheres of activity, 
which in turn becomes the defining feature of the liberal state: 1999 op cit., 34. 
78 As discussed in Chapter 2, this raises the question of the accumulation and distribution functions of a 
given ‘regime’, and whether both are performing well together. See Rapley, J., 2004, Globalization and 
Inequality: Neoliberalism’s Downward Spiral, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Co... 
79 Farmers are traditionally regarded not as workers but as independent producers, so here I might be 
accused of stretching categories. However my concern is not to be faithful to strict definitions or legalities, 
but rather to look to the substance of the role that particular groups play within the overall functioning of 
the system as a whole. In that sense, farmers are producers, in the same way that workers in the more 
traditional sense produce, with their labour and skill, products and services at multiple other points within 
the globalising capitalist food system. 
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important consumers of several products of the system, notably seeds, farm 
machinery, fossil fuels, and agri-chemicals.  
Thirdly, there are the transnational corporations that dominate, as oligopolies, the 
key economic sectors of proprietary seeds; agri-chemicals; meat-packing and grain 
processing; food and beverage manufacturing; transport and shipping; and large-scale 
retailing. The corporations involved in the retailing spectrum of the system are also 
reliant on advertising companies to promote and sell their products.  
Fourthly, there are private financial enterprises, such as investment banks and hedge 
funds, which have in various ways financed the expansion of existing production 
sectors of the system, and in recent years opened new fields of accumulation such as 
agro-fuels. Within these actors we must also include those who engage in speculation 
on commodity markets, which is cited by many as a significant factor in the food price 
volatility since 2008.  
Lastly, there is the great majority of ordinary people in the North especially, but also 
in the South, who support the system as consumers of its products. Without sufficient 
numbers of end-consumers the circuits of production and consumption would not be 
completed, profits would collapse, capital could not be accumulated and re-invested, 
and the system would fall into a severe crisis.  
The Food Sovereignty movement  
In this section what I want to do is examine briefly what is meant by a ‘movement’, 
then look at who the principal actors are within the Food Sovereignty movement. Next 
I look at some of the key elements of Food Sovereignty itself, before turning finally to 
outline some of the actions and strategies that the Food Sovereignty movement has 
been undertaking. All of this will of course receive further detailed treatment 
throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapters 3, 5, and 7.  
In the first instance, the Food Sovereignty movement is both a ‘social movement’ and 
a ‘transnational social movement’, or perhaps more accurately, a ‘transnational 
agrarian movement’.80 According to the social movement theory literature, a ‘social 
movement’ is a ‘sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target 
authorities’.81 Likewise, a ‘transnational social movement’ is a social movement 
operating in three or more countries engaged in transnational collective action, that 
is, ‘coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against 
international actors, other states or international institutions’.82 The adjective 
                                                          
80 Borras, S.M., 2010, ‘The Politics of Transnational Agrarian Movements’, Development and Change, 
41(5), 771-803. 
81 Tilly, C., 2004, Social Movements, 1768-2004, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO., 53. Sidney Tarrow 
(2011 (3rd edition), Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge) offers a slightly different definition of social movements as ‘collective 
challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents, and authorities’ (9, emphasis in original).  
82 della Porter, D., and Tarrow, S. (eds.), 2005, Transnational Protest and Global Activism, Rowman and 
Littlefield, Oxford. 
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‘agrarian’ implies that the social movement in question is comprised largely or 
exclusive of farmer, or land-based, social actors.83  
These conceptualisations are rather limited, since they imply that the movements are 
necessarily oppositional in character, and that they are engaged only in the sphere of 
politics and institutions, thus ignoring the spheres of economics and ecology. Amongst 
other consequences, this immediately places almost all the focus of any analysis on 
protests and campaigns, foreclosing any consideration of grounded economic praxis in 
particular times and places. In any case, as will be discussed below, in Chapter 3 and 
elsewhere in the thesis, the self-conceptualisation of the Food Sovereignty movement 
has already moved beyond these limited confines. As a ‘movement’, it clearly 
embraces both the conventional understandings of a social movement as they appear 
in the literature, as well as the intentional enactment of grounded socio-economic and 
political praxis in diverse forms and places.84  
In terms of the principal actors of the Food Sovereignty movement, my analysis  
accords primacy to the originators of Food Sovereignty, the farmer-activists of La Via 
Campesina, for the reasons explained in Chapter 3. Food Sovereignty was collectively 
developed and first articulated by La Via Campesina in 1995, in explicit juxtaposition 
to the concept of ‘food security’ as it was then being deployed by core capitalist 
states in the lead-up to the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996.85 La Via Campesina is 
the global movement for small family and peasant farmers, landless rural workers, 
indigenous peoples, women and youth. Estimates vary, but it is said to include in 
excess of 200 million people affiliated to its 150 member organisations, located in 70 
countries across five continents.86  
 
The member organisations of La Via Campesina, which is Spanish for ‘the peasant way’ 
or ‘the peasant path’, are exclusively organisations of small family and peasant 
farmers. La Via Campesina is careful to privilege the voice of farmers, on the grounds 
that they have been traditionally marginalised and excluded in both national and 
global debates around food and farming. La Via Campesina has developed strategic 
relationships with a number of activist-oriented NGOs.87 These NGOs also form part of 
the Food Sovereignty movement. Some La Via Campesina member organisations are, 
                                                          
83 Borras 2010 op cit.  
84 In these respects, the Food Sovereignty movement can be classified as a ‘hope movement’ 
(Dinerstein,A.C., and Deneulin, S., 2012, ‘Hope Movements: Naming Mobilization in a Post-development 
World’, Development and Change 43(2), 585-602. Dinerstein and Deneulin draw on Marxist Ernst Bloch’s 
(Bloch, E. (1959/1986) The Principle of Hope, Volumes I, II and III. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press) 
conception of ‘the utopian function of hope’ as embodying the ‘not-yet-become’ – the imaginatory human 
capacity to anticipate and enact the future within the present – in order to ground their conceptualisation of 
‘hope movements’ as inter alia ‘a prophetic voice which points to the fact that the reality we are currently 
living is not the only one’: 584-5, 598-99.  
85 Nettie Wiebe, interview with the author, September 2010.  
86 http://viacampesina.org/en/, accessed 11.1.12. It can legitimately claim to be far and away the largest 
social movement in the world today, if not in all of history. By way of comparison, Amnesty International, 
the premier human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO; Amnesty describes itself as a 
‘movement’), has an estimated 3 million supporters: Amnesty International 50th Anniversary, Facts and 
Figures, available at: http://www.amnesty.org.au/50/pdf/amnesty_international_facts_and_figures.pdf, 
accessed 11.1.12. 
87 These include: Friends of the Earth, GRAIN, Food First, FIAN,  
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together with other peasant organisations, members of other national and 
transnational agrarian movements that also support the food sovereignty agenda.88 In 
addition, at the national level there are growing numbers of urban-based food groups, 
such as food co-operatives, community gardens, and community-supported agriculture 
initiatives, which explicitly identify with the values and vision of food sovereignty. 
Equally, there are many such groups which do not so explicitly identify with food 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, I would include them within the broader Food Sovereignty 
movement, because their efforts to construct diverse expressions of localised and de-
commodified food systems are entirely consistent with the basic content of food 
sovereignty.  
In terms of its key elements, as will be seen in Chapter 3, food sovereignty is a broad 
and expanding field in its own right.89 Thematically and philosophically, leading 
‘organic intellectuals’ of the Food Sovereignty movement, such as Hannah Wittman, 
Annette Aurélie Desmarais, Nettie Wiebe and Raj Patel, argue that food sovereignty 
entails a democratised food system; a localised and de-commodified food system; and 
a ‘radical egalitarianism’.90 Amongst other things, a commitment to such 
egalitarianism implies transformed gender relations and the eradication of all forms of 
violence against women.91 
Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe claim that:  
The theory and practice of food sovereignty has the potential to foster dramatic and 
widespread change in agricultural, political and social systems related to food by posing a 
radical challenge to the agro-industry model of food production. The transformation 
envisioned entails a changing relationship to food resulting from an integrated, 
democratized, localized food production model. It also entails a fundamental shift in 
values expressed in changing social and political relations.92 
                                                          
88 These include the Asian Peasant Coalition and the African network Network of Peasant Agriculture and 
Modernisation of Africa (APM-Mondial); the Asian Peasant Coalition (APC). Transnational networks that 
also count NGOs  as members include the European Nyéléni Forum on Food Sovereignty and the 
International Planning Committee (IPC) for Food Sovereignty.   
89 Windfuhr, M., and Jonsén, J., 2005, Food Sovereignty: Towards Democracy in Localized Food Systems, 
ITDG Publishing / FIAN, Bourton-on-Dunsmore, Rugby, Warwickshire. 
90 Wittman, H., Desmarais, A.A., and Wiebe, N., 2010, Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and 
Community, Fernwood Publishing, Black Point, Nova Scotia; Patel, R., 2010, What Does Food Sovereignty 
Look Like? in Wittman et al op cit., 186-196. 
91 Patel 2010 op cit. In its fifth international conference, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 19-22 October, 
La Via Campesina launched its global campaign for the eradication of violence against women: 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=623:declaration-of-maputo-
v-international-conference-of-la-via-campesina&catid=47:declarations&Itemid=70, accessed 11.1.12. 
Reaffirming its commitment to this campaign on International Women’s Day (8 March) in 2011, La Via 
Campesina stated that:  
Our campaign is one of the commitments of all members of Via Campesina to build our Buen Vivir (Good 
Living). It is not just another task or another demand. It is a process of change of men and women in the way we 
look at each other, in the way we treat each other; it is the right to a life with dignity and relations with equity… 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1047:greetings-from-la-via-
campesina-to-the-women-of-the-world&catid=20:women&Itemid=39, accessed 11.1.12.  
92 Wittman et al op cit., 4.  
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The implication is that a process of democratisation of food systems would, according 
to one senior academic affiliated with the Food Sovereignty movement in Canada, 
require a complete rethinking of the assumptions that were  
[A]t the very centre of [the] transition [to capitalism, namely the] divorcing [of primary] 
producers from any right over the goods they produced, and encasing those goods in ever 
larger, ever more disconnected, ever more monopolized, and ever more destructive 
markets. Food Sovereignty…demands that we treat food not simply as a good, access to 
which and the production of which is determined by the market, it demands that we 
recognize the social connections inherent in producing food, consuming food, and sharing 
food. In the process it will change everything.93  
According to such conceptualisations, food sovereignty envisages the replacement of 
the capitalist ontology and market-driven praxis of alienation, with a new ontology 
and democratised praxis of connectedness. In place of the anonymous ‘cash-nexus’ 
which constitutes the sole bond between primary producer and end-consumer in the 
capitalist food system, food sovereignty is premised on the recovery of social 
connectivity via more intimate and direct personal relationships between producers 
(farmers) and the end consumers achieved through localised food systems. In such 
direct and personal exchanges, it can also be argued that something is being altered in 
the minds of the participants as regards their understanding of food itself. A monetary 
exchange is still taking place, but the use value of food – its sensuous, cultural nature, 
and its true ecological and social cost - is being recovered, and more properly 
reflected in the price. The primary consideration is no longer simply about profit; in 
the process food becomes de-commodified; and this represents a deep and effective 
engagement with a central element of the common sense of the globalising capitalist 
food system.  
There are other expressions of the Food Sovereignty movement, notably community 
gardens, and, by extension, the ‘growing’ practice of individuals growing a portion of 
their own food, which are further reinforcing this trend of de-commodification. This 
trend towards self-reliance and even in some places self-sufficiency, represents a 
recovery of earlier traditions in many countries in the North when such practices were 
the ‘norm’. That they are now making a come-back is significant for many reasons, not 
least of which is a possible indication of an increasing lack of confidence in the 
security and even the safety of the globalising capitalist food system.  
A further key element of food sovereignty, and the Food Sovereignty movement, which 
Wittman and her colleagues emphasise, is its self-reflexivity, as regards the need for 
transformational change in terms of attitudes and behaviours towards women within 
the communities and organisations that form the movement. What they are referring 
to here is the campaign launched by La Via Campesina in 2008 for the eradication of 
all forms of violence against women in peasant and farming communities.94 This stance 
is both a matter of adherence to the basic principle of equality, as well as a 
recognition of the reality that in many parts of Africa and Asia in particular it is in fact 
women who constitute the bulk of the family and peasant farmers. The insight that 
                                                          
93 Handy, J., contribution to international workshop on food sovereignty in Saskatchewan, Canada, 2007, 
quoted in Wittman et al 2010 op cit., 4.  
94 See footnote 85 above.  
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any attempt at social transformation must be preceded by personal and group 
transformation is a sign of the movement’s maturity.95  
In terms of the actions and strategies of the Food Sovereignty movement, in the first 
place, there has been a lengthy and on-going process of movement-building and 
reflection by La Via Campesina. Amongst other things, this has involved the 
construction of a common identity capable of uniting what objectively appear to be 
quite disparate groups and individuals. The unifying concept has been the term 
campesino, or peasant, understood by reference to its French meaning as ‘person of 
the land’; together with the common lived experience of marginalisation and suffering 
due to the normal operation of the globalising capitalist food system. This process of 
movement-building has from the beginning included the work of critique of the 
globalising capitalist food system. Movement leaders most commonly refer to it as 
‘neoliberal globalisation’. This is arguably a weakness of their critique, since the 
emphasis on ‘neoliberalism’ as a conjunctural expression of globalising capitalism 
tends to occlude consideration of the deeper structures, shifts, fundamental 
imperatives and contradictions of the capitalism system as a whole, such as continued 
economic growth.  
Shortly after La Via Campesina was established, work also began on the development 
of their alternative paradigm to the globalising capitalist food system: food 
sovereignty. La Via Campesina and its constituent members have formulated other 
campaigns and engaged in various forms of direct action, protest and ‘shadow 
summits’. They have also engaged with some agencies of the United Nations, the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation in particular, and have elaborated a project to attempt 
to gain recognition of the human rights of peasants via a UN Convention to that effect.  
At the national level, Via Campesina and affiliated groups have been successful in 
working with some governments, such as Ecuador, to secure the institutionalisation of 
food sovereignty principles in national constitutions and framework laws. This process 
is in its infancy, and has been limited to a few countries in the South. Interestingly, 
some communities and municipal governments in a few parts of the United States, 
motivated by what they see as the unwarranted interference of Federal and State 
authorities in the operation of local food economies on the pretext of ‘food safety’, 
and inspired by the broader transnational movement for food sovereignty, have 
recently passed ‘Local Food and Community Self-Governance’ ordinances, asserting 
their right to democratically determine the conditions under which they produce and 
exchange food.96  
                                                          
95 “If we do not eradicate violence towards women within our movement, we will not advance in our 
struggles, and if we do not create new gender relations, we will not be able to build a new society”: Via 
Campesina, 2008, Declaration of Maputo, Fifth International Conference, quoted in Wittman et al 2010 op 
cit., 5.  
96 This trend is most noticeable in the State of Maine, often regarded as the crucible of the local food 
movement in the United States, and is documented by Food for Maine’s Futures in their newsletter, Saving 
Seeds, Issue 12, Winter 2012, available at: 
https://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1221/images/Saving%20Seeds%20Winter%202012%20Web.pdf, 
accessed 10.1.12. 
30 
 
In addition to these primarily political actions, there are as noted a host of economic 
and socio-economic practices that have been enacted, such as farmers’ markets, 
community-supported agriculture, food co-operatives and community gardening. Using 
the food systems approach and drawing on the ontology of connectedness, I theorise 
these initiatives as part of the broader movement for food sovereignty, even though in 
many cases they may have no ‘radical’ political agenda of opposition or resistance to 
the globalising capitalist food system. The reason is that an effective counter-
hegemonic movement requires a multidimensional collaborative effort, including the 
political work of critique, opposition and resistance, and the creative social, cultural 
and economic work of the development and implementation of the new models 
intended to transform and replace the hegemonic system.  
Development of the argument through the thesis chapters 
The structure I am deploying in the thesis is a double-movement, or flow, between the 
context of the globalising capitalist food system, and the response to this context of 
the Food Sovereignty movement. To facilitate the analysis and discussion, I have 
separated the context into two spheres: political-institutional, and ecological-
economic. The discussion of each sphere takes place in its own chapter, and is 
followed in the succeeding chapter by the analysis of the responses of the Food 
Sovereignty movement to the most salient aspects of the context. The aim of this 
structure is to create a dynamic sense of contestation – the ongoing negotiation of 
hegemony, and the waging of counter-hegemonic struggles – which enables me at the 
end of the thesis to draw conclusions regarding the essential Gramscian question: has 
the Food Sovereignty movement managed to shift the existing disposition of forces, 
and thus destabilised the hegemony of the globalising capitalist food system?  
Chapter 2 focuses on theory and method. The method is a neo-Gramscian political 
ecology. It is informed by neo-Marxist political ecology and political economy, and a 
Gramscian theory of politics. The central element, as mentioned above, is a Gramscian 
‘balance of forces’ analysis, which seeks to determine whether and to what extent the 
Food Sovereignty movement is a counter-hegemonic political force.  
 
In Chapter 3 I deal with case studies, the first of which is the development of food 
sovereignty by La Via Campesina, as outlined above, with particular emphases on the 
campaign for a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, and on the 
advocacy of agro-ecology. I argue that in the methodologies of agro-ecology can be 
observed key elements of a new ‘good sense’ for sustainable, resilient and equitable 
agriculture, that can progressively replace and eventually make redundant the 
currently prevailing ‘common sense’ of large-scale, resource-intensive, technology-
dependent industrialised agriculture. The second case study concerns the development 
of food sovereignty via the local food movement in northern NSW / South-East 
Queensland. This movement is broadly representative, in terms of its core philosophy 
and key strategies and actions, of similar movements throughout the Anglo-Saxon 
Global North. These movements seek to contribute to the de-commodification of the 
globalising capitalist food system by challenging the primacy of impersonal capitalist 
exchanges around food and agriculture. They also have a political component, as they 
seek to develop policy alternatives to support these embryonic economic initiatives.  
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The purpose of Chapter 4, which deals with the political-institutional context, is to 
identify the main political-institutional elements of the globalising capitalist food 
system and to explain how this balance of forces achieves and maintains the hegemony 
of the system. Some of these elements, such as the implementation of structural 
adjustment programs and the dismantling of support frameworks for domestic 
agriculture, as well as the inauguration of trade liberalisation, have been mentioned 
earlier in this Introduction. I will discuss several others in the course of Chapter 4, 
such as the promotion of market-led agrarian reform, the judicial enforcement of 
intellectual property laws, and the creation of an agro-fuels boom through government 
subsidies and targets.  
 
As noted earlier, in this thesis I am particularly concerned to examine the ways in 
which the system’s hegemony is founded on ‘consent’, dependent in part upon a 
certain ‘common sense’. This common sense is linked to a particular, state-corporatist 
understanding of ‘food security’, and in its modern incarnation food sovereignty was 
explicitly articulated in juxtaposition to that discourse. Further, Food sovereignty 
relies heavily on the language and (to a certain extent) the institutions of human 
rights. Accordingly, in Chapter 4 I will pay particular attention to the way in which the 
human right to adequate food has, in recent years, been incorporated within a 
marketised and free trade-oriented framework of food security. 
In Chapter 5 I examine the normative construction and politics of food sovereignty as a 
principal means of challenging the political-institutional basis of the hegemony of the 
globalising capitalist food system. This necessarily entails a detailed discussion of 
human rights, for the reasons mentioned above. Thus I will examine the status, 
content, institutional development within the United Nations system, and degree of 
enforcement of the right to adequate food. By reference to Guatemala as a case 
study, I will look at efforts to implement the right to adequate food.  
Next, I will discuss some of the areas of overlap and divergence between food 
sovereignty and the right to adequate food; and examine La Via Campesina’s efforts to 
secure a new UN Convention on the Rights of Peasants, and what this might mean for 
food sovereignty. I will examine the politics of food sovereignty at the international 
level, in the form of street protests and shadow summits. Then I will examine the 
degree of political acceptance and institutionalisation of food sovereignty at the 
national level, with a particular focus on Ecuador as one of the few countries to have 
taken significant steps in this direction. Finally, I will raise some questions about the 
risks in devoting time and resources to institutionalising food sovereignty in the United 
Nations framework, having regard to some of the major critiques of human rights 
formulated over the past few decades.  
The purpose of this Chapter 6, which discusses the socio-economic and ecological 
context for the thesis, is to constitute the second plank of the Gramscian ‘balance of 
forces’ analysis, with an examination of how the system’s hegemony is maintained. 
Whereas in Chapter 4 the focus centred in extra-economic forms of coercion, as 
exercised by political-institutional actors, here it shifts to purely economic forms of 
coercion as exercised by the largest economic actors, the transnational corporations. 
As before, there a principal concern is to identify the ways in which the system’s 
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hegemony is supported via common sense, and in this chapter the inquiry here 
examines the construction of individual subjectivities via the technologies of 
advertising, aimed especially at young children. The concept of ‘cheap food’, and its 
relation to an accumulation regime increasingly dependent on credit to maintain levels 
of consumption, is also examined in this context. Further, I also examine how the 
tendency towards over-production is causing the system both to generate intensifying 
inequalities, and to encounter key planetary boundaries which, arguably, constitute 
the ecological limits of its further expansion. Here I look in particular at the Republic 
of Soy in South America.  
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to examine the effectiveness of the socio-economic and 
ecological responses developed by the Food Sovereignty movement to the context 
explained in Chapter 6. By reference to case studies, the discussion centres in the first 
instance on agro-ecology as constitutive of the purported new ‘good sense’ in 
agriculture and food production, contrasted with the ‘common sense’ of intensified 
industrialised agriculture. Secondly, I discuss the building of local food economies as 
constitutive of the new ‘good sense’ across the five sectors of the food system, 
contrasted with the ‘common sense’ of increasing corporatisation and concentration of 
ownership.  
Re-statement of the argument 
My argument is that the Food Sovereignty movement is engaging deeply and 
constructively with the tensions of the globalising capitalist food system by mounting a 
counter-hegemonic struggle to transform and transcend this power formation. This 
struggle is multi-dimensional and multi-scalar, involving the intellectual work of 
critique, the political work of resistance and opposition, and the creative cultural and 
economic work of developing and enacting feasible new models. In the process a new 
‘good sense’, based on the ontology of connectedness, is being elaborated, enacted 
and naturalised, thereby expanding the realm of the possible; and posing a substantive 
challenge to the capitalist food system’s ontology of alienation and its foundational 
‘configurations of scarcity’.97 The ontology of connectedness is manifesting as the 
three pillars of food sovereignty: redistributive agrarian reform, agro-ecological 
methodologies, and localised and democratised food systems.  
 
 
  
                                                          
97 Panayotakis op cit.  
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Chapter 2  
Theory and method 
The decadent international but individualistic capitalism in the hands of which we found 
ourselves after the war is not a success. It is not intelligent. It is not beautiful. It is not just. 
It is not virtuous. And it doesn't deliver the goods. In short we dislike it, and we are beginning 
to despise it. But when we wonder what to put in its place, we are extremely perplexed. 
John Maynard Keynes1 
 
In this chapter I set out the method I intend to use to guide the development of this 
thesis, as well as its principle theoretical foundations. First, I provide a summary of 
the method, then an outline of my key methodological commitments as regards 
questions of ontology and epistemology. Next I will summarise, by reference to the 
principal literature, the main theoretical traditions on which my method is based: 
political ecology, neo-Marxist critiques of contemporary globalising capitalism, food 
regime theory, and a Gramscian theory of politics. Finally, I will explain how the 
method will be applied in the remainder of the thesis.   
Summary of the method 
The method I have developed in order to guide the development of the argument in 
this thesis is what I call a ‘neo-Gramscian political ecology’. The method entails a 
synthesis of recent neo-Marxist work in political ecology and political economy with a 
Gramscian theory of politics.  
The method provides the theoretical foundations, the conceptual tools and logical 
steps which enable me to:  
 
 Identify the principal tensions of the globalising capitalist food system, having 
regard to the principles of a neo-Marxist-based political ecological critique of 
the system,  
 Analyse the effectiveness of the responses to these tensions being articulated 
and practiced by diverse expressions of the emergent Food Sovereignty 
movement, on the basis that this movement is engaged in a counter-hegemonic 
political struggle, and 
 Draw conclusions regarding the depth and constructiveness of those responses. 
 
A neo-Gramscian political ecology is firmly grounded in the structuralist Marxist 
tradition. At the same time, it is careful not to fall into the error of economic 
determinism and reductionism, and thereby plays particular attention to the inter-
relationship between structure, agency, consciousness and practice.2 Consistent with 
the broader Marxist tradition, this method has a particular philosophical and political 
                                                          
1 1933, National Self-Sufficiency, Section III, available at: 
http://www.panarchy.org/keynes/national.1933.html, accessed 31.12.11.  
2 The ‘base-superstructure metaphor’ of orthodox Marxism is a classic example of economic determinism. 
34 
 
commitment to contribute to progressive political praxis by subordinate social classes; 
that is, classes of people who because of shared economic, social and/or political 
status typically find themselves as the objects rather than the subjects of the exercise 
of political-economic power. In the particular topic which is the concern of this thesis, 
prominent among these classes are small family and peasant farmers whose livelihood 
conditions, most critical commentators agree, have been progressively and 
substantively undermined by the operation of the globalising capitalist food system.  
 
The ‘ecological rift’ 
That the method is based in political ecology elevates as a matter of first-order 
importance an examination of the specific processes in the globalising capitalist food 
system by which an ‘ecological rift’, in what is postulated as the ‘natural metabolism 
between humanity and nature’, has been opened and progressively widened in the 
course of the past two centuries.3 This foundational concept provides the point of 
synthesis with neo-Marxist approaches to the analysis of the globalising capitalist food 
system. Thus, consistent with the Marxist method of abstraction and critique, the 
specifically ‘capitalist’ features and dynamics of the globalising food system are 
identified and discussed. Here I also draw on elements of accumulation regime theory, 
and in particular recent work on food regime theory, to examine the dynamics at 
work.4 Throughout this discussion and analysis I return to the exploration of the 
‘ecological rift’ opened by the globalising capitalist food system, which, as indicated 
in the Introduction, in reality represents not only the alienation between humanity and 
nature, but also the alienation between people themselves, in terms of intensifying 
inequalities. It is therefore both an ecological and a social rift.5 This process allows me 
                                                          
3 The concept of an ‘ecological rift’ is based on Marx’s analysis of the ‘metabolic rift’ between humanity 
and nature that he witnessed in the mid-19th century: see Moore, J.W., 2000, ‘Environmental Crises and the 
Metabolic Rift in World-Historical Perspective’, Organization and Environment, 13(2), 123-157, Foster, 
J.B., 2000, Marx’s Ecology, Monthly Review Press, New York, and Foster, J.B., Clark, B., and York, R., 
2010, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, Monthly Review Press, New York. 
4 For a recent exposition of regime theory and its application to the neoliberalism, see Rapley, J., 2004, 
Globalization and Inequality: Neoliberalism’s Downward Spiral, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Co. 
As regards the application of accumulation regime theory to the global food system, the seminal paper is 
Friedmann, H., and McMichael, P., 1989, ‘Agriculture and the State System: the Rise and Fall of National 
Agricultures, 1870 to the Present’, Sociologia Ruralis, 29, pp. 93–117; see also McMichael, P., 2004, 
‘Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime’, Symposium on New Directions in the Sociology of 
Global Development, XI World Congress on Rural Sociology, 65; Friedmann, H., 2005, ‘Feeding the 
Empire: The Pathologies of Globalized Agriculture’, Socialist Register, 2005, 124-143; Friedmann, H., 
2006, ‘From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes’, 
Research in Rural Sociology and Development, 11, 227-264, and McMichael, P., 2009a, ‘A Food Regime 
Genealogy’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 36, 139-169. In his survey of the literature in rural sociology, 
Frederick Buttel (2001, ‘Reflections on Late 20th Century Agrarian Political Economy’, Sociologia Ruralis, 
41(2), 165-181) describes the ‘regime-type work’ of Friedmann and McMichael as ‘one of the most durable 
perspectives in agrarian studies since the late 1980s, in large part because it is synthetic and nuanced’, 
combining ‘Wallerstein’s world-systems perspective’, Marxist and ‘Gramscian-type’ accounts, and the 
‘economic sociology / anthropology of Karl Polanyi’: 172. 
5 In their survey of numerous quantitative studies mapping indicators of societal well-being against levels 
of income inequality in the OECD countries, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2010, The Spirit Level: 
Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin Books, London), argue that relative levels of income 
inequality explain why material progress has in most countries not been accompanied by increasing levels 
of happiness and well-being. ‘The evidence’, they say, ‘shows that reducing inequality is the best way of 
improving the quality of the social environment, and so the real quality of life, for all of us [including] the 
better-off’: 29.  
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to identify some of the key ecological and social tensions which are generated by the 
globalising capitalist food system.  
 
Understanding these tensions as conceptually and structurally linked by Marx’s concept 
of alienation, as the argument progresses I juxtapose the capitalist ontology of 
alienation, which necessitates the maintenance and further expansion of the 
ecological and social rift, with the food sovereignty ontology of connectedness, which 
grounds multiplying forms of praxis which seek the healing of that rift. Hence the 
enactment of counter-hegemonic politics, which I discuss below, is multidimensional 
and multiscalar, and includes efforts at economic as well as political democracy. At 
the same time the terrain of hegemonic struggle is also ontological and symbolic, as 
the new ‘connected’ good sense of food sovereignty seeks to disrupt and displace the 
atomised and alienated common sense of the globalising capitalist food system, 
thereby undermining the ‘consent’ on which its hegemony rests.  
 
A Gramscian theory of politics 
Having identified the key tensions as the context for the thesis, this analysis sets the 
stage for the application of the second part of the method, which is informed by a 
Gramscian theory of politics. According to this theory, a relatively stable hegemonic 
power formation in any given society depends on its rule being maintained by a 
mixture of coercion and consent, with the role of the latter being the most important 
in terms of the goal of temporal stability. Consent amongst subordinate social classes 
to the rule of hegemonic elites is achieved in significant part through the 
internalisation of the ‘common sense of the age’, which plays a crucial role in 
naturalising the status quo. Counter-hegemonic politics necessarily unfolds in multiple 
spheres, however the work of critiquing the prevailing common sense and so 
developing a critical consciousness amongst subordinate classes is fundamental to it. It 
is, according to my interpretation of Gramscian theory, the development of this 
critical consciousness which enables subordinate classes to formulate political-
economic strategies, and undertake sets of practices, that cumulatively and 
collectively might be said to constitute counter-hegemonic politics. Further, it is the 
practice of such politics that enables such groups to begin to exercise effective agency 
and so become in their own right the subjects, rather than the objects, of history.  
 
Key methodological commitments and principles 
In this section I set out what I understand to be the purpose of critical theory and 
method, followed by my philosophical commitments as regards questions of ontology 
and epistemology. Here I also explicate what I consider to be a ‘proper’ relation 
between the spheres of economy and ecology, as achieved through the unifying term 
oikos.  
 
The approach to questions of ontology is realist and relational. That is, the existence 
of structures comprised of social relations and having causal properties is recognised, 
and acknowledged as ‘ontologically distinct’ from human action, including inter-
subjective relations.6 It is accepted that capitalism has a logic and tendencies, which, 
                                                          
6 Joseph, J., 2008, On the Limits of neo-Gramscian International Relations Theory: A Scientific Realist 
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in historically specific interactions with other structures and the ‘conscious 
interventions’ of individuals and groups, help explain transformations in national and 
global political economies.7 The rigid ‘base / superstructure’ separation is abandoned 
in favour of a relational ontology where the separation between the economic, 
political, and cultural spheres is didactic rather than ontological. That is, no one 
sphere is accorded a causal primacy over the other. 
 
Rather than regarding structures and agency as 'mutually constitutive' and thereby 
effectively collapsing one into the other, a proper relationship between structure, 
agency, practice and consciousness can and must be articulated.8 Structures are 
reproduced, not created, by historical actors. As Andrew Sayer explains, however, the 
concept of reproduction itself is not straightforward, since it happens neither 
'automatically and rarely intentionally', rather:  
[T]he execution of actions necessary for [the] reproduction [of social structures] must be 
seen as a skilled accomplishment requiring not only materials but particular kinds of 
practical knowledge. Actors are not mere dupes, automata, or bearers of roles, 
unalterably programmed to reproduce. The very fact that social structures are historically 
specific – that societies have existed and do exist without nuclear families, private 
property, prisons etc. – ought to remind us of the contingent status of social structures.9  
It is this contingent and historically specific nature of social structures – including 
hegemonic power formations - which demonstrates their susceptibility, both 
theoretically and practically, to change. However, certain social structures – such as 
the capitalist economy as a whole - tend by their nature to be particularly durable, an 
assertion that is verifiable historically and empirically.10 This indicates not the 
impossibility of substantive (that is, transformative) change of such structures, but 
rather that such change, if it is to occur, is most likely to do so ‘gradually, from 
within’.11  
Conventionally, structures and agency are seen as oppositional, in the sense that 
agency is what enables human action, whereas structures, while not determining such 
action, typically constrain it.12 There is however no reason in theory or practice why 
these two concepts should be regarded as oppositional, nor why structures should not 
also be enabling, as well as constraining, of human action .13 Similarly there may be 
‘structures of agency’, such as customary or religious systems, which at once enable 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Account of Hegemony in Ayers, J.A. (ed.), 2008, Gramsci, Political Economy and International Relations 
Theory: Modern Princes and Naked Emperors, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 69-70.  
7 Ibid., 72.  
8 Ibid., 69.  
9 Sayer op cit, 96.  
10 “The most durable social structures are those which lock their occupants into situations which they 
cannot unilaterally change and yet in which it is possible to change between existing positions”: ibid., 95. 
Thus, a group of workers may abandon their employment and join a commune, but to the extent that they 
are still dependent for their survival on the commodities produced by the capitalist economy, they continue 
to contribute, albeit to a lesser extent than previously, to its reproduction.  
11 Ibid. The qualification 'most likely' does not of course rule out the possibility of more abrupt, 
'revolutionary', change; it does suggest however that it would unrealistic, even naïve, to expect such a 
change to be in any way probable.  
12 Marsden op cit., Ch 3.  
13 Ibid., 218.  
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and constrain (for example, within a particular belief system) human action. However, 
while structure and agency are not oppositional, they are not the same thing; and in 
order not to conflate them, a mediating influence must be identified. In a realist 
ontology, this is not consciousness per se, but ‘social practice as embodying both 
conscious and unconscious social activity, customs, routines, and other forms of 
collective behaviour’.14 Whilst ‘agents act consciously within practice’, the normal 
result of this is ‘the unconscious or unintended reproduction of deeper social 
structures’.15 Hence the emphasis placed by Gramsci and other radical thinkers such as 
Paolo Freire on the necessity of educative practices to develop critical consciousness 
and awareness.16 It also flows from this that processes of hegemonic formation are 
structurally conditioned, and therefore must be seen as ‘emergent and historically 
contingent’.17  
 
As regards epistemology, contrary to idealist and purely subjective approaches 
regarding the question of how we obtain our knowledge about the world such as social 
constructivism, it is implicit in a realist approach that there is an ‘objective’ basis on 
which we can assess competing forms of knowledge. Given this approach, a distinction 
is made between facts and values; historical analysis is not to be conflated with 
normative judgments; and ‘wishful thinking’, in the form of suppositions regarding 
what one would like to happen as distinct from what is happening, is to be rigorously 
avoided.18 Normative commitments are possible, but they must be grounded in 
‘effective reality’, being a ‘relation of forces in continuous motion’.19 As Joseph Femia 
puts it, '[u]ltimately theories are to be judged by the facts of the world rather than by 
their ‘progressive' intentions’.20 Claims to truth are approached as provisional and 
historical, and this applies equally to Marxism as it does to other worldviews.21  
 
At the same time, naïve objectivism and positivism – which continue to shape much 
common sense thinking, despite their poor status in the academy - are firmly rejected 
because of their tendency towards reification and thus to the inducement of 
passivity.22 For example, if 'the economy' is conceived in the popular mind as an 
external, ‘nature-like’ force with which one merely interacts, rather than actively 
shapes and reproduces, then the scope for agency is correspondingly diminished, and 
                                                          
14 Joseph op cit., 74.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Mayo 1999, Gramsci, Freire and Adult Education: Possibilities for Transformative Action, London: Zed 
Books. 
17 Joseph op cit., 78.  
18 Femia, J., 2008, Gramsci, Epistemology and International Relations Theory in McNally, M., and 
Schwarzmantel, J., 2009, Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance, Routledge, Oxford.  
19 Gramsci 1971 op cit., 172 
20 Op cit., 39.  
21 As Gramsci puts it (using ‘philosophy of praxis’ to denote Marxism):  
If the philosophy of praxis affirms theoretically that every “truth” believed to be eternal and absolute has had practical 
origins and has represented a “provisional” value (historicity of every conception of the world and of life), it is still 
very difficult to make people grasp “practically” that such an interpretation is valid also for the philosophy of praxis 
itself, without in so doing shaking the convictions that are necessary for action: 1971 op cit., 406. 
22 Reification is the 'common tendency...to turn active, conscious social relationships and processes into 
things which exist independently of us so that we think of them in terms of “having” rather than “being”': 
Sayer op cit. 16. 
38 
 
the social forces and processes perpetuating the status quo are reinforced.23 In 
contrast, the critique of the common sense notion of ‘objective reality’ as existing 
‘out there’, separate from people, is intended to facilitate the processes whereby 
individuals and groups struggle to shed themselves of their status as ‘objects’ in 
capitalist social relations in order become creative subjects and movers of history.24 As 
such it is intended to facilitate empowerment and transformational change. 
 
Further, having regard to the all-pervasiveness of common sense ideologies, it is 
recognised that knowledge is both ‘theory-laden’ and fallible, and therefore relative.25 
As Gramsci puts it, ‘[w]e know reality only in relation to man, and since man is 
historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming’, not an eternally 
fixed and static ‘given’.26 Just as people ‘produce’ and reproduce themselves through 
their daily activities, so knowledge production is a ‘social activity’, achieved with ‘raw 
materials and tools [that are] linguistic, conceptual[,] cultural [and] material’.27 These 
tools vary from place to place according to language and other factors, and they 
change and develop through human action and interaction over time.  
 
As a social practice, the production of knowledge, and in particular the content of 
aspects of that knowledge at any given time, are influenced by the ‘conditions and 
social relations’ in which it takes place, including existing configurations of political 
and economic power.28 A ‘critical’ political ecology has a particular concern to 
scrutinise the centrality of expert knowledge in relation to questions of the 
environment and society; and to problematise how the ‘hegemonic control of 
knowledge’ marginalises other forms of knowledge and meaning-making.29 As I discuss 
below, one of the major contributions of food sovereignty as an emerging 
transnational social movement, and one of the sources of its counter-hegemonic 
potential, is its foundation in an expanding ‘peasant ontology and epistemology’.30 In 
this sense, the battle for hegemony assumes an ontological and epistemological 
dimension, with the spread of globalising capitalism dependent on the embrace of a 
modern and even ‘hyper-modern’ (in the case of new technologies) ontology; and the 
counter-hegemonic movements asserting an alternative ontology and epistemology, 
grounded mainly in critical modernism.  
 
                                                          
23 Swanson, J., 2009, ‘Gramsci as Theorist of Politics’, Rethinking Marxism, 21(3), 336-344, 338.  
24 As Gramsci puts it, 'There exists...a struggle for objectivity (to free oneself from partial and fallacious 
ideologies) and this struggle is the same as the struggle for the cultural unification of the human race': 1971 
op cit., 445.  
25 Sayer op cit., 5;  
26 Gramsci 1971 op cit., 446. 
27 Sayer op cit., 16. 
28 Ibid, 4. In other words, the production of scientific knowledge can be, and often is, politically and / or 
economically motivated. It is important to bear this consideration in mind when considering questions such 
as claims regarding the supposedly benign effects on human and environmental health of genetically 
modified organisms, when those claims are made by scientists who are financially linked to corporations 
seeking to advance the expansion of GMOs.  
29 Peet, R., Robbins, P., and Watts, M., (eds.), 2011, Global Political Ecology, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 
10, 31.  
30 McMichael, P., 2008a, ‘Peasants Make their Own History, But Not Just as They Please’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change, 8(1 & 2), 205-228, 205. 
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Rural sociologist Philip McMichael has long been a sympathetic observer of La Via 
Campesina, and has contributed to the theoretical development of food sovereignty.31 
He argues that food sovereignty’s radical ‘politicization of food’ and the assertion by 
the organised peasantry of ‘world historical’ subjectivity which it represents, has 
posed a fundamental challenge to both the ontology and epistemology that underlie 
the ‘narrative of capitalist modernity’.32 Thus, La Via Campesina has, with food 
sovereignty, reformulated the classical ‘agrarian question’ from one that was 
concerned primarily with the political and class commitments of a dwindling and 
dispossessed peasantry in the context of the inevitable historical agrarian transition 
from feudalism to capitalism, to a highly politicised re-conceptualisation of food and 
agriculture as based fundamentally on relations of social reproduction and ecological 
stewardship, rather than production for accumulation.33 In the process, it has made 
possible a profound interrogation and critique of the naturalised assumptions 
underpinning the ontology of the neoliberal restructuring of agriculture and food 
systems, in particular the ‘phenomenon of a ‘world price’, the corporate subsidy 
system as a foundation of the WTO [and] the capital / state nexus (in the multilateral 
institutions) as a global force’.34 Further, it has re-asserted, via a ‘grounded ecological 
perspective’ the foundational and ‘multifunctional’ role of agriculture in social 
reproduction as an epistemic principle, countering the epistemic violence through 
which the peasantry was ‘remove[d] from history’ in the ‘narrative of capitalist 
modernity’.35 
Food sovereignty, according to McMichael, represents a peasant ontology which  
[C]ritiques the reductionism and false promises of neoliberalism [and] posit[s] a practice 
and a future beyond the liberal development subject, and the science of profit. This 
emerging ontology is grounded in a process of revaluing agriculture, rurality and food as 
essential to general social and ecological sustainability, beginning with a recharged 
peasantry.
36 
This ontology – which I conceive as the ontology of connectedness - therefore directly 
raises the question of a ‘post-capitalist modernity’ and claims for the peasantry ‘the 
right to produce society’ as fundamental to it.37 For McMichael, part of the 
‘significance of the food sovereignty movement is that, in the narrative of capitalist 
modernity, its project is virtually unthinkable’; and in the process it opens up ‘a 
method of developing an alternative modernity, re-centred on agriculture and food’.38  
 
This roots of this ontology of connectedness, and indeed of the Food Sovereignty 
movement more generally, can be discovered in the rich history of peasant rebellion, 
as captured in the classic works of peasant history and politics of the 1960s and 1970s 
                                                          
31 Professor of Development Sociology at Cornell University, McMichael has ‘worked with La Via 
Campesina on the food crisis and agroecological alternatives’: Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe, 2009, xii.  
32 McMichael 2008a op cit., 205.  
33 Ibid., 208, 210-216.  
34 Ibid., 212.  
35 Ibid., 213.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. , 216.  
38 Ibid., 218.  
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by Barrington Moore Jr, James Scott and Eric Wolf.39 The seminal contributions of 
these writers included the identification, contrary to orthodox Marxist analysis which 
valorized the working class as the leading agent of social change above all others, of 
the critical role played by the peasantry as ‘the decisive social base of most, if not all, 
successful twentieth-century revolutions’ as well as the socio-economic and politico-
cultural conditions in which such rebellion was likely.40 As regards the latter, Scott’ s 
articulation of the ‘moral economy of the peasantry’ provided a rich theoretical 
framework with which to examine the customs and mores of agrarian societies, 
including distinctive peasant notions of justice and rights, the persistent violation of 
which increases the probability of peasant revolt:  
 
A great deal of peasant violence in the Third World and historically in the West may be 
seen as a collective effort to preserve pre-capitalist communal rights against the 
incursion of a bureaucratic state and capitalism.41 
 
While undoubtedly building on this rebellious and revolutionary tradition, the extent 
to which the contemporary Food Sovereignty movement might be portrayed as 
anachronistic and backwards-looking in the face of the inevitability of capitalist 
modernity and technological ‘progress’ is an important theme that runs through this 
thesis. Certainly for McMichael and other ‘organic intellectuals’ of the movement, 
food sovereignty is future-oriented:  
 
Instead of defending a world lost, transnational movements such as Via Campesina 
advocate a world to gain – a world beyond the catastrophe of the corporate market 
regime, in which agrarianism is revalued as central to social and ecological 
sustainability. More than a self-protective manoeuvre, the peasant movement 
proclaiming food sovereignty calls into question the neoliberal ‘food security’ project, 
and its trope of feeding the world with food surpluses generated in the North.42 
This alternative modernity of food sovereignty would appear to resemble an agrarian-
focused version of ‘critical modernism’ as a new development project, under which 
‘development means using production to meet the needs of the poorest people’, under 
conditions of ‘reproductive democracy’.43 The ‘Six Pillars of Food Sovereignty’ 
contained in the Declaration of Nyéléni that followed an inaugural global forum for 
                                                          
39 Moore, Barrington Jr., 1966, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press; Scott, J.C., 1976, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: 
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; and Wolf, E.R., 
1969, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper and Row. See also Migdal, J.S., 1974, 
Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Paige, J.M., 1975, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and 
Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World. New York: Free Press; and Jenkins, J.C., 1982, ‘Why Do 
Peasants Rebel? Structural and Historical Theories of Modern Peasant Rebellions’, American Journal of 
Sociology 88(3), 487- 514.  
40 Scott, J.C.,  1977, ‘Hegemony and the Peasantry’, Politics and Society 7(3), 267-296, 269-271. 
41 Ibid., 279-280.  
42 McMichael, P., 2008a, ‘Peasants Make their Own History, But Not Just as They Please’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change, 8(1 & 2), 205-228, 210.  
43 Peet, R., and Hartwick, E., 1999, Theories of Development, Guildford Press, New York. Peet and 
Hartwick juxtapose their Marxist-informed critical modernism against capitalist modernity, arguing for 
‘socialist development [which] means transforming the conditions of reproduction under the control of 
directly democratic and egalitarian social relations so that the needs of the poorest people are met’: 208.  
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food sovereignty held in 2007 would appear to confirm food sovereignty as a project of 
critical modernity, with their focus on the social reproductive and ecological 
stewardship role played by small-scale producers.44 Significantly, this Declaration also 
expressly envisaged the implementation of food sovereignty through the 
democratisation and localisation of food systems, which brings under the umbrella of 
food sovereignty the growing local food movement in the global North. 
 
The method I will use in this thesis is based on Marxist abstraction; that is, beginning 
with a chaotic totality, one abstracts its constituent elements (structures, agents, 
practices, and the relationship between them) in order to arrive at a coherent 
explanation of a concrete and historically specific phenomenon. This process is based 
on a dynamic treatment of contemporary capitalist social relations, premised on a set 
of core characteristics of capitalism (wage and property relations, impersonal markets 
and a high level of market dependence, and so on). From the general, highest level of 
abstraction, one moves progressively to the more specific.  
 
In terms of the subject matter of this thesis, the elaboration of a coherent relationship 
between social structures, agency, consciousness and practice is based on a systematic 
abstraction of:  
 
 The key social structures that constitute the globalizing capitalist food system, 
including the social relations of production within that system and the nature 
of political relations that characterize the contemporary global governance 
framework around food and agriculture, 
 The leading (in the sense of being the most powerful in political and economic 
terms) actors within the globalizing capitalist food system, and the principal 
institutions that constitute the contemporary global governance framework 
around food and agriculture,  
 The practices that constitute the globalizing capitalist food system, and how 
these shape and form a pervasive commonsense as regards the need for the 
further consolidation and expansion of that system,  
 The nature of the actors that collectively constitute the global movement for 
food sovereignty,  
 The practices of the Food Sovereignty movement actors, and how these 
practices work to develop a critical awareness and consciousness among their 
supporters regarding the emergence of a new ‘good sense’ around food and 
agriculture 
 
Through these steps we thus move from the very general - the totality of human 
relations to the environment - to the more specific.  
 
Central to the method, and at the highest level of abstraction, is the elaboration of 
what I term a ‘proper’ - in the sense of being systematic and coherent - relation 
                                                          
44 Nyéléni 2007- Forum for Food Sovereignty, available at 
http://www.foodsovereignty.org/public/new_attached/49_Declaration_of_Nyeleni.pdf, accessed 30.8.10. 
The full Declaration is reproduced as Appendix [A] to this thesis. 
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between ‘ecology’ and ‘economy’. Etymologically , these two terms have the same 
root in Greek, i.e. oikos, literally meaning ‘house’, ‘household’, or ‘family’.45 Drawing 
literally on this Greek root, ‘ecology’ as oikos logos is concerned with the study of the 
‘law or the working of nature’s household’, while ‘economy’ as oikos nomos refers to 
household management, with perhaps the qualifying adjective ‘careful’ being implicit 
in that conception.46  
 
In its modern usage, ‘ecology’ has stayed reasonably close to the Greek conception, 
albeit with the ‘household’ extended to embrace local, regional and global 
ecosystems. Thus, ecology is the scientific study of the relations of organisms to one 
another and their environment, as one branch of biology.47 The term ‘economy’, by 
contrast, has diverged substantially from its Greek origins, and is now most commonly 
understood as the total wealth of a given society or nation, typically measured in 
terms of the gross throughput of goods and services as denoted by Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).48 
 
In a capitalist economy, a central policy goal is to ensure that this GDP figure 
increases by a minimum percentage each year, i.e. that the economy continually, and 
exponentially, ‘grows’.49 As will be discussed in the course of the thesis, it is this 
imperative towards growth and expansion that is generative of some of the most 
significant tensions in the globalising capitalist food system, and thus of some of the 
most fruitful opportunities for the articulation and practice of alternatives to it by the 
Food Sovereignty movement.50  
                                                          
45 Oxford Modern English Dictionary, 333. 
46 O’Hara, S.U., 2009, Feminist Ecological Economics in Theory and Practice in Salleh, A. (ed.), 2009, 
Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice: Women Write Political Ecology, Pluto Press, London, 180-196, 180.  
47 The meaning of ecology can be altered somewhat by the placing of qualifiers such as ‘human’: OMED… 
48 O’Hara op cit., 181-3. Adopting a critical standpoint such as ‘ecofeminist political economy’, GDP is a 
value-laden metric that delimits ‘the economy as a boundaried system that excludes or marginalises many 
aspects of human existence and of nonhuman nature’: Salleh op cit. ‘What ecofeminist political economy 
explores is the gendering of economic systems. It sees a material link between the externalisation and 
exploitation of women and the externalisation and exploitation of nature’: Mellor, M., 2009, Ecofeminist 
political economy and the politics of money in Salleh op cit., 251-267, 251. 
49 Continual growth of an economy is by definition exponential, since an economy that grows every year 
will, within a certain number of years and depending on the rate of growth, double; and then that doubled 
economy will at a further point in time double, and so forth, ad infinitum. Thus, US GDP per capita, which 
was $8,832 (in 2005 dollars) in 1940, had more than doubled to $20,823 by 1970; that figure had more than 
doubled again to $42,000 by 2009: Perry, M.J., 2009, ‘Recent Contraction has Barely Affected Decades of 
Sustained Economic Growth’, http://seekingalpha.com/article/160310-recent-contraction-has-barely-
affected-decades-of-sustained-economic-growth, accessed 22.8.11.  
50 The GDP measure has been subjected to various political economic, ecological, sociological and feminist 
critiques. In 2006, for example, the British-based New Economics Foundation published a study entitled 
Growth Isn’t Working (http://www.neweconomics.org/publications/growth-isn%E2%80%99t-working, 
accessed 30.8.11), which argued that economic growth achieved in the neoliberal era was failing to benefit 
the world’s poor. Four years later the same Foundation published Growth Isn’t Possible 
(http://www.neweconomics.org/publications/growth-isnt-possible, accessed 30.8.11), which drew on the 
work of ecological economists such as Herman Daly to argue that infinite economic growth was simply 
incompatible with the Earth’s biophysical capacity. See also Heinberg, R., 2011, The End of Growth: 
Adapting to Our New Economic Reality, New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, Canada. More than 
twenty years earlier New Zealand feminist scholar Marilyn Waring published If Women Counted: A New 
Feminist Economics (1988, Harper & Row, subsequently re-published as Counting for Nothing: What Men 
Value, and What Women are Worth), which drew together numerous feminist critiques of the glaring 
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My neo-Gramscian political ecology begins then by proposing a conceptual (re-) linkage 
of ‘economy’ to its Greek roots, facilitated via the unifying function served by the 
term oikos. Thus ‘economy’, in this critical conception, is not the conventional 
measure of societal progress by reference to GDP increases. Rather, it describes the 
sum total of human activities connected with the healthy functioning, of the total 
human household, that is, the planet Earth; which is necessary for humanity to ‘live 
well’.51  
 
The phrase ‘live well’ is deliberately chosen. It is the English translation of the Spanish 
phrase buen vivir, the term deployed in the Declaration issued following the World 
People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of the Mother Earth held in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, in April 2010, and since embraced by Via Campesina activists.52 
In the Cochabamba Declaration, buen vivir is juxtaposed to the ‘logic of 
[commodification], competition, progress and limitless growth’, as well as to the 
hierarchies of domination, that globalising capitalism is said to embody. In place of 
this logic and these hierarchies, buen vivir is said to be founded on relationships of 
harmony, balance, solidarity and equality. It calls for the elaboration of new socio-
economic and political systems aimed at overcoming simultaneously the alienation 
between humanity and nature, as evidenced by numerous measures of environmental 
degradation, and between people themselves, as manifested in growing levels of 
inequality.53 As with food sovereignty, it is a contemporary expression of the emerging 
ontology of connectedness. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
omissions and perversities of conventional GDP measurements. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, op cit.), on 
the basis of their survey of the quantitative literature, advance the thesis that, beyond a certain point, further 
economic growth actually diminishes, rather than enhances, the quality of life, stating that: 
[W]e have got close to the end of what economic growth can do for us…Economic growth, for so long the 
great engine of progress, has, in the rich countries, largely finished its work. Not only have measures of 
wellbeing and happiness ceased to rise with economic growth but, as affluent societies have grown richer, 
there have been long-term rises in rates of anxiety, depression and numerous other social problems: 5-6.  
See also Hamilton, C., and Denniss, R., 2005, Affluenza: When Too Much is Never Enough, Allen & 
Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW; and Hamilton, C., 2003, The Growth Festish, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 
NSW.  
51 This reconceptualisation of the economy draws substantially on the work of feminist ecological 
economists over the past decade or so; as Sabine O’Hara states: ‘Feminist ecological economists move 
ecological and social indicators that better reflect sustaining functions and processes to the fore…This 
means that complexity rather than reducibility, variability rather than specialisation, diversity rather than 
homogeneity, provisioning rather than non-satiation, and the ability to co-operate rather than compete, all 
become indispensable dimensions of a resilient and sustainable economy’: op cit., 190.  
52 Known as the Cochabamba Declaration. The full English text of the Declaration is reproduced in 
Appendix B to the thesis. See also La Via Campesina, 2011a, ‘Final Declaration of the 2nd Continental 
Encounter of Agroecology Trainers in La Via Campesina’, Chimaltenango, Guatemala, 8 August 2011, 
available at: http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1105:2nd-latin-
american-encounter-on-agroecology&catid=23:agrarian-reform&Itemid=36, accessed 15.9.11. 
53 Cochabamba Declaration, op cit. Wilkinson and Pickett make the point that recent efforts to measure 
societal well-being other than by reference to GDP, such as Friends of the Earth’s Index of Sustainable 
Economic Welfare (http://www.foe.co.uk/community/tools/isew/, accessed 30.8.11; the ISEW was first 
developed by Herman Daly and John Cobb Jr in their 1989 book, For the Common Good, Beacon Press, 
Boston), the Gross National Happiness Index of the Kingdom of Bhutan 
(http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/, accessed 30.8.11) or the Genuine Progress Indicator (see Lawn, 
P.A., 2003, ‘A Theoretical Foundation to Support the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, Genuine 
Progress Indicator and other related Indexes’, Ecological Economics, 44, 105-118), all pointed to the same 
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According to this critical conception and ontology, the ‘economy’ has a functional 
purpose only, that is, to provide mechanisms for human societies to organise and 
coordinate their activities so as to satisfy their material needs, and to do so in ways 
that do not jeopardise the well-being of other living creatures, eco-systems and 
natural environments, or of future human generations to secure their own well-
being.54 Securing the ‘growth’ of the economy at all costs cannot be an unquestioned 
end in itself; and, further, the operation of the economy cannot be structured in such 
a way as to render it largely impervious to detrimental human and environmental 
impacts consequent upon ‘economic’ decisions.55  
 
This relational understanding of ecology and economy contrasts with the conventional 
and hierarchical approach in which the economy is regarded both as an autonomous 
sphere of human activity that operates more or less independently of apparent 
ecological constraints, and as the over-riding priority of human societies.56 The 
conventional approach, founded on the ontology of alienation, is also mechanistic and 
reductionist.57  
Key theoretical foundations of the method 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will set out in more depth the principal neo-Marxist 
perspectives that inform and guide the development of this method: political ecology 
and food regime theory. Then I recapitulate how these theories are synthesised into a 
neo-Gramscian political ecology. Finally I will set out how I intend to apply the method 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Political ecology 
Conventional accounts of Marxist theory have not traditionally been noted for their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pattern: increases in material living standards (as measured by GDP) in poorer countries ‘results in 
substantial improvements both in objective measures of wellbeing like life expectancy and in subjective 
ones like happiness. But [as] you get more and more of anything, each addition to what you already have – 
whether loaves of bread or cars – contributes less and less to your wellbeing’: 2009 op cit., 7-8, 10. 
54 This conception closely follows that laid down in the 1987 Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, Our Common Future, commonly referred to as the Bruntland Report (UN 
A/42/427). 
55 In classical and neo-classical economics, adverse environmental and human impacts are typically not 
factored into the ‘costs of doing business’ and thus are left out of the prices of products and services. In 
other words, they are ‘externalised’, or alternatively, ‘socialised’.  
56 Here I am referring directly both to the systemic practice of cost externalisation, and to the growth 
imperative, mentioned above. As noted earlier, in mainstream discourse, the economy is reified as 
something ‘out there’, with recessions likened to natural events such as earthquakes: Sayer 1992 op cit., 42. 
http://www.agmates.com/herald/gfc-tsunami-headed-for-australia-are-you-prepared-video/, accessed 
30.8.11.. 
57 Thus, according to the logic of commodification, people and the environment are regarded as ‘inputs’ 
(i.e. in the form of labour and natural resources) into the ‘economic machine’, in order that it can then 
generate wealth and (so it is assumed) contribute to societal well-being. The metaphor of the ‘machine’ to 
describe and explain the operation of individual enterprises, and of the economy as a whole, has its origins 
in the ‘broader mechanistic paradigm that was formulated by Descartes and Newton in the seventeenth 
century and has dominated our culture for several hundred years, during which it has shaped our modern 
Western society and has significantly influenced the rest of the world’: Capra, F., 2003, The Hidden 
Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living, Flamingo, London, 89-90. Capra notes the developing 
contrast in systems and organizational theory between this machine metaphor – especially popular in the 
early twentieth century as Taylorism and Fordism, but still culturally predominant - and the metaphor of the 
organization (and, by extension, the economy), as a living organism: ibid. 
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ecological content. In our era, diverse environmental challenges of varying complexity 
and gravity are forcing themselves increasingly into public and political 
consciousness.58 The idea that there might be objective, physical constraints, both on 
the capacity of human economies to grow infinitely and exponentially, and on the 
capacity of human societies to achieve this goal through technological innovation and 
adaptation, has for many years been debated on the fringes of mainstream discourse.59 
For the first time since the 1970s, it is also, in the early years of the second decade of 
the 21st century, beginning to be raised within official circles.60 A theoretical tradition 
with the explanatory pretensions and emancipatory goals of Marxism must take these 
developments, and their implications, seriously.61  
 
The transdisciplinary field of political ecology emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a 
result of the perceived inadequacies of the then-prevailing conceptual and 
methodological resources to explain intensifying levels of environmental degradation.62 
Hence political ecology sought to integrate political economic understandings of power 
configurations with the emerging science of ecology.63 A critical political ecology is 
grounded firmly in the Marxist theory of alienation; and takes as its starting point an 
examination of the dynamics and historical transformations of capitalism proceeding 
from Marxist political economy. 
 
This thesis follows the conceptualisation of a critical, global political ecology offered 
by Richard Peet, Paul Robbins and Michael Watts.64 The adjective ‘global’ draws 
attention to, first, the ‘planetary character of the ecological crisis’; secondly, the 
emergence of a ‘liberal international green regime’ of global environmental 
governance, and a ‘profusion of forms of situated knowledges’ that constitute 
‘counter-discourses’; thirdly, the location of global ecological crises such as climate 
change in ‘the material world of basic provisioning systems, and in the energetic 
foundations of modernity itself’, what the authors call ‘the political economy of 
carbon-capitalism’; and finally, the ‘knowledge-power formations’ that constitute the 
foundations a global form of ‘environmental rule [or] environmentality’.65  
 
                                                          
58 E.g. Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, etc etc. 
59 Daly, H.E., 1996, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development, Beacon Press, Boston; 
Heinberg, R., 2011, The End of Growth: Adapting to Our New Economic Reality, New Society Publishers, 
Gabriola Island, Canada. These and other authors are of course building on the foundations laid in 
Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., and Behrens III, W.W., 1972, The Limits to Growth: A Report 
for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Humanity, Universe Books, New York. 
60 Jackson, T., Prosperity with Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet, Earthscan, London. 
61 The process of fully integrating ecological and feminist critiques of capitalism into Marxist and Marxian 
theory has been substantially advanced in the past decade and a half, with the publication in 1995 of István 
Mészáros’ Beyond Capital representing a significant step forwards: see John Bellamy Foster’s Foreword to 
Mészáros’ 2008 work, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time: Socialism in the 21st Century, 
Monthly Review Press, New York, 12-13.  
62 Peet et al 2011 op cit., 24. At the time, existing explanations for environmental problems centred on 
‘population growth, inappropriate technology, or poor management’: ibid.  
63 Blaikie, P., and Brookfield, H., 1987, Land Degradation and Society, Methuen, London and New York, 
17 cited in Peet et al op cit., 24.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid., 10-11.  
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These four dimensions of global political ecology ground the manner in which I develop 
the context for this thesis in Chapters 4 and 6. Similarly the conclusions of Peet and 
his colleagues regarding the incompatibility between capitalism and lasting 
sustainability, and hence the need for urgent transformative change, inform both my 
development of the context and the analysis of the responses of the Food Sovereignty 
movement in Chapters 5 and 7.  
 
Feminist perspectives complement this global and critical approach by enriching the 
conceptual vocabulary and analytical tools of political ecology.66 Adopting what she 
terms an ‘embodied materialist’ epistemology, Ariel Salleh proposes a model of a 
gendered political ecology which ‘integrates three kinds of subsumption’, namely the 
‘social debt owed by capitalist employers for surplus value extracted from [wage and 
slave] labourers’; the ‘ecological debt owed by the global North to the South for direct 
extraction of the natural means of production or livelihood of non-industrial peoples’; 
and the ‘embodied debt owed North and South to unpaid reproductive workers who 
provide use values and regenerate the conditions of production, including the future 
labour force of capitalism’.67 In response to the epistemic and daily violence of the 
‘capitalist patriarchal system’, Salleh looks to diverse practices of ‘eco-sufficiency’, 
which ‘imply local autonomy and resource sovereignty’, as ‘prefigurative’ of 
‘economic [and social] relations beyond alienation’.68 Food sovereignty, with its call 
for the prioritisation of locally and democratically controlled production for local 
consumption, is a leading example of such ‘eco-sufficiency’; and at the same time its 
ontology of connectedness grounds both an ‘intervention and [a] framework’ that 
points in the direction of the transformational change which Peet and his colleagues 
state is so urgently required.  
 
For the reasons outlined throughout the thesis, the operation of contemporary forms 
of industrialised agriculture and food production has had, and continues to have, an 
especially direct and profound impact on the environment and ecosystems. For the 
purposes of the thesis, my neo-Gramscian political ecology begins with Marx’s own 
thesis that a ‘rational agriculture is inconsistent with the capitalist system’.69 Neo-
Gramscian political ecology can be broken down into the assertions set out below.70 I 
preface what follows with the statement that while it is not part of my thesis to 
defend the alleged incompatibility of capitalism with a ‘rational agriculture’, the 
reasoning nonetheless grounds the development of the argument I pursue in this 
thesis.  
 
                                                          
66 Salleh, A. (ed.), 2009, Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice: Women Write Political Ecology, Pluto Press, 
London.  
67 Ibid., 4-5.  
68 Ibid., 8, 13, 17-19, 291-308.  
69 Marx, K., 1867, Capital Vol. 1 (Tucker, R. (ed.), 1978, Marx-Engels Reader, W.W. Norton & Co, New 
York, 416-7).  
70 This section is based on the work of Foster, Clark and York op cit., and Foster, J.B., 2000, Marx’s 
Ecology, Monthly Review Press, New York. For the relatively limited purposes of the thesis, I have 
restricted myself to the specific elements of the neo-Marxist ecology which concerns the elaboration of the 
distinction between ‘capitalist agriculture’ and ‘rational agriculture’. It should be noted, however, that 
Foster, Clark & York’s work on Marxist ecology is much broader and ambitious in scope: Foster 2000 op 
cit., 21-65, 205; Foster et al 2010 op cit., 215-247.  
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1. There is a social metabolic relation between humanity and nature71 
John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark and Richard York narrate how German chemist and 
soil scientist, Justus von Liebig, was amongst the first to explain ‘how the soil required 
specific nutrients – nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium – to maintain its ability to 
produce crops’, and that the recycling of crop wastes and animal and human manures 
back to the soil in pre-capitalist societies had enabled the soil to remain fertile. Just 
as there is a complex and continual series of exchanges of nutrients and wastes at the 
cellular level within an individual organism in order to maintain that organism’s 
healthy functioning, so, according to von Liebeg (and later Marx, who followed his 
reasoning), there is a form of social metabolism between humanity and nature. 
According to this social metabolic relation, the fertility of the soil sustains both 
individual people and human society as a whole, while depending on careful human 
management of agriculture and food production to ensure that fertility levels are 
maintained over time.72 From this conceptualization, it is a relatively short step to a 
perspective in which farmers are regarded as occupying a relationship of care and 
stewardship towards the land they work and own.73 
 
2. Capitalist agriculture is expressive of a widening metabolic or ecological rift 
Capitalist agriculture, so it is claimed, is premised on the one-way transfer of 
nutrients from the country to cities, with the consequent fouling of air and 
waterways.74 It is therefore said to provoke a ‘metabolic’, or ‘ecological’, rift between 
humanity and nature.75  
                                                          
71 Metabolism, which derives from the Greek metabole, literally meaning ‘change’, is a biological term that 
describes ‘all the chemical processes that occur within a living organism, resulting in energy production and 
growth’: Oxford Modern English Dictionary, 669. Thus Fritjof Capra describes how, at the cellular level, 
there is a ‘complex network of metabolic processes [that are] ceaselessly at work, transporting nutrients in 
and waste out of the cell, and continually using food molecules to build proteins and other cell 
components’: Capra, F., 2003, The Hidden Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living, Flamingo, 
London, 4.  
72 Foster et al op cit., 76-77. István Mészáros has further extended the metaphor of social metabolism into 
the foundational concept of a ‘social metabolic order’, which he deploys as the basis for a thorough-going 
critique of the socially and environmentally destructive (and self-destructive) impacts of the capitalist 
system (Beyond Capital, The Challenges and Burdens of Historical Time, op cit.). For Mészáros, the social 
metabolic order consists of a series of six ‘first-order mediations’ between humanity and nature, which are 
reproduced in Appendix C (The Challenges and Burdens of Historical Time op cit., 44).  
73 This relationship of stewardship is captured in the earlier traditions of (animal) husbandry, discussed by 
American agrarian writer and thinker Wendell Berry, amongst others (see for example Berry, W., 1990, 
What Are People For? Essays by Wendell Berry, North Point Press, New York, and Berry, W., 2005, The 
Way of Ignorance and Other Essays by Wendell Berry, Shoemaker & Hoard, Berkeley, CA). It was also 
explicitly mentioned in the final report of the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science 
and Technology for Development (IAASTD, Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report, Johannesburg, 
April 2008), i.e. that in working towards a shift to sustainable agricultural systems, ‘farming communities, 
farm households and famers [should be recognised] as producers and managers of ecosystems [and that] 
local and traditional knowledge [should be valorized] accordingly as ‘dynamic’ and ‘positive’.  
74 The contemporary reality of factory farmed pigs provides graphic confirmation of the arguments of Marx 
and Engels: ‘A typical CAFO of 100,000 animals can generate more waste than a city of 1 million 
people…Manure thus becomes a form of waste rather than a potential resource, and waste from pig 
facilities is particularly onerous. It may contain not only the usual excess nutrients but [also] pathogens, 
trace elements, antibiotics and hormones. A study of wetlands nearby waste lagoons in Nebraska found 
abundant cyanobacteria and incryocystin toxins. Tetracycline, macrolide, and diterpene antibiotics were 
detected in lagoon and canal sediment and water samples, as were concentrations of 17-B estradiol and 
testosterone…’: Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 74.  
75 Foster et al 2010 op cit., 76-7.  
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The transgression and near-transgression of several key planetary boundaries (see 
below) has been directly attributed to the land use changes and ecosystem impacts 
consequent on the expansion of large-scale industrialised agriculture in the second 
half of the 20th century.76 Here it should be mentioned that capitalism is by no means 
uniquely responsible for provoking a ‘metabolic rift’: many other societies and 
civilisations, from antiquity onwards, have in various ways and to varying degrees 
over-exploited the resource bases which sustained them for centuries.77 What 
distinguishes the ecologically destructive tendencies of actually existing globalising 
capitalism from historically previous systems and civilisations are, first, the 
accelerating pace of destruction due to capitalism’s productive capacities; and 
secondly, the planetary (i.e. global) scale of the destruction as capitalism has 
expanded its reach to encompass most of the Earth.78  
 
3.  The metabolic rift, as ‘cheap food’, is constitutive of capitalist development 
Agricultural revolutions, Jason Moore, argues, have played a crucial role in the 
historical development of capitalism, by creating the conditions for, and stimulating, 
successive major new phases of capital accumulation.79 They have played this role by 
bringing about, through a combination of outright ‘plunder’ and technologically-driven 
productivity gains, an ‘ecological surplus’, with ‘cheap food’ at its centre, that has 
managed to restrain the cost of labour relative to other factors of production, and so 
enable sustained profitability.80  
                                                          
76
 The authors of the Planetary Boundaries study (see below) attribute this causal relationship, as does the 
United Nations Millennium Ecosystems Assessment Reports, whose primary finding was that “Over the 
past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable 
period of time in human history, largely to meet rapidly growing demands for food, fresh water, timber, 
fiber, and fuel. This has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on 
Earth”: MEA 2005, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, 
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf, accessed 31.10.08..  
77 Catton, W., 1980, Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change, University of Illinois Press, 
Chicago; Diamond, J., 2011, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Penguin Books, New 
York; Tainter, J.A., 1988, The Collapse of Complex Societies, Cambridge University Press, New York & 
Cambridge.. 
78 In a recent article John Bellamy Foster describes the accelerated pace of contemporary ecological 
destruction as the ‘accumulation of catastrophe’, drawing on historian William McNeill’s conception of the 
‘conservation of catastrophe’, as the cumulative conservation of the ‘potential for catastrophe’ as human 
societies develop and modify nature to suit their purposes: Foster, J.B., 2011, ‘Capitalism and the 
Accumulation of Catastrophe’, Monthly Review, 63(7). See also Philip McMichael ( 2000, The Power of 
Food’, Agriculture and Human Values, 17(1), 21-33), who argues that ‘[i]n a world in which fifteen percent 
of the global population produces and consumes eighty percent of the world’s income, accelerating 
development is arguably a recipe for social and ecological disaster’: 28.  
79 Moore, J.W., 2000, ‘Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical Perspective’, 
Organization and Environment, 13(2), 123-157. Moore, J.W., 2010, ‘The End of the Road? Agricultural 
Revolutions in Capitalist World Ecology, 1450-2010’, Journal of Agrarian Change,10( 3) 389–413, 395-7. 
80 ‘Affordable food is part of what scholars call the social wage – the overall package of basic goods and 
services supplied through either direct wages or public goods and entitlements that allow for the 
reproduction of the labor force’: Gutham op cit., 54. As Jason Moore puts it, the ‘ecological surplus [has 
been] central to accumulation over the longue durée [because it drove down the] system-wide organic 
composition of capital, thereby providing a crucial condition for the revival of profitability’: op cit. 392-3. 
The ‘organic composition of capital’ is an analytical term developed by Marx to refer to the ratio of the 
value of constant capital (materials and fixed costs) to the value of variable capital (labour power) 
embodied in the production of a commodity: Capital, Vol.III, Ch 8.  
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Thus the first phase of the Industrial Revolution was built on the ‘English agricultural 
revolution of the long seventeenth century’, the foundations of which lay not only in 
transformations in agricultural practices and rising labour productivity, but crucially in 
the expansion of geographical frontiers, in England and its colonies.81 Yields began to 
stagnate from 1760 onwards, and food prices rose sharply82; the ‘ecological surplus’ 
was not significantly produced again until the Peruvian guano and the global wheat 
trades commenced from the late 1840s.83 This ‘second’ English agricultural revolution 
constituted what Friedmann and McMichael term the ‘colonial-diasporic’, ‘first’ global 
food regime; and again it was premised on geographical expansion and expropriation, 
this time in the form of commercial family farms extending deep into the indigenous 
territories of North America, Argentina and Australia.84 As the ecological surplus 
achieved during the second English agricultural revolution began to stagnate, a key 
technological innovation, in the form of the Haber-Bosch process for fixing nitrogen, 
allowed the production of synthetic fertilisers on an industrial scale after World War 1. 
It was this discovery, together with the large-scale mechanisation of agriculture, and 
the later development of high-yielding hybrid seeds during the ‘Green Revolution’, 
which constituted the first American agricultural revolution; and signalled the 
commencement of the second, ‘mercantile-industrial’, global food regime.85  
Moore argues that these successive English and American agricultural revolutions each 
constituted a ‘great leap forward in the provision of cheap food’, generating a 
substantial ecological surplus and laying the foundations for a ‘revolutionary expansion 
(and subsequent, low-cost reproduction) of the world proletariat that accompanies a 
                                                          
81 Ibid., 403. This revolution ‘could only proceed on the basis of a double movement of geographical 
expansion: an ‘inner’ conversion of nitrogen-rich pasture into arable land (therefore opening an expansive 
nitrogen frontier) within England [and] an outer conersvion of the English Caribbean into plantation 
monocultures, in sugar above all’: ibid., citing Overton 1996 and Dunn 1972.  
82 Moore op cit., 394. It is no coincidence perhaps that this period saw the development and rise in 
popularity of the theories of Thomas Malthus regarding the allegedly insolvable problem of over-
population, brought about the incapacity of food production, which expanded ‘arithmetically’, to keep pace 
with the rise in population, which expanded ‘geometrically’: see Foster et al op cit., 378-80, 384-391. 
83 Moore op cit., 403, quoting Pomeranz 2000 (216-7). For a discussion of the Peruvian guano trade, see 
Foster et al op cit., 78-9, 352-371.  
84 Friedmann (1987), Friedmann and McMichael (1989). Friedmann (2005 op cit., 126) notes how these 
regions were simultaneously re-defined as the world’s ‘bread-baskets’, and how today Argentina, Australia 
and Canada are leading actors in the ‘Cairns Group’ of countries at the WTO which now ‘promote[s] the 
complete liberalization of trade in food’. The geographical expansion and expropriation that characterised 
the first global food regime produced several results: a ‘sharp’ decline in world cereal prices and hence in 
the price of food for the ‘proletarian heartlands’; a stimulation in demand for the ‘most dynamic capitalist 
sectors of the era’, namely railroads and shipping, as well as the growth of new industries to service 
agricultural production; genocide of indigenous populations, as they were violently dispossessed in the 
name of capitalist development; and a collapse in small-holder agriculture in Europe, brought about by the 
imports of cheap grain and meat from the settler countries: Moore 2010 op cit., 399; Friedmann 2006 op 
cit., 235; Friedmann and McMichael 1989 op cit., 101; Harvey 2003 op cit., 43-45. 
85 Friedmann and McMichael (op cit.) periodise this regime from 1945-1973; however its legacies, above 
all in the form of cheap, mass produced food, continue to this day. As previously, this food regime has 
opened up several new arenas of capital accumulation: seeds, agri-chemicals, food processing and 
manufacturing, fast-foods, factory farming, large-scale retail. As Julie Guthman narrates, the introduction of 
hybrid seeds was accompanied by a wholesale transition to agricultural intensification, and ‘thus hastened 
appropriationism, referring to processes where industry seizes processes once part of farm production and 
sells them back as inputs’: 2011 op cit., 58.  
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new long wave [of capital accumulation]’.86 Each followed a previous period of 
stagnation which, Moore suggests, can in retrospect be viewed as a developmental 
crisis that was capable of ‘resolution through new forms of productivity and plunder’; 
and whose resolution paved the way for new ‘long waves’ of capital accumulation.87  
 
4. The metabolic rift has now widened to such an extent that key planetary 
boundaries are being transgressed 
The opening of the metabolic rift by capitalist agriculture, at the time that von Liebig 
and Marx were researching and writing about it in the 1850s and 1860s, was already 
contributing to air and water pollution, as well as to soil degradation. As Foster, Clark 
and York explain, the impacts of declining soil fertility were offset by the importation 
of large amounts of guano (bird droppings) from the coastal islands of Peru.88 Thus was 
set in motion what they call an ongoing process of ‘rifts and shifts’, ‘whereby 
metabolic rifts are continually created and addressed – typically only after reaching 
crisis proportions – by shifting the type of rift generated.’89 Hence, as guano supplies 
were depleted in the second half of the 19th century, capitalist agriculture was once 
again able to displace the problem of soil fertility via the discovery of the process 
(Haber-Bosch) for producing artificial nitrogen fertilizer.90 While artificial fertilisers 
(and other agri-chemicals such as herbicides and pesticides) have managed to sustain 
crop yields for several decades, their near-universal application by industrialised, and 
industrializing, farmers has come at a heavy environmental and social cost; that is, 
new and more serious forms of the ecological rift have been opened, such as processes 
of eutrophication that have lead to the emergence of oceanic dead zones.91  
 
At the current time contemporary research is suggesting that this rift has widened into 
the transgression and near transgression of a series of key ‘planetary boundaries’, 
which are proposed as bio-physical constraints to the further expansion, both of 
capitalist agriculture in particular and of capitalist economies – and, for that matter, 
                                                          
86
 Moore 2010 op cit., 398. It is hardly a matter of coincidence that the yield increases achieved by the 
Green Revolution have coincided with a doubling of the world’s population in the forty years from 1970, 
and a consequent doubling of the global proletariat, to an estimated 3 billion people by the turn of the 20
th
 
century: see Coates, D., 2000, Models of Capitalism, Growth and Stagnation in the Modern Era, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 
256. 
87 Moore op cit., 395.  
88 2010 op cit. 352-372. 
89 Ibid., 78-79.  
90
 Ibid., 79. This dynamic might also be grasped using the metaphor of capitalism deploying ‘technological 
fixes’ to displace, or at least postpone the worst consequences of, the ecological degradation caused by its 
processes of production. There is an analogy here between the technological fix and the ‘temporal-spatial 
fixes’. The latter is the phrase used by David Harvey to explain how world capitalism, and American 
imperialism, has historically managed to displace elsewhere, or delay in time, the worst impacts of systemic 
crises (Harvey, D.,2003, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. From the political 
economic perspective, arguably both strategies are currently in operation (as at May 2012), as the continued 
resort by the US Federal Reserve to a policy of ‘quantitative easing’ since 2008 has devalued the US dollar 
relative to other currencies, to the advantage of American exporters, while at the same time it artificially 
inflates asset values and postpones the day of reckoning as regards the burgeoning US debt: see Hudson, 
M., 2010, ‘US ‘Quantitative Easing’ is Fracturing the Global Economy’, Bard College Levy Economics 
Institute Working Paper No.639, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1713852 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1713852, accessed 3.5.12.  
91 Foster 2011 op cit.  
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of all types of economy that seek the goal of infinite exponential growth - in general.92 
As I discuss in Chapter 6, Tony Weis describes these as the ‘bio-physical 
contradictions’ impeding further capitalist development.93  
 
5. The ecological rift widens in parallel with the social rift 
The ecological rift widens in parallel with the social rift (that is, the intensification of 
inequalities between countries, and the intensification of inequalities within countries 
via class stratification), and indeed is a product of it.94 The transgression of planetary 
boundaries is attributed to the exponential growth of the globalising capitalist 
economy; and that growth in turn depends to a large extent on increasing consumption 
in the Global North, much of it supported through excessive levels of individual debt.  
 
6. Capitalism acknowledges no absolute limits to its own growth and expansion 
Capitalism’s core features include the centrality of the private ownership and control 
of the means of production, as well as the elevation of individual private gain as a 
primary systemic goal. These features foster a dynamic of competition as well as an 
underlying imperative towards further accumulation and expansion. Cumulatively, this 
means that capitalism acknowledges no absolute limits – no ‘boundaries’, planetary or 
otherwise - to its own growth and expansion, but only ‘barriers’ which it endeavours to 
overcome through technological means, productivity gains, or ‘plunder’ via 
geographical expansion and diverse forms of dispossession.95 An important 
contemporary expression of the latter is the so-called ‘global land grab’, which I 
discuss in Chapter 6. 
 
This inability to acknowledge any limits is also observable in two key ecological and 
social paradoxes that characterize the capitalist system. The first is the Lauderdale 
paradox, which states that as private riches (exchange value) increase, public wealth 
(use value) decreases.96 The difference between the two in classical political economy 
                                                          
92 Inter-disciplinary research led by the Stockholm Resilience Centre resulted in the publication in 2009 of a 
paper which proposed the existence of nine critical planetary boundaries, the crossing of which could push 
humanity past a series of tipping points into ‘catastrophic’ conditions: Rockstrom, J., Steffen, W., Noone, 
K., Persson, A., Chapin, F.S., Lambin, E., Lenton, T.M., Scheffer, M., Folke, C., Schellnhuber, H.J., 
Nykvist, B., de Wit, C.A., Hughes, T., van der Leeuw, S., Rodhe, H., Sorlin, S., Snyder, P.K., Costanza, R., 
Svedin, U., Falkenmark, M., Karlberg, L., Corell, R.W., Fabry, V.J., Hansen, J., Walker, B., Liverman, D., 
Richardson, K., Crutzen, P., and Foley, J., 2009, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space 
for Humanity’, Ecology and Society, 14(2), 32-65..  
93
 Weis, T., 2010, “The Accelerating Biophysical Contradictions of Industrial Capitalist Agriculture", 
Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(3), 315-341. One such boundary – or contradiction – is found in 
accelerating rates of biodiversity loss: ‘current and projected rates of biodiversity loss constitute the sixth 
major extinction event in the history of the Earth’, with the rate of species extinction accelerating by 100-
1000 times over the background rate ‘since the advent of the Anthropocene, and ‘projected to increase 
another 10-fold’ in this century: Ibid., 47. In June 2008 the Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological 
Society of London officially announced the end of the stable inter-glacial Holocene epoch and the 
beginning of the decidedly unstable Anthropocene. (Zalasiewicz, J., Williams, M., Smith, A., Barry, T.L., 
Coe, A.L., Brown, P.R., Brenchley, P., Cantrill, D., Gibbard, P., Gregory, F.J., Hounslow, M.W., Kerr, 
A.C., Pearson, P., Knox, R., Powell, J., Waters, C., Marshall, J., Oates, M., Rawson, P., and Stone, P., 
2008, ‘Are We Now living in the Anthropocene?’ GSA Today, 28(2), 4-8, emphasis added. 
94 Foster et al 2010 op cit., 47, 49.  
95 Foster et al 2010 op cit., 28.  
96 The Lauderdale Paradox is named after James Maitland, the eighth Earl of Lauderdale, and his Inquiry 
into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth and into the Means and Causes of Its Increase, published in 
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is that monetary value is attached to the former because it exists in a condition 
(either actual or constructed) of scarcity, whereas the latter exists in a condition of 
(relative) abundance and is not susceptible to monetary exchange.97 More generally, a 
critical and democratic reconstruction of the ‘configurations of scarcity’ that 
constitute contemporary globalising capitalism will likely be essential to any 
emancipatory project of social transformation.98 
 
The Jevons paradox, also known as the ‘rebound energy’ effect, is named after 
William Stanley Jevons, and states that as efficiencies in production methods increase, 
the total throughput of non-renewable and renewable resources (and therefore waste 
and pollution) also tends to increase, not decrease.99  
Regime theory & global food regime theory 
Adapting the concept of the regime as developed in international relations theory, 
John Rapley defines a ‘regime’ as:  
 
[T]he norms of reciprocity that govern relations between governors and governed, and 
between dominant and subordinate classes, [so that] a stable regime corresponds to an 
implied contract that binds elites and masses in bonds of mutual obligation.100  
 
The stability of any regime depends, says Rapley, upon a ‘mass perception of 
distributive justice’. This entails both the distribution of material resources as well as 
‘cultural [and / or] spiritual component[s]’ that underpin the norms on which the 
masses consent to the prevailing mechanisms and substantive content of material 
distribution.101 Further, a ‘functional regime must contain two components: a 
distributive regime and an accumulation regime, [since in order] to [be able to] 
distribute resources, regimes must also generate them’.102 Using this framework, 
Rapley suggests that the neoliberal version of globalization has since the mid-1970s 
functioned as an ‘eminently successful accumulation regime’, but has provoked a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1804: Foster, Clark & York op cit., 53-4.  
97 Ibid., 54. In many ways Lauderdale anticipated through this paradox the impacts of privatisations in the 
era of neo-liberalism, most obviously in the realm of water services: “The drying up and contamination of fresh 
water diminishes public wealth, creating investment opportunities for capital, while profits made from selling 
increasingly scarce water are recorded as contributions to income and riches”: ibid., 70. These and similar 
processes are generating social tensions and resistances, and in the case of Bolivia, leading to the overthrow 
of a regime and the installation of the country’s first indigenous President: see Dangl, B., 2007, The Price 
of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia, AK Press, Edinburgh, West Virginia. For a more 
general treatment of the Chicago School of Economics doctrine that underpinned the privatisations and 
other restructurings that Dangl discusses in the case of Bolivia, see Klein, N., 2007, The Shock Doctrine: 
The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Allen Lane, London. 
98 Panayotakis, C., 2011, Remaking Scarcity: From Capitalist Inefficiency to Economic Democracy, Pluto 
Press, London.  
99 Foster et al 2010 op cit., 139-143. For the 30 countries that constitute the OECD, the total volume of 
municipal solid waste ‘increased almost 23 percent between 1990 and 2006 from 530 to 650 million tons’, 
confirming the positive correlation between economic growth in capitalist economies and increasing 
volumes of waste: Moore 2011 op cit., 136. 
100 2004 op cit., 7.  
101 Ibid. There is a clear linkage here to the Gramscian theory of politics, which I deal with in the following 
section. As Rapley puts it, ‘regime stability tends to correspond to cultural stability, and regime crisis tends 
to correspond to cultural ferment and what Gramsci called hegemonic dissolution’.  
102 Ibid., 8.  
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series of distributive crises.103 Further, he argues, since this is a global regime, the 
crises are not merely isolated occurrences in countries in the periphery of the global 
system, but rather form part of a ‘global chain’ of reactions that is beginning to 
rebound back to the core capitalist countries of the United States and Europe.104 
 
The development of global food regime theory represented the adaptation of the 
general elements of regime theory to describe particular epochs in the development of 
a global or world agriculture and food system, as foreshadowed above. The originators 
of this approach, Philip McMichael and Harriet Friedmann, denote three such regimes 
to date: the ‘colonial-settler regime’ (1870-1914), the ‘mercantile-industrial regime’ 
(1945-1971), and the ‘corporate food regime’ (1975-present).105 These correspond to 
equivalent periods in the development of global capitalism: the era of liberal free 
trade and European imperialism that ended with World War I; the post-World War II 
era of Keynesian-led expansion and unchallenged US hegemony in international 
relations; and the contemporary period of neoliberal-led globalization. As noted 
above, there is also a broad temporal and geographic correspondence between these 
regimes and the agricultural revolutions periodised by Jason Moore.  
 
Friedmann defines an ‘international food regime’ as a ‘sustained but nonetheless temporary 
constellation of interests and relationships’ that forms part of a ‘larger perio[d] of stability in 
relations of power and property’.106  What is emphasized here is a ‘political-epochal’ rather than 
an ‘economic-cyclical’ logic in the construction and maintenance of what come to be hegemonic 
regimes structuring agricultural production, and food processing and distribution, on the world 
scale.107 Alluding to Albritton's emphasis on the trend towards the extensification of capitalist 
social relations, McMichael depicts 'world agriculture' as:  
 
[R]efer[ring], not to the entirety of agriculture across the earth, but to a transnational space 
integrated by corporate circuits…a world agriculture resembles Hardt and Negri’s emergent 
concept of ‘Empire’, characterized by the elimination of boundaries – either spatial or temporal 
(implicit in the process of abstraction) and, most significantly, a “paradigmatic form of biopower” 
(2000:xv) where capital violently reconstitutes humans through reconstituting the natural order, 
in the name of food security and peace’
.108
    
 
                                                          
103 Ibid., 8. The neoliberal regime was preceded by the Keynesian regime, which for twenty-five years 
(1946-1971) functioned so successfully as both an accumulation and distributive regime that Eric 
Hobsbawm termed this period the ‘golden age’ of global capitalism: Hobsbawm, E., 1994, The Age of 
Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, Abacus, London, 257-286. The Golden Age, 
Hobsbawm records, ‘had [by 1968] largely achieved the most dramatic, rapid and profound revolution in 
human affairs of which history has record’: 286.  
104 Rapley 2004 op cit., 8, 13-14. This argument, constructed in 2003-4, shows a remarkable degree of 
prescience, anticipating by several years the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis that began in 2007 and, 
as of late 2011, is still unfolding.  
105 See Friedmann, and McMichael 1989 op cit., and the other references cited in footnote 5 above,  
106 Friedmann, H., 2006, ‘From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of 
Food Regimes’, Research in Rural Sociology and Development, 11, 227-264, 228.  
107 Buttel, F., 2001, ‘Reflections on Late 20th Century Agrarian Political Economy’, Sociologia Ruralis, 
41(2), 165-181, 173.  
108 McMichael 2004 op cit., 61.  
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Explicit in such a formulation is the identification of ‘the corporate food regime’ with ongoing 
processes of violent expansion discursively legitimated by the regime's appropriation of a neo-
statist discourse of 'food security'; i.e. only the further expansion and institutionalisation of this 
regime will enable humanity to feed its growing numbers in the uncertainty-filled decades 
immediately in front of us. Here we can also see how a widely prevailing sense of 'crisis' and 
generalised anxiety about the future is also given an explicitly ideological twist in order to justify 
the perpetuation and expansion of a particular mode of organising production, exchange and 
consumption relations around food and agriculture. 
 
One can distill from the work of Friedmann and McMichael a number of characteristics of a 
global food regime that allow its emergence, development and de-composition to be analysed 
over time, as well as the contributions that it plays in relation to processes of nation-state 
formation, capital accumulation and identity formation. These characteristics include:  
(i) spatial-temporal specificity: the elements of a food regime are ‘geographically and 
historically specific’, and must be examined in such specificity;109 
(ii) imbrications with processes of nation-state formation, industrialisation and identity 
formation: both historical (such as the opening up of indigenous-held interiors of the 
wheat- producing countries110) and contemporary (emerging concepts of 'agrarian 
citizenship' in Brazil, the 'new agrarianism' in the US111);  
(iii) historical contingency and immanence: this can be demonstrated by deploying the 
counter-factual 'what if?' device;112     
                                                          
109 Pechlaner, G., and Otero, G., 2008, ‘The Third Food Regime: Neoliberal Globalism and Agricultural 
Biotechnology in North America’, Sociologia Ruralis, 48(4), 351-372, 352.  
110 Friedmann 2005 op cit., 127, also Friedmann and McMichael op cit., 96. Contradictorily, these 
processes took place simultaneously with the ‘culmination of colonialism’, or perhaps more correctly 
speaking the high age of imperialism, as Britain resorted to imperial strategies to fend off emerging 
challenges to its hegemony from the US and Germany, which, together with other European powers and 
Japan, extended colonial rule over much of Asia and Africa in an effort to secure markets for their 
expanding industries as well as ‘access to tropical products required by new technologies and new mass 
diets': ibid., 97, citing Hobsbawm 1987, 63-4.  
111 Recent articulations of 'agrarian citizenship' are modernised versions of the older peasant tradition of the 
'moral economy': Edelman, M., 2005, ‘Bringing the Moral Economy Back In...to the study of 21st century 
Transnational Peasant Movements’, American Anthropologist, 7(3), 331-345, drawing on the work of EP 
Thompson, 1971,  ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 18th Century’, Past & Present, 50, 76-
136, and Scott, J., 1977, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in South-East Asia, 
Yale University Press; McMichael, P., 2006, ‘Peasant Prospects in the neoliberal age’, New Political 
Economy, 11(3), 407-418; McMichael, P., 2008a, ‘Peasants Make their own History, But Not Just as They 
Please..’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(1&2), 205-228.  McMichael takes the term 'agrarian citizenship' 
from Wittman, H., 2005, ‘The Social Ecology of Agrarian Reform: The Landless Rural Workers' Movement 
and Agrarian Citizenship in Mato Grosso, Brazil’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Development Sociology, 
Cornell University. 
112 For example, a key moment in the formation of the second food regime came in 1947 when the US and 
the UK vetoed the proposal of Lord Boyd Orr, the first head of the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations, for the formation a World Food Board. Had this proposal been carried, a transparent 
regime of liberal international trade would likely have emerged, based on the UK model of ‘deficiency 
payments’ to farmers, guaranteeing them stable prices; this in turn would have ensured that surpluses did 
not accumulate, and post-World War II history may have taken an entirely different course. Amongst other 
matters, the generation of agricultural surpluses, which in turn flows from the subsidy payments made to 
American and European farmers, is largely what underpins the highly uneven and unequal nature of global 
agricultural trade today. Friedmann comments that ‘[c]ontests over new directions have so far created new 
food regimes – something by no means guaranteed to continue into the future’: 2006 op cit., 229.  
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(iv) emergence following instability & political contestation: food regimes have emerged 
as a result of political contestation during periods of instability characterized by crisis, 
demands made by influential political constituencies and social movements, and the 
intended and unintended effects of the compromises that resolve those demands;  
(v) food regimes as drivers of capital accumulation, and accumulation by dispossession: 
global agricultural trade drove the development of railways and shipping industries in 
the 19th century113; the industrialisation of agriculture in the mid-20th century saw the 
opening of new arenas of capital accumulation in pesticides, chemicals and hybrid 
seeds, while today the frontiers of accumulation have shifted to biotechnology and 
nanotechnology.114 Expansion of agriculture in the 19th century required the 
dispossession of indigenous populations; expansion of monocultures in  the 20th and 
21st centuries are one of the drivers of rural de-population and contemporary ‘land-
grabs’;115   
(vi) the capacity of food regimes to adapt to and incorporate critique: leading to the 
emergence of 'green capitalism': '[a]n ecological phase of capitalism [entailing] a shift in 
the rules of economic activity so that profits are renewed through less depletion of 
resources…less pollution…and [through] selling products that are culturally defined as 
environmentally superior’.116 Fair Trade and organics are obvious examples of this phase 
of 'ecological capitalism', although any potentially renegade movement,  most especially 
(for the purposes of this thesis) the local food movement, is susceptible to such co-
optation; 
(vii) creation of new sets of social relations and contradictions: especially emigration and 
slum-led urbanisation; ecological consequences of industrialised monocultures include 
soil erosion and degradation, which in turn jeopardise production and put pressure on 
new 'virgin' territories such as tropical rainforests;   
(viii) temporary and crisis-tending nature: food regimes are epochal and temporary in 
nature, and enter into a period of crisis (understood as decomposition / disintegration) 
when the ‘implicit rules’ that underpin the system and make it appear natural during its 
stable phase ‘no longer have the same consequences’ and ‘become named’.117 At this 
point the relationships, practices and institutions that have formed the basis of the 
                                                          
113 Friedmann 2006 op cit., 235; Friedmann 2005 op cit., 126. Harvey (2003, 141-2) contrasts expanded 
reproduction with the violence of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which is discussed further below. Of 
course this circuit of expanded reproduction was itself facilitated by earlier and simultaneous processes of 
accumulation by dispossession in the form of the violence meted out to indigenous populations and the 
expropriation of their lands, all of which was justified in chauvinistic and racist terms (ibid., 43-4).  
114 Scrinis, G., 2007, ‘From Techno-Corporate Food to Alternative Agri-Food Movements’, Local-Global: 
Studies in Community Sustainability, 4, 112-140.  
115  McMichael op cit., 58, citing Hobsbawm, E., 1992, ‘The Crisis of Today’s Ideologies’, New Left 
Review, 192, 55-64.  
116  Friedmann, H., 2006, ‘From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and the Emergence of 
Food Regimes’, Research in Rural Sociology and Development, 11, 227-264, 230.  Friedman sees this new 
accumulation regime of green capitalism as being one branch of a global corporate-led reorganization of the 
world into ‘rich eaters’, catered for by the certified organic, wholefoods and fair trade industries, and ‘poor 
eaters’, who are left with mass-produced, genetically-modified, cheap commodities that are the modern 
legacies and outgrowths of the global diets shaped by the earlier food regimes: 252. 
117 Friedmann op cit., 232-3.  
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regime begin to decompose and in the ensuing period of instability and contestation 
‘real choices [over future] direction[s]’ are possible.118 
 
 It is apparent from the foregoing that many features of global food regimes theory 
inform the development of my neo-Gramscian political ecology, and provide it with 
considerable analytical power as regards both the examination of the tensions of the 
globalising capitalist food system; and the counter-hegemonic character of the Food 
Sovereignty movement. Specifically, the emergence of the food sovereignty and ‘anti 
/alter-globalisation movements’ in the 1990s named and problematised the 
assumption that ‘there is no alternative’ to corporate-led globalisation as inter alia 
the means to ‘feed the world’.  The intensification of social and ecological tensions 
(inequality, climate change, biodiversity loss and so on) have further undermined the 
regime’s legitimacy and thrown it deeper into crisis and a state of decomposition. The 
‘corporate food regime’ has endeavoured to respond through its self-portrayal as 
‘green capitalist’, yet this in turn is increasingly derided by food sovereignty activists 
as ‘greenwashing’.  
 
Summarising, the main focus of the global food regime approach is to detect the 
mechanisms by which the regime achieves, for a time, stability as a hegemonic power 
formation that structures patterns of production and distribution in ‘world agriculture’ 
(see above). The data and argument developed in this thesis strongly suggest that, 
consistent with the expectations of global food regime theory, we are entering – or 
have already entered -  a period of instability and contestation. It is important to bear 
this in mind as we incorporate a Gramscian theory of politics into the neo-Gramscian 
political ecology in the last part of this section.  
 
Globalising capitalism 
As Richard Peet and his colleagues note, a global political ecology must be firmly 
based in a clear understanding of the historical transformations of capitalism; which in 
turn requires the analytical tools of Marxist political economy.119 Here I offer a brief 
synopsis of the globalising, expansionary tendencies of capitalism, which, as I discuss 
in Chapters 4 and 6, are manifesting today in specific ways in the globalising capitalist 
food system. 
 
From its beginnings, capitalism has been an inherently expansionary system. By the 
1880s, the imperatives of capitalist accumulation were encountering the limits of the 
nation-state system as it then operated, in the form of a lack of profitable outlets 
within national boundaries for the investment of surplus savings accrued through 
financial speculation in the previous decade. Thus, as Hannah Arendt recounts, the 
‘export of money [was] followed by export of government power’; specifically the 
‘expansion of the national instruments of violence’, in order to protect the new waves 
of foreign investments.120 
                                                          
118  Ibid., 234.  
119 2011 op cit. 
120 Arendt op cit., 136-7. As she puts it,  
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In other words, endless capital accumulation will require lesser or greater degrees of 
coercion and violence, depending on the historical conjuncture and the prevailing 
exigencies. Contemporary globalising capitalism is, in the account of Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, characterised by the predominance of purely economic forms of coercion, 
achieved through the compulsion of the impersonal market system, over ‘extra-
economic’ forms of coercion; that is, political, military and judicial powers.121 Wood 
argues that ‘capitalism is unique in its capacity to detach economic from extra-
economic power’, but that at the same time this economic power ‘cannot exist 
without the support of extra-economic power’, which continues to be ‘supplied by the 
[nation-state].’122 It follows from this, in Wood’s view, that theorising globalisation as 
characterised by either a ‘stateless world’ or one in which states are ‘increasingly 
irrelevant’, is not only inaccurate, but also politically disempowering.123 For Wood, the 
economic power of capital depends on the extra-economic powers exercised by the 
state, but the relationship between the two powers is fraught with contradictions and 
tensions, most especially in the era of ‘globalization’.124 During the twenty-five years 
of the ‘golden age’ following World War II, the two logics operated in relative 
symbiosis, under the hegemonic cultural and political leadership of the United States 
as the ‘super-imperialist state’, as well as the ‘primary engine of capital 
accumulation’.125 When this period of stable hegemony broke down for a variety of 
reasons in the early 1970s, and the leading role of the United States as the centre of 
world manufacturing was challenged by Germany and Japan, the United States 
responded by deregulating capital flows and ‘asserting its hegemony through 
finance’.126 
 
The mechanisms and impacts of the financialisation of capitalism in the era of 
neoliberal globalization will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. For the purposes of my 
method, what matters here is that the turn to financialisation signalled, first, the end 
of unchallenged US hegemony in global politics; and secondly, the commencement of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
[T]he so-called laws of capitalism were actually allowed to create realities…Money could finally beget money 
because power, with complete disregard for all laws – economic as well as ethical – could appropriate wealth…”: 
ibid.  
For Arendt, the expansionist drive was always immanent in capitalist development, based on  
[T]he theoretically indisputable proposition that a never-ending accumulation of property must be based on a 
never-ending accumulation of power…The limitless process of capital accumulation needs the political structure 
of ‘so unlimited a Power’ that it can protect growing property by constantly growing more powerful: ibid., 143. 
121 Wood, E.M., 2003, Empire of Capital, Verso, London, 4. As Wood points out, this is not to say that 
extra-economic forms of coercion do not play an important role, as can be seen in recent years through the 
invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.  
122 Ibid., 5.  
123
 The political form of globalization is not a global state but a global system of multiple states, and the new 
imperialism takes its specific shape from the complex and contradictory relationship between capital’s expansive 
economic power and the more limited reach of the extra-economic force that sustains it: Wood 2003 op cit., 6. 
124 Ibid., 24. David Harvey similarly sees the essence of contemporary globalising capitalism as lying 
within what he terms the dialectical relationship between the ‘territorial and capitalist logics of power’: 
2003 op cit., 27-8. 
125 Ibid., 48, 50-55.   
126 Ibid., 62.  
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an ongoing period of ‘predatory practices’ that collectively Harvey terms 
‘accumulation by dispossession’.127  
 
A Gramscian theory of politics  
The value of Antonio Gramsci as a political theorist and activist is, as Stuart Hall puts 
it, that he provides us, not with the ‘answers’ or the ‘key’ to the resolution of 
contemporary problems, but rather ‘with the tools to ask the right kinds of questions 
about [contemporary] politics’.128 
How then does a Gramscian theory of politics provide the tools with which to assess 
the relations of forces in the terrain of contemporary global food politics? It is from 
within Gramsci’s rich concept of hegemony as a long-term political project, together 
with his insights regarding the conditions for the potential destabilisation of 
hegemony, that the relevant tools can be discovered. While there are several ‘tools’ 
within Gramsci’s thought that are relevant to this thesis, I will focus most attention on 
the concept of the ‘common sense’ that is a key element underpinning any hegemonic 
formation, and its linkage to the idea of ‘consent’. A Gramscian theory of politics 
holds that politics – as the sphere of social life concerned with the making of decisions 
regarding the distribution of authority, power and resources, and associated 
contestations regarding how and by whom such decisions are made - is a central 
human activity.129 It is far broader than purely electoral or party politics. The sphere 
of politics, as conceived by Gramsci, is autonomous from, though closely linked to, the 
economy.130 The contestation for power and authority – either in a given society or 
globally - manifests dynamically as the ongoing maintenance of hegemonic relations by 
the leading class or classes over the subordinate class or classes, with both acting 
within the constraints and imperatives of historical possibility and necessity according 
to the specific conjuncture.131  
                                                          
127 Ibid., 71-3, 139-145. As he puts it, the use of debt in the form of structural adjustment programmes, the 
deliberate orchestration of crises, the expropriation of peasant proprietors via both economic and extra-
economic forms of coercion, and the ‘wholesale commodification of nature in all its forms’, feature 
prominently in these expressions of contemporary globalising capitalism: ibid., 145-148. The deliberate 
orchestration of crises is the subject of an extensive treatment by author and activist Naomi Klein (2007 op 
cit.). 
128 In particular, Hall notes how Gramsci insisted on focusing upon 
[T]he notion of difference, to the specificity of a historical conjuncture: how different forces come together, 
conjuncturally, to create the new terrain, on which a different politics must form up. 
Hall, S., 1987, ‘Gramsci and Us’, Marxism Today, June 1987, 16-21, 16. 
129 Hobsbawm, E., 2011, How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism, Little, Brown, London, 
321-2.  
130 Here I am adopting the usage of Raymond Williams, who wrote that '[w]e have to revalue 
'determination' towards the setting of limits and the exertion of pressure, and away from a predicted, 
prefigured and controlled content': 1991, Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory, in Mukerji, 
C., and Schudson, M., 1991, Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Practices in Cultural Studies, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 410.  
131 What has come to be known as a strategy of 'counter-hegemony' is derived, as Stanley Aronowitz notes, 
from Lenin's United Front strategy of the 1920s, in opposition to the 'council communists' who insisted on 
'smashing the state' via worker action from below: Aronowitz, S., 2008, Gramsci's Concept of Political 
Organization in Francese, J. ,(ed)., 2008, Perspectives on Gramsci: Politics, Culture and Social Theory, 
Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon., 11. 
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The maintenance of a hegemonic power formation over a period of time rests on a 
combination of the consent and / or acquiescence of subordinate classes to the rule of 
leading classes, as well as access by the latter to the coercive apparatus of the state 
as necessary to discipline from time to time non-consenting groups and individuals.132 
That said, hegemony is characterized by what Gramsci termed ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’, not by domination achieved through the exercise of force.133 It follows 
that far from being automatic and permanent, hegemonic relations need constantly to 
be negotiated and renegotiated in order to be maintained. Periods of hegemony in a 
particular country, and at the global level, can and do pass from periods of stability 
into periods of de-stabilisation, even crisis; and it is from within the latter that new 
hegemonic – or counter-hegemonic – projects can be constructed and advanced.134 
A highly significant insight of Gramsci was that hegemony as ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’ was not merely a political, but also a cultural project. One of the leading 
theorists of cultural hegemony, Raymond Williams, discusses how Gramsci’s 'deep' 
theory of hegemony overcomes the fundamental inadequacy of an orthodox Marxist 
'base / superstructure' analysis, whilst nevertheless retaining the element of social 
'intentionality' that is essential in order to grasp the nature of social relations in a 
capitalist society: 
[H]egemony supposes the existence of something which is truly total, which is not merely 
secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a 
depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even 
constitutes the substance and limit of common sense for most people under its sway…That is 
why hegemony is not to be understood at the level of mere opinion or mere manipulation. It 
is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary 
understanding of the nature of man and of his world. It is a set of meanings and values 
which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus 
constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because 
experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to 
move, in most areas of their lives.
135 
                                                          
132 As Peter Ives explains, for Gramsci coercion and consent are not 'mere antonyms', but rather exist in a 
dialectical relation; not only is there quite often a 'fine line' separating them, but one conditions the other: 
2004, Gramsci's Politics of Language: Engaging the Bakhtin Circle and the Frankfurt School, University 
of Toronto Press: Toronto., 11-12, citing Femia, J., 1987, Gramsci's Political Thought, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 35-50.  
133 1971 op cit., 57-8.  
134 Thus, it is commonly accepted that the period from the late 1960s through to the late 1970s saw the 
decomposition of one period of hegemony at the global and national levels, that of Keynesian welfare state 
capitalism, and the formation of a successor, in the form of neoliberalism: Hall op cit., Harvey, D., 2005, A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, London. Now, in 2012, with the onset of the so-
called ‘global financial crisis’ in 2008, some critical commentators believe that we are witnessing the de-
composition of the hegemony of neoliberalism: Harvey, D., 2010, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of 
Capitalism (2010, Oxford University Press, New York. . 
135 Williams, R., 1991, Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory, in Mukerji, C., and Schudson, 
M., 1991, Rethinking popular culture: contemporary practices in cultural studies, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 412-4. Williams explains social intentionality as revelatory of the 'class character' of 
'certain kinds of ratifying theory, certain kinds of law, certain kinds of institution...These laws [etc.] which 
are so often claimed as natural, or has having universal validity or significance, simply have to be seen as 
expressing and ratifying the domination of a particular class': ibid.  
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This rich depiction of hegemony provides, amongst other insights, an indication as to 
the complexity and multi-dimensionality of 'consent' a primary condition of a 
hegemonic power formation. At one level, ‘consent’ is understood here not in the 
liberal sense of a fully conscious and informed affirmation of 'free will' by autonomous 
individual subjects, but rather as a more passive – even unconscious – individual and 
collective acceptance or acquiescence to the worldview of the leading classes.136  
On this level, such acceptance / acquiescence is to an important extent made possible 
by the general absence in subordinate classes of a coherent and critical worldview of 
their own (‘good sense’). In place of such a worldview, as Williams suggests, their 
understandings of the world, and of their own place within it, are shaped primarily by 
the fragmentary, chaotic and contradictory elements of 'common sense' thinking. This 
'common sense' is perpetuated over time and space via the informal mechanisms of 
what Gramsci termed 'folklore', as well as formal 'civil society' institutions such as 
education, religion and, more so in our time than Gramsci’s, the media and advertising 
industries.137 Amongst other effects, the diffusion of a widely-accepted common sense 
normalises and naturalises existing distributions of power, authority and resources, 
and so plays a fundamental role in contributing to the stability of a hegemonic power 
formation. It performs this role not, as Williams says, in the guise of ‘mere 
manipulation’, but rather as a more totalising ‘saturation’ of the consciousness.  
Taking this notion of the ‘saturation of the consciousness’ a bit further, it might also 
be argued that ‘consent’ as a condition of hegemony takes a more active form, in the 
sense that in the industrialised countries at least a significant majority of the 
population both consciously and unconsciously reproduces the principal forms of the 
capitalist economy on which the rule of the leading classes depends. Hence, far from 
seeking any transformational change to this economy, the majority desires its 
continued ‘normal’ functioning, and acts on a daily basis to bring about this result. 
Nevertheless, objective social conditions have in the past created the potential for a 
destabilisation in hegemony, and will likely do so again in the future, including in 
industrialised nations.138 Actual changes in power relations in a progressive direction, 
however, will not occur without shifts in consciousness and sustained political activity 
by subordinate classes that enable them to propose, in the universal interest, a 
credible and coherent alternative political and cultural project.139  
                                                          
136 Ives 2004 op cit., 52.  
137 Landy, M., 2008, Gramsci in and on Media, in Francese op cit. In the context of food and agriculture, 
the role of the media in maintaining system hegemony is of particular significance, having regard to the 
many hundreds of millions of dollars spent annually by food and beverage manufacturers on advertising to 
promote their products, much of it aimed at young children: see Nestle, M., 2002, Food Politics: How the 
Food Industry Influences Health and Nutrition, Berkeley: University of California Press. As a practising 
and academic nutritional profession, Marion Nestle states that she has 'become increasingly convinced that 
many of the nutritional problems of Americans - not least of them obesity - can be traced to the food 
industry's imperative to encourage people to eat more in order to generate sales and increase income in a 
highly competitive marketplace': 5. See also Critser, G., 2004, Fatland: How Americans Became the Fattest 
People in the World, London: Penguin Books, 113-5. 
138 A prolonged economic recession, or a depression, in which large numbers of people experience both 
absolute and relative deprivation, is one instance of such conditions. 
139 In this respect it should be borne in mind that many countries in the industrialised world turned to 
fascism and militarism in the 1930s; and recent years have seen the resurgence of the political far right in 
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The supersession and transformation of existing fragmentary common sense by 
subordinate classes – and most especially their 'organic intellectuals' - is one of the 
most important elements of successful counter-hegemonic politics.140 For Gramsci, 
these 'organic intellectuals' – organic in the sense of emanating from the particular 
social group, and in the sense of 'organising' that group141 - would play both a directive 
and an educative role, in helping to forge a 'cultural and social', or 'moral-intellectual', 
bloc. As Gramsci conceived it, the organic intellectuals would carry out the two 
fundamental tasks of Marxism: 'combat[ting] modern ideologies in their most refined 
form', and educating members of subordinate classes so as to enable them to engage 
critically with 'common sense' conceptions of the world.142  
 
This educative process presupposes a direct and constant dialectical and reciprocal 
relationship of learning, critical analysis and reflection between the intellectuals and 
the members of the subordinate classes. The relationship must be based on the 
practical lived experience of the latter; otherwise, it would simply become a purely 
intellectual and abstract exercise.143 It is in this sense that the organic intellectuals of 
the Food Sovereignty movement, especially the peasant-scholars and activists from the 
South, derive much strength from the grounded authenticity of their ‘intellectual’ 
work of writing and speaking. Leaders like Henry Saragih, for example, the current 
global coordinator of La Via Campesina, have been able to move creatively and 
simultaneously between (in Saragih’s case) the ‘traditional’ life a peasant farmer in 
northern Sumatra; and the modern, or post-modern, life of an alter-globalisation 
movement activist, regularly travelling between Jakarta, New York, Geneva, Rome 
and other centres of global governance; and speaking with conviction and authority 
about the hardships experienced by the peasantry worldwide.144 
 
The work of critique of common sense is not an end in itself, but is intended to lead 
towards the successful articulation of a unifying and coherent worldview, which can 
attract increasing numbers of individuals and groups. This coherent worldview – a new 
‘good sense’ – creates the basis on which can emerge an alliance of groups that 
transcends the purely 'corporate' interests, such as those based solely in identities such 
as class, or gender, or race, of any single group.145 As Benedetto Fontana puts it, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the United States and Europe. Peter Evans (2008 op cit.), basing himself principally on Polanyi’s ‘double-
movement’ thesis rather than Gramsci, makes the point that Polanyi ‘never assumed that the movements for 
social protection generated by the failure of the self-regulated market would necessarily take progressive 
forms’: 285.  
140 Liguori op cit., 130, 132.  
141 Ives 2004 op cit., 45, who notes that the organising function of the organic intellectual includes, 
crucially, the organisation of language.  
142 1971 op cit., 330, 332-3, 392. 
143 Ibid., 330-335. The reciprocal nature of this relationship is highlighted by Peter Mayo (1999, Gramsci, 
Freire and Adult Education: Possibilities for Transformative Action, Zed Books: London, 87). 
144 Saragih was recently named by the UK Guardian newspaper as one of the world’s 20 ‘Green Giants’, 
those individuals ‘who will be setting the environmental agenda in the coming year’: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jan/16/green-power-list-top-20, accessed 12.1.12.  
145 Birchfield, V., 1999, “Contesting the hegemony of market ideology: Gramsci’s ‘good sense’ and 
Polanyi’s ‘double-movement’”, Review of International Political Economy, 6(1), 27-54.  
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'stages of political action parallel [the] stages of political consciousness, and both 
reflect the movement from narrow self-interest to the common interest'.146 
 
The development of this thesis has in large part been based around the direct 
engagement with a number of the leading organic intellectuals of the Food Sovereignty 
movement. This engagement has taken the form of in-depth discussions of the 
secondary literature generated by a number of activist-scholars prominent in the field; 
and primary research in the form of in-depth interviews with international leaders of 
La Via Campesina and affiliated peasant and farmer organisations in Canada, Ecuador, 
Indonesia and Australia. The numbers of interviews are small, but in-depth. They take 
the form of ‘key informant’ interviews rather than a larger sample of interviewees as a 
broadly representative cross-section of the Food Sovereignty movement.  
 
These interviews have been complemented by an extended process of participant-
observation. As regards La Via Campesina, this involved attendance and participation 
at the 2nd regional East and South-East Asian Youth Conference, held in Timor Leste in 
March 2009; as well as interviews with several youth leaders of peasant organisations 
from the Philippines, Korea, Japan and Thailand attending that Conference. As regards 
the local food movement in Australia, my research is based on years of participant-
observation in both the Coffs Coast region of New South Wales as well as being a 
Director of the Food Connect Foundation. This participant-observation is 
complemented with interviews conducted with farmers, wholesalers and retailers in 
the Coffs Coast region of Australia; and with the founder of the Food Connect social 
enterprise, Robert Pekin.  
 
At the level of political organisation and strategy, counter-hegemonic struggles must 
necessarily be based on alliances formed around the articulation of such a unifying 
worldview, based on values and principles that mobilise and unite people both within 
and across national, linguistic and cultural boundaries.147 Further, such struggles 
require the identification and mobilisation of a key agent, or agents, of change, 
including firm and effective leadership; and such leadership, to be effective, must be 
grounded in national realities, and in a ‘dialectical analysis of the ever-shifting 
equilibrium of political forces’ at the national level.148 The practice of counter-
hegemonic politics thus prefigures the formation of a ‘national-popular collective 
will’, which entails the abandonment of intellectualised and abstract cosmopolitanism 
                                                          
146 Fontana, B., 2008, Power and Democracy: Gramsci and Hegemony in America, in Francese op cit., 91. 
Thus, Pat Devine and David Purdy argue that what (for example) the British Left badly needs is a new 
political project, a 'long-term undertaking informed by deep and lasting values [which] make[s] sense of the 
past, identif[ies] the main problems facing society in the present, and propos[es] a strategy for tackling 
them in the future' (Devine, P., and Purdy, D., 2009, Feelbad Britain: A Gramscian view, in McNally and 
Schwarzmantel op cit., 180.. 
147 Jones, B.G., 2008, compares Gramsci's revolutionary thought and strategy with that of Amilcar Cabral 
and Frantz Fanon: 214-5. 
148 San Juan Jr., E., 2008, Antonio Gramsci's Theory of the National Popular and Socialist Revolution in the 
Philippines, in Francese op cit., 181; also McNally, M., 2009, Gramsci's internationalism, the National-
Popular and the Alternative Globalisation Movement in McNally, M., and Schwarzmantel, J., 2009, 
Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance, Oxford: Routledge. 
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to reconnect with the ‘socio-economic needs and cultural demands of the common 
people’ in each country.149  
 
It follows that in order to be effective, a counter-hegemonic project requires a direct 
and serious engagement with national politics; and the prioritisation of such an 
engagement above symbolic street protests against the institutions of global 
governance such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organisation.150 This emphasis is also informed by Wood’s insistence that the 
contemporary ‘global’ system is, more than ever, a system of nation states.151 
Democratic struggles must be pursued at the national level; and as gains are made 
there, these can be translated to global arenas.152 The Gramscian perspective is 
internationalist and ‘cannot be otherwise’, but ‘the point of departure is ‘national’: in 
other words, global transformation will proceed from nationally-grounded struggles 
and successes; and not the other way round. Such struggles will likely be linked by 
shared ‘universal’ values and commitments, but lasting progress is unlikely to come 
from ‘top-down’ global-led initiatives. The implications of this for the Food 
Sovereignty movement are that, while its supporters may self-consciously view it as a 
leading proponent of ‘counter-hegemonic globalisation’, the substantive achievements 
are most likely to be observed at the local and national levels.153 The advances 
achieved towards food sovereignty in many countries in Latin America, notably 
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, as well as in some African countries (Mali and Senegal) 
and at the pan-European level (in the form of the Nyéléni Forum on European Food 
Sovereignty), on the basis of sustained social movement mobilisation and political 
struggle at the national level, support this Gramscian ‘national-popular’ perspective.  
 
In the context of his discussion of the Italian ‘Risorgimento’, Gramsci developed 
Vincenzo Cuoco's term 'passive revolution' as a short-hand way of capturing those 
                                                          
149 McNally 2009 op cit., 61. McNally notes how in Gramsci's estimation the French Jacobins provided the 
model for such a revolutionary national-popular strategy. As Epifanio San Juan Jr puts it, a 'new way of 
being Gramsician' is to 'apply Gramsci's dialectical materialist approach to the task of democratic 
mobilization against finance capital in specific national settings': 2008 op cit., 166. 
150 San Juan Jr op cit., who argues, by reference to the case of the Philippines, that the failure to engage in a 
serious and ‘meticulous’ analysis of the balance of forces at the national level leads ‘to catastrophes’ and is 
‘the current malady afflicting anti-globalisation “leftists”’ in the Philippines ‘who consider the battle against 
the IMF / WB / WTO as more important than fighting the ruthless fascist acts of the US / Arroyo regime’: 
181.  
151 Wood 2003 op cit., 141.  
152 Peter Evans describes this dynamic as the ‘virtuous circles’ of ‘multilevel contestation’:  
If symbiotic relations between transnational and domestic movements strengthen domestic movements, increasing their 
leverage in national political processes, this symbiosis also contributes to more progressive national political action at 
the global level. More progressive state actorsprovide transnational movements with potential national allies at the 
global level, strengthening these transnational movements and enhancing their ability to act as allies for domestic 
movements. 
Evans, P., 2008, ‘Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?’ Politics and Society, 36(2), 271-305, 295.  
153 Peter Evans defines ‘counter-hegemonic globalization’ as ‘a globally organized project of transformation 
aimed at replacing the dominant (hegemonic) global regime with one that maximizes democratic political 
control and makes the equitable development of human capabilities and environmental stewardship its 
priorities’: 2008 op cit., 272. Evans, in common with many other supporters of the ‘alter-globalisation’ 
movement, subscribes to the perspective that the capacity of national governments to take progressive 
policy decisions has been constrained by ‘neoliberal globalization’, but that in the current era there has been 
an ‘expansion of possibilities for trumping national constraints by organising at the global level’: ibid., 276. 
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processes of elite-led change which would avert a revolutionary transformation from 
below.154 A ‘passive revolution’ is thus a manifestation of ‘political leadership [as a] 
function of domination’; it is a ‘revolution-restoration’, in other words, a restoration 
of ruling class dominance, albeit under political configuration, altered to a greater or 
lesser extent, but leaving untouched the fundamental aspects of capitalist social 
relations.155 Passive revolution is connected by Gramsci analytically with the term 
trasformismo, to describe the ideological convergence of political parties - as has in 
fact occurred to a large extent during the era of neo-liberalism - and thus ‘the 
formation of an ever more extensive ruling class’.156 In this thesis I also use it to 
describe the many processes of co-option of potentially radical political and economic 
tendencies, and their reincorporation within the main circuits of the globalising 
capitalist political economy.  
A passive revolution typically occurs when there is a ‘crisis in the ruling class's 
hegemony’ or a ‘crisis in authority’, such as that following defeat in a war or in the 
context of revolutionary demands being made by ‘huge masses (especially of peasants 
and petit-bourgeois intellectuals)’.157 Arguably the neo-liberal counter-revolution took 
place at just such an historical moment, when the previous accumulation and 
distribution regime (Keynesian state-led macroeconomic management and welfare 
statism) appeared, for a wide variety of reasons, to have exhausted the limits of its 
further development. Its decomposition coincided in the industrialised countries with a 
wave of youth counter-culture, civil rights and self-determination movements, second-
wave feminism, and militant trade unionism.  
 
In the current context of austerity, processes of passive revolution and trasformismo 
may dovetail with the growing popularity of self-reliant localisation initiatives such as 
the Transition movement. In their enthusiasm for food relocalisation, food sovereignty 
advocates might be said to have absorbed what several critics have identified as an 
un-reflexive embrace of the ‘local’ as the contemporary site of an expanding 
progressive politics of social justice. According to this non-dialectical perspective, the 
‘social embeddedness’ of relations at the local level is assumed to be ‘good’, and 
thereby juxtaposed to the ‘bad’ disembedded relations that inhere in the atomized 
global capitalist market.158  
Taking issue with what they see as a simplistic dualism, these critics problematize the 
‘local’, drawing on social histories and contemporary practices to suggest that the 
organisation of power relations at this level can and do produce practices and 
                                                          
154 Ibid., 59, 106-120. Gramsci spoke of the 'intellectual, moral and political hegemony' and leadership of 
the Moderates before and during the Risorgimento, but this was a hegemony exercised in order to effect a 
'passive revolution'. He saw the same process underway in the later years of his own life with the rise of 
fascism, which as he noted generated 'a period of hope and expectation [in] certain Italian social groups 
such as the great mass of urban and rural petit bourgeois': 108-9, 115, 117-8. 
155 Ibid., 108-9, 115, 117-8. 
156 Ibid., 58-60, 109.  
157 Ibid., 211-2.  
158 Winter, M., 2003, ‘Embeddedness, the New Food Economy and Defensive Localism’, Journal of Rural 
Studies, 19, 23-32; Hinrichs, C.C., 2003, ‘The Practice and Politics of Food System Localization’, Journal 
of Rural Studies, 19, 33-45; DuPuis, E.M., Goodman, D., and Harrison, J., 2006, “Just Values or Just Value? 
Remaking the Local in Agro-Food Studies”, Research in Rural Sociology and Development, 12, 241-268. 
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outcomes of intolerance and exclusion.159 They argue that in many instances emerging 
local food organisations and networks are representative of such a ‘defensive 
localism’, which valorises the particular interests of local farmers while occluding 
broader questions of environmental sustainability and the ethical treatment of food 
sector workers and animals.160 Further, they suggest that in its privileging of consumer 
choice as a principal vehicle for social change, food system localization works to 
‘reproduce neoliberal subjectivities’ and therefore constitutes in important respects 
‘an intrinsic element of neoliberal political economy’, undermining its own progressive 
and transformative ambitions.161  
Taking this critique further, it could be argued that the food sovereignty demand for 
national food self-sufficiency has clear overtones of the protectionism that 
characterised the breakdown of the international system in the 1930s. This equation of 
food sovereignty with protectionism has recently been used by some critics to argue 
that food sovereignty principles will actually be harmful to national and global 
aspirations of food security.162 I engage at some length with these critics in Chapter 3. 
In reply to the ‘defensive localism’ critics, Edmund Harris suggests that these critiques 
themselves are over-forceful; and that in the scholars’ predilection to ‘see 
neoliberalism everywhere’, they end up reifying neoliberal social relations and 
‘inadvertently reproduce the dominance of neoliberal discourse’.163 As a corrective 
against this academic tendency which he says forecloses ‘a politics of possibility’, 
Harris proposes using Gibson-Graham’s method of ‘reading for difference, not 
dominance’ in order to ‘cultivat[e] a mode of thought which can operate outside the 
discursive bounds of neoliberalism’; and thereby understanding ‘the landscape of 
alternative food politics [as] populated by a variety of emergent institutions and 
practices’ which are bringing about ‘positive changes’.164 Activist-scholar Amory Starr 
likewise sees these critiques as containing significant limitations, largely because they 
treat local food as a ‘set of institutions, policies or commodities’, and not as a social 
movement.165 Starr also detects a tendency amongst left critics of the local food 
movement, as well as among anti-capitalists, to ‘spurn market projects as 
                                                          
159 DuPuis et al op cit., 242, 245-6, describing the manner in which the locally-controlled regulation of 
pesticides in California’s major industrial agricultural region of the San Joaquin Valley ‘disproportionately 
and notoriously reflect the economic interests of the dominant agricultural elites, while sidelining and 
rendering invisible the concerns of poor, noncitizen, marginalized farmworker communities’. 
160 Winter op cit., 29-31.  
161 DuPuis et al op cit., 243-5, 256.  
162 Southgate, D., 2011, ‘Food Sovereignty: The Idea’s Origins and Dubious Merits’, ATDF Journal 8 (1/2), 
18-22; Kerr, W.A., 2011, ‘Food Sovereignty: Old Protectionism in Somewhat Recycled Bottles’, ATDF 
Journal 8 (1/2), 4-9; Aerni, P., 2011, ‘Food Sovereignty and Its Discontents’, ATDF Journal 8 (1/2), 23-40. 
163 Harris, E.N., 2009, ‘Neoliberal Subjectivities or a Politics of the Possible? Reading for Difference in 
Alternative Food Networks”, Area, 41(1), 55-63, 60-62, 66.  
164 Ibid., 66, citing J.K. Gibson-Graham, 1996, The End of Capitalism (as We Knew It): A Feminist Critique 
of Political Economy, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, and 2006, A Post-Capitalist Politics, University of 
Minnesota Press, London. See also Dixon, J., 2011, ‘Diverse Food Economies, Multivariant Capitalism, 
and the Community Dynamic Shaping Contemporary Food Systems’, Community Development Journal , 
46(S1), i20-i35, who likewise draws on the ‘diverse economies’ approach of Gibson-Graham to map the 
emergence of alternative food networks.  
165 Starr, A., 2010, ‘Local Food: A Social Movement?’ Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies, 10(6), 
479-490, 486-7.  
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ideologically inadequate pragmatism’.166 Here, she makes an important point with 
much relevance to the discussion of my case studies regarding local food in Australia:  
[A]nti-capitalists have innovated precious few strategies engaging to the alienated, 
individualistic, fearful consumer culture we find ourselves organizing in. If the market is 
where society increasingly spends its time and attention, then we need to learn to 
organize in the market, keen to identify its fissures and expand them into new worlds. This 
is not reformism or apologism, it is recognizing the historical political-cultural reality in 
which we find ourselves and those with whom we would like to make revolution.
167 
This passage highlights a number of issues of central importance in terms of the 
development of the Gramscian component of my method. First, in developing the 
critique of common sense and the articulation of a new good sense, a counter-
hegemonic movement needs to work from within the common sense itself, rescuing 
those elements of it which are familiar and which can be progressive, in order to make 
them coherent. Secondly, this is also consistent with a (non-dogmatic) dialectical 
interpretation of history and politics, which sees contradictory tendencies and 
ambiguities in all social forms; and draws attention to the contingency of events and 
phenomena. Thirdly, the recognition that much contemporary local food activism in 
countries such as the United States and Australia must of necessity take place within 
the market reflects Marx’s own insights regarding the conditions of historical 
subjectivity and agency.168 Thus, in her reading of local food as a social movement, 
Starr valorises both the capacity of innovative social entrepreneurs to create 
meaningful change, and the potential for Community-Supported Agriculture initiatives 
to achieve a ‘collective ideological praxis’ as they reconfigure exchange relations 
between local producers and consumers.169 Similar observations might be made, with 
greater or lesser degrees of confidence, to other typical local food practices, such as 
farmers’ markets and community gardening. 
Before moving to my synthesis of a ‘neo-Gramscian political ecology’, I wish to 
mention briefly the application, by Food Sovereignty movement organic intellectuals 
Eric Holt-Giménez and Annie Shattuck, of the Polanyian ‘double-movement’ thesis to 
the assessment of the struggles waged by food movements against the ‘corporate food 
regime’.170 This thesis posits the historical and contemporary expansion of the 
capitalist market by the supporters of economic liberalism seeking the ‘establishment 
of a self-regulating market’; with such waves of expansion periodically resisted by 
counter-movements for reform and state intervention to ‘re-embed’ markets in society 
                                                          
166 Ibid.  
167 Ibid. 
168 “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted 
from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living”: 
from the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx, 1973. 
169 2010 op cit., 480, 486.  
170 Holt-Giménez, E., and Shattuck, A., 2011, ‘Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: 
Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(1), 109-144. Holt-
Giménez is Director of the California-based NGO FoodFirst, and Shattuck works for that organisation as a 
researcher. FoodFirst, like GRAIN, FIAN and ETC, is strongly supportive of food sovereignty and La Via 
Campesina.  
67 
 
and thereby ‘protec[t] man and nature’, owing to the social and self-destructive 
tendencies of unregulated capitalist markets.171  
Combining the ‘double-movement’ framework with global food regime theory (see the 
discussion above), Holt-Giménez and Shattuck postulate, on the one hand, the 
hegemonic ‘corporate food regime’ as comprised of ‘neoliberal’ and ‘reformist’ actors 
and institutions, each of which is endeavouring to establish the conditions for its 
stabilisation and continued expansion.172 On the other, they identify ‘progressive’ and 
‘radical’ trends within the ‘global food movement’, with the former articulating 
‘practical alternatives to industrial agrifoods, such as sustainable, agro-ecological and 
organic agriculture and farmer-consumer community food networks, largely within the 
economic and political frameworks of existing capitalist food systems’; and the latter, 
epitomised by food sovereignty, making demands for ‘structural reforms to markets 
and property regimes, and class-based, redistributive demands for land, water and 
resources’.173  
Holt-Giménez and Shattuck suggest that the outcome of present struggles over the 
corporate food regime will largely depend on the trajectory of the ‘progressive’ 
elements of the food movement; and in particular whether they opt to ally themselves 
with reformist elements of the regime, or alternatively whether they can forge 
alliances with the ‘radical’ actors of the food movement.174 They suggest that, unlike 
the neoliberal and reformist elements of the regime, there is no ‘symbiotic’ affinity 
between progressive and radical elements of the food movement; and hence the 
movement is susceptible to ‘fragmentation’.175 They also make the very important 
point, as I emphasise throughout the thesis, that the lack of attention to the needs of 
food workers is a ‘profound area of silence commonly found across all trends in the 
food movement’; and that ‘it is difficult to imagine just how the [movement] could 
significantly change the food regime without establishing strong, strategic alliances 
with food system workers’.176 Transposing this to the transnational level, the strongest 
basis for such alliances, they argue, would be by reference to class interests: ‘linking 
the livelihood interests (production and reproduction) or underserved communities in 
the North with those of the besieged peasantry in the Global South’.177 
These points are well made, and the analytical framework developed by Holt-Giménez 
and Shattuck provides a useful methodological tool to assist with the balance of forces 
assessment. There is of course a considerable overlap with my own framework, 
                                                          
171 Birchfield 1999 op cit., 38-9, quoting Polanyi, K., 1944 (1957), The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon Press, Boston, 130, 132. See also Maertens, E., 2008, 
‘Polanyi’s Double-Movement: A Critical Reappraisal’, Social Thought and Research, 29, 129-153.  
172 Holt-Giménez and Shattuck op cit., 114.  
173 Ibid., 115. 
174 Ibid., 133-136. ‘Neither reform nor transformation will likely occur without social movements strong 
and imaginative enough to inspire citizens to action and force governments to act. Historically, reforms 
have been forced on liberal markets not by dint of reformists in government, but as the result of intense 
social pressure, unrest and the threat of ungovernability. To build this kind of political power, organizations 
in the food movement will need strong alliances and must distinguish superficial reform from structural 
change’: 134. 
175 Ibid., 135 
176 Ibid.  
177 Ibid., 136.  
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although, for reasons already mentioned, I have chosen to use the ‘globalising 
capitalist food system’ rather than ‘corporate food regime’, emphasising inter alia the 
capitalist rather than the merely corporate nature of the object under consideration; 
and the Food Sovereignty movement, rather than the ‘global food movement’, as the 
principal historical subject, to emphasise the inclusive, dynamic and open nature of 
food sovereignty, rather than make a somewhat artificial delineation between the 
‘progressive’ and ‘radical’ elements. Arguably, Holt-Giménez and Shattuck’s division 
between ‘progressive’ and ‘radical’ is perhaps too neat, and insufficiently dialectical, 
as the above discussion on the contested nature of the ‘local’ suggests. Community-
supported agriculture initiatives can simultaneously challenge and support the 
commodity logic and ideology of the capitalist market. The same applies to agro-
ecology. Further, at the level of theory, an analysis resting solely on Polanyi arguably 
lacks a sufficiently nuanced and dynamic theory of politics and agency, which, as Vicki 
Birchfield argues, is precisely what Gramsci provides.178 
Synthesis: a neo-Gramscian political ecology 
To recapitulate: the hypothesis being explored in this thesis is that the Food 
Sovereignty movement embodies the potential for effective counter-hegemonic 
politics to the globalising capitalist food system. The method, and the theory on which 
it is based, must be apt to explain the principal phenomena and enable the hypothesis 
to be satisfactorily tested.  
 
These theoretical resources enable me to detect and describe the principal tensions of 
the globalising capitalist food system. Yet since the main concern is the exploration of 
potential counter-hegemonic politics, I need to incorporate a Gramscian theory of 
politics in order to explore the conditions under which such politics might successfully 
be enacted, and the subjective qualities of the agency that would be required for such 
enactment. For the purposes of this thesis, I place particular emphasis on the role of 
organic intellectuals as regards the critical engagement with the common sense that 
sustains the hegemony of the globalising capitalist food system; the development of a 
coherent ‘good sense’ that can progressively replace this common sense, based on an 
emerging, peasant-led ontology of connectedness; the articulation of a project in the 
‘universal interest’ that supersedes narrow corporate and sectoral interests of 
particular classes; the construction of broad-based alliances on which an effective 
‘national-popular’ strategy can be mobilised; and the constant risks of passive 
revolution and trasformismo.  
 
 
Application of the method 
There are three principal moments:  
                                                          
178 1999 op cit., 39-43. Birchfield describes Gramsci’s seminal contribution to Marxism in the following 
terms:  
Gramsci dismissed the rigid separation of base and superstructure and began to describe domination as something 
congealed in the superstructure – the cultural, intellectual and moral realm – as opposed to the economic base. He 
effectively introduced human agency and a theory of consciousness here while also retaining the penetrating 
Marxian critique of the historicity of social relations embodied in the mode of production…he went beyond 
Marx’s understanding of civil society and false consciousness with his realization that there was a meshing of 
base and superstructure in which a whole social stratum operated to maintain the system: 42. 
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 a systematic abstraction of the social formations, i.e. the globalising capitalist 
food system, and the Food Sovereignty movement,  
 an elaboration of the ‘effective reality’ as between the two social formations, 
via a balance of forces analysis, and  
 the assessment of the concreteness and quality of the engagements of the Food 
Sovereignty movement with the key tensions of the globalising capitalist food 
system.  
 
The systematic abstraction of the social formations was undertaken in the 
Introduction. Here I will focus on the second and third moments.  
 
As regards the effective reality & balance of forces, by reference to authoritative 
reports such as the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment and International Assessment on 
Agriculture, Science and Development, we can identify significant destructive impacts 
that contemporary industrialised agriculture is having on planetary, local and national 
ecosystems. We can also note that the globalising capitalist food system is highly 
vulnerable to the increasingly well-accepted reality of depletion of non-renewable 
resources, especially fossil fuels, since it (like all industrial processes) is highly 
dependent on constant inputs of cheap fossil-fuel derived energy and chemicals.179  
 
The globalising capitalist food system represents, in its contemporary form, the 
industrialisation and the corporatisation of agriculture and food. Examining the 
productive forces across the five sectors of the food system (production, processing 
and manufacture, transport and distribution, retail and consumption, and waste and 
recycling) reveals its principal characteristics, which will be detailed in Chapter 6. In 
contrast, the Food Sovereignty movement proposes a quite distinct set of productive 
forces and social relations. La Via Campesina, has responded, for example by 
developing increasing capacity for self-conscious agency and action through internal 
processes of movement formation, paying especial attention to the role of women and 
youth.  
 
These analyses allow me to draw initial conclusions regarding the existing balance of 
political-institutional forces, as well as the capacity of food sovereignty to expand the 
realm of the possible and to shift the existing balance of forces. The three moments of 
                                                          
179 The widespread use of fossil-fuels and related technologies and infrastructure that came with the advent 
of the Industrial Revolution marks a dramatic turning point in human history. As Gavin Bridge notes,  
 
Unlike wind, water or other solar-derived sources of energy, fossil fuel energies can be expanded and made to 
flow at will, enabling the realization of economies of scale. They are mobile in a way that wind and water power 
are not, and allow an unprecedented geographical concentration of production…The reliance on machines and 
large-scale infrastructure for the release of fossil energies have given industrial capitalism many of its distinctive 
social and geographical forms so that it makes sense to talk of a “fossil fuel mode of production”. Huber…argues 
that by decisively shifting productive forces from human labor to machines, fossil fuels generalized the 
conditions for a class monopoly over the means of production. And in the sphere of circulation, fossil fuels 
overcame “the biological constraints of transporting goods” and became a primary means for expanding markets 
and reducing the costs of circulation. 
2011 op cit., 312, citing Huber, M., 2009, ‘Energezing Historical Materialism: Fossil Fuels, Space and the 
Capitalist Mode of Production’, Geoforum, 40(1), 105-115.   
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analysis are synthesised to achieve a concrete whole in terms of the ‘effective reality’ 
and the balance of forces. In terms of the concreteness and quality of engagements by 
the Food Sovereignty movement with the key tensions of the globalising capitalist 
food system, the analysis must determine the extent to which the Food Sovereignty 
movement constitutes the effective practice of counter-hegemonic politics. The 
analysis will be guided by the key Gramscian-informed question: to what extent are 
these engagements ‘convincing and shift the previously existing disposition of social 
forces’?  
 
This key question can be further broken down into a series of specific questions, which 
I have anticipated in the course of preceding discussion, as follows:  
 Are the campaigns and actions of the Food Sovereignty movement based in, and 
do they critically engage with, the 'common sense' that underpins the 
legitimacy of the globalizing capitalist food system? 
 To what extent does the movement articulate and enact practices and projects 
that realistically expand the realm of the possible? 
 How effective have global-level campaigns targeting global institutions been?  
 Having regard to the 'balance of forces', how realistically grounded are these 
campaigns?  
 Are they matched by a similar concentration of forces at the national level: a 
'national-popular' strategy which (re-)connects the movement with the socio-
economic and national traditions of its members in each country, as well as 
building cross-interest and cross-class alliances?  
 Are the critiques and normative proposals of the movement regarding the 
historical necessity of change convincing?  
 To what extent have processes of 'passive revolution' (elite-led change) and 
trasformismo (co-optation of potentially radical movements / normative 
proposals into elite formations and ideology) taken place or are taking place?  
 
This approach differs considerably from existing frameworks of analysis in the social 
movement literature. For example, in assessing the impact of La Via Campesina’s 
‘Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform’, Saturnino Borras Jr adopts the five-stage 
framework developed by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink to determine the 
effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks.180 The stages are as follows:  
1. ‘Framing debates and getting issues on the agenda’,  
2. ‘Encouraging discursive commitments from state and other policy actors’,  
3. ‘Causing procedural change at the international and domestic level’,  
4. ‘Affecting policy’, and 
5. ‘Influencing behaviour change in target actors’.181 
While this framework is useful at one level, it – and the social movement literature 
more generally - is limited insofar as it positions La Via Campesina and the Food 
Sovereignty movement almost exclusively in oppositional and reformist terms. More 
                                                          
180 Keck, M., and Sikkink, K., 1998, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.  
181 Ibid., 201, quoted in Borras 2008 op cit., 269.  
71 
 
fundamentally, as an approach grounded in social constructivism and according 
primacy to ideational factors over social structures and material forces182, the 
maintenance and durability of the systemic integrity of the globalising capitalist 
political economy is assumed, not problematized, in this analytical framework.183 A 
major problem with this paradigm – Wendy Brown argues that it is a problem 
replicated in variants such as Habermasian theory of communicative action184 – is that 
it occludes and marginalises the role of power and politics, within a broader historical 
American liberal narrative of progress. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I set out a number of further sub-questions in 
relation to each of the Gramscian-informed questions articulated above. This set of 
questions will serve as the guide and focus for the exploration of the thesis argument 
through the remaining chapters.  
 
Critical engagement with common sense 
 Who are the 'organic intellectuals' of the movement, and what role have they 
played and do they play in the movement’s evolution? 
 Which elements of prevailing common sense (e.g. individualism, food as cheap, 
consumer choice, etc.) are consistently and critically addressed by the 
movement? 
 Which elements are ignored and / or uncritically addressed? 
 Are the analyses and discourses of the movement increasing in coherence and 
critical insight? 
  
Realistically expanding the realm of the possible 
 To what extent can we speak of a coherent alternative social and political 
project being articulated and advanced by the movement?  
 What are the components of that project? 
 Which of these components are being implemented now? 
 Which of these components cannot be implemented now, and why? 
 How likely is it that the barriers to the implementation of the project as a 
whole may be overcome? 
 
Effectiveness of global-level campaigns 
 
 Have any of the goals of any of these campaigns been achieved?  
 If so, what practical & political changes have been made as a result? 
                                                          
182 Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K., 2001, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 391-416. 
183 Sterling-Folker, J., 2000, ‘Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal 
Institutionalism Compared’, International Studies Quarterly, 44(2), 97-119, 98-100, thus ‘[c]onstructivism 
has tended to replicate liberal arguments, conclusions and predictions about the future of international 
relations as a result’, ibid. L.H.M. Ling critiques constructivism for its failure to conceive of an include any 
perspectives from worlds other than the dominant Eurocentric one: see Ling, L.H.M., 2006, ‘Global 
Presumptions: A Critique of Sørensen’s World-Order Change’, Conflict and Change, 41, 382-392, 387-8. 
184
 Brown, W., 2000, ‘Revaluing Critique: A Response to Kenneth Baynes’, Political Theory, 28(4), 469-
479.. 
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 If not, have any practical and political changes been made anyway? 
 What have been the benefits and costs, in organisational and movement terms, 
of the campaigns? 
 
Existence of national-popular strategy 
 What actions are the movement taking at the national level? 
 Are the movement acting from purely sectoral or corporate interest? Are they 
moving towards positioning themselves as acting in the universal interest? 
 What alliances have the movement made with other social movement groups? 
 What political relationships have the movement formed?  
 What attitude do the movement take towards national and sub-national 
political processes? Are they engaged with these processes, or do they shun 
them? 
 
Convincing-ness of normative proposals 
 Are the movement gaining in numerical strength and political credibility?  
 What popular support do the movement enjoy?  
 What legislative or other changes have taken place at the national or sub-
national level, linked to the movement’s actions, which further their strategic 
visions and goals?  
 
Tendencies and impacts of passive revolution / trasformismo 
 Which potentially radical elements of the movement have been reincorporated 
back into the dominant circuits of capital accumulation processes?  
 Which elements of the movement’s discourse and practices are liable to 
trasformismo? e.g. contestations over claims to be advancing the 'human right 
to food' and 'food security'; the dangers of parochialism and prejudice inherent 
in discourses of 'the local'; the dangers of protectionism and fantasies of 
autarky in discourses of 'national sovereignty' 
 What have been the actual experiences to date of passive revolution / 
trasformismo? Based on the assessment of the 'relation of forces', what are the 
likely tendencies in the future? 
Based on this analysis, I then assess which are the most realistically grounded, and 
therefore the most promising, progressive tendencies amongst the movement, and 
consider ways in which these tendencies can be strengthened and developed. 
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Chapter 3 
Case Studies 
“[F]or those concerned with contesting the anti-democratic impulses of an atomized, 
anti-political global market society, we must propose counter-hegemonic strategies 
of rectifying a public sphere, where power can be made more visible and therefore 
subjected to accountability. To be successful, these strategies must be omnipresent 
and take multiple forms in the political, cultural and intellectual realms.” 
Vicki Birchfield1 
 
I support the argument that the Food Sovereignty movement embodies a potential 
counter-hegemonic political force by reference to two case studies: the development 
of Food Sovereignty by La Via Campesina, and two elements of the local food 
movement in Australia. Each case study constitutes a particular manifestation of the 
Food Sovereignty movement. Their exploration will be guided by the key Gramscian-
informed questions that I outlined at the end of Chapter 2, setting the stage for the 
deeper exploration of the particular campaigns and strategies of the various social 
movement actors and thus the full elaboration of the thesis argument in Chapters 5 
and 7.  
While these cases are intended to be illustrative and, to a certain extent, 
representative of the global food sovereignty movement, they obviously do not 
describe the entire field. The local food movement in Australia is broader than the 
Coffs Coast and Food Connect; and internationally it is growing rapidly, especially in 
North America. The global movement for food sovereignty, and for that matter 
transnational agrarian activism, is broader than La Via Campesina.  
As discussed below, I have selected the two elements of the local food movement in 
Australia that I have been closely involved with as a participant-observer over the 
past several years. I have seen local food initiatives ebb and flow in the Coffs Coast 
since 2008, and I have similarly witnessed first-hand the internal dynamics of the 
Food Connect social enterprise in Brisbane since 2009. What the thesis may lose in 
‘objectivity’, it gains through the detailed understandings of a critical insider’s 
perspective.  
Alongside La Via Campesina, food sovereignty as a concept and political movement is 
supported by numerous other alliances and networks. These include the member 
organisations (farmers, fisherfolk, and NGOs) of the International Planning Committee 
(IPC) for Food Sovereignty; the Network of Peasant Agriculture and Modernisation of 
Africa (APM-Mondial); the Asian Peasant Coalition (APC); the European Nyéléni Forum 
                                                          
1 Birchfield, V., 1999, ‘Contesting the Hegemony of Market Ideology: Gramsci’s ‘Good Sense’ and 
Polanyi’s ‘Double-Movement’’, Review of International Political Economy, 6(1), 27-54, 36. 
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on Food Sovereignty; and Food Sovereignty Alliances that have recently emerged in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, amongst many other networks 
and organisations at the regional and national levels around the world. There is a 
certain amount of shared membership amongst some of the larger networks; for 
example some movements that belong to the IPC for Food Sovereignty, the APC and 
APM-Mondial also belong to La Via Campesina.  
The reason for choosing to focus on La Via Campesina rather than, or in addition to, 
one or more of these other groupings, is both to keep the thesis within manageable 
confines, and to allow for in-depth discussion of La Via Campesina as a social 
movement. La Via Campesina is the largest transnational agrarian movement; and the 
most diverse in terms of the geographical dispersion, class composition and political 
ideology of its membership, It is both the originator of the concept of food 
sovereignty, and its most persistent protagonist over time, especially at the global 
governance level, with its campaign for a new United Nations Declaration on 
Peasants’ Rights. Assessing the success or otherwise of La Via Campesina’s efforts to 
advance food sovereignty as a counter-hegemonic strategy will, having regard to its 
size and scope, enable me to draw conclusions regarding the counter-hegemonic 
potential of the movement as a whole.   
La Vía Campesina’s development of food sovereignty 
First I propose to outline the emergence of food sovereignty and its subsequent 
development over time by La Via Campesina. The focus will be on the normative 
content of food sovereignty and its conscious positioning in juxtaposition to the 
productivist discourse of food security which the architects of the globalising 
capitalist food system have been promoting since the mid-1990s as a means of 
legitimising and justifying the further expansion of the system. I will also touch on 
the question of human rights and its relation to food sovereignty, which I develop at 
length in Chapter 5; and agro-ecology as a foundational pillar of food sovereignty in 
the La Via Campesina framework, which I explore further in Chapter 7.  
While this case study concerns the development of food sovereignty by La Via 
Campesina and not the farmers’ movement per se (nor for that matter transnational 
agrarian movements in general), it is nevertheless important to my argument that I 
devote some consideration to La Via Campesina as a transnational agrarian 
movement. The reason for this is that, in order to conduct an assessment of the 
balance of political and economic forces, I need to be able to make a judgment as to 
the relative strength and capabilities of La Via Campesina, as the leading actor within 
the wider Food Sovereignty movement, vis-à-vis the dominant actors in the 
globalising capitalist food system. Hence I will begin this section with an outline of 
the origins, political strategies, successes and shortcomings of La Via Campesina, 
which I will further develop in Chapters 5 and 7.  
In the following discussion, I draw on some of the emerging literature forging a 
synthesis between agrarian studies and social movement theory that recognises the 
historical, political and organisational complexities ‘that necessarily characterize any 
effort to construct cross-border alliances linking highly heterogeneous organizations, 
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social classes, ethnicities, political viewpoints and regions’.2 The aim within this 
literature is to ‘acknowledge [the] contradictions, ambiguities and internal tensions’ 
in a transnational agrarian movement such as La Via Campesina, in order, as ‘engaged 
intellectuals, to advance a transformative political project by better comprehending 
its origins, past successes and failures, and current and future challenges’.3  
This aim is entirely consistent with a critical and realist approach as outlined in 
Chapter 2. It also contrasts with an understandable tendency in some of the 
literature to over-estimate the impact that La Via Campesina and the Food 
Sovereignty movement has achieved to date, and even at times to romanticise it in 
ways that at times border on wishful thinking. Thus, Walden Bello, recalling the 
symbolic suicide protest of South Korean farmer Lee Kyung Hae at the fifth 
ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation in Cancun, Mexico, wrote that  
Lee was one of the exceptional figures…that have made the new peasant movement…the 
epitome of dedication, courage, imagination, innovative organising and élan over the last 
decade, taking up the role that the industrial working class filled decades ago…4  
The organised industrial working class, from the latter decades of the 19th century 
through to the 1960s, was a force that wrought major social reforms and advances in 
democratic rights from establishment capitalist parties in country after country in the 
industrialised West, substantively re-shaping the ‘configurations of scarcity’ that are 
fundamental to capitalist economies, the maintenance of elite privilege, and thus 
hegemonic power formations.5  
In his examination of the reasons which explain the ‘size and effectiveness of income 
security states’ that militate against poverty and inequity in the ‘affluent capitalist 
democracies’, Alexander Hicks concludes that the effective industrial and political 
organisation of the working classes is the principal cause.6 Whatever else might be 
said or claimed for the new peasant internationalism that La Via Campesina and food 
sovereignty embodies, their impacts to date can hardly compare with the 
achievements of the organised working class of the first decades of the 20th century.7 
                                                          
2 Borras, S.M., Edelman, M., and Kay, C., 2008, ‘Transational Agrarian Movements: Origins and Politics, 
Campaigns and Impact’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(2 & 3), 169-204. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Bello, W., 2009, Food Wars, Verso, London, 125. 
5 Panayotakis, C., 2011, Remaking Scarcity: From Capitalist Inefficiency to Economic Democracy, Pluto 
Press, London. As regards the historical achievements of the organised working class, in some countries, 
notably Germany and Italy, the proletariat came close to achieving socialist revolutions in the tumultuous 
years of 1918-1920; and indeed socialist, anarchist and communist workers were elected to power as the 
Popular Front in Spain in 1936, only for the country to descend into a bloody civil war that ended in 1939 
with General Franco’s fascist counter-revolution: Hobsbawm, E., 1994, The Age of Extremes: The Short 
Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Abacus, London, 67-71; Thomas, H., 2001, The Spanish Civil War, 
Random House, New York.  
6 Hicks, A.M., 1999, Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, x. 
7 Achievements, it should be said, that have been substantially undermined during the ‘neoliberal counter-
revolution’, as labour has once more become increasingly commodified in emerging configurations of 
scarcity – austerity, structural adjustment, free trade - reminiscent of pre-welfare state forms of capitalism: 
see Harvey 2005 op cit. Gøsta Epsing-Anderson (1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.) explains the welfare state in terms of an effort by the working 
classes to achieve the greatest possible measure of de-commodification of labour, i.e. to reduce the market 
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Of course, one would hardly expect achievements at such a level, which were the 
outcome of more than a century of organisation and struggle, from a transnational 
farmer and peasant movement that has not yet completed twenty years of existence 
in a formal, institutional sense. That said, contemporary transnational agrarian 
movements clearly have their social and political origins in long histories of peasant 
rebellion; and it is important that such continuities, as well as divergences, be made 
explicit.  
A more realistic assessment, albeit still supportive and sympathetic, is called for. 
Where Bello is perhaps correct is that La Via Campesina and the broader ‘peasant 
International’ is currently the main transnational social force proposing the broad 
outlines of a systemic alternative to capitalism.8 It is not enough, however, to 
propose a systemic alternative; that alternative must, as my questions at the end of 
Chapter 2 indicated, be sufficiently convincing to mobilise and organise large groups 
of people who can substantively shift the balance of forces in the direction of the 
desired transformation.  
Beginning the balance of forces analysis requires then an examination of the political-
economic context for the emergence of La Via Campesina; its class composition and 
social bases; its political ideologies; the extent to which it is genuinely representative 
of the sectors whose interests it claims to be advancing; its political tactics and 
actions; the actual political and economic impacts thus far of those tactics and 
actions; and internal movement dynamics.9 I turn briefly to each of these issues, 
before proceeding to La Via Campesina’s systemic normative alternative: food 
sovereignty.  
In terms of its origins, the immediate context for the emergence of La Via Campesina 
was provided by neoliberal restructuring of agrarian relations worldwide to the 
widespread detriment of the rural poor in general, including the peasants and small 
farmers.10 One of the main participants in the formation of La Via Campesina, former 
President of the Canadian National Farmers Union Nettie Wiebe, observes that the 
particular historical context in the early 1990s was the drive towards trade 
liberalisation, and the anticipated impact that this would have on small farmers. As 
she puts it,  
[W]e realised that the liberalisation of agricultural trade was going to reorganise 
production in all of our domains, no matter what kind or level of agriculture we were 
                                                                                                                                                                          
compulsions that are the hallmark of capitalism; and the owners of capital, by contrast, are constantly 
seeking to increase the levels of commodification of labour.  
8 It is of course far from being the only such force. In particular, 2011 witnessed the birth of what might be 
termed a nascent transnational ‘Occupy’ movement, motivated by the widening experience of austerity 
policies consequent upon the global financial crisis of 2008-9, and the intensification of inequalities that 
such policies are causing: see DeGraw, D., 2011, ‘The Occupy Wall Street Movement, Report From the 
FrontLines: Origins of the 99% movement’, 29.9.11, available at: http://ampedstatus.org/a-report-from-
the-frontlines-the-long-road-to-occupywallstreet-and-the-origins-of-the-99-movement/, accessed 
15.10.11; also Marom, Y., 2011, ‘Reflections of a Wall Street Occupier: We are winning – what do we 
want?’ 13.10.11, available at: http://ampedstatus.org/reflections-from-a-wall-street-occupier-we-are-
winning-what-do-we-want/print/, accessed 20.10.11.  
9 Ibid., 181-2.  
10 McMichael, P., 2005, Globalization in Janoski, T., Alford, R., Hicks, A., and Schwartz, M.A. (eds.), The 
Handbook of Political Sociology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 587-606. 
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engaged in; and that it would be very, very hostile to small-scale, diverse production. 
And that was us.11 
The 1992 Managua Declaration, one of the foundational texts of La Via Campesina, 
put the matter even more strongly, with its authors regarding trade liberalisation as 
an existential threat for peasants and small farmers:  
Neoliberal policies represent a dramatic constraint on farmers throughout the world, 
bringing us to the brink of irredeemable extinction and further aggravating the 
irreparable damage which has been caused to our rural environs…Trade and international 
exchange should have as their fundamental goal, justice and cooperation rather than 
survival of the fittest…We reject policies which promote low pricing, liberalized markets, 
the export of surpluses, dumping and export subsidies. Sustainable agricultural 
production is fundamental and strategic to social life and cannot be reduced to a simple 
question of trade.
12 
In this Declaration and subsequent documents of Via Campesina and the broader 
movement for food sovereignty we can clearly detect this movement’s continuity 
with earlier traditions of ‘the moral economy of the peasant’ and closely associated 
notions of peasants’ rights and justice.13 Adapting the original usage of ‘moral 
economy’ by eminent historian of the English working class, EP Thompson, in relation 
to ‘confrontations in the market-pace over access to necessities’, James Scott 
located in Southeast Asian peasant communities strong customary values around the 
concept of a ‘just price’ as well as ‘access to land [and] redistributive mechanisms 
and forms of reciprocity that linked peasants with elites and with each other’, 
including understandings of the acceptable limits of processes of commodification 
and appropriation of commonly-held resources.14 As Marc Edelman comments, while 
‘[t]oday the specific resources targeted for commodification are different than a 
century ago, the moral discourse of the affected peasants in remarkably similar’15; as 
we can see from this excerpt from the statement by Henry Saragih, Global 
Coordinator of La Via Campesina, delivered to the 9th Asia-Europe People’s Forum 
held in October 2012:  
If we want to overturn the bleak situation of our current food system, we need to 
attack the roots of the problems. Injustice in land, water and seeds must be addressed. 
Stop land and water grabbing and also patents of seeds. Genuine agrarian reform must 
be implemented. We need to focus to rural areas to address our hunger problem by 
restructuring our mode of production to a more sustainable-agroecology farming. This 
is also to protect and restore our Mother Earth.16 
                                                          
11 Interview with the author, 15.9.10. 
12 Excerpt from the Managua Declaration, quoted in Desmarais op cit., 76.  
13 Scott, J.C., 1976, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Edelman, M., 2005, ‘Bringing the Moral Economy back in…to 
the Study of 21st-Century Transnational Peasant Movements’, American Anthropologist, 107(3), 331-345.  
14 Edelman 2005 op cit., 332, discussing Scott 1976 op cit. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Saragih, H., 2012, ‘Our Time Has Come: Food Sovereignty Now!’, available at: 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/food-sovereignty-and-trade-mainmenu-
38/1320-our-time-has-come-food-sovereignty-now.   
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While there is clearly a continuity with the moral economy perspective elaborated in 
the 1960s and 1970s, there is also a clear departure, in at least two senses. First, 
that literature was elaborated at the beginnings of contemporary globalisation, and 
so its focus (and that of peasant rebellions) was either local or national. Today, as 
the sources of violations of peasants’ rights and sense of justice have become 
transnational, so have the peasant movements themselves and their locus of much of 
their actions.17 Secondly, the norms articulated by the peasants around ideas of ‘just 
price’, rights and limits to commodification have similarly become 
internationalised.18  
While neoliberal restructuring in general, and the push for the liberalisation of trade 
in agricultural commodities in particular, created the objective conditions for the 
emergence of a transnational agrarian movement like La Via Campesina, the actual 
emergence and protagonist nature of La Via Campesina depended on the actions of 
groups of organised sectors of the peasantry and farmers in several countries, first in 
building national-level alliances, and then in establishing the links that would 
eventually lead to the transnational movement itself.19 These links included solidarity 
exchanges between women farmers from the Canadian National Farmers Union (NFU) 
and the Nicaraguan Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos (UNAG – the National 
Union of Farmers and Ranchers) during the late 1980s and 1990, as well as between 
the NFU and farmer groups in China, Mozambique, Cuba, the Caribbean, Mexico, the 
USA and the Philippines.20 
As Marc Edelman observes, the solidarity exchanges that the Sandinista-led 
Nicaraguan government fostered amongst peasant organisations in Central America 
during the 1980s were a key part of the historical context for the establishment of La 
Via Campesina.21 A key moment was a meeting in Managua in May 1992, attended by 
representatives of eight farmer and peasant organisations from North America, 
Central America and the Caribbean, and Europe.22 One of the principal founding 
organisations was ASOCODE23; and central to its establishment in 1991 was a large 
flow of development funds from European donors that formed part of the 
Copenhagen Initiative for Central America.24 In that sense, the development projects 
of European NGOs helped facilitate the emergence of La Via Campesina, and the 
                                                          
17 Edelman 2005 op cit., 337.  
18 Ibid., 339.  
19 Ibid., 182. See also Desmarais, A.A., 2007, Globalization and the Power of Peasants: La Via 
Campesina, Fernwood Publishing, Halifax, 77-84.  
20 Desmarais op cit., 78; also interview with Nettie Wiebe, 15.9.10. Other significant formative links 
included exchanges between the French Confédération Paysanne, and farmer organisations in the USA, 
Peru, the Philippines and Nicaragua, as well as regular exchanges between Central American and Mexican 
peasant organisations: ibid. 
21 Edelman, M., 2008, ‘Transnational Organizing in Agrarian Central America: Histories, Challenges, 
Prospects’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(2& 3), 229-257, 232.  
22 Desmarais op cit, 75. The eight organisations attending this meeting were ASOCODE, Winward Islands 
Farmers Association, Canadian National Farmers Union, Coordination Paysanne Européene (European 
Peasant Coordination), Coordinadora de Agricultores y Ganaderos (Coordinator of Farmers and Ranchers, 
Spain), National Farmers Union (Norway), and the Dutch Farm Delegation.  
23 Asociación de Organizaciones Campesinas Centroamericanas para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo, 
Association of Central American Peasant Organizations for Cooperation and Development. 
24 Edelman 2008 op cit., 233.  
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continued financial support from some of these agencies has been crucial to the 
peasant movement’s ability to conduct international meetings and run an 
international secretariat.25 
Subsequently, forty-six representatives of farming organisations from North, Central 
and South America and the Caribbean, Europe and Asia met in Mons, Belgium in May 
1993 and formally established La Via Campesina, the ‘Peasant Way’.26 The emergence 
of a ‘peasant International’ in the late 20th century has significant historical 
antecedents. Organisationally, scholars point to the Bulgarian-led ‘Green 
International’ and the Soviet-led ‘Red Peasant International (Krestintern)’ in the 
1920s, noting that these earlier, short-lived Internationals were comprised of 
peasant-led political parties and governments rather than social movements.27 
Ideologically and politically, Joan Martinez-Alier describes La Via Campesina as 
‘ecological neo-Narodnism’, tracing a direct historical lineage to the pre-1917 
Narodnik peasant movement in Russia, whose militants and supporters ‘dreamt of 
moving towards a kind of socialism based on peasant communes without relying on 
the growth of an industrial proletariat’.28  
In terms of its class composition, La Via Campesina is self-described as ‘a movement 
of peasants, small and medium-sized farmers, landless people, women farmers, 
indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers’.29 This is an extraordinarily 
diverse and heterogeneous category of social classes and groups. Even the core of La 
Via Campesina, its social base, of small farmers and peasants, is very heterogeneous, 
given that there are rich, middle-income and poor farmers in the North, and rich, 
middle-income and poor peasants in the South, including many millions of landless 
peasants.30 As noted below, this limits the extent to which it can claim to be 
genuinely representative of the vast numbers of rural poor worldwide who have been 
impacted by diverse processes of agrarian change throughout the 20th century, and 
under neoliberal restructuring in the past three decades in particular. Indeed 
Saturnino Borras Jr., Marc Edelman and Cristobal Kay argue that the exclusion for 
many years of landless Dalit groups in India by the rich and middle-income Karnataka 
State Farmers Association (KRRS31) reflects  
[T]he relatively low priority to workers’ issues within La Via Campesina, whose advocacy 
caters primarily to surplus producing strata of the peasantry who are engaged with issues 
of trade and biotechnology. There have been no systematic worker-centred campaigns 
                                                          
25 Desmarais op cit., 122-123. The International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty, in which La 
Via Campesina plays a leading role, also receives support from numerous European state- and church-
based aid organisations: see http://www.foodsovereignty.org/Aboutus/Donors.aspx, accessed 14.4.12.  
26 Desmarais op cit., 76-7.  
27 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 174-176, 183.  
28 Martinez-Alier, J., 2011, ‘The EROI of Agriculture and Its Use by the Via Campesina’, The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 38(1), 145-160, 154. Martinez-Alier notes that while Marx was sympathetic to the 
Narodnik perspective on transformative social change, Lenin was ‘strongly opposed to the ‘peasant way’ 
in Russia [and] [n]o protagonist role was to be given to the peasantry’ in the 1917 Revolution: ibid.  
29 La Via Campesina, ‘What is La Via Campesina? The International peasant’s voice’ 
http://www.viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=27&I
temid=45, accessed 20.9.11. 
30 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 193-4; also Borras, S.M., 2008, ‘La Via Campesina and its Global Campaign 
for Agrarian Reform’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(1 & 2), 258-289.  
31 Karnataka Rayja Raitha Sangha, KRRS. 
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within La Via Campesina (around wages, for example) except, of course, land reform, 
which KRRS initially opposed as a focus for a global campaign…
32
 
These tensions between different classes within La Via Campesina and their (at 
times) conflicting class interests also raises questions of internal movement 
dynamics, discussed briefly below. At the same time, Borras argues, the ‘mass base 
[of La Via Campesina] more or less represents sectors in the global North and South 
that are already economically and politically marginalised’, which is one of the most 
‘important unifying commonalities’ amongst its diverse membership.33 Borras 
delineates the class profile of La Via Campesina as including: 
(i) ‘landless peasants, tenant-farmers, sharecroppers and rural workers 
mainly in Latin America and Asia’, 
(ii) ‘small and part-time farmers located in (Western) Europe, North America, 
Japan and South Korea’, 
(iii) ‘family farms in the global South, including those in Africa as well as those 
created through successful partial land reforms, such as those in Brazil and 
Mexico’,  
(iv) ‘middle to rich farmers, mainly, but not solely, in India’, and 
(v) a ‘semi-proletariat located in urban and peri-urban communities in a few 
countries such as Brazil and South Africa’.34 
  
‘The most numerous, most vibrant and politically influential groups within La Via 
Campesina’, Borras says, ‘are the Latin American block, the (Western) European 
group and a few Asian movements’.35 The global campaigns that are run and 
prioritised reflect to an important extent the class interests of the dominant strata 
within the broader movement, as Borras notes with respect to trade liberalisation, 
and the lack of ‘worker-centred’ campaigns. Wages, as Borras points out, ‘are not 
favoured issues by middle and rich farmers’, who may indeed ‘be the oppressors of 
farmworkers’; and ‘land reform is an issue [likely] to be resisted by rich farmers’.36  
What this implies, in terms of my questions posed at the end of Chapter 2 regarding 
the convincing-ness of the Food Sovereignty movement’s normative proposals, is that 
while the farmer-centred focus of La Via Campesina has allowed it to grow rapidly 
amongst the constituencies outlined by Borras, the extent of its popular support 
amongst broader strata of the population is limited by its failure to date to articulate 
campaigns responding to the needs and priorities of workers, qua workers. This 
appears to be a key limitation and weakness of the Food Sovereignty movement, and I 
will return to it later in the thesis and in the conclusion.  
As one would expect of a movement with as diverse a membership as La Via 
Campesina, there are several ideological currents. Borras detects at least five: ‘(i) 
varying strands of radical neo-populists, (ii) various types of Marxists, (iii) radical 
                                                          
32 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 193; see also Borras 2008 op cit., noting that it was the Asian groups that 
managed to get LVC to launch a global campaign for agrarian reform, over the initial opposition of the 
KRRS.  
33 Borras 2008 op cit., 259, noting how this social base distinguishes LVC from the more politically 
conservative and Northern-based International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP).  
34 Ibid., 274. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid,, 277.  
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groups with anarchist tradition, (iv) radical environmentalists and (v) feminist 
activists’, which are evident both between different member organisations, and 
between different factions within some of the larger organisations such as the 
Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement (MST).37 As of 2008, the ‘dominant current’ 
amongst the global La Via Campesina leadership, according to Borras, was ‘a radical 
neo-populist tendency’, with representatives of the other four currents also 
included.38 As mentioned above, this ‘radical neo-populism’ is reflective of the 
‘ecological neo-Narodnism’ that La Via Campesina embodies.39 
Ideological divisions amongst peasant and farmer organisations within countries have 
been used, as noted in the case of India and the KRRS, to block other organisations 
from joining La Via Campesina.40 Further, one outcome of the dynamic with the KRRS 
was the formation of a new peasant movement in Asia – the Asian Peasant Coalition – 
with a membership based comprised of ‘the most destitute strata of the peasantry’.41 
While this ‘network has the potential to sharpen the class analysis and related 
demands of La Via Campesina’, relations between the two movements have been 
somewhat strained, although a dialogue exists through La Via Campesina members 
who are also members of the Asian Peasant Coalition.42  
There are two levels on which the issue of representativity needs to be tackled: the 
claims of La Via Campesina to be a ‘global’ movement; and the claims of national 
organisations and movements to represent ‘the peasants’ or ‘the farmers’ in their 
territories. As to the first, La Via Campesina has no membership as yet in China, 
Russia, the Middle East, North Africa or Central Asia; and as a result, its claims to be 
a ‘global’ movement do not stand up to serious scrutiny.43 To be fair, La Via 
Campesina’s principal slogan – ‘Globalise the struggle, globalise hope!’ – implicitly 
recognises the limited character of the movement as it stands, and the need to 
continually broaden its appeal, geographical coverage and numerical strength.  
                                                          
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Martinez-Alier 2011 op cit. Martinez-Alier traces the ‘ecological’ element of the ‘neo-Narodnism’, as 
seen in La Via Campesina’s slogan of recent years that ‘Small Farmers Cool the Planet’, has its origins in 
the study of the energetic flows of agriculture by Ukranian Narodnik activist and medical doctor S.A. 
Podolinsky; and in particular his argument that pre-fossil fuel agriculture was a net producer of energy 
(i.e. that it produced a positive ‘energy return on energy invested’, in the form of human and animal 
labour expended): ibid., 152-3.  
40 Ibid., 278-9. A similar dynamic also occurred in the Philippines, with two splits (1993 and 2000) in the 
Peasant Movement of the Philippines (KMP, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Philipinas) producing two new 
organisations. The first, the Demokratikong Kilusang Magbubukid ng Philipinas (dKMP, Democratic 
Peasant Movement of the Philippines) resulted in frosty relations with the KMP that hampered the 
effective functioning of La Via Campesina in the mid-1990s (Desmarais, op cit., 146). The second, 
UNORKA (National Coordination of Autonomous Local Rural People’s Organizations), also had difficult 
relations with KMP so that its requested membership of La Via Campesina was for many years blocked by 
that organisation: ibid. UNORKA is now a candidate member of La Via Campesina: 
http://www.viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=71, accessed 
21.9.11. 
41 Ibid., 279. 
42 Ibid.; Interview with Tejo Pramono, La Via Campesina Secretariat, Jakarta, 31.3.09. 
43 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 180; also interview with Tejo Pramono, La Via Campesina Secretariat, Jakarta, 
31.3.09. Pradmono advised that La Via Campesina is in discussions with farmer groups in Iran and in 
some Central Asian republics, but not as yet in China or Russia.  
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As regards the second, there are few, if any countries, where La Via Campesina 
members could claim to represent the majority of its ‘social base’: marginalised 
peasants (including rural labourers) and small farmers.44 Even its most politically 
active and influential member, the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement, is, by the 
admission of one of its founders, ‘very small’ as ‘an organized force of the [rural] 
workers in Brazil’.45 Thus, while La Via Campesina certainly has a presence in a 
significant number of countries and across a large diversity of rural groups, and can 
be regarded as more significantly representative ‘than any other transnational 
agrarian movement’, its direct representation of peasants and small farmers, and of 
landless rural workers, mean that it ‘represents only a small fraction of the global 
rural working classes (at least for now)’.46  
Thus, while its undoubted trajectory has been one of rapid growth and expansion in 
its short life to date, the representation of La Via Campesina is partial, both at the 
global and the national levels.47 This partiality of representation takes an acute form 
in the under-representation of important and large sectors of the rural working 
classes, such as migrant workers.48  
In terms of the research questions posed at the end of Chapter 2, the argument I 
pursue in the thesis is that the partially representative character of La Via Campesina 
limits its capacity to grow as a movement, in terms of popular support, numerical 
strength, and political credibility. As regards the existence and development of both 
a ‘national-popular’ strategy and a coherent social and political project that is 
capable of unifying all subordinate social classes and groups, the overwhelming 
prioritisation of the needs of small farmers reflects a corporatist or sectoral 
tendency. food sovereignty has the potential to contribute to the formation of 
effective ‘national-popular collective wills’ and, simultaneously, the emergence of a 
‘counter-hegemonic globalisation’, however further theoretical and political work is 
required for this potential to be realised.49  
The detailed consideration of La Via Campesina’s political and economic strategies 
and actions forms the subject of Chapter 5 and, as regards agro-ecology and forms of 
direct exchanges between producers and consumers, Chapter 7. At this stage I wish 
to do no more than briefly mention the principal strategies, and highlight those that I 
will consider in detail later in the thesis. What is evident is that La Via Campesina has 
had to adapt and be flexible with its campaigns and strategies, according to changing 
contexts and new expressions of accumulation by dispossession such as the expansion 
of agro-fuels and the phenomenon of ‘land-grabbing’. 
                                                          
44 Borras 2008 op cit., 280.  
45 Stedile, J.P., 2007, The Class Struggles in Brazil: The Perspective of the MST, in Global Flashpoints: 
Reactions to Imperialism and Neoliberalism, Socialist Register 2008, eds. Panitch, L., and Leys, C., 
Merlin Press, London, 195, quoted in Borras 2008 op cit., 280.  
46 Borras 2008 op cit., 280.  
47 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 183-4.  
48 Ibid., 185.  
49 On ‘counter-hegemonic globalisation’, see Evans 2008 op cit.; also Evans, P., 2005, Counterhegemonic 
Globalization: Transnational Social Movements in the Contemporary Global Political Economy in 
Janoski, T., Alford, R., Hicks, A., and Schwartz, M.A. (eds.), The Handbook of Political Sociology, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 655-676. 
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La Via Campesina has launched a series of global campaigns responding to particular 
needs and priorities of its membership, with a bias as noted towards small farmers 
and peasant producers. Consistent with its early (and continuing) focus on trade 
liberalisation, the first of these campaigns was ‘Get the WTO out of Agriculture’. 
Other prominent campaigns launched subsequently were the Global Campaign for 
Agrarian Reform, and the Campaign to End Violence against Women.50 La Via 
Campesina has made the struggle to end all forms of discrimination and violence 
against women a high priority, beginning with ensuring parity of gender 
representation at all levels of its internal decision-making structures.51  
While La Via Campesina has launched a total of seven campaigns of which food 
sovereignty is said to be one, every other campaign, to a greater or lesser extent, 
forms part of the expanding food sovereignty political, economic, ecological and 
cultural agenda. Food sovereignty is the systemic alternative that La Via Campesina 
and others are promoting to counter the further consolidation and expansion of the 
globalising capitalist food system. Hence the major focus in the thesis will be on food 
sovereignty, with other specific campaigns, such as agrarian reform, considered 
where appropriate.  
As discussed earlier and  below, the articulation of food sovereignty draws very 
heavily on narratives and discourses of rights, including historically-based 
understandings of peasants rights and justice; and the particular role that rights-
language plays in the emerging construction of what a number of scholars are terming 
‘agrarian citizenship’.52 Influenced by their growing Asian membership, La Via 
Campesina have now formalised the set of rights-based demands into a campaign for 
a new United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants. This campaign represents 
at once the centrepiece of the strategy to institutionalise food sovereignty as a policy 
framework at the international level; and, through its linkage with the existing 
institutional framework of the human right to adequate food, creates possibilities for 
enabling the implementation of food sovereignty at the national level. At the same 
time, human rights as a strategy for transformative political and economic change 
can be problematic.53  
                                                          
50 The Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform, launched in 1999, has been run jointly by La Via 
Campesina and the Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN): http://www.fian.org/programs-
and-campaigns/projects/global-campaign-for-agrarian-reform, accessed 28.12.11. The Campaign to End 
Violence Against Women was launched by La Via Campesina on 16 January, 2009: 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=668:via-campesina-
campaign-to-end-violence-against-women&catid=20:women&Itemid=39, accessed 28.12.11.  
51 See Desmarais 2007 op cit., 161-181.  
52
 Hannah Wittman in particular has developed the concept of ‘agrarian citizenship’ in recent years: see 
Wittman, H., 2009, “Reframing Agrarian Citizenship: Land, Life and Power in Brazil”, Journal of Rural 
Studies 25, 120-130; Wittman, H., 2010, Reconnecting Agriculture and the Environment: Food 
Sovereignty and the Agrarian Basis of Ecological Citizenship in Wittman, H., Desmarais, A.A., and 
Wiebe, N., 2010, Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community, Fernwood Publishing, 
Black Point, Nova Scotia; and 
Wittman, H., 2010a, ‘Reworking the Metabolic Rift: La Via Campesina, Agrarian Citizenship, and Food 
Sovereignty’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(4), 805-826. 
53 I explore these issues, which relate directly to several of the research questions posed at the end of 
Chapter 2, at some length in Chapter 5. 
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Together with other elements of the broad alter-globalisation movement, members of 
La Via Campesina have engaged in street protests and shadow summits accompanying 
major international meetings such as gatherings of the G8, the G20 and WTO 
Ministerials, in attempts to de-legitimise and ‘name and shame’ these state-led 
institutional embodiments of ‘neoliberal globalisation’.54 It members have also 
engaged in other forms of direct action at the national level, such as uprooting 
plantings of genetically modified crops, and occupations of idle lands in order to 
press claims for land redistribution.55  
As I indicated in my research questions at the end of Chapter 2, the formation of 
alliances is critical to the development and implementation of an effective ‘national-
popular’ strategy. La Via Campesina has developed alliances with a number of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), notably the ETC (Erosion, Concentration and 
Technology) Group, Friends of the Earth International, GRAIN, the Land Action and 
Research Network, and FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN), who have 
been able to provide specialist research and knowledge to support La Via Campesina 
campaigns and actions in fields such as genetically modified technologies, the human 
right to food, corporate concentration in food and agri-business, tracking the 
phenomena of land grabs, and monitoring the development of agro-fuels.  
At the national level, La Via Campesina member groups, and other like-minded 
peasant- and farmer organisations and movements, have entered into strategic 
alliances with some NGOs and urban-based consumer groups, with a view to pressing 
local, state and federal governments to adopt legislative and policy changes 
according to food sovereignty principles.56 What is notable, however, is the lack (to 
date) of alliances with trade unions and other organisations that represent the 
interests of workers in the food system; and this absence, as noted above, has 
important implications for the overall effectiveness of the Food Sovereignty 
movement, especially in countries like the United States and Australia, where 
farmers constitute such a small percentage of the total working population.57  
                                                          
54 Notably at the Third Ministerial of the WTO in Seattle in 1999: ibid., 111-114.  
55 In particular the KRRS undertook numerous forms of direct action against Cargill and Monsanto in 
India from 1992 onwards; and the MST has uprooted plantings of GM seeds in Brazil: ibid., 116-8. In 
Chapter 7 I discuss the MST and its articulation of ‘agrarian’ or ‘ecological citizenship’ amongst the urban 
unemployed in Brazil: see the references of Wittman in footnote 321 above. . 
56 In Chapter 5 I discuss recent political developments in Ecuador that such alliances are producing. 
57 There are signs that national-level expressions of the global Food Sovereignty movement are beginning 
to incorporate workers’ organisations into their core organising and political structures. The United States 
Food Sovereignty Alliance, for example, which was formed in 2010, includes amongst its core (founding) 
members the Food Chain Workers’ Alliance: http://www.usfoodsovereigntyalliance.org/about/member-
missions, accessed 28.12.11. The Food Chain Workers’ Alliance, formed in July 2009, is 
 [A] coalition of worker-based organizations whose members plant, harvest, process, pack, transport, 
prepare, serve, and sell food, organizing to improve wages and working conditions for all workers along the food 
chain…The Alliance works together to build a more sustainable food system that respects workers’ rights, based on 
the principles of social, environmental and racial justice, in which everyone has access to healthy and affordable food: 
http://foodchainworkers.org/?page_id=38, accessed 28.12.11. 
The Food Chain Workers’ Alliance currently has 13 member organisations, some of which are from the 
traditional US trade union movement (e.g. the United Food and Commercial Workers Union), and others 
are non-traditional labour-based organisations responding to the needs of immigrant and Latino 
populations, such as the Coalition of Immokalee Workers; and still others are NGO advocacy and legal 
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In parallel with political campaigns, forms of direct action and alliance-building, La 
Via Campesina has sought to cultivate relationships of discussion and negotiation with 
certain agencies of the United Nations, notably the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), the Human Rights Council, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, and the Committee on World Food Security.58 Managing these 
relationships requires sensitivities to the internal politics of the various agencies, 
which ‘pull in different directions’.59  
In terms of the articulation of economic alternatives, in recent years, and responding 
in part to the growing public clamour for effective action on climate change, La Via 
Campesina has been encouraging its members to embrace agro-ecological production 
methods; and on this basis has been making the political and ecological claim that 
‘small farmers cool the planet’.60 As discussed in Chapter 7, some member 
organisations, such as the Indonesian Peasant Union, are establishing agro-ecology 
training centres and demonstration farms in order to encourage their individual 
members to transition to these methods and away from reliance on chemically-based 
production. International meetings on agro-ecology are also now being facilitated by 
La Via Campesina; and agro-ecology is being promoted as a key component of food 
sovereignty.  
There is a growing amount of institutional and expert support gained by the vision of 
small-holder agro-ecology as perhaps the best means to feed the world in a socially 
just and environmentally sustainable manner.61 While by no means solely or even 
largely attributable to the efforts of La Via Campesina, this high-level recognition is 
potentially a significant achievement and reflects the fact that La Via Campesina is 
critically engaging with the common sense of the system, mapping out the contours 
of its own ‘good sense’, and expanding the ‘realm of the possible’. At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
defense coalitions, such as Brandworkers International, and Just Harvest USA: 
http://foodchainworkers.org/?page_id=7, accessed 28.12.11. 
58 Borras 2008 op cit., 267; Borras et al 2008 op cit. 172. In 2011, La Via Campesina was included with 
other groups as part of the Civil Society Mechanism participating with FAO member states, international 
institutions like the World Bank, and the private sector on the Committee on World Food Security: 
http://www.viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1099:la-via-
campesina-opposes-land-grabbing-at-the-un-committee-on-food-security&catid=23:agrarian-
reform&Itemid=36, accessed 21.9.11. 
59 Tejo Pramono, interview 31.3.09, commenting on the internal politics of the FAO, which he says ‘is not 
easy to handle for La Via Campesina’, given the tendencies within the FAO that wish to support the new 
Green Revolution proposed for Africa, and that advocate for the conclusion of the Doha Development 
Agenda of the WTO as a ‘solution’ to global food security issues.  
60 La Via Campesina, 2009, ‘Small Scale Sustainable Farmers are Cooling Down the Earth’, 
http://viacampesina.net/downloads/PAPER5/EN/paper5-EN.pdf, accessed 21.9.11. This document drew 
on research presented to La Via Campesina by the New World Agriculture and Ecology Group, a cross-
disciplinary and inter-institutional research group with in the US, Canada, Mexico and Nicaragua: 2009, 
Effects of Industrial Agriculture on Global Warming and the Potential of Small-Scale Agro-ecological 
Techniques to Reverse those Effects, Nov 20, 2009, available at 
http://www.viacampesina.net/downloads/DOC/ViaNWAEG-10-20-09.doc, accessed 21.9.11. For a 
discussion of La Via Campesina as the embodiment of ‘ecological neo-Narodnism’, see Martinez-Alier 
2011 op cit.  
61 Much of the literature is assessed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Food, Olivier 
de Schutter, in his March 2011 Report: see United Nations, Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to 
Food, Olivier de Schutter, 2011, Agro-Ecology and the Right to Food, Report presented at the 16th 
Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/16/49).  
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there is, here as elsewhere, a risk of passive revolution and trasformismo, with the 
World Bank appropriating, in La Via Campesina’s view, the language of agro-ecology 
in order to legitimise its proposed market-led ‘solutions’ to the challenges of climate 
change through the promotion of an international trade and off-sets in soil carbon.62 
As regards the analysis of impact, in Chapter 2 I discussed the limitations of the Keck 
and Sikkink framework to analysing the effectiveness of transnational social 
movements; and in particular the privileging of ideological over structural change. 
This framework nevertheless has a limited utility as an initial step in assessing the 
counter-hegemonic potential of La Via Campesina and food sovereignty, because it 
provides an indication as to progress made in the critique of the prevailing common 
sense of the globalising capitalist food system and the articulation of a new good 
sense. Borras, Edelman and Kay conclude that La Via Campesina has had by far the 
greatest impact in framing debates and getting issues on the agenda of international 
actors, in relation to the Global Campaign on Agrarian Reform as on other issues.63 
While ‘little headway’, they say, has been made in the subsequent four stages 
outlined by Keck and Sikkink, they suggest that  
[I]t is possible that one of the most valuable aspects of La Via Campesina is [its] 
reframing the terms of relevant policy and political debates internationally, which in turn 
can help create a favourable context for (sub)national movements to actually make 
palpable gains.
64 
This observation, which points to the potentiality of food sovereignty as a framework 
for ‘counter-hegemonic globalisation’, is supported by the way in which food 
sovereignty is being institutionalised in the legal and policy frameworks of a number 
of countries.65 In Chapter 5 I discuss how this process is unfolding in the case of 
Ecuador. More generally, however, Borras, Edelman and Kay are prima facie right to 
state that La Via Campesina and the Food Sovereignty movement have thus far failed 
to shift the balance of forces at the global level to any significant extent in terms of 
the major goal of systemic transformation of the globalising capitalist food system. 
One way of measuring this is the degree to which rural de-population is taking place, 
as political-economic changes inherent to the capitalist ontology of alienation are 
causing peasants, small farmers and their surrounding communities to abandon the 
land and move to cities or to emigrate abroad. Although the situation is complex, and 
in certain places dialectical processes of ‘re-peasantisation’ may be said to be 
occurring, the clearest trend in most countries would appear to be ‘de-
peasantisation’, or more prosaically, ‘urbanisation’.66  
                                                          
62 La Via Campesina, 2011, ‘La Via Campesina Call to Durban: Soil Carbon is Not for Sale’, 
http://www.redd-monitor.org/2011/09/17/our-carbon-is-not-for-sale-via-campesina-rejects-redd-again/, 
accessed 21.9.11. See also Martinez-Alier 2011 op cit., who argues that La Via Campesina’s proposed 
‘solutions [to climate change] – small-scale agriculture based on agro-ecological production systems, 
underpinned by redistributive agrarian reform and integrated primarily into localised and regionalised 
markets – ‘have strong empirical and theoretical footing in the study of energy flows in agriculture by 
academics over many decades’: 157.  
63 2008 op cit., 271; Borras et al 2008 op cit., 190-1.  
64 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 191.  
65 See Evans 2008 op cit regarding counter-hegemonic globalisation.  
66 Re-peasantisation – literally an increase in the numbers of people living according to what might be 
87 
 
After the small island states, some of the most urbanised countries are those where 
the modernisation and industrialisation of capitalist agriculture is the most deeply 
entrenched: England and its former colonies.67 Worldwide, a significant historical 
milestone was passed in 2010 when, for the first time, a greater proportion of the 
world’s population lived in cities than in the countryside.68 While the speed with 
which this outcome came about is in part due to the rapid industrialisation and 
modernisation that China (and, to a lesser extent, India) has undergone since 1980, 
the deterioration in living conditions for many millions of small and peasant farmers 
across the South as a result of structural adjustment conditionalities, trade 
liberalisation and the spread of industrial-scale monocultures has also played a key 
role in driving the rural-urban population shift.  
As a result of these multiple and reinforcing dynamics, farm populations have 
dwindled dramatically in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and are likewise falling in many 
other places. Today less than 2% of the total US population are farmers; and the 
figure in Australia is less than 1%.69 The trend globally appears to be towards a 
decrease in the numbers of farmers in general, and small and peasant farmers in 
particular.70 It is for this reason that Nettie Wiebe regards the single biggest failure of 
La Via Campesina to date as being ‘the inability to hold ground (literally) as the 
displacement of small farmers and rural communities continues, and corporate 
concentration ramps up’.71 In other words, the balance of forces remains, prima 
facie, clearly in favour of the globalising capitalist food system.  
As regards the internal movement dynamics, transnational social movements such as 
La Via Campesina are not static and fixed entities; rather, as Borras, Edelman and 
Kay point out, they  
[A]re highly dynamic, undergoing surging and ebbing all the time…Movements may 
come and go, rise and fall, or strengthen but later weaken…
72 
                                                                                                                                                                          
understood as a ‘peasant mode of farming’ – is claimed by Jan ver der Ploeg (2008, The New Peasantries: 
Struggles for Autonomy and Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization, EarthScan, London), 
amongst others, to be increasing.  
67 In the United States, for example, only 7% of the population lived in cities in 1810; by 1900, that figure 
had risen to 33%; by 1950, to 64%; and by 1990, more than 75% of the total population lived in cities: US 
Census Bureau, Population: 1790-1990, Table 4, www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-
4.pdf, cited in Hesterman, O., 2011, Fair Food: Growing a Healthy, Sustainable Food System for All, 
PublicAffairs, New York, 8. According to one list of the world’s 204 states ranked according to levels of 
urbanisation, (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_urb-people-urbanization, accessed 22.9.11), 
Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada and the United States rank 18th (91%), 20th (90%), 
31st(86%), 39th (79%) and 44th (77%) respectively, with the percent of the population living in urban 
centres shown in brackets. 
68 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009, World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Division, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm, accessed 19.9.11. 
69 Ibid., 9. For Australia, see Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2006, Agriculture in Focus: Farming 
Families in Australia, Series 7104.0.55.001, which reported a drop in the number of farming families 
from 116,000 in 2001 to 101,000 in 2006. The percentage change in NSW from 2001-2006, was a drop of 
7.9%; across the country as a whole, the change was 9%. The rate of change was steepest in Queensland, 
which saw a drop of 13.1% in the total number of farming families in the State. 
70 See the discussion in Chapter 7. 
71 Interview with the author, 15.9.10.  
72 Ibid., 181.  
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Nettie Wiebe, one of the leading actors within La Via Campesina confirms this ‘ebb 
and flow’ dynamic within the movement: 
 [S]ometimes when we think that somewhere in the world we’re losing ground, 
elsewhere in another part of the world we’re in fact gaining ground. The stories out of 
Mexico [in 2010] are really quite terrifying, but the stories out of the [United] States, it 
seems there’s a bit of a reprieve on a few things there. So it’s an ebb and a flow, and we 
take courage from each other, which is of course one of the advantages of being part of a 
large network.73  
The same point is made by Tejo Pramono, confirming the nature of La Via Campesina 
(and therefore of the wider movement for food sovereignty) as a ‘process’, with 
national organisations ‘hav[ing] their ups and downs [and] not always growing’.74 A 
high priority over the next period, according to Pramono, is to ‘strengthen the 
regions [so that] they function well’.75 
Charting the rise and fall of the foremost of these coalitions, ASOCODE, Marc 
Edelman attributes their weaknesses to ‘two main sources’. In the first place, there 
were a series of internal difficulties: ‘political differences, disputes over resources, 
over-funding by cooperation agencies, and an emphasis on networking activity, rather 
than concrete gains’. Secondly, these movements were negatively impacted by 
external factors such as declining commodity prices and a reduction in the relative 
importance of agriculture, which led to a rural exodus and with it the draining of 
numerical strength, political influence and organisation capacities of the 
organisations that formed the base of ASOCODE, which formally ceased to exist in 
2005.76 Edelman notes that in a Central American panorama characterised by large 
waves of economic migration, the collapse of commodity prices and dependence on 
remittances, the prospects for the re-emergence of a newly invigorated transnational 
peasant movement in the region appear bleak.77  
Complementing this assessment, Jefferson Boyer argues that the construction of food 
sovereignty had no historical resonance in Honduras, unlike the term ‘food security’ 
which, due to historical associations with struggles for land security, meant that ‘the 
                                                          
73 Interview with the author, 15.9.10. One of the earliest examples of the ebb and flow dynamic in La Via 
Campesina was the exit of ‘one of the key founders of La Via Campesina’, UNAG from Nicaragua, 
shortly after La Via Campesina was established, to return to the more politically conservative and 
establishment-oriented International Federation of Agricultural Producers. Another was the disintegration 
of the previously powerful transnational peasant coalitions of Central America which had been so 
instrumental in the establishment of La Via Campesina from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s: Borras et al 
2008 op cit., 179, who note that one of the many points of distinction between LVC and IFAP is that IFAP 
collaborates with the troika of international financial institutions (the World Bank, IMF and WTO), 
whereas LVC adopts a confrontational stance towards them: 188. Regarding the departure of UNAG, 
Borras states that as a member of IFAP, it had a ‘closer affinity to fellow middle to rich farmers…and to 
issues more concerned about government support services, production and trade issues, and credit facility 
via bilateral and multilateral donor agencies’, which put it in direct class opposition with ‘the concerns of 
another Nicaraguan founding organization’, the ATC (Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo, 
Farmworkers’ Association). The ATC was much more focused on issues to do with ‘wages and land’: 
2008 op cit., 276. 
74 Interview with the author, 31.3.09.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Edelman 2008 op cit., 235, 242-5. 
77 Ibid., 251.  
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very word seguridad [had] a central place in the campesino’s cultural lexicon on key 
words’.78 These associations, dating from the ‘developmentalist’ era of the 1950s and 
1960s, explicitly linked ‘food security’ with the goal of national self-sufficiency in 
basic foodstuffs.79 Boyer’s assessment was that ‘beyond the national leadership ranks’ 
of the main peasant organisations, Via Campesina’s campaign for food sovereignty 
‘had not reached [rural peasant communities] in a deliberate, systematic way’, 
largely because the local leaders ‘were not sufficiently convinced’ that it better 
responded to their needs that ‘the older food security [development] trope’.80 In 
terms of my research questions, clearly these issues bear on the mobilising capacity 
of food sovereignty in terms of its movement-building potential. As discussed below, 
Via Campesina no longer juxtaposes food security and food sovereignty in strict 
oppositional terms, but rather argues that the latter is the route to the former.  
Food sovereignty 
Food sovereignty has been analysed and interpreted from a variety of perspectives by 
scholar-activists and scholar-farmers who would, in Gramscian terminology, be 
regarded as constitutive of the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the Food Sovereignty 
movement. In the succeeding discussion I consider a range of these perspectives, 
which begin to convey some sense of both the theoretical breadth and depth, and the 
practical political import, of this new framework for understanding social relations 
around food and agriculture. These perspectives allow me to deepen the exploration 
of certain aspects and practices of the Food Sovereignty movement that I pursue in 
Chapters 5 and 7. In the process, they help me to answer the research questions set 
out in Chapter 2 regarding the role played by the organic intellectuals as regards the 
critique of the common sense of the globalising capitalist food system, as well as to 
delineate the components of the alternative social and political project that food 
sovereignty represents, and the extent of its coherence.  
First, however, I want to locate the – formal and institutionalised - emergence of 
food sovereignty in 1995, as a self-consciously and ‘very politicised’ farmer- and 
peasant-discourse, juxtaposed to the prevailing ‘productivist’ and free trade-oriented 
food security discourse of the globalising capitalist food system.81 Since then it has 
broadened further to become potentially the foundation of a systemic alternative.  
While originally it was very clearly differentiated from a particular language of food 
security, Wiebe explains that food sovereignty is in fact a necessary condition for 
‘genuine food security’:  
We say, and I think there’s growing evidence for this, that you won’t have food security 
in the long run without food sovereignty. The sustainability and control of the system has 
to accrue to you, or you will never be food secure. So we say that a necessary condition 
of food security is food sovereignty, but not as oppositional in the first instance [when] 
we were we trying to delineate this alternative radical vision. We had to juxtapose it, we 
had to set it out there. Now you’ll see it’s our objective to broaden, deepen and examine 
                                                          
78 Boyer, J., 2011, ‘Food Security, Food Sovereignty, and Local Challenges for Transnational Agrarian 
Movements: the Honduras case’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(2), 319-351, 323.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid., 332.  
81 Interview with Nettie Wiebe, 15.9.10. 
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from many perspectives what food sovereignty might look like, and how we can discuss it 
in different contexts.
82  
Before considering some of those perspectives below, it is worth briefly recalling the 
key elements of the content of food sovereignty in its first formulation by La Via 
Campesina during the shadow summit to the 1996 World Food Summit held in Rome.83 
In the first place, food sovereignty was expressed to be a national right of self-
determination as regards food production capacity, as well as a means of satisfying 
the basic individual human right to adequate food. The achievement of food 
sovereignty was claimed to depend to an important extent on peasants and small-
scale producers, especially women. For these groups, food sovereignty claimed the 
right to redistributive agrarian reform; the right to the means of, and resources for, 
production; the right to produce food staples for their countries; the right to 
adequate incomes; and the right to be free from all forms of violence. The right to 
produce food further implied a right of environmental stewardship in peasants and 
small farmers. As discussed earlier, these rights, insofar as they touch on questions of 
access to resources, redistribution and questions of reciprocity, have their origins in 
long-standing traditions of peasants’ rights and justice.84  
The implementation of these rights, and therefore of food sovereignty, required a 
number of measures. First, there had to be a reconceptualization of the nature of 
food, as ‘first and foremost [a] source of nutrition, and only secondarily an item of 
trade’. Each nation should therefore, according to La Via Campesina, ‘prioritize food 
for domestic consumption and food self-sufficiency’. Secondly, the ‘dumping’ of 
agricultural commodities had to end, and proper regulation of food prices established 
in order to ensure that they ‘reflect[ed] the true costs’ of production. Thirdly, food 
production should not be driven by the need to earn foreign currency to pay interest 
on debts; and debt forgiveness was required. Fourthly, the growing power of 
transnational corporations over agricultural policies had to be curtailed, via ‘the 
regulation and taxation of speculative capital and a strictly enforced Code of Conduct 
for transnational corporations’.  
Finally, La Via Campesina asserted the need to democratise the ‘United Nations and 
related institutions’ so that ‘peasants and small farmers, and rural women in 
particular, have direct input into formulating agricultural policies at all levels’. This 
claim was based on the universal rights ‘to honest, accurate information and open 
and democratic decision-making’, which in turn formed ‘the basis of good 
                                                          
82 Ibid. See also Schanbacher, W., 2010, The Politics of Food: The Global Conflict Between Food Security 
and Food Sovereignty, Praeger, Santa Barbara, California, who argues that 
[A] critical analysis of the food security and food sovereignty models reveals fundamental antagonisms between 
the way hunger and malnutrition are conceived within these two constructs. Ultimately, the food security model 
is founded on, and reinforces, a model of globalization that reduces human relationships to their economic 
value. Alternatively, the food sovereignty model considers human relations in terms of mutual dependence, 
cultural diversity, and respect for the environment: ix.  
83 La Via Campesina, 1996, ‘The Right to Produce and Access to Land’, Position of the Vía Campesina on 
Food Sovereignty presented at the World Food Summit, 13-17 November, Rome, 
http://www.viacampesina.org, reproduced as Appendix E. 
84 See the previous discussion on the ‘moral economy of the peasant’.  
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governance, accountability and equal participation in economic, political and social 
life, free from all forms of discrimination’.85 
The content of food sovereignty therefore draws very heavily on human rights. This 
includes rights that are already recognised in the international human rights corpus, 
such as the right to adequate food, and the right to freedom from discrimination; and 
many others that are not, such as the right to redistributive agrarian reform, the 
right to the means of production, and the right to produce for one’s country. This 
second set of rights, into which the majority of the rights mentioned above fall, are 
rights claims rather than rights per se.86 Their assertion, which builds on historical 
traditions of peasants’ rights and notions of justice, forms a key political strategy of 
La Via Campesina, as seen in the efforts to advance through the United Nations a 
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants. These claims, most of which are expressed in 
the form of the assertion of collective rather than individual rights, are an important 
part of the process of building class solidarity, and a shared identity and vision; and 
therefore their assertion is fundamental to building movement strength.87 At the 
same time, the Declaration in its entirety can be understood as the assertion of what 
political philosopher Hannah Arendt termed ‘the right to have rights’; the praxis of 
claiming rights, Arendt argued, was fundamental to the recovery of human dignity for 
marginalised and oppressed peoples.88 In terms of my research questions, then, this 
campaign appears to bring significant organisational and movement benefits, quite 
apart from any institutional and policy change that it may produce.  
The firm assertion of a ‘peasant identity’ and an associated set of rights can be seen 
a contemporary expression of the basic historical antagonism between capitalism and 
the peasantry. In his 2009 book, provocatively entitled Food Wars, written in the 
wake of the many food riots precipitated by extreme volatility in commodity markets 
during the first half of 2008, activist-scholar Walden Bello argues that the neoliberal 
restructuring of agrarian relations since 1980, in the form of structural adjustment 
loan conditionalities and trade liberalisation, constitutes a sharp intensification of a 
centuries-long conflict, which he terms ‘Capitalism versus The Peasant’.89 Capitalist 
agriculture, he suggests, regards the peasantry as an obstacle to its appropriation of 
land and other resources in order to expand production for export; and those 
peasants who cannot or will not make the transition to become capitalist farmers 
                                                          
85 Ibid.  
86 The construction of rights claims on the basis of social struggles reflects a ‘socio-political’ rather than a 
‘liberal-legal’ understanding of human rights (see Estevez, A., 2008, ‘A Latin American Sociopolitical 
Conceptualization of Human Rights’, Journal of Human Rights, 7, 245-261) and owes much to the Latin 
American and Asian membership of La Via Campesina.  
87 Panitch, L., and Gindin, S., 2010, Capitalist Crises and the Crisis This Time, Socialist Register 2011, 
Merlin Press, Pontypool, 17.  
88 Arendt, H., 1973, Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt, New York, 293, cited in J.C. Isaac, 1996, ‘A 
New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights’, American 
Political Science Review, 90(1) 61-73, 63; also Arendt, H., 1958, The Human Condition, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago,1958, discussed in Isaac, op cit., 64-5; Parekh, S., 2007, ‘Resisting “Dull and 
Torpid” Assent: Returning to the Debate Over the Foundations of Human Rights’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 29, 754-778, 776; also Helis, J., 2008, ‘Hannah Arendt and Human Dignity: Theoretical 
Foundations and Constitutional Protection of Human Rights’, Journal of Politics and Law, 1(3), 73-78. 
89 Bello, W., The Food Wars, Verso, London, 37.  
92 
 
should be, and are being, expropriated.90 As discussed in Chapter 6, the global ‘land-
grab’ phenomenon represents an intensification and acceleration of this historical 
dynamic. Yet even as capitalist agriculture appears poised on the verge of its final 
triumph in this epic struggle, it is, Bello says, increasingly mired in intractable crises, 
many of which are of its own making, and it is rapidly losing legitimacy.91 Who ends 
up as victor in the Food Wars, according to Bello, ‘will be determined by which 
paradigm of production can better bring about food security’.92 In Phillip McMichael’s 
terms, this is  one of the most important achievements of Via Campesina and the 
broader Food Sovereignty movement to date: the re-framing of the classic ‘agrarian 
question’, from one concerned with the class allegiances of a dying peasantry, to one 
which problematises the very foundations of the capitalist food system, and claims 
for a ‘recharged peasantry’ the right to produce food ecologically and sustainably, 
and thus reproduce global society.93 
While Bello’s shorthand depiction of the ‘global peasantry’ as a single and 
homogenous, unified class, is clearly inaccurate, bearing in mind the discussion 
above, it is nevertheless the case that La Via Campesina has managed to achieve a 
significant measure of movement unity and even an internationalised cross-class 
consciousness and shared identity around a broad conceptualisation of ‘peasant’ as 
‘people of the land’, as Nettie Wiebe explains: 
Are we Canadian farmers ‘people of the land’? Well, yes, of course. And it’s important to 
take that language back…We too are peasants and it’s the land and our relationship to 
the land and food production that distinguishes us…We’re not part of the industrial 
machine. We’re much more closely linked to the places where we grow food and how we 
grow food, and what the weather is there…
94
  
Here Wiebe is alluding to what Peter Rosset terms the ‘food-producing vocation’ of 
the farmers allied with La Via Campesina and the Food Sovereignty movement; and 
the distinction between this and the ‘export vocation’ of transnational agribusiness.95 
As well as forging class consciousness, solidarity and a strong sense of a unified 
political project, the introduction and use of distinctions and contrasts such as these 
by ‘organic intellectuals’ of the movement like Wiebe and Rosset play an important 
role in critiquing the common sense of the system, and developing the new ‘good 
sense’ of food sovereignty. The sense of connectedness and solidarity amongst 
diversity is intangible, but as an indicator of consciousness and critical awareness it is 
an essential ingredient in a long-term struggle to shift the balance of forces:  
                                                          
90 Ibid., 35.  
91 Ibid., 36.  
92 Ibid., 15. In Bello’s view, history, ecology and morality are firmly on the side of the ‘global peasantry’ 
which are ‘becoming what [Marx] said the working class would become: a “class for itself”, or a 
politically conscious force’: 18. 
93 McMichael 2008 op cit., 213.  
94 Desmarais op cit., 195, quoting Wiebe in Edelman, M., 2003, Transnational Peasants and Farmers 
Movements and Networks, in Glasius, H.M., and Kaldor, M., (eds), 2003, Global Civil Society Yearbook 
2003, Oxford University Press, London, 187.  
95 Rosset, P., 2009, ‘Fixing our Global Food System: Food Sovereignty and Redistributive Land Reform’, 
Monthly Review, 61(3). 
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To stand…and to walk shoulder to shoulder with people who all recognise that what 
we’re struggling for here are sustainable, nutritious, locally-based, empowering systems 
of farming, and that that’s key to all of us, that’s a tremendous strength…The hardships 
that we suffer, and the joys we have, don’t look the same, but…they’re very real in our 
own context. That kind of solidarity, generated of course by the political necessity of 
standing in solidarity with each other, has been just a powerful, powerful dynamic 
internationally. And it has sometimes surprised us in La Via Campesina just how powerful 
that has been.
96 
Class and transnational solidarity, though clearly necessary, will not on their own be 
enough to achieve the desired transformation in the globalising capitalist food 
system: sustained, strategic political action is required; and crucially, from the 
Gramscian perspective, the articulation of a universal project which engages not just 
the ‘global peasantry’ but growing numbers of all subordinate classes in many 
countries, especially those of the global North. However, in talking about the ‘crises 
of capitalism’, as Bello does, there is a risk of a sense of teleology creeping in; of 
assuming that the ‘converging crises’ – financial / economic, climate, energy, food, 
legitimacy – will inevitably result in the collapse of capitalist industrialised 
agriculture, and (perhaps) of the capitalist system itself.97 In the same vein, senior 
Via Campesina researcher Tejo Pramono states that  
[W]ith the financial crisis, and the energy crisis, and the climate crisis, we feel that the 
whole model of [capitalist] industrial agriculture is collapsing…it cannot survive. I believe 
that [the capitalist powers] will finish with difficulties to maintain the system…It might 
be that the crises will worsen. I hope that that will happen, so that they will have to 
change.98 
Capitalism has faced and overcome many crises previously, even deep ‘structural 
crises’ such as that we appear to be in at present.99 The resolution of these crises, 
and the forms that such resolutions take, are highly contingent on a number of 
factors, not least the character and force of the political interventions by the 
subordinate classes.100 As discussed below in relation to the local food movement in 
Australia, there are risks that discourses of the ‘local’, ‘transition’ and 
                                                          
96 Interview with the author, 15.9.11.  
97 Bello has developed over the past decade his thesis of ‘de-globalization’, which he describes in relation 
to capitalist agriculture as follows:  
Today, the global economic crisis has derailed the globalist project and inaugurated an era of de-globalization. 
Industrial agriculture has not only been overtaken by a crisis of legitimacy that has been spreading for some 
time but the global production and supply chins that it is built on might now wither away…with the collapse of 
the global economy, the integration of production and markets that has sustained the spread of industrial 
agriculture is going into reverse: 2009 op cit., 38, 36.  
98 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 31.3.09.  
99 Panitch and Gindin op cit., 5, mentioning three previous structural crises: the long depression of the last 
quarter of the 19th century, the ‘more concentrated Great Depression of the 1930s’, and ‘the decade-long 
‘stagflation’ of the 1970s: 5.  
100 Panitch and Gindin, and many other writers on the left in the industrialised countries, emphasise what 
they believe will be the decisive role played by the ‘Western working classes’ in the resolution of the 
current crisis. In particular, they believe that the question as to ‘whether there can be a radical redefinition 
of what is meant by standards of living in the context of working-class struggles, both in the North and the 
South, is now on the agenda as never before’; and in particular that there is a need to advance demands 
which challenge the commodification logic of capitalism and the capacity of people ‘to act independently 
of it’, such as universally-available and free public transport: ibid., 16-17.  
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‘sustainability’ could be co-opted in one possible resolution of the crisis which would 
see current austerity programmes extended and made permanent as part of the 
reconfigurations of scarcity leading to a ‘transition’ to an ostensibly ‘green and 
sustainable’, though still capitalist, still globalising, and still profoundly unequal, 
food system.  
Such an outcome would be a clear case of both passive revolution (elite-led change) 
and trasformismo (co-option). Any movement with counter-hegemonic pretensions, 
having generated an initial momentum and attracted substantial popular support, 
needs to be capable of building on such beginnings; and be wary of the risk that its 
dynamism and radicalism might be channelled in mild reformist directions that 
support the existing hegemonic power formations. According to David Harvey, one of 
the world’s foremost Marxist geographers and political economists, and a close 
observer of capitalism and its crises over several decades, the task of ‘disparate 
political movements, transcending barriers of space and time’, is clear if they 
genuinely wish to move to a post-capitalist society: 
Capitalism will never fall on its own. It will have to be pushed. The accumulation of 
capital will never cease. It will have to be stopped. The capitalist class will never 
willingly surrender its power. It will have to be dispossessed.101  
As regards transformation in the globalising capitalist food system, two of the 
pathways to achieving this, both of which form key pillars of the Food Sovereignty 
movement, are clear: redistributive agrarian reform which expropriates large 
landowners and makes land available to small-scale producers; and re-orientation of 
production for domestic consumption rather than export, with mechanisms to ensure 
fair returns for producers. These two measures alone, if widely implemented, would 
significantly challenge the logic of commodification and ceaseless expansion of 
production that underpin the globalising capitalist food system. At the same time, 
they would represent democratically achieved reconfigurations of scarcity, 
responding to immediate and longer-term social needs; and thereby enhancing the 
movement for economic democracy.102  
At the level of theory, other organic intellectuals of the Food Sovereignty movement 
argue that it has a distinct and unique philosophical grounding which implies, in 
terms of my research questions, that it has begun to ‘expand the realm of the 
possible’.103  
Food sovereignty, however, is not merely the philosophical basis of La Via Campesina 
as a transnational agrarian movement. Its framers intend it to ground and enable a 
concrete political praxis, namely the strategies and actions necessary to defend and 
valorise peasant producers and small farmers in the face of the capitalist 
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in Ecuador. 
103 This draws explicitly on Philip McMichael’s argument that food sovereignty represents a particular 
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transformation of rural landscapes and social relations; and potentially the 
transformation, and supersession, of capitalist agriculture itself. Its content is based 
on a series of existing rights and numerous rights claims, as well as a series of values 
statements and principles that flow from its peasant ontology and epistemology. Is it 
possible, though, to pin down a ‘core’ of food sovereignty? 
As it has developed in various iterations since 1996, the different formulations of 
food sovereignty have accumulated certain omissions and contradictions. 
Unsurprisingly, as the Food Sovereignty movement has gained in strength and political 
efficacy, it has begun to attract a number of critics, some of whom joined forces in a 
recent issue of the ATDF Journal in an apparent effort to demolish the claims of food 
sovereignty to offer a politically, socially or economically viable path out of the 
impasse in which the global food system is mired.104 At one level, a fair portion of 
these critiques consist in ad hominem attacks against some of the leading activists 
and proponents of food sovereignty, as well as numerous appeals to emotion, 
ridicule, cherry-picking, unjustified generalisations, ignoring counter-factual 
evidence, and the creation of several straw man arguments. For example, Philipp 
Aerni describes the first UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Zeigler, as  
A self-styled intellectual with no competence in the field of food policy whatsoever 
but many friendship ties to the dictators of socialist authoritarian regimes in Africa 
and Latin America. His rigid socialist ideology has not budged an inch since the 1970s. 
The enemy is capitalism and the salvation lies in communism.105  
This ad hominem attack is not incidental, but is rather central to Aerni’s main 
critique of food sovereignty, which runs more or less as follows: food sovereignty is 
an out-dated left-wing ideology whose main proponents are affluent environmental 
activists in Europe. These people fail to understand the ‘realities’ of farming in sub-
Saharan Africa; and as a consequence they are seeking to impose a misguided agenda 
of national food self-sufficiency on poor peasant farmers based on the utopian ideal 
of the human right to food. This will likely lead to famines, as happened under Stalin 
and Mao, and is happening now in North Korea and Zimbabwe.106 Further, food 
sovereignty has become a ‘lifestyle phenomenon’ which ignores the harsh fact ‘that 
agriculture has always been a fight against nature’.107 The affluent European 
proponents of food sovereignty are also ‘anti-science’ and, in their ‘[anxiety] to 
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ATDF Journal 8 (1/2), 4-9; Aerni, P., 2011, ‘Food Sovereignty and Its Discontents’, ATDF Journal 8 
(1/2), 23-40. 
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defend their privileged lifestyles’, are denying the multiple benefits of biotechnology 
to the world’s poor farmers.108 
The linkage between food sovereignty, food self-sufficiency, protectionism, and 
famine is central to Aerni’s critique, as it is to the shorter critiques of Douglas 
Southgate and William Kerr.109 For them, the conclusion is clear: free trade and 
further liberalisation of agricultural markets are the only proven path to food 
security.110 In many respects, Aerni and his colleagues have caricatured the food 
sovereignty position, intentionally creating a straw man which they then knock down 
by raising the bogey man of communism. Nowhere in the food sovereignty literature 
or policy demands are there any calls for complete autarchy and total opposition to 
trade, and much less for the forced collectivisation of Stalin. Rather, there is 
opposition to contemporary ‘free trade’ which, as amply documented, ‘has 
concentrated enormous wealth in the hands of very few people, while ushering in 
policies that have worsened the lives of several billion [others]’.111  
Further, in claiming that communism was mainly responsible for famines and excess 
mortality in modern times, Aerni and his colleagues ignore the historical record of 
contemporary mass famine under the WTO free trade regime, which has clear 
historical antecedents in the ‘late Victorian holocausts’ brought about the British free 
trade regime in the latter decades of the 19th century.112 Of course no-one would 
question the brutality of the horrifically failed attempts at collectivisation by Stalin 
and Mao, but this type of cherry-picking and straw man argumentation substantially 
detracts from the validity of Aerni et al’s critique.  
Indeed, their stance of ‘free trade’ advocacy and the claim that food sovereignty is 
merely re-hashed ‘old protectionism’ which will undermine food security and create 
more suffering, is further undermined in the article of Ramesh Sharma, which 
appears in the same issue of the journal.113 Sharma notes that 
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[T]he positions articulated by the food sovereignty side are increasingly guiding 
national policy responses to the price spikes in the global food sector. This is revealed 
by the renewed national focus on food production, higher targets for food self-
sufficiency, increased attention to small farmers and to inequities in their access to 
productive and national resources as well as markets.114 
Sharma goes on to suggest that there is an emerging consensus amongst development 
economists, and within international institutions, that effective policies to improve 
the lot of small farmers are central to achieving poverty- and hunger-reduction 
objectives.115 Prima facie this speaks to the constructive and effective engagement 
by the food sovereignty movement with the intensifying tensions of the globalising 
capitalist food system. It contradicts the argument that food sovereignty is simply the 
revival of a tired and discredited ideology, and should therefore be rejected.  
What the critiques do reveal however is that there is a certain lack of clarity in the 
articulation of food sovereignty which renders it vulnerable to these sorts of distorted 
presentations. Sharma makes this point well in calling on food sovereignty advocates 
to do more to demonstrate the practical effectiveness of its principles, and how they 
can be incorporated into national policy documents:  
In order to fill the gap between rhetoric and reality, advocates of food sovereignty 
need to come up with empirical evidence and studies on best practices to convince 
policy makers and other stakeholders in the respective countries that they have a 
coherent and detailed approach that can be clearly written in national policy 
documents such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as well as trade and 
agricultural policies.116 
As I discuss in Chapters 5 and 7, there are now examples of the incorporation of food 
sovereignty principles into national laws and institutions, notably in Ecuador and 
Venezuela.117 Further, there are numerous examples, some of which are also 
empirically documented, of the multiple benefits of the practical implementation of 
food sovereignty principles in the form of food localisation and regionalisation 
initiatives. Nevertheless, Sharma’s point is well-made, and more work remains to be 
done on these issues.  
Other omissions and contradictions relate to the class composition and biases of La 
Via Campesina, as noted earlier. For example, the structural inequalities and 
potential conflicts between farm owners and farm workers are effaced, and the call 
for ‘new social relations free of oppression and inequality between [inter alia] men 
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made by ACT-based filmmaker Simon Cunich: http://www.growingchange.com.au/, accessed 20.2.12. 
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and women’ sits uncomfortably alongside the eulogising of the family farm, bearing in 
mind that ‘the family is one of the oldest factories for patriarchy’.118 These 
contradictions might be resolved, Raj Patel argues, by recognising that there are 
certain preconditions to the substantive realisation of the rights claimed by food 
sovereignty. In particular, he says, the ‘right to shape food policy’, implies a 
commitment to a ‘radical egalitarianism’; and operationalizing this envisages a 
‘society in which the equality-distorting effects of sexism, patriarchy, racism and 
class power have been eradicated’.119 It is this ‘radical egalitarianism’, Patel 
suggests, which lies at the ‘core of food sovereignty’.120 
What does ‘radical egalitarianism’ actually mean in practice? Patel says that his 
‘interpretation doesn’t pre-empt others, nor does it set in stone a particular political 
program’.121 Similarly Nettie Wiebe emphasises national variability in the practical 
evolution of food sovereignty:  
[O]ne of our strategies around food sovereignty is to try to deepen, in radical ways, what 
kind of an alternative this offers to our current system. The practical application of that 
is very diverse and very challenging... we have to be constantly struggling to re-define it, 
and make it concrete in our own context.
122 
The emphasis on diversity of local cultures and conditions is fundamental, and a key 
point of differentiation with the epistemic and material violence of the globalising 
capitalist food system, as Wiebe states:  
The model of food sovereignty is very deliberately a model that isn’t global. In a very 
real way, it respects the diversity of conditions, situations, ecosystems, and cultures; 
that have grown up, and are indigenous to, various areas of the world. One of the huge 
problems of the globalised, liberalised trade system is that it erases diversity, and 
therewith erases the possibility of long-term sustainability.
123 
What Wiebe doesn’t acknowledge here is that the attempts by La Via Campesina to 
institutionalise food sovereignty, most notably via the proposed Declaration on 
Peasants’ Rights, is precisely a ‘global model’; namely, the creation of universal and 
binding norms via the human rights mechanisms of the United Nations. Yet while the 
normative framework is global – the universalisation of the ‘moral economy of the 
peasant’ – its concrete application in different societies can take into account 
cultural diversity. Amongst other things, what we can see here is a very self-
conscious form of ‘social ecological thinking’; namely, that, just as sustainable 
ecosystems are those that are bio-diverse, sustainable social systems must also be 
based on ‘biological, cultural, political and agricultural’ diversity.124 This raises the 
general question as to what are the conditions in which such diversity can be 
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119 Ibid., 194.  
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121 Ibid., 195.  
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guaranteed; and the specific question as to whether this diversity is possible in a 
capitalist system. Patel’s ‘radical egalitarianism’ raises these questions more or less 
directly. A society in which ‘class power, racism, sexism and patriarchy have been 
eradicated’ will, almost by definition, not be a capitalist society, since a capitalist 
society is by its nature one in which economic and (to a lesser extent) political power 
are concentrated in the capitalist class by virtue of its ownership and control over the 
means of production.125 
Ecological thinking and new forms of social relations free of oppression bring directly 
into consideration the research questions I posed at the end of Chapter 2, in the 
application of my neo-Gramscian political ecology, especially as regards the 
intellectual work of expanding the realm of what is politically possible, in the context 
of a widening ecological or metabolic rift.126  
Having posed the existence of such a rift, the question, from progressive and radical 
political perspectives, then becomes how individuals and social collectivities can 
begin to heal it. It is at this point that the political praxis of food sovereignty and La 
Via Campesina as a ‘movement in action’, based on an emerging, peasant-led 
ontology of connectedness, becomes significant. Hannah Wittman, using the concept 
of the metabolic rift as a point of departure, suggests that the grounded praxis of La 
Via Campesina member organisations such as the land occupations, formation of 
producer cooperatives and building of communal schools undertaken by Brazilian the 
Landless Workers Movement (MST) since its formation in 1984, constitutes the 
embodiment and enactment of an ‘agrarian citizenship’.127  
Agrarian citizenship, says Wittman, ‘goes beyond traditional or liberal conceptions of 
rights linked to individual property, production or possession’.128 Instead, it proceeds 
from an ‘ecological rationality’, not an ‘economic rationality’, and ‘recognize[s] how 
the political and material rights and practices of rural dwellers are integrated into 
the socio-ecological metabolism between society and nature’.129 For Philip 
McMichael, agrarian citizenship ‘involves the re-territorialisation of states through 
the revitalization of local food ecologies under small-farmer stewardship, in the 
interests of society at large’, based on the right of small farmers ‘to produce society 
                                                          
125 Peet and Hartwick op cit., 200-201, summarising the Marxist critique of capitalist modernity: 
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and manage local resources’.130 It is precisely the widening of the ecological rift 
under the globalisation of capitalist agriculture, says Wittman, that is creating both 
the necessity and the opportunity for food sovereignty, as practiced in diverse, 
grounded forms of agrarian citizenship, to differentiate itself from the capitalist 
‘laws of motion’ that cause the rift.131 However, while the conceptualisation and 
practice of agrarian citizenship may be ‘interests of society at large’, the issue 
remains as to whether it is actively constructed as a universal project, so as to 
ground the formation of a national-popular collective will, or whether it remains 
limited to the corporate and sectoral interests of small farmers.  
Agrarian citizenship is a key form of the grounded praxis of food sovereignty. Central 
to the rights claims that form the basis of agrarian citizenship (and food sovereignty) 
is the right to exercise control over the means of production of food: land, water, 
and crucially, seeds. Without ‘seed sovereignty’ – ‘the right of the peoples to 
recover, defend, reproduce, exchange, improve and grow their own seed’ – the ‘full 
realization of food sovereignty’ will be impossible.132 Actualising seed sovereignty 
means both resisting the growing corporate control over seed through the expansion 
of intellectual property rights, as discussed in Chapter 6, and the recovery and 
continuation of the traditional practice of saving and sharing seed at the local level. 
As discussed below, seed saving is also a common feature of local food initiatives in 
countries such as Australia.  
Seed-saving is one component of agro-ecology: ‘the application of ecological 
concepts and principles to the design and management of sustainable agro-
ecosystems’.133 Agro-ecology captures a range of production and design 
methodologies, such as nutrient and energy recycling, integration of crops and 
livestock, species diversification and taking a ‘whole-of-system’ approach rather than 
a reductionist focus on a single species.134 Together with redistributive land reform 
and localised food systems, agro-ecology forms one of the three foundational pillars 
of food sovereignty.  
Farmer autonomy and self-determination lie at the centre of the philosophy of agro-
ecology. This methodology of production is explicitly intended to reduce farmer 
dependence on purchased external inputs such as seed, agri-chemicals and fossil 
fuels, because its aim is to build ‘agricultural systems in which ecological interactions 
and synergisms between biological components provide the mechanisms for the 
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134 United Nations, Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, 2011, Agro-
Ecology and the Right to Food, Report presented at the 16th Session of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, A/HRC/16/49. 
101 
 
system to sponsor its own soil fertility, productivity and crop protection’.135 As such, 
it arguably poses a direct challenge to the further consolidation and expansion of the 
globalising capitalist food system, which is premised on what rural sociologists have 
termed the decades-long tendency towards ‘appropriationism’, that is, ‘the process 
by which corporate agribusiness reduces the importance of nature in farm 
production’, and thereby generates multiple opportunities for capital accumulation 
and profit.136 Appropriationism is an expression of how the capitalist food system 
patterns configurations of scarcity to the benefit of agribusiness; agro-ecology 
disrupts such configurations by (re-)connecting farmers with a natural economy of 
abundance.  
Agro-ecology as a genuinely liberating practice should not be simplistically confused with 
certified organic production, or fair trade labels, both of which have been quite 
comfortably reinserted within the circuits of the globalising capitalist food system. 137  
La Via Campesina has had to shift from an early singular focus on trade liberalisation 
to embrace a wider range of emerging issues. Key among these has been climate 
change. La Via Campesina have attempted to use this issue as an opportunity to 
reinforce their critique of the common sense of the system and to add further 
substance to their emerging good sense of food sovereignty.138 Hence in 2009, in 
advance of the Copenhagen Climate Change negotiations, they advanced their claim 
that ‘small farmers are cooling the planet’.139 Central to this claim is emerging 
research which demonstrates that agro-ecological production techniques which 
restore soil fertility by increasing levels of organic matter, and thus soil carbon, has 
the potential to sequester significant amounts of greenhouse emissions from the 
atmosphere.140  
I will discuss these matters at more length in Chapters 6 and 7. At this stage I wish to 
note briefly two further important aspects about agro-ecology and its underpinning of 
food sovereignty as a potential counter-hegemonic project. First, the success of agro-
ecological methods is fundamental, not just to the claims about climate change, but 
to the underlying question of whether small-scale farmers can feed the planet. A key 
                                                          
135 Altieri 2010 op cit.  
136 Goodman, D., Bernardo, S., and Wilkinson, J., 1988, From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory of 
Agro-Industrial Development, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, cited in Pfeffer, M.J., 1992, ‘Sustainable 
Agriculture in Historical Perspective’, Agriculture and Human Values, 9(4), 4-11. As I discuss in Chapter 
7, Max Pfeffer is sceptical of the extent to which ‘sustainable agriculture’ does actually pose a challenge 
to appropriationism: ibid., 10. 
137 As Altieri notes:  
Organic farming systems that do not challenge the monocultural nature of plantations and that rely on external 
inputs and expensive foreign certification seals and fair-trade systems destined only for agro-export offer very 
little to peasants and small farmers, who become dependent on external inputs and foreign and volatile markets: 
Altieri 2010 op cit. 
 See also Jackson, P., Russell,P., and Ward, N., 2009, The Appropriation of ‘Alternative’ Discourses by 
‘Mainstream’ Food Retailers, in Maye, D., Holloway, L., and Kneafsey, M., (eds.), 2009, Alternative Food 
Geographies: Representation and Practice, Elsevier, Kidlington, Oxford,  
138 Martinez-Alier 2010 op cit. 
139
 Ibid.; La Via Campesina, 2009, ‘Small Scale Sustainable Farmers are Cooling Down the Earth’, 
http://viacampesina.net/downloads/PAPER5/EN/paper5-EN.pdf, accessed 21.9.11.  
140 Ibid., GRAIN.  
102 
 
part of the common sense of the globalising capitalist food system is that only large-
scale, industrialised agriculture for export is capable of meeting the food demands of 
a growing world population. Agro-ecology poses a direct challenge to such claims.141 
To the extent that this challenge is well-founded, it will significantly advance the 
political credibility of the global movement for food sovereignty.  
Secondly, in the past few years as it has developed its thinking and campaigning 
around sustainable farming and climate change, La Via Campesina has held two 
‘Continental Encounters’ of Agro-Ecology Trainers in La Via Campesina.142 The 
Declarations produced following these meetings are notable for their increasing 
radicalism; they represent a qualitatively significant development in food sovereignty 
compared to earlier formulations mentioned above. In the first place, the cause of 
the multiple crises is explicitly identified as the ‘capitalist system’, rather than 
simply ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘neoliberal globalisation’; and its multiple contemporary 
forms of accumulation by dispossession, such as land-grabbing and mining, are named 
and denounced.143  
In the second place, ‘peasant, indigenous and community-based agro-ecological 
farming [which] reduce[s] dependence on the capitalist system’ is explicitly stated to 
be ‘a cornerstone in the construction of food sovereignty’, whereas previously there 
were only general and somewhat vague statements about the need for ‘sustainable 
farming’. Thirdly, agro-ecology is stated to be ‘vital’ in ‘people’s struggles’ for a 
post-capitalist society, ‘whose final aim is not accumulation’; indeed, ‘true’ agro-
ecology is said to be ‘part of a socialist project’ and is said to be incompatible with 
the capitalist system. Going forward, these agro-ecology trainers of La Via Campesina 
commit themselves to the construction a reflexive analysis on the basis of a ‘dialog 
among [their respective indigenous] cosmovisions’, as ‘complemented by a historical 
materialist and dialectical interpretation of reality’; with the aim of ‘liberating’ 
themselves and ‘achieving buen vivir for [their] peoples’.144 
Thus, from its emergence as (primarily) a denunciation of liberalised agricultural 
trade in 1996, food sovereignty has rapidly evolved to the point where it is 
increasingly identified, both by the organic intellectuals of the movement as well as 
the praxis of La Via Campesina member organisations and its more militant 
individuals, with an explicitly post-capitalist, neo-socialist project. Its transformative 
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ambitions do not appear to be in doubt. What remains to be seen is whether they 
stand any prospect of being achieved. To a significant extent, that depends on what 
is happening in countries that form the core of the globalising capitalist food system, 
led by the United States. With that in mind, I turn to consider my second case study, 
the local food movement in Australia.  
The local food movement in Australia 
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, food sovereignty contains a number of 
significant philosophical and political commitments. In terms of its practical 
implementation, the re-localisation of food systems, including the establishment of 
mechanisms that enable direct, or near-direct, exchanges between farmers and urban 
residents, features prominently in many articulations, as well as in thinking of leaders 
and strategists of the movement. In other words, food sovereignty strategists appear 
to have in mind, at least partly, democratically-constructed food localisation as a 
cornerstone in the practical enactment of food sovereignty principles. In this section, 
I consider some ways in which local food is being practised in two sites of eastern 
Australia: the Coffs Coast region of the state of New South Wales; and Brisbane, the 
capital of the state of Queensland.145  
In Chapter 2 I discussed recent scholarship seeking to problematise the politics and 
practices of food localisation, raising questions as to the extent of its progressive or 
non-progressive character. These debates lead to a wider issue, which is of central 
importance for this thesis: namely, what is the transformative potential of local food? 
For some observers, such as Clare Hinrichs, it is clearly limited, ‘represent[ing] 
modest socio-economic, cultural and environmental shifts in encouraging 
directions’.146 Melanie DuPuis, David Goodman and Jill Harrison see significant 
transformative potential, but this is contingent on the local food movement rejecting 
‘defensive localism’ and a ‘problematic communitarian discourse of social justice’ 
centred around a ‘perfectionist politics’ represented by imposed standards such as 
organic labelling, in favour of a reflexive, egalitarian localism built on ‘the imperfect 
politics of process’.147 Amongst other things, a reflexive localism would not impose 
rigid ‘economic boundaries between a particular “here” and a global “there”, but 
[would] engender and deepen [local food movement activists’] connections with the 
people who live nearby’.148 These scholars also point to the need for local food to 
expand access to healthy food for much broader numbers of people, which in their 
view will mean going ‘beyond the creation of farmers’ markets and CSAs [to] explore 
more democratic food provisioning processes, including public procurement policies, 
consumer cooperatives and community food schemes’.149 From this perspective, the 
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local food movement and related initiatives needs to adopt a more explicit and 
inclusive commitment to a universal and democratically-constructed sense of social 
justice, which arguably could be grounded in a politicised understanding of the right 
to food.  
Others, pointing to what they see as the de-commodifying and de-reifying practices 
of the movement, as well as the creation of new ‘commons’ spaces and opportunities 
for self-provisioning, are more optimistic about its transformative potential.150 The 
capacity for local food institutions such as community gardens and Food Policy 
Councils to strengthen civic engagement, build community through strengthening 
social capital, and foster a more politicised number of ‘food citizens’ are cited as 
evidence of transformation.151 As to how and when such transformation might take 
place, there is general consensus that change will be incremental, achieved through 
‘pragmatic’ and ‘reflexive’ politics of negotiation, debate and engagement.152 
Consistent with an approach that sees local food as a social movement, Starr 
observes, in terms strikingly reminiscent of the La Via Campesina insiders Nettie 
Wiebe and Tejo Pramono quoted above, that ‘we would understand its promise as a 
participatory process and long-term dialogue’, with the focus of the inquiry on its 
‘trajectories and expansions’, rather than ‘what it has done’.153 With such a focus in 
mind, and explicitly conceiving the local food movement as part of the wider Food 
Sovereignty movement, I now turn to a brief discussion of the local food case studies.  
Local food on the Coffs Coast 
As with Food Connect (see below), I have found myself in the role of participant-
observer in the development of a local food movement on the Coffs Coast since 2008. 
I co-founded the Bellingen Local Food Network in late 2007, then the Coffs Coast 
Local Food Alliance and the Bellingen Community Gardens Association in 2008. 154 I 
also co-coordinated the Bellingen Local Food Film Festival in 2008-9, and then the 
Coffs Coast Local Food Film Festival in 2010-11, as well as the Coffs Coast Permablitz 
programme from 2010-12. This case study is based accordingly on my lengthy and 
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intensive degree of personal involvement, as well as conversations and semi-
structured interviews with numerous local residents, farmers, growers, educators, 
and providers of emergency food relief. Consistent with the ‘reflexive, egalitarian 
localism’ proposed by DuPuis and her colleagues, as well as a dialectical approach to 
both action and research, I offer through this case study my own critical reflections 
on this movement.  
The first point that should be noted is that, compared to other expressions of the 
local food movement in Australia and beyond, the ‘movement’ on the Coffs Coast as 
such is in its relative infancy. Its antecedents date back to the late 1990s, with the 
establishment of the Bellingen Growers Market and the Coffs Regional Organic 
Producers Organisation (CROPO), and the Coffs Growers Market in 2004. Short-lived 
experiments with community gardens at different private sites in Bellingen occurred 
in 2000-1 and again in 2003-4.  
These were discrete, disconnected initiatives. The intentional launching of something 
that could be regarded as a ‘movement’ took place in late 2007, with the 
establishment of the Bellingen Local Food Network. From 2008 onwards, the level of 
activity, and the numbers of groups involved, increased considerably. The first 
Bellingen Local Food Film Festival was held in early 2008. Later that year the Coffs 
Coast Local Food Alliance was established (see below), as well as the North Bank 
Road Community Garden in Bellingen (again on private land), the Bellingen Seed 
Savers Network, the Dorrigo Green Life Style Group, the Nambucca Valley Local Food 
Network, Transition Bellingen, and an informal shared gardening arrangement on 
private land involved eight families. In 2009 the second Bellingen Local Food Film 
Festival was held, and a draft Coffs Coast Local Food Futures Framework was 
produced; also Permablitz Bellingen, the Bellingen Environmental Youth Experience, 
and the Coffs Regional Community Gardens Association were established. 2010 saw 
the planting of an edible streetscape, consisting of 16 citrus trees, on the entry into 
Bellingen, as well as the holding of a Permablitz at the Bellingen Primary School, the 
first Coffs Coast Local Food Film Festival, and the launching of the region’s first 
vegie-box scheme, Bello Food Box. In 2011 the Community Gardens were established 
at the Bellingen and Bowraville High Schools, and a new Bellingen Permaculture 
Collective was formed.  
All of this activity is occurring in a region with a long agricultural heritage, with the 
Coffs Coast historically being a major banana-growing region of Australia, from the 
1930s to the early 1970s.155 Today the region produces the majority of Australia’s 
blueberry crop.156 The other main agricultural activities are dairy and beef cattle 
farming, intensive forms of horticulture such as Lebanese cucumbers and roma 
tomatoes, and niche markets in some certified organic lines, such as Russian garlic 
and pecan nuts.157 As banana production dwindled with urban expansion and 
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competitive pressures from the heavily mechanised and large-scale tropical banana 
industry in North Queensland, thousands of small growers either abandoned fruit 
growing or diversified into other crops, such as blueberries, avocadoes and lychees. 
The pressure to diversify continues as produce from other regions in Australia 
squeezes the ‘window’ available to producers on the Coffs Coast.158  
Other than the small number of growers who sell into the Coffs and Bellingen 
growers’ markets and the small-scale ‘Bello Food Box’, as well as a few local 
wholesalers who attempt to source local produce to meet the demand of their 
business customers, the bulk of the produce is shipped out of the region to the 
central markets in Sydney and Brisbane, and to the centralised distribution centres of 
the major supermarkets. From there, a percentage (not measured) will find its way 
back to retail outlets on the Coffs Coast, consistent with the standard practice for 
food distribution in Australia. 
The Coffs Coast Local Food Alliance, and related initiatives such as the Coffs Coast 
Local Food Film Festival, Coffs Coast Permablitz, and the Community Gardens 
Associations in Bellingen and Coffs Harbour, came into existence as a result of a 
funding opportunity made available through the NSW State Government. To a certain 
extent, the aims and objectives of these initiatives are driven by the priorities of the 
funder and Coffs Harbour City Council, as the lead body in the Alliance, which centre 
on general environmental awareness-raising and education, and ‘sustainable living’, 
with a particular focus on climate change adaptation and mitigation. The individuals 
participating in the various project activities share these motivations, as well as 
others such as the desire to eat well, to achieve a measure of self-reliance, and build 
greater levels of food security; as well as (amongst a minority) ideological 
considerations regarding the structure of the food system in Australia, which is 
dominated by the two major supermarkets.  
Many of the groups are linked to broader national and international networks. The 
Bellingen Local Food Network identified itself with the broader global movement for 
food sovereignty. The community gardens are part of growing national and 
international phenomena. The Seed Savers Network is part of a wider Australian and 
international network, which, as noted earlier, links to the movement for seed 
sovereignty, an element of food sovereignty. Permablitz originated in Melbourne in 
2006 and has spread around Australia; Transition initiatives began a year earlier in 
England, and have now spread to over two-dozen countries, albeit located exclusively 
in North America, Western Europe and Australasia.159 Both Permablitz and Transition 
have their roots in permaculture, which originated in Australia in the late 1970s and 
has also spread internationally.160 Farmers’ markets and CSAs likewise constitute 
growing national and international phenomena.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/productsbyCatalogue/950D33073DC81695CA25745F0020
5C9A?OpenDocument, accessed 15.2.11.  
158 For example, the commercial growing of potatoes on the Dorrigo plateau, a traditional form of 
agriculture for decades, has declined rapidly in recent years. 
159 http://www.permablitz.net/, accessed 15.9.10; http://www.transitionnetwork.org/projects/map/, 
accessed 26.9.11. 
160 http://www.permacultureaustralia.org.au/, accessed 26.9.11. 
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In terms of socio-economic composition, consistent with local food movements 
elsewhere, and localisation movements generally in the developed world, the 
participants in the embryonic Coffs Coast local food movement are overwhelmingly 
white, and mostly middle class. There is for example no involvement as yet of the 
sizeable African immigrant community in Coffs Harbour, nor of indigenous 
communities. Nor has any effort yet been made to work with emergency providers of 
food relief in the region, who serve individuals and families living at or below the 
poverty line. The lack of engagement to date with these groups is consistent with the 
movement reflecting generally middle class concerns about sustainability and 
resilience, with little attention being paid thus far to questions of social justice and 
access to healthy food for under-served communities. In these respects, the 
movement would seem, for the most part, to be a clear manifestation of ‘defensive 
localism’ critiqued by Melanie DuPuis and her colleagues.161  
As regards its trajectories, the movement has expanded rapidly in a short period. It is 
probably no coincidence that the year of most rapid growth was 2008, when several 
major events occurred internationally, including: a food price crisis and food riots; a 
spike in oil prices that generated widespread discussion of Peak Oil; and the onset of 
the Global Financial Crisis.162 As all these tendencies seem to be re-emerging, albeit 
in different forms, in late 2011 and 2012, it is reasonable to expect that the numbers 
of people taking an interest in local food in the region will continue to grow.163  
 
Much work remains to be done in terms of deepening and broadening the movement, 
and in creating democratic structures that enable participation from many more 
stakeholders in the food system such as farmers’ representatives and emergency 
providers of food relief. There have been proposals and discussions around the 
establishment of a Small Farms Centre and a regional Food Policy Council, however 
no resourcing is yet available for such initiatives. The Local Food Alliance is perceived 
as largely driven by Coffs Council and project-specific, and this has acted as a 
disincentive to the involvement of groups and individuals not connected with the 
funded project. This raises questions as to what will become of the Alliance once the 
funding ends in July 2012. The extent of institutional support for the movement is 
also uncertain, with many local councillors unconvinced of the benefits or merits of 
local food, as distinct from ‘traditional’ agriculture for distribution via centralised 
market structures, or for export.  
The Food Connect model of community-shared agriculture in Australia 
Community-shared or community-supported agriculture is a principal means by which 
local farmers and their supporters in rural and urban communities have attempted to 
redress the inequalities and irrationalities of the capitalist food system.164 When La 
                                                          
161 DuPuis et al 2006 op cit. 
162 As Gavin Bridge argues persuasively, from the perspective of critical political ecology and economy, 
the conventional and popular way in which Peak Oil is theorised and understood as a ‘simple’ matter of 
‘below-ground’ physical constraints on supply is problematic: 2011 op cit. I discuss this further in Chapter 
6.  
163 This trend will be reinforced by the fact that, after two years of delays, the community gardens in Coffs 
Harbour and the Bellingen High School have now been established. 
164 Feagan, R., and Henderson, A., 2009, ‘Devon Acres CSA: Local Struggles in a Global Food System’, 
Agriculture and Human Values, 26, 203-217.  
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Via Campesina speaks of localised food systems and forms of direct exchange 
between farmers and consumers, this is the type of model they most frequently have 
in mind. A community-supported agriculture initiative is 
[G]enerally defined as a localized food production and consumption system, organized to 
share farming risks between producers and consumers, practice ecologically sensitive 
forms of food production, and contribute to building community and educating the 
shareholders about agricultural processes and realities through their participation.165  
Traditionally, a group of consumers – usually called ‘shareholders’ or ‘subscribers’, 
will agree to invest in the farm for a growing season, spreading the costs of farm 
operation, including a fair return for the grower, between themselves; and receiving 
in return a weekly box of farm produce.166 This form of exchange is portrayed in the 
community-supported agriculture and local food literature as representing a de-
commodification of food and food-based relationships, which clearly distinguishes it 
from the anonymous cash nexus of capitalist market exchanges.167  
This model of food distribution originated in Japan in the mid-1960s as teikei, which 
means ‘cooperation’, and is often translated as ‘food with a farmer’s face on it’.168 
From there, it spread to Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
where it has so far achieved the largest impact in terms of an exponential growth in 
the number of community-supported agriculture initiatives.169  
Like the local food movement on the Coffs Coast, I am involved with Food Connect in 
a professional and personal capacity. I met the founder of the Brisbane-based Food 
Connect enterprise, Robert Pekin, in mid-2009, in my project work with the Coffs 
Coast Local Food Alliance. Since then I have worked with Robert in the Food Connect 
Foundation, established in 2010 to further certain strategic objectives, notably the 
piloting in Australia of farmland trusts as a mechanism to protect prime farmland 
from continued urban sprawl. So as with the Coffs Coast local food movement, my 
qualitative research with Food Connect takes the form of participant observation. 
While my degree of familiarity may impact to some extent on the ‘objectivity’ of my 
observations, they are enriched by my unparalleled access to Robert Pekin over 
several years, the high degree of trust that exists between us and, as a result, the 
                                                          
165 Ibid., 203.  
166 Ibid., 204.  
167 Ibid., 204-5; Hinrichs, C.C., 2000, ‘Embeddedness and Local Food Systems: Notes on Two Types of 
Direct Agricultural Market’, Journal of Rural Studies, 16, 295-303; Jacques, S., and Collins, L., 2003, 
‘Community-Supported Agriculture: An Alternative to Agribusiness’, Geography Review, 16(5), 30-33.  
168 Japanese Organic Agriculture Association, ‘TEIKEI System – Producer-Consumer Co-partnership, 
‘"Teikei" is an idea to create an alternative distribution system, not depending on the conventional market. 
Though the forms of "teikei" vary, it is basically a direct distribution system. To carry it out, the 
producer(s) and the consumer(s) have talks and contact to deepen their mutual understanding: both of 
them provide labor and capital to support their own delivery system. In this system they usually set 
delivery stations, where the nearest consumers of 3 to 10 families can get the delivered products. The 
Japanese organic agriculture movement started with this "teikei" system. "Teikei" is not only a practical 
idea but also a dynamic philosophy to make people think of a better way of life either as a producer or as a 
consumer through their interaction’: http://www.joaa.net/english/teikei.htm#ch3-1, accessed 25.9.11.  
169 The United States had a few dozen such initiatives in the mid-1980s, and by 2008 that number had 
risen to 1,500, with 12,549 farms participating, according to the 2007 US Agricultural Census: see: 
Feagan and Henderson op cit., 204; http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/csa/csa.shtml, accessed 25.9.11. 
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detailed understanding I have developed of the Food Connect ‘journey’ over time as 
an ‘insider’, that would not have been possible as an ‘impartial’ researcher 
conducting one or two time-limited interviews. It is for these reasons that I have 
selected Food Connect as a case study for this thesis.  
As I discuss in Chapter 7,  Robert Pekin is a ‘failed’ dairy farmer, having lost his 
father’s property in the context of the commercialisation and de-regulation of the 
Australian dairy industry in the mid-1990s. As he describes it, his path to recovery, or 
redemption, came in the establishment of a small-scale, single-farm community-
supported agriculture initiative on a piece of land he leased from a supportive farmer 
near Hobart. At the time, Pekin had no financial resources, and the arrangement he 
came to with the farmer had many elements of what Brazilian author Euclides Mance 
calls a ‘solidarity economy’170:  
I said I’d run [the paddock] as a [community-supported agriculture initiative], and I 
explained it to him. And he said, what is it, some kind of communist thing? And I said, no, 
I don’t think it’s that, it’s just a new model of farming, it’s from the philosophy of social 
engagement, it’s a risk-sharing opportunity for subscribers and farmers. So he let me 
have the paddock for six months, rent-free, free electricity and free water, as long as I 
worked a day a week for him. It was a great deal.171  
Pekin built the garden by hand, driven by passion, rather than any expectation of 
personal financial gain. He obtained part-time work at a fish-farm, and used his 
wages to pay for the materials and plants for his market garden. He began by growing 
salad vegetables and leafy greens, selling them on the side of the road, and to local 
cafes and restaurants with whom he made contact, ‘while we built up the 
subscription model’. In keeping with the principles of agro-ecology, and in order to 
have sufficient variety to make up an attractive box of produce, Pekin diversified his 
production to the maximum extent possible.172  
Consistent with the philosophy of ‘seed sovereignty’, Pekin also began to collect and 
propagate his own seed, with the help of a local grower, knowledgeable in those 
techniques. After he returned to Colac for a month’s visit to repair relations with his 
father and to speak to former dairy farmer colleagues interested in diversifying along 
the community-supported agriculture lines, he left his Hobart venture to the local 
people, and began a five-year journey (1999-2004) travelling round Australia working 
with farmers to help them set up community-supported agriculture initiatives.  
He managed to help establish nine community-supported agriculture initiatives in 
Western Australia, New South Wales, Tasmania, Queensland and Victoria. However, 
by 2004, Pekin could see that while a great deal of enthusiasm had been generated 
around the concept, its success in practice was at best mixed. Most of the initiatives 
he had helped established, as well as others that had been established 
                                                          
170
 Mance, E.A., 2007, ‘Solidarity Economics’, Turbulence, 1, available at: 
http://turbulence.org.uk/turbulence-1/solidarity-economics, accessed 5.11.11. I discuss this concept briefly 
in Chapter 7 and the Conclusion to the thesis.  
171 Interview with the author, 30.10.11.  
172 “I grew 70 different types of vegetables. Within those types, I’d have another 7-8 varieties of carrots, 
and 12 varieties of tomatoes, and 20 varieties of garlic. Cos’ I wanted to know what would grow on the 
farm, and be most productive”: Interview with the author, 30.10.11  
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independently, were folding. Pekin, who by that time was ‘heavily invested in the 
[community-supported agriculture] movement worldwide’, concluded that two 
crucial steps were needed in the Australian context to make the model viable.173 
First, it had to be implemented as a multi-farmer, rather than a single-farmer, 
model, so that the burden of growing the produce didn’t all fall on the one farmer. 
Secondly, it needed to be located within the capital cities, in order to access a larger 
market.174  
By this point (2004), Pekin had moved to Brisbane, was in the process of helping to 
establish two more community-supported agriculture initiatives in Beerwah, and was 
still giving talks to farmers and the public about the model. He was asked by a group 
of seven farmers in the Lockyer Valley to help them set up a multi-farmer 
community-supported agriculture venture, which would sell into Brisbane. The 
venture was set up and commenced operations, but it eventually fell apart due to 
internal conflicts amongst the farmers, and the bankruptcy of the lead farmer in the 
group.  
From the failure of this venture emerged Food Connect Pty Ltd. Food Connect is a 
hybrid of a single-farm community-supported agriculture initiative, because it brings 
together a larger number of farmers and growers, with a larger number of 
subscribers; and it does this by creating an intermediary social enterprise to facilitate 
the packing, marketing and distribution of the produce. Thus, Food Connect Brisbane 
obtains produce from about 70 growers, and provides weekly boxes of produce to 
around 1000 subscribers in Brisbane and the Gold Coast. 
Other key differences are that, unlike a traditional single-farm community-supported 
agriculture initiative, the subscribers are not obliged to invest in an entire growing 
season (typically six months). Rather, their minimum subscription period is four 
weeks, although Food Connect encourages subscribers to take out longer 
subscriptions if possible, and some do, up to a year or more in a few cases. Although 
there is not the direct, personal relationship with a single individual grower, Food 
Connect strives to retain the ‘community building’ and educational aspects of a 
community-supported agriculture initiative. To this end, a ‘Farm Letter’ is included 
with every box, profiling one of the supplying farmers, and offering recipes and 
suggestions for the produce. Food Connect also organises regular weekend-long farm 
tours to a few of the local farmers, so that subscribers can get to meet and know 
their farmers in person. 
In terms of the key successes and challenges of the model to date, according to 
evaluations by independent consultants, as well as the enterprise’s own data, the 
main successes include:  
                                                          
173 Robert’s visits to half a dozen of the community-supported agriculture initiatives which had folded 
revealed that the primary reasons for their failure were identified as it being ‘simply too hard to establish a 
community group, and to grow that many vegetables for a box’: interview with the author, 30.10.11. 
174 Interview with the author, 30.10.11. As a confirmation of the potential for symbiosis between theory 
and practice, Robert’s thinking about the multi-farmer model became ‘solidified’ after he read an 
academic article in which a scholar advanced the view that only this model would be viable in the longer-
term.  
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 increased farmer viability, with an average of 40-55 cents in each food dollar 
going back to the farmers and growers, as compared with 10-15 cents in the 
supermarket / central market system  
 improved health outcomes – Food Connect subscribers report an increase in 
their consumption of fruit and vegetables by as much as 50%; and children of 
subscribers report a higher level of familiarity with fruit and vegetables 
 being a source of inspiration for others around the country wanting to do the 
same (e.g. Bello Food Box, CERES Fair Food) 
 being regarded as a model of a sustainable social enterprise – reduced carbon 
and ecological footprints compared to mainstream food distribution175 
 
In its six years in operation, Food Connect has always struggled financially. Its 
survival has been due, to a significant extent, to the tremendous personal sacrifice 
and commitment of Robert Pekin, and also of a number of committed staff, who have 
worked for years at minimum wage rates.176 Food Connect was established with no 
start-up loans or grants from any source, and this has placed it at a disadvantage ever 
since. While it may be achieving good outcomes for its farmers, a number of whom 
have said they would have abandoned farming had it not been for Food Connect, its 
social justice outcomes in terms of its own workforce is much more debatable. 
A further substantial challenge has been the constant reality of subscriber ‘churn’; 
that is, an inability to retain large numbers of subscribers for the long-term. The 
churn rate has often reached levels as high as 80 or 90%, which has placed great 
pressure on Food Connect to market itself in order to continually attract new 
subscribers. Thus far, it has managed to do so, although the inability to deal with the 
churn situation must place question marks over the viability of this business model, 
which relies almost entirely on a single product line, in the long-term.  
Exit surveys conducted by Food Connect attribute the churn to the pervasiveness of 
attachment by former subscribers to the culture of consumer choice. That is, 
departing subscribers have simply got sick of receiving the same types of vegetables 
and fruit, week in and week out, in their boxes. One result is that some of the 
produce is left unused and then thrown away, leading subscribers to the conclusion 
that the service is not good value for money. Dealing with this attachment to choice, 
and the related lack of a culture of eating seasonally and locally, is a major challenge 
for Food Connect and similar businesses.177  
In 2010 Food Connect expanded into Sydney and Adelaide, with mixed results. Food 
Connect Adelaide started very well, but entered into a crisis after about nine months 
when it started experiencing high levels of churn. The Directors took the view that 
the company was insolvent, and closed its doors on 30 June 2011, after 
approximately 15 months’ operation. Food Connect Sydney started much more 
slowly, and has steadily increased its subscriber base over time. Food Connect Sydney 
also had the cushion of a $125,000 start-up grant from Social Ventures Australia.  
                                                          
175 Food Connect received a Banksia Sustainability Award from the Queensland Government in 2010.  
176 Interviews with Robert Pekin, Food Connect Founder, during 2010 and 2011.  
177 Interviews with Robert Pekin, Food Connect Founder, during 2010 and 2011. 
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As regards the socio-economic composition of Food Connect subscribers, market 
research for Food Connect has identified that the majority of its subscribers are 
female and fall with the demographic known in marketing jargon as LOHAS – 
Lifestyles of Health and Sustainability.178 According to the LOHAS Journal, this market 
segment includes from 13-19% of the US adult population and is worth $290 billion per 
year ‘for goods and services focused on health, the environment, social justice, 
personal development and sustainable living’.179 In Australia the LOHAS market is 
predicted to reach $27 billion by the end of 2011, and includes 11% of the adult 
population.180 Organic produce is known to be a LOHAS product, which means that 
LOHAS individuals will tend to be in the middle to upper income brackets. Thus, as 
with conditions for its workers, Food Connect has not, as yet, adequately addressed 
the issue of improved access to healthy food for lower socio-economic and 
marginalised groups. This places its social justice credentials under further scrutiny. 
 
In terms of the motivations and philosophy of the Food Connect founders, they 
clearly see themselves as ‘social entrepreneurs’. That is, they view themselves as 
innovative and inspirational individuals, working to achieve social change using a 
business approach.181 In this respect, their ideology is supportive of market 
capitalism, but a reformed version of it that consistently achieves a ‘triple bottom 
line’ result.182  
 
Robert Pekin also speaks enthusiastically about ‘associative economics’, a form of 
economic thought that seeks ‘to place human beings at the centre of all economic 
processes’.183 Associate economics is said to steer a ‘third way’ between free market 
capitalism and state-controlled socialism, in order to facilitate ‘the shift from 
competitive, national economies to the inherent dynamics of a single global 
economy’.184 The development of the field owes much to the economic thought of 
Rudolf Steiner, who is also regarded as the philosophical originator of community-
supported agriculture.185 The community-supported agriculture model and associative 
economics are linked in the following way by Gary Lamb:  
                                                          
178 See the LOHAS Journal: http://www.lohas.com/lohas-journal, accessed 25.9.11. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Phillips, S., 2010, ‘Everybody’s a greenie now’, 
http://www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2010/02/23/2827683.htm, accessed 25.9.11. 
181 One of the role models mentioned in conversation is Muhammed Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank 
and Nobel Peace Prize recipient for his role in empowering poor and marginalised women through micro-
credit loans: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Yunus, accessed 26.9.11.  
182 The ‘natural capitalism’ proposed by Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins is a recent 
outgrowth of this line of social entrepreneurial thought: 2011, Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next 
Industrial Revolution, Rocky Mountain Institute, Snowmass CO. According to its promotional website, 
Natural Capitalism ‘is the first book to explore the lucrative opportunities for businesses in an era of 
approaching environmental limits’: http://www.natcap.org/sitepages/pid5.php, accessed 29.12.11. 
183 http://www.associative-economics.com/, accessed 26.9.11. 
184 http://www.cfae.biz/associative-economics/, accessed 26.9.11.  
185 King, C.A., 2008, ‘Community Resilience and Contemporary Agri-ecological Systems: Reconnecting 
People and Food, and People with People’, Systems Research and Behavioural Science, 25(1), 111-124; 
Lamb, G., 1994, ‘Community Supported Agriculture: Can it Become the Basis for a New Associative 
Economy?’ Paper delivered at the 5th Annual Community Supported Agriculture Conference at Kimberton, 
Pennsylvania, available at 
http://socialrenewal.com/pdfs/CommunitySupportedAgriculture%5B2%5D.pdf, 26.9.11. 
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The most basic necessity of earthly life, food, can provide the starting point for moving 
from our present government-guided, production-driven market economy, which is based 
on competition, to an independent, associative economy based on consumer needs and 
conscious, rational decisions between producers and consumers.
186 
In such articulations community-supported agriculture initiatives and associative 
economics are understood to be pointing towards a co-operative, post-capitalist 
future society and economy. Thus, one of the most potentially transformative 
elements of the community-supported agriculture model is said to be the way in 
which it facilitates a direct dialogue between farmers and ‘eaters’ as to what should 
be grown, and how much, to meet everyone’s needs; as opposed to production being 
driven by considerations of profit.187 Food Connect, however, as a hybridised version 
of a community-supported agriculture initiative, does not facilitate such a direct 
dialogue between its farmers and its subscribers. 
As regards possible future directions and trajectories, although it has managed to 
survive in a marketplace dominated by cultural assumptions of ‘cheap food’ and 
‘endless consumer choice’ all year-round, Food Connect has in its short life struggled 
to stabilise, let alone grow significantly. When expansion came in the form of new 
operations opening in Adelaide and Sydney, the fact that one of these failed in little 
over a year prompts the question: how viable is the business model in Australian 
conditions? At a time when farmers’ markets are experiencing strong growth across 
the country; when new community gardens are similarly coming into existence on a 
regular basis; and when the LOHAS market segment is expected to grow 
exponentially, in theory there should be a growing demand for the sort of ‘ethical’ 
and ‘socially and environmentally conscious’ buying relationship that Food Connect 
offers. One thousand subscribers a week in a market place of several million potential 
customers is clearly not going to make any serious inroads into the established retail 
distribution system in Australia for fresh food. Hence prima facie the Food Connect 
model is doing little – in strict economic terms – to shift the balance of forces within 
the Australian capitalist food system and so contribute to the wider counter-
hegemonic struggle. 
While box schemes can grow to large sizes – Riverford Organic Vegetables in the 
United Kingdom delivers 47,000 boxes a week, after starting with local deliveries to 
30 people188 - Food Connect has not experienced the sort of growth that might 
indicate that it will scale up significantly. This raises the question as to how the local 
food movement can achieve a greater economic and social impact, an issue that has 
been recognised and discussed in North America.189 One of the approaches being 
developed and implemented there is the concept of a multifunctional Regional Food 
Hub, which provides essential infrastructure in the local food supply chain in the form 
of an aggregator and distributor of local produce.190 Preliminary research undertaken 
                                                          
186 Op cit.  
187 Ibid. As discussed in Chapter 2, the profit imperative invariably points towards maximisation of 
production, with all the associated social and ecological tensions that flow from this dynamic. 
188 http://www.riverford.co.uk/about_riverford/, accessed 26.9.11. 
189 Mount op cit.  
190 Barham, J., 2011, Regional Food Hubs: Understanding the Scope and Scale of Food Hub Operations, 
Preliminary Findings from a National Survey of Regional Food Hubs, United States Department of 
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by the US Department of Agriculture has found that over 100 such food hubs now 
exist in the United States, most established since 2006; and with a significant 
percentage having explicit social justice mandates.191 
By selling to local businesses such as restaurants, independent grocers and 
institutions such as schools, hospitals and aged care centres, these hubs arguably 
represent a more secure and resilient business model than household vegetable box 
schemes like Food Connect. They also have considerable potential to reach a much 
greater scale of operation than the traditional community-supported agriculture 
initiative. As discussed in Chapter 7, the concept is now under consideration by local 
governments and health departments in some areas of Australia. There are questions 
as to how and whether the potentially transformative elements of the community-
supported agriculture model, as outlined above, might be retained in a Food Hub 
operation; and I will address these in Chapter 7. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Agriculture Marketing Service.  
191 Average annual sales approach $US1 million; the average number of business customers that each hub 
serves is 40; the average number of jobs each hub creates is 13; and more than 40% of hubs are working 
in ‘food deserts’ to increase access to fresh and healthy produce to under-served and vulnerable 
populations: ibid.  
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Chapter 4 
The political-institutional context 
“[T]he world as a whole is not poor...malnutrition exists and persists because of the 
powerlessness of the poor and the indifference of the rich...On the whole, the rich really 
don't care much about the poor...We do not yet have a strong community at a global level. 
Many poor people, and even entire countries, are abandoned to their fate...In a genuinely 
caring global community, people would not be left to live and die in intolerable conditions in 
any part of the globe...In the end, there is only one good reason to end hunger: we care 
about each other. Ending hunger is the right thing to do...People should be able to live in 
dignity because they are people. No other reason should be necessary. The main reason for 
ending hunger in the world is that it is not right for people to remain hungry. No other 
reason should be necessary. Any other reason is inadequate”. 
 
George Kent1 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the political-institutional context that 
underpins the consolidation and expansion of the globalising capitalist food system, 
so that in Chapter 5 I can examine the responses of the Food Sovereignty movement, 
and draw some preliminary conclusions as to whether, and to what extent, the 
balance of forces at the political-institutional level is altering.  
Consistent with my neo-Gramscian political ecology, the principal terms of the 
political-institutional context are that the hegemony of the globalising capitalist 
food system is enabled and sustained by the framework of globalising capitalism at 
the global and national levels, which has been, and continues to be, both 
progressively consolidated, and increasingly contested, over time. I draw on the 
recent analytical framework developed by Eric Holt-Giménez and Annie Shattuck to 
explore the transformative potential of the food movements vis-à-vis what they term 
the corporate food regime; and in particular their distinction between ‘neoliberal’ 
and ‘reformist’ tendencies within the regime.2 This distinction is useful in terms of 
mapping the shifting contours according to which the hegemony of the globalising 
capitalist food system has been negotiated and re-negotiated in recent years in the 
context of the 2008 ‘global food crisis’.  
This chapter provides a (non-comprehensive) overview of the key moments in the 
erection of this framework in recent decades, which, cumulatively and collectively, 
can be viewed as consolidating and expanding a pattern of globalising capitalist 
relations around food and agriculture. As will be recalled, globalising capitalism is 
characterised by the ‘development of economic relations favourable to the 
                                                          
1 Kent, G., (ed) 2008, Global Obligations for the Right to Food, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 213-
215. 
2 Holt-Giménez, E., and Shattuck, A., 2011, ‘Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: 
Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(1), 109-144. The 
‘food regime’ analysis is based of course on the work of Harriet Friedmann (1987) and Philip McMichael 
(1989, with Friedmann): see Chapter 2.  
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interest[s] of [the] dominating countries’, with the role of the state, in both the 
dominating and dominated countries, being essential to this process.3 The 
contemporary phase of globalising capitalism is strongly associated with the 
financialisation of capitalism that began with the breaking down of the Keynesian 
compromise that had structured the non-Soviet bloc world economy since 1945; a 
key moment of rupture came with the abandonment of the fixed US dollar-gold 
exchange standard by US President Richard Nixon in August 1971.4 As a project 
intended to restore power to ruling elites in the core capitalist countries, as well as 
to shore up US hegemony in the international system, debt played (and continues to 
play) a critical role in the unfolding of neoliberalism in general5, and in the 
construction of the globalising capitalist food system in particular.6  
At the international level, the Third World debt crisis, combined with the Thatcher 
and Reagan revolutions in America and Britain, established the conditions in which 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) deployed processes 
of ‘structural adjustment’ to transform the nature of agriculture in many indebted 
Southern countries. This was closely followed by the inclusion of trade in agricultural 
commodities in the Uruguay Round of the Global Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 
which culminated in the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 
1995. The WB’s ‘market-led agrarian reform’ program has continued the integration 
of Southern agricultural systems into the globalising capitalist food system.7 The 
priorities of the core capitalist powers, and the extent of the lobbying influence of 
major food corporations, were recently further confirmed in the context of 
negotiations leading up to a first-ever High Level Meeting of the United Nations on 
non-communicable diseases, held in September 2011.8 Previously expressed 
commitments to specific targets and deadlines as regards the burden of dietary-
related ill-health were watered down, and language suggesting that regulatory 
                                                          
3 Duménil, G., 2004, ‘The Economics of US Imperialism at the Turn of the 21st Century’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 11(4), 657-676, 660. 
4 Peet, R., and Hartwick, E., 1999, Theories of Development, Guilford Press, New York, 48-9.  
5 Harvey, D., 2005, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 15-19, 92-3; also 
Harvey, D., 2003, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Harvey, following Hannah 
Arendt’s thesis that ‘a never-ending accumulation of property must be based on a never-ending 
accumulation of power’, argues that ‘any hegemon, if it is to maintain its position in relation to endless 
capital accumulation, must endlessly seek to extend, expand, and intensify its power’; however as he also 
notes, this gives rise to the ‘ever-present danger of over-extension and over-reach’: 2005 op cit., 35. The 
theme of US over-reach in the contemporary era is developed by authors such as Chalmers Johnson 
(2004, Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, Verso, London) and Walden 
Bello (2005, Dilemmas of Domination, Metropolitan Books, New York) in relation to the bloated US 
military expenditure, weapons arsenal and overseas bases. Gabriel Kolko (2006, The Age of War: The US 
Confronts the World, Lynn Rienner, Boulder), who argues that the post-World War II record demonstrates 
that the ‘US has failed abysmally to bring peace and security to the world’: 176.  
6 Patnaik 2003, ‘Global Capitalism Deflation and Agrarian Crisis in Developing Countries’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change, 3(1-2), 33-66, 34. 
7 Bello, W., 2006, ‘The Capitalist Conjuncture: Over-accumulation, Financial Crises and the Retreat from 
Globalisation’, Third World Quarterly, 27(8), 1345-1367, 1347; Soederberg, S., 2005, ‘The Transnational 
Debt Architecture and Emerging Markets: The Politics of Paradoxes and Punishments’, Third World 
Quarterly, 26(6), 927-949; Patnaik 2003 op cit., 38.  
8 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ga11146.doc.htm, accessed 26.9.11.  
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measures be adopted to ‘discourag[e] the production and marketing of unhealthy 
foods’ was abandoned.9 
A series of international food summits and high-level conferences of the G8 and the 
G20 have been held since 1996 to provide a forum for heads of state and agriculture 
ministers to discuss the problem of ‘global food security’ and, since 2008, the ‘global 
food crisis’; and to formulate measures and strategies to be taken to respond to 
these phenomena. As mentioned in Chapter 3, these various international gatherings 
have produced a certain framing of ‘global food security’ which is basically 
supportive of the further consolidation and expansion of the globalising capitalist 
food system, forming part of the contemporary ‘common sense’ that sustains it. This 
conceptualisation of food security, and the means by which it can and should be 
achieved, reveal how the hegemony of the system is currently being re-negotiated. 
The extent to which this understanding of food security has been internalised by 
some governments is illustrated by reference to the release in June 2011 of the 
Australian Government’s Issues Paper for a first-ever National Food Plan. 
These moments at the international level have in turn been supported and reinforced 
by steps taken at the national level by the core capitalist powers, the United States 
especially. Only some of the most significant of these steps can be dealt with here. 
In the first place, the US and European governments have continued the annual 
multi-billion dollar subsidy payments to commodity producers, first established in 
the context of the great Depression of the 1930s.10 These subsidies in turn form a 
large part of the context of the push for further trade liberalisation, as well as the 
opposition to it. Similarly, the setting of targets for agro-fuel production, and the 
payment of production and consumption subsidies by these and other governments, 
have played a key role in enabling the ‘agro-fuels boom’, the impacts of which I 
consider in Chapter 6. The erection by the US government of a regulatory and 
intellectual property regime favourable to the commercial expansion of genetically 
modified seed (GM), together with governmental promotion of the benefits of this 
technology, has resulted in 146 million hectares in 29 countries being planted with 
this seed in 2010, mainly for crops such as corn, soy and canola, from a baseline of 
1.7 million hectares in 1996.11 Another measure taken by the US government which 
has enabled the expansion of the globalising capitalist food system has been the 
loosening of regulations regarding financial speculation in commodities; again, the 
impact of such speculation will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
                                                          
9 Swinburn, B., 2011, ‘Public health policy at the mercy of corporate greed’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
7.9.11, available at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/public-health-policy-at-the-mercy-of-
corporate-greed-20110906-1jv50.html, accessed 26.9.11. 
10 ‘The gist of New Deal farm policy was enhanced government spending to restore farm prices and 
hence farmer incomes. Specifically, the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1938 entailed 
government loans that would allow farmers to store commodities rather than market them, so [as to] not 
glut the market. The loan program provided a minimum price support, because if market prices fell below 
the set rate, farmers would then put excess grain in storage…’: Gutham 2011 op cit., 57.  
11 According to the industry peak body’s annual review: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, available at 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/42/executivesummary/default.asp, accessed 26.9.11. It 
should be noted that bio-tech plantings are heavily concentrated in a few countries, notably the US, 
Brazil, Argentina, India, Canada, China, Paraguay, Pakistan and South Africa, with 13 of the 29 countries 
devoted a minimal acreage (less than 100,000 hectares) to these crops.  
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The political-institutional context at the global governance level 
As indicated above, the key moments in the construction of the political-institutional 
framework for the globalising capitalist food system were the advent of the Third 
World debt crisis, the promotion of trade liberalisation, and the rolling back of 
redistributive agrarian reform. After briefly summarising the contemporary global 
framework as it applies to the food system, I turn to examine each in turn.  
Applying their ‘comparative analytical framework for different political and social 
trends within the corporate food regime and global food movements’, Holt-Giménez 
and Shattuck discern ‘two main trends within the corporate food regime’, namely 
‘Neoliberal’ and ‘Reformist’.12 In their assessment, the neoliberal trend is hegemonic 
and is ‘managed by institutions such as the USDA, the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy, the WTO, the private sector financing arm of the WB, and the IMF’, in 
collaboration with ‘the major agrifood monopolies, [the] agricultural policies of the 
G8 and big philanthropy capital’; while the reformist trend is ‘managed by weaker 
offices in the same institutions’, as well as some agencies of the United Nations, 
such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation.13  
Basing themselves on the Polanyian ‘double-movement’ thesis, which I have 
discussed in Chapter 2, Holt-Giménez and Shattuck argue that the contemporary 
dynamic within the corporate food regime is one ‘in which reform is largely 
subjugated and instrumentalized by liberalization’ because thus far there has been 
insufficient pressure, either due to social movement activism or ‘environmental 
implosion’, to ‘substantively reform’.14 The leading food-related UN agencies– 
notably the FAO and its reformed Committee on World Food Security, the High-Level 
Task Force on Global Food Security, and the Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Food 
– are, in their assessment, becoming effectively sidelined as regards the taking of 
key decisions in global agri-food governance.15 Rather, the WB has emerged as the 
key global governance institution in this field.16 Its 2008 World Development Report 
has set the parameters for a global market- and free trade-led set of policy 
responses to what appears to be a near-permanent global food crisis; and its market-
led agrarian reform program is established a framework of land titling and property 
rights which is facilitating renewed concentration of landholdings and the 
acceleration of a global ‘land grab’ in many countries.17 As I discuss further in 
Chapters 5 and 6, the land-grab phenomenon expresses in several respects the key 
tensions that are now acutely manifesting within the globalising capitalist food 
                                                          
12 2011 op cit., 115. 
13 Ibid., 115, 119, 121. By ‘big philanthropy capital’ the authors are referring mainly to the protagonist 
role played by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in promoting the ‘Green Revolution for Africa’ in 
partnership with the Monsanto Corporation: 119. They draw explicity on Michael Edwards’ construct of 
‘philanthrocapitalism’, defined as the belief that ‘business thinking and market methods will save the 
world’: Edwards, M., 2008, Small Change: Why Business Won’t Save the World, Berret-Koehler 
Publishers, San Franscisco, 2.  
14 Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2011 op cit., 124.  
15 Ibid., 121. 
16 Ibid., 119, citing as evidence the establishment of the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program as 
a ‘multilateral trust fund set up by the US, Canada, Spain and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to 
span the gap between the $40 billion a year needed to end hunger, the $20 billion promised by the G8 
countries, and the $14 billion that is actually forthcoming on these promises’.  
17 Ibid.,  
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system as the ecological and social rift widens. As McMichael and Friedman would 
put it within food regime theory terms, the very naming of this phenomenon as a 
‘land-grab’ highlights the extent to which the hegemony of the corporate food 
regime is becoming destabilised.  
The context for contemporary phenomena such as land-grabs, and associated regime 
destablisation and contestation, is the era of structural adjustment ushered in by 
the ‘Third World debt crisis’ of the 1980s. Previous to that decade, and consistent 
with the prevailing economic development theories of the post-colonial era, as well 
as the key role played by peasantries in many independence struggles, many states 
across sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and south and south-east Asia, prioritized 
the modernization of peasant agriculture during the 1960s and 1970s.18 They were 
supported in this effort by Northern donors, in the belief that raising productivity 
levels amongst the peasantry in largely rural societies would generate surpluses and 
tax revenues, as well as raising levels of demand and consumption; and that this 
would in turn create the conditions for the broader modernization and 
industrialization of these countries.19 Expenditures on rural development, including 
subsidized fertilizer and seed packages, price supports for farmers and state-led 
procurement and distribution, rose in many places during this period.20 As a result, 
crop yields increased, rural poverty fell, rural employment began to diversity, and 
many countries in the South achieved and retained the status of net exporters of 
agricultural produce until the 1980s.21  
This status of widespread net food export status began to be reversed during the 
1980s, and by 2008 ‘about 70 per cent of countries in the Global South [were] net 
food importers’.22 This transition from relative food autonomy to growing food 
dependency, and rising levels of poverty, malnutrition and food insecurity, came 
about for several reasons. Structural adjustment programs negotiated in the wake of 
the Third World debt crisis, which saw levels of debt across the South increase by 
4000% between 1970 and 2002, featured prominently.23 These programs failed in 
their ostensible objectives of ‘mobilizing external investment’, improving ‘world 
market access’ for Southern exports, promoting sustainable growth and reducing 
poverty.24 Yet, if, as appears more likely, their real purpose was to open up Southern 
                                                          
18 Bryceson, D.F., 2010, Sub-Saharan Africa’s Vanishing Peasantries and the Specter of a Global Food 
Crisis, in Magdoff, F., and Tokar, B. (eds), 2010, Agriculture and Food in Crisis: Conflict, Resistance 
and Renewal, Monthly Review Press, New York, 69-84, 70.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid., 71-2; also Patnaik 2003 op cit., 47.  
21 Peet and Hartwick op cit., 42, 45-6. From 1966-1970, Africa averaged food exports of 1.3 million tons 
a year: Bello, W., 2009, Food Wars, Verso, London, 68.  
22 McMichael, P., 2010, The World Food Crisis in Historical Perspective, in Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 
51-67, 62.  
23 Bello 2009 op cit., 68-9; Patel, R. 2007, Stuffed and Starved: Markets, Power and the Hidden Battle for 
the World Food System, Black Inc., Melbourne, 148-9; Bradshaw, Y.W., and Wahl, A-M., 1991, ‘Foreign 
Debt Expansion, the International Monetary Fund, and Regional Variation in Third World Poverty’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 35(3), 251-272, 252; See 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/exdebt.htm, accessed 1.02.08. 
24 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2002, UNCTAD Says Structural Adjustment 
has Failed in Africa, 27.9.02, available at http://www.panapress.com/UNCTAD-says-structural-
adjustment-has-failed-in-Africa--13-465752-18-lang1-index.html, accessed 27.9.11; Bello 2009 op cit., 
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countries to global financial capital, create the conditions that ‘enable[d] [domestic] 
government[s] to push through [austerity] policies that otherwise would have been 
rejected’, and thereby facilitate the transfer of resources and wealth from South to 
North, and then they must be judged a success.25  
The key shift came in 1981, when the WB released its Accelerated Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa report.26 It attributed the economic difficulties that the 
continent was experiencing in the wake of the second oil shock to the ‘over-
involvement of the African states in their economies’.27 Conditions attached to loans 
required the dismantling of previous measures of support for peasant agriculture; 
and these conditionalities have in turn led to the undermining of food production 
capacity, and contributed significantly to the growth of import dependency.28 More 
generally, the deflationary policies of across-the-board reductions in government 
spending, wage cuts, and interest rate rises caused anemic growth and long 
recessions in many Southern countries, except where neoliberal policies were not 
adopted.29 The reversals in economic growth rates dwarf the comparatively paltry 
                                                                                                                                                                         
71-2. Noting that the average  
25 Patnaik 2003 op cit., 38; Soederberg 2005 op cit.; Przeworski, A., and Vreeland, J.R., 2000, ‘The Effect 
of IMF Programs on Economic Growth’, Journal of Development Economics, 62, 385-421, 391; Klein 
2007 op cit. As at 2008, 80% of the outstanding figure of $2.5 trillion for all developing countries 
consisted of compounded interest, with indebted countries transferring around $100 million each day to 
private financial interests and governments in the Global North: 
http://www.stwr.net/content/view/714/1/#Articles, accessed 22.1.08. Interest payments for 2005 alone 
were $513 billion for all developing countries, and $43 billion for the poorest 59 countries: Jubilee 2000 
http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/2.%20How%20big%20is%20the%20debt%20of%20poor%20co
untries+2647.twl, accessed 24.1.08. Much of the original debt was incurred by corrupt, dictatorial and 
even mass murdering rulers such as Indonesia’s General Suharto, making comparisons with odious forms 
of debt peonage seem tragically appropriate: Chinweizu, 1985, ‘Debt Trap Peonage’, Monthly Review, 
37, Nov.1985, 21-36; New Economics Foundation, 2006, Odious Lending: Debt relief as if morals 
mattered, http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/v3gdvw45bflbyn55gy1fwr4514092006174700.pdf, 
accessed 22.1.08. 
26 Bello 2009 op cit., 70-1; Bryceson 2010 op cit., 72. This report reflected the ideological ‘“purge” of all 
Keynesian influences’ from both the WB and the IMF in the early 1980s and the subsequent adherence of 
staff within both institutions to a developing ‘neoliberal orthodoxy’, thus ushering in the ideological 
hegemony of the neoliberal tendency in the globalizing capitalist food system: Harvey 2005 op cit., 29; 
Bello 2009 op cit., 71; Bryceson op cit., 72. 
27 Bryceson op cit., 72. 
28 Bryceson op cit., 72-74, 84; Patnaik, U., 2010, Origins of the Food Crisis in India and Developing 
Countries in Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 85-101, 96-8.  
29 Harvey notes how neoliberalism has failed to resolve the underlying problem of ‘flagging capital 
accumulation’, with average global growth rates falling from 3.5% in 1960s, to 2.4% in the 1970s, to 
1.4% in the 1980s, to 1.1% in the 1990s, and the high growth rates were achieved in countries that had 
adopted ‘radically different institutional arrangements’ to the global centres of neoliberalism, namely 
China, Japan (during the 1980s) and West Germany: 2006, ‘Neo-liberalism as Creative Destruction’, 
Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 88(2), 145-158, 151-2. Based on a data set of 1024 
annual observations of 79 countries from 1979-1990, Adam Prezowski and James Vreeland found that the 
average growth rate for countries participating in IMF programs was 2% compared to 4.4% for those that 
were not participating: op cit., 403. Other analyses suggest that sub-Saharan Africa experienced negative 
growth for the whole of the 1980s: Sharma, D., 2005, ‘Trade Liberalization in Agriculture: Lessons for 
the First 10 Years of the WTO’, APRODEV, Brussels; see also Wesibrot, M., and Rosnick, D., 2003, 
‘Latin America's Growth Failure Continues into the 21st Century’, available at 
http://www.cepr.net/publications/another_lost_decade.htm, accessed 15.5.04; also Weisbrot, M., Baker, 
D., Kraev, E., and Chen, J., 2003, ‘The Scorecard on Globalisation 1980 -2000: Twenty Years of 
Diminished Progress’, http://www.cepr.net/globalization/scorecard_on_globalization.htm, accessed 
15.5.04; also Easterly, W., 2005, ‘What Did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies 
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sums that have been transferred by Northern countries in the form of ‘development 
aid’.30 Import dependency, coupled with the establishment of what McMichael terms 
a ‘world price’ for agricultural commodities, have rendered poor and marginalized 
populations in the South, who spend fifty percent or more of their income on food, 
highly vulnerable to the increasing volatility in food prices over recent years.31 
Levels of food import dependency and associated vulnerabilities created by 
structural adjustment programs became further entrenched with the liberalisation 
of trade in agriculture.32 The contemporary push for trade liberalisation under US 
hegemony recalls in certain respects the pre-World War I era of free trade under 
British imperial hegemony, which constituted the first ‘global food regime’.33 The 
theoretical justification for free trade is found in the ‘law of comparative advantage’ 
and specialisation developed by the British classical economist David Ricardo.34 Thus,  
[D]eveloping countries were told that food security, based on self-sufficiency in food 
grains production, was passé in a modern globalised world, even for large countries with 
poor populations. Rather, they would benefit from specializing in the non-grain crops in 
which they had a ‘comparative advantage’ by increasing their exports, and purchasing 
their grains and dairy products from northern countries that had surpluses of those 
products.35 
According to its promoters, the most prominent of which were the representatives of 
the US and European governments, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the WTO 
would implement Ricardo’s law and maximise universal welfare, by 
[E]nding subsidies to inefficient producers, tear[ing] down tariff walls, and end[ing] the 
practice of holding government-controlled food stocks. World market supplies [would] 
then move to where need is greatest. In turn, world prices for agricultural commodities 
[would] rise, which [would] be good for farmers [and] consumers [would] pay less, 
benefiting from the efficiencies created by sharper competition.36 
                                                                                                                                                                         
and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans’, Journal of Development 
Economics, 76, 1-22; also Abouharb, M.R., and Cingranelli, D.L., 2006, ‘The Human Rights Effects of 
World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000’, International Studies Quarterly, 50, 233-262, 238-9.  
30 Basing himself on World Bank figures, Robert Pollin (2003, Contours of Descent: US Economic 
Fractures and the Landscape of Global Austerity, Verso, London & New York) notes how the less 
developed countries (excluding China) recorded annual average growth rates of 5.5% from 1961-1980, 
but this dropped to 2.6% from 1981-2000. For the five-year period from 1995-1999, had the less 
developed countries (excluding China) returned to pre-neoliberal growth rates, their net gain would have 
been $2.4 trillion, or $480 billion per annum. This is more than five times what they would have received 
in development aid if the North collectively had met its promise of devoting 0.7% of GDP to aid; and 
more than 10 times what was actually received over the period in aid ($55 billion per annum): 165-167.  
31 McMichael 2010 op cit., 59-60. 
32 As noted in Chapter 3, the inclusion of agriculture in the Uruguay Round of the Global Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (1986-1994) was the immediate impetus for the formation of La Via Campesina. 
33 Friedmann and McMichael 1989 
34 Ricardo, D., 1817, On the Principles of Political Economy. According to this ‘law’, a net total benefit 
will ensue to all countries in a trading relationship if each specialises in those productive activities in 
which they have either the greatest advantage or the least disadvantage. Murphy, S., 2010, Free Trade in 
Agriculture: A Bad Idea whose Time is Done in Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 103-119, 105-6.  
35 Patnaik, U., 2010 op cit., 95. 
36 Murphy op cit., 105; Sharma op cit., 19.  
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In practice, the benefits of trade liberalisation in agriculture have, according to 
critics, accrued almost entirely to transnational agri-business, while its adverse 
impacts have exacerbated an already severe global rural crisis.37 The collapse in 
development assistance funding for Southern agriculture since the 1980s adds further 
evidence to the picture of the wholesale abandonment of small-scale producers to 
the outcomes of a globalised free trade ‘free for all’, in which the playing field has 
been heavily tilted in favour of Northern agri-business interests.38 Three issues in 
particular stand out. One is that the United States and the European Union continue, 
in violation of the AoA, to pay their commodity producers hundreds of billions of 
dollars annually in farm payments (subsidies).39 This has led to the practice of the 
‘agricultural dumping’: Northern transnational grain traders sell large volumes of 
basic grains into Southern markets at below the cost of production.40 Subsidy 
payments in the United States and the European Union encourage the over-
production of certain commodities, depress global prices, and frequently rush into 
Southern countries as ‘import surges’, thereby undermining the conditions of trade 
for Southern farmers producing those commodities, such as cotton farmers in Burkina 
Faso and Benin.41 Estimates suggest the annual loss of export earnings to Southern 
farmers attributable to such over-production and dumping to be in the region of 
US$60 billion.42 
Secondly, WTO rules and structural adjustment programmes ‘pushed developing 
countries to eliminate their public food stocks’.43 Yet these were the foundation of 
domestic systems of grain procurement and ‘distribution at controlled prices[,] put 
in place after decolonization, precisely in order to break free from earlier colonial 
systems of specialization and trade that had severely undermined nutrition 
                                                          
37 Sharma op cit; Murphy op cit., 106-113. Fred Magdoff and Brian Tokar state bluntly that ‘the ideology 
of ‘comparative advantage…is absolute rubbish. There are definite winners and losers in such a system, 
with the winners’ power to implement their desires trumping all other considerations’: 2010, Agriculture 
and Food in Crisis: An Overview in Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 18.  
38 “In 2007, the share of the EU’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to agriculture was a little more 
than three percent of its total ODA spending. This was down from more than 13 percent in 1987. In the 
US it was a little under five percent of its overall ODA spending in 2007. This was down from more than 
20 percent in 1980”: Anderson, M.D., 2009, ‘A Question of Governance: To Protect Agribusiness Profits 
or the Right to Food?’ Agribusiness Action Initiatives, available at 
http://www.iatp.org/files/258_2_107086.pdf, accessed 15.10.10. 
39 ‘Despite their WTO commitments, total OECD support to agriculture rose from US$302 billion in the 
late 1980s to an average annual expenditure of US$330 billion in 1999-2001’: Green, D., and Griffith, 
M., 2002, ‘Dumping on the Poor: The Common Agricultural Policy, the WTO and International 
Development’, CAFOD, London, available at 
http://www.uneca.org/ednd/atpc/documents/april/Dumping%20on%20the%20poor%20by%20CAFOD.p
df, accessed 27.9.11. Levels of subsidies fluctuate according to commodity prices. Thus, with higher 
commodity prices in recent years, subsidy levels have falled, to $227 billion in 2010: ‘China’s Farm 
Subsidies Soar but OECD States’ at Record Low’: http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-09-china-farm-
subsidies-soar-oecd.html, accessed 27.9.11.  
40 Murphy op cit., 11-112; Sharma op cit., 10-14.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Sharma op cit., 16.  
43 Murphy op cit., 110.  
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standards’.44 The result has been a steep rise in food import bills for many 
countries.45 
Third, the doctrine of comparative advantage, when combined with the need to earn 
foreign currency to meet interest payments on debts, has seen a significant shift 
from domestic food production to the growing of cash crops for export.46 For 
example, in the decade to 2001, India had witnessed a displacement of eight million 
hectares – over six per cent of its food producing land – to export crops: cotton, 
soybean, sugarcane, horticulture, floriculture and prawn farming.47  
Liberalised trade in agriculture has been experienced by millions of small farmers 
and rural communities as an aggressive form of economic coercion, and as 
accumulation by dispossession.48 Giving material expression to Bello’s heuristic 
device of the ‘Food Wars’ fought by ‘capitalism against the peasants’, agricultural 
commodity dumping and import surges have led to a rural exodus and accelerated 
the phenomenon of de-peasantisation; as many as two million Mexican small maize 
farmers, for example, left their farms in the wake of the implementation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, from January 1994.49 Those farmers who 
have stayed on the land have done so under conditions of increasing hardship, 
including high levels of debt, which, in the case of cotton farmers in India, has 
resulted in an epidemic of suicides and other desperate measures such as the sale of 
organs.50 Domestic food production has been undermined in many places, and this 
has resulted in increasing levels of poverty, malnutrition and inequality.51  
The negative impacts of structural adjustment and trade liberalisation have been 
compounded by the rolling-back of processes of redistributive agrarian reform in 
recent decades. Historically, agrarian reform in the 20th century has taken a variety 
of forms.52 Redistributive agrarian reform – the expropriation of landed monopoly 
                                                          
44 Patnaik 2010 op cit., 95.  
45 Murphy op cit., 110.  
46 Patnaik 2010 op cit., 95.  
47 Patnaik 2003 op cit., 51.  
48 McMichael, P., 2006, ‘Peasant Prospects in the Neoliberal age’, New Political Economy, 11(3), 407-
418, 407.  
49 Patel 2007 op cit., 48-51; Bybee, R., and Winter, C., 2006, ‘NAFTA’s Disastrous Impact on Mexican 
Economy’, 25.4.06., http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0425-30.htm, accessed 27.9.11. 
50 Patnaik 2003 op cit., 52-3; Patel 2007 op cit., 50; also Mohanty, B.B., 2005, ‘‘We are Like the Living 
Dead’: Farmer Suicides in Maharashtra, Western India’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 32(2), 243-276.  
51 In the case of India, for example, Utsa Patnaik reports that ‘the average Indian family of five in 2005 
was consuming a staggering 110kg less grain per year compared to 1991’, as well as a ‘steep decline in 
protein intake for four-fifths of the rural population over the period 1993-94 to 2004-05’: Patnaik 2010 
op cit., 92. Patnaik argues that the actual levels of poverty in China and India have been severely 
underestimated by both governments, as well as by the World Bank, because they have abandoned a 
nutritional measure in favour of a CPI measure. She says that this has ‘produced absurdly low current 
official poverty lines’ of 12 rupees per day in 2005 ‘which would not have bought even one kilogram of 
open market rice’; and the same is true of China: 93-4. She concludes that ‘the correct poverty lines are 
more than double the official ones and applying them shows that the percentage of poor have not 
decreased but have risen sharply during the period of market oriented reforms and emphasis on exports’: 
94. 
52 In one recent typology, for example, four categories are identified: ‘cold war proxies’, ‘endogenous 
social revolution’, ‘postwar Allied consolidation’, and ‘endogenous political compromise’: Rosset, P., 
Patel, R., and Courville, M. (eds), 2006, Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform, Food 
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classes, and the distribution of their land to landless and land-poor peasants and 
small farmers, together with other support mechanisms to help the latter boost their 
production – is commonly said to have been one of the keys to successful and lasting 
economic development in countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam 
and China.53 The first redistributive land reform of the 20th century is identified as 
that which followed the Mexican Revolution of 1910.54 It has been argued that the 
transition to capitalism required redistributive land reform to abolish pre-capitalist 
landed property because of its fundamentally unproductive nature.55 Currently, some 
scholars argue that this type of reform is the only way to deal effectively with the 
contemporary global crisis of un- and underemployment in many countries in the 
South.56  
While a number of largely successful agrarian reform programs were undertaken 
from the 1940s to the 1960s, many attempted programs were frustrated over 
succeeding decades by determined landlord opposition.57 Often, such opposition 
translated into violent repression of peasants mobilising either to defend their land 
from expropriation from powerful landed and capitalist interests, or, consistent with 
a ‘moral economy of the peasantry’, to agitate for redistributive land reform.58 
Further, comprehensive redistributive agrarian reform required the sort of state 
intervention and regulation that structural adjustment was scaling back, so the 
impetus for this type of reform diminished as governments focused on measures to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
First Books, Oakland, 16, quoted in Akram-Lodhi 2007 op cit., 557. 
53 Patnaik 2003 op cit., 39-40: ‘Much of China’s good growth, reduction in rural poverty and excellent 
performance on the human development indicators can be trade to the initial egalitarian land reform and 
its consolidation through the decentralised units like cooperatives and the later commune system up to 
1980…Those developing countries that do not tackle the question of archaic agrarian relations and 
effectively abolish land monopoly soon find that their development strategy runs aground on account of 
an insufficiently expanding internal market which only a prosperous peasantry can provide’. See also 
Rosset, P., 2010, Fixing our Global Food System: Food Sovereignty and Redistributive Land Reform, in 
Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 189-205, citing the redistribution of land in the wake of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse in 1991 as a central factor in achieving a ‘remarkable rate of 4.2. per cent annual growth in per 
capita food production from 1996 through 2005’: 194. See also Griffin, K., Khan, A.R., and Ickowitz, A., 
2002, ‘Poverty and the Distribution of Land’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 2(3), 279-330, 315, but for a 
contrary argument see Bramall, C., 2004, ‘Chinese Land Reform in the Long-Run Perspective and in the 
Wider East Asian Context’, Journal of Agrarian Change 4(1 & 2), 107-141. See also Mo, P.H., 2003, 
‘Land Distribution Inequality and Economic Growth; Transmission Channels and Effects’, Pacific 
Economic Review, 8(2), 171-181, whose regression analysis found that ;and distribution inequality has a 
significant negative effect on the rate of GDP and productivity growth.  
54 Borras, S.M., and Ross, E.B., 2007, ‘Land Rights, Conflict, and Violence Amid Neo-Liberal 
Globalization’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 19, 1-4, 2.  
55 Bernstein, H., 2002, ‘Land Reform: Taking a Long(er) View’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 2(4), 433-
463, 438. 
56 Rosset op cit., 199; also van der Ploeg, J., 2008, The New Peasantries: Struggle for Autonomy and 
Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization, Earthscan, London, who argues that ‘in most 
continents, there is only one adequate mechanism for tackling and superseding [the] condition of 
marginality and that is by enlarging the ranks of the peasantry and providing for peasant-managed forms 
of rural and agricultural development’: xvi.  
57 Borras, S.M., 2008, ‘La Via Campesina and its Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change 8(1 & 2), 258-289, 262; also Bello 2009 op cit., 63-67, discussing the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Program of President Aquino of the Philippines, introduced in 1988.  
58 As has occurred for example at regular intevals in the Philippines over many decades: see Franco, J.C., 
and Borras, S.M., 2007, ‘Struggle Over Land Resources in the Philippines’, Peace Review: A Journal of 
Social Justice, 19, 67-75.  
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finance external debt payment obligations. However, by the early years of the 21st 
century, three factors coalesced which led the WB to embrace agrarian reform once 
more, albeit of a rather different type. The first was the by-then acknowledged 
‘systemic failure of structural adjustment’ to boost agricultural productivity or 
reduce rural poverty in the South.59 The second was the perceived need to respond 
to La Via Campesina’s campaign for a new round of redistributive agrarian reform.60 
The third was the pressure placed on the ‘international financial institutions [to] 
develop a market-friendly policy response to the need for asset redistribution in 
[the] politically fragile circumstances’ that accompanied the end of apartheid and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.61 
Hence from the early-to-mid 1990s onwards the WB has worked with several 
countries across the South to implement what came to be known as ‘market-led 
agrarian reform’.62 Arguing that past ‘state-led’ agrarian reforms had failed because 
of ‘distortions of the land market, poor programme design and implementation, and 
excessive cost’, as well as elite resistance, the WB’s alternative was intended to 
secure: 
[T]he redistribution of land from large to smaller owners via market transactions in order 
to achieve objectives of both social equity and economic efficiency…New ‘family 
farmers’ are to be drawn into increasingly liberalised markets for land, commodities and 
agricultural services.
63  
In other words, this type of land reform was intended to deepen and broaden the 
penetration of capitalist market relations amongst the global peasantry; an irony, as 
one scholar notes, given ‘the well-documented failures of global capitalist 
development over the past 25 years’.64 While the impacts to date of this model of 
reform are still being evaluated and contested, critical assessments from numerous 
countries suggest that it has had a ‘very limited impact on patterns of landholding 
where reforms have actually been carried out’, and that its character is ‘pro-elite 
[and anti-poor’.65  
                                                          
59 Akram-Lodhi 2007 op cit., 555.  
60 Ibid., also Borras 2008 op cit.  
61 Akram-Lodhi 2007 op cit., 556. 
62 Lahiff, E., Borras, S.M., and Kay, C., 2007, ‘Market-led Agrarian Reform: policies, performance and 
prospects’, Third World Quarterly, 28(8), 1417-1436.  
63 Ibid., 1420.  
64 Akram-Lodhi 2007 op cit., 556.  
65 Analyses suggest that the landed elite in countries such as Egypt and the Philippines consolidating and 
even expanding their holdings and power by securing a ‘net transfer of wealth and power’ from the rural 
poor: Lahiff et al op cit., 1431; Borras, S.M., Carranza, D., and Franco, J.C., 2007, ‘Anti-poverty or Anti-
poor? The World Bank’s Market-led Agrarian Reform Experiment in the Philippines’, Third World 
Quarterly, 28(8) 1557-1576; Bush, R., 2007, “Politics, Power and Poverty: Twenty Years of Agricultural 
Reform and Market Liberalisation in Egypt”, Third World Quarterly, 28(8) 1599-1615; Akram-Lodhi, 
A.H., 2007a, ‘Land, Markets and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, 
Third World Quarterly, 28(8), 1437-1456; de Medeiros, L.S., 2007, “Social Movements and the 
Experience of Market-led Agrarian Reform in Brazil”, Third World Quarterly, 28(8), 1501-1518; Gauster, 
S., and Isakson, S.R., 2007, 2007, “Eliminating Market Distortions Perpetuating Rural Inequality: An 
Evaluation of Market-assisted Land Reform in Guatemala”, Third World Quarterly, 28(8) 1519-1536; 
Lahiff, E., 2007, ‘“Willing buyer, willing seller”: South Africa’s Failed Experiment in Market-led 
Agrarian Reform”, Third World Quarterly, 28(8) 1577-1597. A contrasting case is the highly 
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Further, concerns are now being raised about the way in which the market for 
private property in land which the reforms are introducing can be used to facilitate 
large-scale acquisitions of arable land by foreign corporations and sovereign wealth 
funds – the so-called ‘global land-grab’.66 This highly contested phenomenon, which 
has been most prominent in sub-Saharan Africa, will be further discussed in Chapter 
6.67 For present purposes, what is notable is that it is consistent with the general 
historical trajectory of recent decades which has been to create regulatory, legal 
and political frameworks favourable to the expansion of capitalist social relations 
and large-scale, industrialised agriculture. Recent examinations of the context 
behind several land deals in Mali, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia reveal that the World 
Bank has played a leading role in creating a ‘favourable climate for foreign 
investment’, including the promotion of reforms to customary land tenure 
arrangements which facilitate the leasing and sale of large areas of land.68 
Meanwhile, in May 2012 the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Committee on World 
Food Security released a ground-breaking  document, the Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context 
of National Food Security.69 These Guidelines, which were the result of three years’ 
of negotiations between governments and civil society actors, have been hailed by 
the latter as an important breakthrough in creating a global, rights-based framework  
for ensuring secure access to food-producing resources for rural  and indigenous 
communities.70 They will be discussed briefly in Chapter 5.  
The legitimising frame of ‘food security’ 
Above I have charted some of the key moments in the erection of the political-
institutional architecture at the international level which has supported the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
controversial program of expropriation and redistributive agrarian reform commenced in Zimbabwe in 
2000, discussed in Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Mahenehene, J., Murimbarimba, F., and 
Sukume, C., 2010, Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities, James Curry, Woodbridge, Suffolk. 
Contrary to the widespread perception disseminated in Northern media that the ‘fast-track’ land reform 
undertaken in Zimbabwe led to a collapse in agriculture production and chronic food insecurity, extensive 
empirical research has revealed a far more complex and differentiated picture (Scoones et al op cit.). 
66 The so-called ‘land grab’: see GRAIN Briefing, ‘Seized! The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial 
Security’ October 2008, available at http://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-
for-food-and-financial-security, accessed 5.4.11; also von Braun, J., and Meinzen-Dick, R., 2009, ‘“Land 
Grabbing” by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities’, International Food 
Policy Research Institute Policy Brief 13, April 2009, available at: 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/bp013all.pdf, accessed 28.9.11.  
67 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, released a briefing note on land 
grabs in 2009, which addressed their human rights implications: Large-scale Land Acquisitions and 
Leases: A Set of Core Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, 11.6.09, 
available at http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20090611_large-scale-land-
acquisitions_en.pdf, accessed 30.6.11. 
68 These reports have been published by the Oakland Institute, and constitute part of an intended series of 
seven. See (2011) ‘Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Country Reports from Mali, Sierra 
Leone and Ethiopia’, available at http://media.oaklandinstitute.org/special-investigation-understanding-
land-investment-deals-africa, accessed 28.9.11.  
69 Available at: http://www.panap.net/sites/default/files/Voluntary-Guidelines-Full-version-FAO-
2012.pdf, accessed 21.2.13. 
70 E.g.La Via Campesina, 2012, ‘The Voluntary Guidelines on the Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests 
are Complete’, available at: http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/agrarian-
reform-mainmenu-36/1198-the-voluntary-guidelines-on-the-tenure-of-land-fisheries-and-forests-are-
complete, accessed 21.2.13.  
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globalising capitalist food system, and facilitated its expansion. In this section, I will 
examine how the continuing persistence of high levels of hunger and malnutrition in 
the contemporary world has provided the context in which the core capitalist states 
have used a series of World Food Summits and ‘high level meetings’ to legitimise the 
system’s continued expansion through a ‘productivist’ discourse of ‘global food 
security’.71 By this discourse, I mean the claim that ‘feeding the world’ can only be 
achieved via the continued expansion of large-scale, high-tech industrialised 
agriculture, together with the related claim, either made explicitly or by 
implication, that ‘low-tech’, small-scale, peasant agriculture is incapable of ‘feeding 
the world’. This productivist discourse at once seeks to renegotiate the hegemony of 
the globalising capitalist food system by re-framing the common sense on which the 
system is based; and to de-legitimise claims made by food sovereignty proponents 
that their alternative represents an emerging ‘good sense’. 
As a concept in international politics, ‘food security’ only emerged for the first time 
in the early 1970s, and at that time was understood in food supply and price stability 
terms at the macro level.72 Influenced by the work of development economist 
Amartya Sen, the conceptualisation of food security was refined over the following 
two decades to focus on issues of consumption and access at the individual and 
household levels, especially for poor and vulnerable people.73  
Normatively, food security as the guarantee to ‘all people at all times [of] physical, 
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food’ resembles in 
several respects the universal human right to adequate food; and indeed in numerous 
global summits and conferences in recent decades, states have, as I discuss below, 
                                                          
71 ‘The existence of hunger on a global scale is a source of legitimacy for large food and biotechnology 
firms in promoting private solutions to development’: McMichael, P., 2001, ‘The impact of globalisation, 
free trade and technology on food and nutrition in the new millennium’, Proceedings of the Nutrition 
Society, 60, 215-220, 215; also McMichael, P., 2003, Food Security and Social Reproduction: Issues and 
Contradictions in Gill, S., and Bakker, I., 2003, Power, Production and Social Reproduction, Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York, 169-189.  
72 FAO Economic and Social Development Department, 2002, Food Security: Concepts and 
Measurement, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4671e/y4671e06.htm, accessed 11.10.11. The 
original definition of food security at the 1974 World Food Summit was the ‘availability at all times of 
adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and 
to offset fluctuations in production and prices’: ibid.  
73 Ibid. FAO’s State of Food Insecurity 2001 offered the following definition, now widely accepted: 
‘Food security…exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life’. The seminal work of Sen’s was Poverty and Famines (1981, Clarendon Press, Oxford). 
Over ‘200 competing definitions’ of food security had already been identified by 1992: Smith, M., 
Pointing, J., and Maxwell, S., 1992, “Household Food Security, Concepts and Definitions: An annotated 
bibliography”, Development Bibliography No.8, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 
Brighton, cited in Alcock, R., 2009, ‘Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security’, 
School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol Working Paper No.07-09, 
10. Alcock notes how one of the leading experts on food security, Simon Maxwell, has traced ‘three 
paradigm shifts’ in its meaning since the 1970s: ‘from the global / national to the household / individual, 
from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective, and from objective indicators to subjective 
perception’: 11. For a recent contrast of food security and food sovereignty, see Carney, M., 2012, ‘ 
“Food Security” and “Food Sovereignty”: What Frameworks are best suited for Social Equity in Food 
Systems?’ Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems and Community Development, 2(2), 71-88.  
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formally committed themselves to the achievement of both.74 However, as the 
globalising capitalist food system became hegemonic during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
means for achieving both food security and the right to food shifted from the public 
to the private sphere. Whilst still formally a state responsibility, food security – 
consistent with the general neo-liberal shift - became a policy goal to be achieved 
primarily via market mechanisms and private sector actors, with the state playing an 
enabling role in terms of setting the policy frameworks in which the market can 
function efficiently.75 These are the terms in which the hegemony of the system is 
being re-negotiated at present.  
Accordingly, this ‘privatisation of food security’ delivery translates to calls for the 
further liberalisation of trade in agriculture, and the creation of enabling 
environments for greater foreign investment in the South, as part of the overall 
broadening and deepening of the social relations that constitute the globalising 
capitalist food system.76 One important element of this discourse – and thus of the 
common sense of the system - is that it is research, technology and science which 
saved hundreds of millions of people from hunger and starvation through the Green 
Revolution; and that therefore the peoples and governments of the world should now 
place their faith in the corporate inheritors of this tradition who are mapping out the 
path to food security in the 21st century through biotechnology.77  
Over many years states have affirmed and reaffirmed their commitment and their 
responsibility to ‘eradicating hunger and malnutrition’, albeit with diminishing levels 
of ambition and confidence as the decades have passed and the numbers of 
malnourished people have increased. At the first World Food Summit, in 1974, when 
400 million people were defined as ‘food insecure’, governments committed 
themselves to eradicating hunger within 10 years.78 The same goal – albeit with no 
stated time limit – was reaffirmed by representatives of 159 countries during the 
1992 International Conference on Nutrition held in Rome in 1992, in the ‘World 
Declaration and Plan of Action for Nutrition’.  
 
 
                                                          
74 Food and Agriculture Organisation, State of Food Insecurity in the World 2001, available at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1500e/y1500e00.htm, accessed 10.5.09. The right to adequate food is 
contained in Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (UN 
General Assembly, 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html, accessed 12.11.10).  
75 McMichael 2003 op cit., 169; McMichael, P., 2000, ‘The Power of Food’, Agriculture and Human 
Values, 17(1), 21-33, 27. 
76 Ibid., 171-3. 
77 Jansen, K., and Gupta, A., 2009, ‘Anticipating the Future: 'Biotechnology for the Poor' as Unrealized 
Promise?’ Futures, 41, 436-445. 
78 Kent, G., 2005, Freedom from Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food, Georgetown University 
Press, Washington D.C., 50, who notes that this declaration was subsequently endorsed by the United 
Nations General Assembly in Resolution 3348/1974; see also Rogers, P., 2008, ‘The World’s Food 
Insecurity’, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the_world_s_food_problem, 29.4.08, accessed 
11.10.11. Professor Rogers attended the 1974 summit as an observer for the World Development 
Movement.  
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Significantly, this Declaration included the following statement:  
We recognize that access to nutritionally adequate and safe food is a right of each 
individual. We recognize that globally there is enough food for all and that inequitable 
access is the main problem. Bearing in mind the right to an adequate standard of living, 
including food, contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we pledge to act 
in solidarity to ensure that freedom from hunger becomes a reality.79 
Subsequently, the recognition of the contradiction between growing numbers of 
malnourished persons in a world which produced, and which continues to produce, 
an abundance of foodstuffs, appears to have been sidelined. The 1996 World Food 
Summit (WFS) produced the ‘Rome Declaration on Food Security’. 80 The major 
causes of food insecurity were listed as poverty, war and conflict, environmental 
degradation, and gender inequality; the earlier identified contradiction of the global 
political economy was not mentioned. The accompanying Plan of Action set forth 
twelve commitments, including the formal acceptance by states that they were the 
primary agents for delivering food security, as well as the affirmation that the path 
to food security lay in ensuring the full enjoyment of all human rights on a universal 
basis.81 
The 1996 WFS commitment to halve the numbers of malnourished people by 2015 
was re-stated as the third target of the first of the eight Millennium Goals, adopted 
by the United Nations in September 2000, with the apparently slight but significant 
revision that what was now to be halved was not the absolute numbers of those 
malnourished, but rather the proportion of those in hunger. 82 In any case, the 
numbers of malnourished have since risen, not fallen, with a further predicted 
increase to 1.2 billion over the next decade.83 In 2002 the FAO hosted a follow-up 
gathering to the 1996 Summit, and the 1996 pledge to reduce the absolute numbers 
of hungry people to 400 million by 2015 was renewed.84 While calls were made during 
                                                          
79 Ibid.  
80 This summit was attended by 112 Heads or Deputy Heads of State and high level representatives from 
a further 71 countries: http://www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm, accessed 26.5.09. The text of the 
Declaration of the 1996 WFS is available at http://www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm, accessed 26.5.09. In 
the Declaration, governmental representatives reaffirmed the human right to food and freedom from 
hunger; and pledged their ‘political will and… common and national commitment to achieving food 
security for all and to an ongoing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to 
reducing the numbers of undernourished people to half their present level no later than 2015’. 
81 Commitment 12 of the Plan of Action, ibid.  
82 In effect a substantially less ambitious goal, given the projected increase of 1.5 billion in the global 
population between 2000 and 2015: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml, accessed 4.12.08. 
As at 2000, 840 million people were classified as malnourished out of a total population of slightly over 6 
billion people: a proportion of 14%. With a global population of 7.5 billion people, 840 million 
malnourished persons would constitute a proportion of 11.2%. To achieve MDG 3, states will need to 
reduce the numbers of malnourished to 525 million people.  
83 United Nations, 2008, The Millenium Development Goals Report, 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2008/MDG_Report_2008_En.pdf#page
=12, accessed 4.12.2008, 10-11; also ETC Group (Action Group on Erosion, Biotechnology and 
Concentration), 2008, ‘Who Owns Nature? Corporate Power and the Final Frontier in the 
Commodification of Life’, Communiqué Issue #100, November 2008, 
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pub_id=707, accessed 2.12.08, citing the July 
2008 report of the United States Department of Agriculture, (Stacey Rosen et al, Food Security 
Assessment 2007, USDA, Economic Research Service).  
84 This Summit was attended by senior governmental representatives of 179 countries. World Food 
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a multi-stakeholders’ forum for major cuts in the trade-distorting agricultural 
subsidies of developed countries, the text of the official declaration made no 
mention of this issue.85 
Two significant developments emerged from the 2002 summit. The first was the 
adoption by the FAO in November 2004 of ‘voluntary guidelines to support the efforts 
of Member States towards the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in 
the context of national food security’.86 As their title suggests, these Guidelines 
constitute a series of voluntary recommendations for states and contain no binding 
commitments, with earlier proposals for a mandatory Code of Conduct blocked by 
powerful states.87 Some critics argue that the Guidelines in effect represent the 
replacement of the human right to food with a market-based project of food 
security, with the former reduced to a mere aspiration rather than a fundamental 
right. According to this perspective, hunger is not conceived of in the Guidelines as a 
'moral outrage' or a gross violation of a fundamental right, but rather as a 'problem 
to be gradually alleviated'; the persistent phenomenon of global hunger and 
malnutrition is thus de-contextualised and reduced to the mere recitation of 
statistics.88  
Further, hunger, and by extension, the right to food, is alluded to in various 
submissions in purely instrumentalist terms; that is, a malnourished person is not an 
economically active person, and her hunger should be alleviated, not because it is 
the morally right thing to do; or, consistent with a deontological understanding of 
human rights, because it is her fundamental and inalienable right; but rather, 
because it will allow her to contribute to ‘properly functioning markets’ and thus to 
continued economic growth.89 This instrumentalist rationality, which is reflective of 
the disconnection and alienation that characterises the operation of the globalising 
capitalist food system as a whole, runs through the Guidelines.90 The need for 
properly functioning markets is again stressed in Guideline 4, creating the clear 
impression that markets are the primary means by which the right to adequate food 
will be realized. Here we see the emergence of what Indian legal theorist Upendra 
Baxi describes as the 'trade-related market-friendly' human rights paradigm.91 This 
paradigm forms part of the shifting negotiation of the hegemony of the globalizing 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Summit: Five Years Later, Rome, 10-13 June, 
2002,http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsummit/english/newsroom/news/8580-en.html, accessed 4.12.08.  
85 The text of the official declaration is reproduced here: 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/005/Y7106E/Y7106E09.htm#TopOfPage, accessed 4.12.08.  
86
 FAO, 2005, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Food in the 
Context of national food security (Rome: FAO). For a critical review see Germann, J., 2006, Hegemony, 
Discursive Struggle, and Voluntary Guidelines on the ‘Right to Food’: A Study in the Negotiation of 
Meaning, Master’s Thesis, Linköpings Universitet Department of Management and Economics, Sweden. 
87 Germann op cit., 34. 
88 Ibid., 36. 
89 Ibid, 42 
90 For example, states are urged to 'promote good governance as an essential factor for sustained 
economic growth [and] sustainable development' (Guideline 1.3). Guideline 2.4 asks States to adopt a 
'holistic and comprehensive approach to hunger and poverty reduction', which should include 'the 
development of appropriate institutions, functioning markets [and] a conducive legal and regulatory 
framework'. 
91 Baxi, U., 2006, The Future of Human Rights, OUP, Oxford, 234-265.  
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capitalist food system, which is now incorporating a marketised understanding of 
food security and the right to food into its common sense and its discourse of 
legitimation.  
The second development of significance from the 2002 Summit was the formation of 
a multi-stakeholder scientific peer-review process to carry out, for the first time, an 
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD).92 The Executive Summary was approved by 58 of 61 
participating countries, with three – Australia, Canada and the US – abstaining.93  
The IAASTD Report was very much a science-driven, evidence-based document; the 
assessment brought together in an unprecedented inter-disciplinary manner the work 
of hundreds of agricultural and development experts from across the world.94 The 
substance of the report urged a ‘fundamental shift’ in agri-food systems to:  
 prioritise the livelihood needs of small-scale farmers, 
 redress the inequalities experienced by women in agriculture, and 
 embrace and adopt the principles and methodologies of agro-ecology.95 
 
Further, in a tacit critique of the shifting common sense of the system as discussed 
above, the report’s authors rejected a ‘business-as-usual’, market-based approach as 
being at all sufficient to meet the food security challenges of the 21st century.96 
Particular emphasis was placed on the deep inequalities in the global political 
economy and the vulnerabilities faced by marginalised communities and the rural 
poor.97 The IAASTD Report therefore presented governments with a call for a 
substantive reorientation of the global food system.98 It constituted a potentially 
significant challenge to the prevailing ‘productivist’ and marketised discourse of food 
security.  
While the core recommendations of the IAASTD Report have largely been ignored by 
most governments, the political eruption of the global food crisis in 2008 provided 
the context, both for the reaffirmation of the central dynamics of the globalising 
                                                          
92 Initiated in the first instance under the auspices of the FAO and the World Bank, the IAASTD 
expanded to include a number of UN agencies as its sponsors: the UNDP, the UNEP, UNESCO, WHO; as 
well as the multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral Global Environment Facility: IAASTD, Executive 
Summary of the Synthesis Report, Johannesburg, April 2008. 
93 Ibid., x, Appendix A. 
94 Ibid., Foreword. 
95 Ibid. 
96 In a clear reference to neoliberal ideology, the authors stated that ‘we cannot escape our predicament by 
simply continuing to rely on the aggregation of individual choices to achieve sustainable and equitable 
outcomes’: IAASTD, Executive Summary op cit., 3. 
97
 “Development and sustainability goals should be placed in the context of (1) current social and 
economic inequities and political uncertainties about war and conflicts; (2) uncertainties about the ability 
to sustainably produce and access sufficient food; (3) uncertainties about the future of world food prices; 
(4) changes in the economics of fossil-based energy use; (5) the emergence of new competitors for 
natural resources; (6) increasing chronic diseases that are partially a consequence of poor nutrition and 
poor food quality as well as food safety; and (7) changing environmental conditions and the growing 
awareness of human responsibility for the maintenance of global ecosystem services (provisioning, 
regulating, cultural and supporting)”: ibid. 
98 These calls, as I discuss at some length in Chapter 5, have been echoed both before and since by the 
UN Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Food. 
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capitalist food system, and for a new rhetorical emphasis in official declarations on 
the needs of small-scale producers and women. In this way the hegemony of the 
system has been re-negotiated, incorporating elements of an ostensibly critical body 
of work and ‘domesticating’ them to suit the needs of the system for continued 
expansion and capital accumulation. We see here clearly at work the tendencies of 
passive revolution and trasformismo.  
Official declarations and texts from 2008 onwards have repeatedly emphasised the 
need for greater liberalization of trade in agriculture.99 The UN Secretary General 
convened a High-Level Taskforce on the Global Food Security Crisis, with the 
participation of 15 UN agencies, together with the IMF, the WB, the WTO, and the 
OECD.100 This Task Force issued a Comprehensive Framework for Action in July 2008, 
and updated it in September 2010; both documents called for the rapid conclusion of 
the Doha round of trade negotiations as a centre-piece of their strategic 
frameworks.101 The centrality of trade liberalization, and a marketised approach to 
food security, was reaffirmed in the Declaration of the November 2009 World Summit 
on Food Security, convened by the FAO in Rome.102 Paragraph 22 of that Declaration 
reads (in part):  
We will pursue policies and strategies that improve the functioning of domestic, regional 
and international markets and ensure equitable access for all, especially smallholders 
and women farmers from developing countries. We support WTO-consistent, non-trade 
distorting special measures aimed at creating incentives for smallholder farmers in 
developing countries, enabling them to increase their productivity and compete on a 
more equal footing on world markets. We agree to refrain from taking measures that are 
inconsistent with the WTO rules, with adverse impacts on global, regional and national 
food security. We reiterate support to a timely, ambitious, comprehensive and balanced 
conclusion of the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations that would be 
important to achieving food security…103 
Whilst explicitly linking trade liberalization and participation in world markets with 
food security and assuming that the former contributes positively to the latter, this 
statement also embodies a shift in the ‘common sense’ of the globalizing capitalist 
food system that accompanied the 2008 food crisis; namely, a new emphasis on 
small-holder farmers and women.104 In these respects, this statement, as well as the 
                                                          
99 E.g. June 2008 High-Level Conference on World Food Security: ‘Declaration of the High-Level 
Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bio-energy’, para.3: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/foodclimate/HLCdocs/declaration-E.pdf, accessed 4.12.08. 
This conference was convened by the FAO, the UN World Food Programme, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development and Biodiversity International. It was attended by forty-two heads of state and 
100 high-level ministers. G8 Heads of Government Meeting in July 2008: ‘G8 Leaders Statement on 
Global Food Security’, July 8, 2008, paras.3-4, 6. UN High-Level Expert Forum in October 2009, ‘How 
to Feed the World in 2050’: http://www.fao.org/wsfs/forum2050/wsfs-background-documents/hlef-
emreport/en/, accessed 11.10.11. 
100 http://www.un.org/issues/food/taskforce/background.shtml, accessed 11.10.11.  
101 Available at http://www.un.org/issues/food/taskforce/docs.shtml, accessed 11.10.11.  
102 FAO, 2009, ‘Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security’, available at 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/Summit/Docs/Final_Declaration/WSFS09_Declaration.pdf, 
accessed 11.10.11. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2011op cit., 112.  
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Comprehensive Framework for Action, and the WB’s 2008 World Development 
Report, represent an appropriation (trasformismo) of certain elements of this focus, 
including agro-ecological production methodologies, developed in the IAASTD Report, 
the work of the UN Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Food, and in the food 
sovereignty discourse more generally as elaborated by La Via Campesina and 
others.105 The emphasis, however, is not primarily on realizing the right to food or 
eradicating hunger; although these objectives are mentioned, and form a key part of 
the common sense of the system.106 It is instead on boosting the productivity and 
competitiveness of smallholders, and facilitating their inclusion into ‘food 
commodity chains’.107  
Another shift in the system’s common sense, and further evidence of the processes 
of trasformismo, has been the recognition of the chronic under-funding of 
agricultural sectors in the South.108 This recognition is both an implicit 
acknowledgement of the failures of structural adjustment, and an apparent 
acceptance of an important aspect of the critiques aimed at the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ policies of the international financial institutions.109 The official 
declarations of the various summits and meetings have acknowledged that national 
food security is the responsibility of each state, and that there must be ‘national 
ownership’ of food and nutrition security plans.110 However, the context for these 
plans is being set by the major donors to the new global agricultural research 
partnerships. The WB’s Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, launched in 
2010 and funded by the United States, Canada, Australia, Spain, South Korea, Ireland 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, has, according to Holt-Giménez and 
                                                          
105 World Bank, 2008, World Development Report: Agriculture for Development, available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/EXTWDR20
08/0,,menuPK:2795178~pagePK:64167702~piPK:64167676~theSitePK:2795143,00.html, accessed 
10.9.11.  
106 The Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), for example, states as its two primary objectives, to 
‘improve access to food and nutrition support and take immediate steps to increase food availability’, and 
to ‘strengthen food and nutrition security in the longer-term by addressing the underlying factors driving 
the food crisis’; and both objectives in turn are placed under the primary aim of achieving the first 
Millennium Development Goal, namely to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger: op cit.  
107 Thus, the CFA speaks of the need to ‘ensure sustained access to competitive, transparent and private-
sector-led markets for food produce and quality inputs’, such as seed, fertiliser, equipment and animal 
feed, as well as the need to ‘strengthen market linkages, especially between farmers and food traders and 
processors (through e.g. contract farming)’: op cit. See also the Ministerial Declaration of the G20 
Agriculture Ministers, ‘Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture’, Paris, 22-23 June 2011, 
available at: http://agriculture.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2011-06-23_-_Action_Plan_-_VFinale.pdf, accessed 
11.10.11. This declaration mentions the need to pay ‘special attention to smallholders, especially women 
and young farmers’ (para.11), while again highlighting the centrality of ‘open and well-functioning 
markets’ in ‘increasing agricultural production and productivity to meet growing demand’; and of free 
trade in ‘allow[ing] the unrestricted flow of food and agricultural commodities, [thereby] contributing to 
food security’ (para.37); and hence of the need to bring the Doha round ‘to a successful, ambitious, 
comprehensive and balanced conclusion’ (para.38).  
108 The October 2009 Forum produced a projected increase in demand for food and fibre of 70% by 2050, 
and stated that the Global South would require $83 billion annually invested in agriculture in order for 
demand to be met. The Final Declaration of the November 2009 World Summit reaffirms the 
commitment to eradicate hunger and achieve both the MDG and the 1996 World Food Summit goals, as 
well as recognising the need to reverse chronic under-funding of agriculture: ibid.  
109 Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2011op cit., 112. 
110 See CFA Updated, para.87, op cit.  
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Shattuck, a central focus on the promotion of ‘more public money for the 
dissemination of new proprietary agricultural technologies’.111 This Program has 
received most of the money requested for the implementation of the CFA, thereby 
‘shelter[ing] [the funding] from much of the social pressure currently on the UN 
bureaucracies’; Holt-Giménez and Shattuck attribute this to ‘a strategic effort by the 
[WB] to shift the locus of the war on hunger from Rome and New York, where civil 
society has opened political space, to Washington’.112  
From the ‘green capitalist’ perspective, biotechnology purports to offer an 
environmentally and socially responsible production system that addresses pressing 
issues such as greenhouse emissions, ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss.113 
The Global Harvest Initiative, led by four agri-business transnational corporations, 
working in collaboration with a number of Northern NGOs, epitomizes this 
perspective, with its call for the embrace of ‘science-based technologies’ in order to 
‘feed over 9 billion people by 2050 in a sustainable and environmentally friendly 
way’.114 Corporate-led biotechnology is a prime instance of elite-led ‘passive 
revolution’ in the 21st century. 
A further instance of the manner in which the global governance framework is 
shaped by corporate actors to suit their interests is provided by a recent inaugural 
meeting of the United Nations to discuss measures to tackle the obesity pandemic. 
While the gravity of the public health burden posed by obesity is no longer in any 
doubt, critical observers of this UN process have detected a concerted and sustained 
lobbying effort by transnational food corporations to influence the stance adopted at 
these negotiations by representatives of the United States, the European Union, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand governments.115 As stated in the chapter 
summary, commitments to specific deadlines and targets to reduce the burden of 
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112 2011 op cit., 119, 122. In a similar vein, the recent focus of the Consultative Group on International 
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agricultural research centres, has also been on the ‘second’ Green Revolution ‘based on GMOs’: ibid., 
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113 Friedmann, H., 2006, ‘From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of 
Food Regimes’, Research in Rural Sociology and Development, 11, 227-264, 257-8. 
114 This initiative was founded by biotech companies DuPont and Monsanto, grain trader Archer Daniels 
Midland, farm machinery manufacturer John Deere, and a series of ‘consultative partners’: Conservation 
International Caucus Foundation, The Nature Conservancy, TransFarm Africa, the Congressional Hunger 
Centre, and World Wildlife Fund: http://www.globalharvestinitiative.org/index.php/policy-
center/embracing-science-based-technologies/, accessed 11.10.11; see also Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 
2011 op cit., 120. 
115 Food Advertising in the United States, Anthony E. Gallo 
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dietary-related illness have been removed, as have any references to the adoption of 
measures to reduce the consumption and production of energy-dense, nutrient poor 
foods.116  
The transnational food manufacturing industry is rejecting any attempts to tighten 
regulation of its products in the interests of public health, due to concerns that this 
will impact growth in profits and sales; and is lobbying assiduously to achieve this 
outcome.117 Thus, even though they may be marginalised as regards decision-making, 
UN agencies continue to serve a very important role in re-negotiating the system’s 
hegemony. On the one hand, they confer the form of democratic legitimacy, and 
promote the ethical goals of hunger and poverty eradication as the guiding public 
mandate for the system. On the other, they arguably establish the limits of what is 
politically possible and acceptable in terms of domestic regulation of transnational 
corporate ‘freedom of action’.  
In terms of its lobbying and related practices, food industry tactics closely resembles 
those taken by large tobacco companies over several decades to stymie effective 
regulation of the sale and promotion of their products.118 US academic nutritionist 
Marion Nestle, who has studied the practices of US food corporations closely over 
several years, sees clear parallels between the two industries:  
[F]ood companies - just like companies that sell cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, or any 
other commodity - routinely place the needs of stockholders over considerations of 
public health...Food companies will make and market any product that sells, regardless 
of its nutritional value of its effect on health. In this regard, food companies hardly 
differ from cigarette companies. They lobby Congress to eliminate regulations perceived 
as unfavourable; they press federal regulatory agencies not to enforce regulations; and 
when they don't like regulatory decisions, they file lawsuits. Like cigarette companies, 
food companies co-opt food and nutrition experts by supporting professional 
organizations and research, and they expand sales by directly marketing to children, 
members of minority groups, and people in developing countries - whether or not the 
products are likely to improve people's diets…119 
Public health experts have shown how lobbying efforts have successfully stymied 
meaningful action at the national level in every country where the obesity 
phenomenon exists.120 To date, Governments have opted for industry self-regulation 
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on the basis that the state should not interfere with what is essentially, in their 
view, a matter of individual consumer choice.121 However, the evidence is that 
industry self-regulation is doing little or nothing to slow down the spread of the 
obesity pandemic.122 Professor Swinburn admits to considerable frustration as he and 
his colleagues, and many other researchers around the world, have ‘been able to 
specify and model several policy interventions which are highly cost effective and 
feasible, but they are not being implemented due to the counter lobby power of the 
food industry and other private sector interests’.123 Indeed, Swinburn ‘has come to 
see that the core problem is a set of economic, political and policy structures that 
are driving consumption-based growth’.124  
Governments are clearly capable of effectively regulating the food industry in the 
public interest, because they have shown the capacity to do this with the tobacco 
industry, albeit over several decades and in the face of sustained, organised and 
well-resourced industry resistance. At the present time, the indications that food 
industry regulation will be forthcoming in the near future are not promising. This has 
clear implications for the balance of forces analysis, which I return to in Chapters 6 
and 7.  
National-level measures 
Here, I consider how actions by governments of the core capitalist countries at the 
national level have shaped and supported the spread of globalising capitalist 
relations in food and agriculture. I will briefly cover four topics: the ongoing 
payment by the United States and the European Union of farm subsidies to sustain 
surplus production; the use of subsidies and targets by the United States, European 
Union and other governments to promote agro-fuel production and consumption; the 
institutionalisation and promotion of genetically modified organisms by the US 
government; and the loosening of restrictions on financial speculation in agricultural 
commodities, which has contributed significantly to food price volatility in recent 
years.  
I have already mentioned production subsidies above, in the context of the 
discussion on trade liberalisation. Their origins lie in the context of political 
responses taken by the US government in response to the farm crisis during the Great 
Depression years of the 1930s.125 Harriet Friedmann, one of the principal theorists of 
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Lancet, 378, 761.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Friedmann, H., and McMichael, P., 1989, ‘Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Fall of 
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2005, ‘From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes’, 
Research in Rural Sociology and Development, 11, 227-264, 239-241. As Julie Guthman narrates, the 
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foreign demand’ for US produce after World War I which lead to ‘yet another glut of agricultural over-
production’ in the 1920s and declining farm prices, combined with ‘high land prices, which had forced 
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‘global food regimes’, notes the contingency of particular historical outcome, given 
that at the time there were various agricultural support programs, such as the 
transparent and non-trade distorting ‘British system of deficiency payments’.126 
However it was only the non-transparent procurement policy introduced by the 
United States that resulted in ‘government-held surplus stocks’, which the 
government could then remove from the market in ‘order to achieve target prices 
set by Congress’. 127 The existence of the surpluses themselves ‘put downward 
pressure on prices’, with the result that the policy ‘became self-perpetuating’; and 
it also required restrictions to protect US farmers from cheaper imports.128 Thus one 
of the ‘key institutions’ of the emerging ‘mercantile-industrial food regime’ (1945-
1973) were ‘subsidized exports’ from the United States, and later Europe, under the 
aegis of ‘food aid’.129 
As noted above, US and EU subsidies have survived the liberalisation of agricultural 
trade, even as the number of farmers in both regions has dramatically declined.130 
These subsidies are seriously detrimental to the interests of producers and 
consumers in the South.131 One of the most tragic examples is the collapse of Haiti’s 
domestic rice production, brought about by a flood of subsidised imported rice when 
‘the IMF forced Haiti to cut its rice tariff from 35 per cent to 3 per cent in 1995’.132 
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129 Ibid., 240-1. As Friedmann explains, these exports:  
[E]levated the rank of the United States to leading export nation, and fostered a perception that it was somehow 
naturally a “breadbasket.” European countries devastated by war accepted Marshall [Plan] Aid for food, feed 
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130 Julie Guthman suggests that US subsidies have survived the inauguration of the World Trade 
Organisation’s Agreement on Agriculture, because the grain trading and meat-packing transnational 
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131 Subsidies mean that US and EU exports are sold at below the cost of production: “For example, the 
U.S. exports corn at prices 20 percent below the cost of actual production, and wheat at 46 percent below 
cost. This has resulted in Mexican corn farmers being put out of business”: Akande, W., 2002, ‘How 
Agricultural Subsidies in Rich Countries Hurt Poor Nations’, Yellow Times, 19.10.2002, available at 
http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/Subsidies-Hurt-Poor-Akande19oct02.htm, accessed 27.10.08. In a study 
published in 2002, Oxfam documented how the Common Agricultural Policy subsidies paid to inefficient 
European sugar producers meant that highly efficient Mozambican sugar cane producers were crowded 
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employment: Oxfam, 2002, ‘Stop the Dumping! How EU Agricultural Subsidies are Damaging 
Livelihoods in the Developing World’, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/trade/subsidies/2002/10stopdumping.pdf, accessed 27.10.08;  
Ong’Wen, O., and Wright, S., 2007, ‘Small Farmers and the Future of Sustainable Agriculture’, EcoFair 
Trade Dialogue, Discussion Paper No.7, 36. The consequence was that by 2003 ‘three-quarters of all rice 
eaten in Haiti was imported’, ‘Ricelands Foods of Arkansas, the world’s biggest rice mill, saw profits 
increase to $123 million’, while ‘[t]oday Haiti’s rice-growing areas face some of the country’s worst 
hunger and malnutrition’: ibid. 
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With the near-trebling of rice prices during 2007-8, large numbers of Haitians 
experienced extreme suffering and many rioted in protest.133 
The maintenance of farm subsidies in the United States and the European Union has 
long established a dynamic of over-production of the major commodity grains: corn, 
soy, and wheat. From 2007 onwards, the combination of a third ‘oil shock’ and 
pressure to ‘take action’ to reduce greenhouse emissions led these governments to 
set the parameters of a political-institutional framework that enabled a new field of 
accumulation to open up: the production of biofuels, or ‘agro-fuels’, such as ethanol 
and bio-diesel.134 The policy shift was led by the second Bush administration in the 
United States, with the passage in 2007 of the Energy Independence and Security 
Act, whose Renewable Fuels Standards mandated an 800% increase in agro-fuels 
production ‘from 4.7 billion gallons in 2007 to at least 36 billion gallons in 2022’.135 
With the added incentives of tax credits and new multi-billion dollar subsidies, 
farmers across the United States shifted from other crops to corn production; dozens 
of new ethanol plants were constructed; and by 2008 30% of the entire US corn crop 
had been diverted to ethanol production.136 With agro-fuel production capturing ‘80% 
of all US government support for renewable energy, vastly outpacing solar and wind 
technologies’, the ‘agro-fuels boom’, for which major US grain processing 
transnational Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) had advocated since the 1970s, had 
arrived.137 In December 2008 the European Union adopted a biofuels mandate which 
called for a minimum 10% content of renewable transport fuels by 2020, replacing an 
earlier voluntary target of the same percentage.138  
As a consequence, production of feedstock for biofuels has increased sharply in other 
parts of the world, notably the expansion of palm oil plantations in Sumatra, 
Malaysia, Colombia and India, and sugarcane and soybean plantations in Brazil.139 
Agro-fuels have been a leading motivation for large-scale land investments by 
transnational corporations in Africa: in one study examining acquisitions in Mali, 40% 
of all cases ‘involve[d] crops for agro-fuels’.140 Transnational corporations such as 
ADM have taken advantage of this increased production by locating biodiesel 
processing plants in Indonesia and Brazil.141 They have also lobbied extensively to 
secure regulatory and fiscal regimes that are highly favourable to increased 
production.142  
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The ostensible justification for agro-fuels is that they are a benign form of renewable 
energy; and thus in promoting their increased production and consumption, 
governments and corporations can claim to be taking meaningful and substantive 
action on climate change.143 This claim, which clearly forms part of the common 
sense of this emerging element of the globalising capitalist food system, has come in 
for sustained attack, with studies suggesting that, once carbon dioxide and methane 
emissions from land use conversions are taken into account, most agro-fuels actually 
release more emissions than they save.144 Further, they are also widely viewed as 
contributing to food price volatility and food insecurity, by diverting food crops into 
feedstock for transport fuel.145 
As with agro-fuels, genetically-modified (GM) crops constitute another new and 
emerging field of capital accumulation; and as with agro-fuels, the rapid expansion 
of this technology has been facilitated by political and regulatory decisions taken 
largely by the US government from the 1990s onwards. The first key step was in 1992 
when the US Food and Drug Administration ruled that food containing genetically 
modified components were ‘the same or substantially similar to substances 
commonly found in food’, and therefore required no special regulatory oversight, 
and in particular no requirement for these ingredients to be specially labelled.146  
As noted earlier, the planting of GM soybeans, canola, corn, and cotton has 
expanded exponentially. There is considerable and continuing controversy about the 
productivity gains and environmental benefits that GM technology might produce, 
particularly in relation to the reported reduced use of pesticides, as well as the 
potential dangers (or claimed benefits) to human and environmental health and 
biodiversity.147 While these disputes are still to be resolved, it is clearly the case that 
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this technology fits very well into the global business model of the transnational 
agribusiness corporations. The technology is amenable to high volume, industrialised 
monocultural production; and an extensive legal framework of intellectual property 
laws provides a secure juridical environment in which accumulation can take 
place.148 As regards popular and political legitimacy for the further expansion of the 
technology, the biotech companies have, as noted above, turned to a market-based, 
‘green capitalist’ discourse of food security. 149 This strategy of legitimation, which 
constitutes another key element of the common sense of the globalising capitalist 
food system, received a substantial boost with the endorsement of GM technology in 
2001 by the United Nations Human Development Programme 150; and subsequently, as 
noted above, by the World Bank, amongst others. The food security and poverty 
reduction claims of the GM transnationals are strongly contested by La Via 
Campesina and many of the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the Food Sovereignty 
movement.151 
The securing of legal ownership of seed and germplasm via patenting laws means 
that farmers must abandon age-old practices of collecting, saving and swapping 
seeds, because to do so would mean fines or possibly even imprisonment for 
infringement of the patents.152 Instead, they must purchase the seed anew each 
planting season, and since this seed is expensive, it adds considerably to their costs 
and their indebtedness, perpetuating a cycle of dependency already established by 
the first Green Revolution.153 Legal enforcement can now potentially be 
                                                                                                                                                                         
the Regulatory Sham’, ISIS Report, March 2007, available at: 
http://www.i-sis.org.uk/pdf/GM_Food_Nightmare_Unfolding.pdf, accessed 15.11.11; M.A. Garcia and 
M.Altieri, 2005, ‘Transgenic Crops: Implications for Biodiversity and Sustainable Agriculture’, Bulletin 
of Science, Technology and Society, 25(4), 335-353. 
148 “The use of GMOs in farming is associated with many of the same risks as the original Green 
Revolution, including homogenization and input reliance. Their use may reinforce the move to industrial 
agriculture, support capital and enegry-intensive systems, and reinforce the dependency of farmers on 
costly inputs”: Ong’wen & Wright op cit., 43.  
149 As Tim Lang and Michael Heasman put it, corporations ‘not usually associated with humanitarian 
activism are now advocating that [their] technologies…be rapidly implemented in order to feed the 
world’: Lang, M., and Heasman, M., 2004, Food Wars: The Global Battle for Mouths, Minds and 
Markets, EarthScan, London, 22. The leading players are the US multinationals Monsanto, DuPont, 
Syngenta, and Dow Chemicals: 179-80.  
150
 In its 2001 Human Development Report the UNDP stated that: “Trangenics offer the hope of crops 
with higher yields, pest- and drought-resistant properties and superior nutritional characteristics—
especially for farmers in ecological zones left behind by the green revolution. In China genetically 
modified rice offers 
15% higher yields without the need for increases in other farm inputs, and modified cotton (Bt cotton) 
allows pesticide spraying to be reduced from 30 to 3 times’: Making New Technologies Work for Human 
Development, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2001/, 2, accessed 30.10.08.  
151 Altieri, M., and Rosset, P., 1999, ‘Strengthening the Case for Why Biotechnology will not help the 
Developing World: A Response to McGloughlin’, AgBioForum 2(3 & 4), 226-236; Sherman, D.G., 2009, 
‘Failure to Yield: Evaluating the Performance of Genetically Engineered Crops’, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, April 2009.  
152 “Private detectives have been used in Canada and the United States to enforce intellectual property 
regimes. Monsanto has filed 73 cases in court and has claimed billions of dollars in compensation from 
farmers who have saved seed. Penalties have included massive fines and prison sentences”: Ong’wen & 
Wright, op cit., 43, 45.  
153 Ibid. As a further instance of the extent to which the US legal system supports and protects 
corporations, the ‘Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act’ was passed in 2006 to protect factory farming 
operations from direct action taken by animal rights activists: Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 76.  
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complemented by scientific and biological coercion.154 As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
impacts of the growing commercialisation of GM crops in India have been even more 
stark, in the form of an epidemic of farmer suicides linked to mounting debt.155  
The Australian government is generally supportive of the further commercialisation 
of GM crops.156 Some GM crops (Canola, Soy) have already received approval for 
commercial plantings, and Australia has 700,000 hectares of GM cotton and canola as 
at 2010.157 Trials for plantings of GM wheat have also been approved, and Monsanto 
recently acquired a 20% stake in one of the country’s leading grain breeding 
companies.158 Australian State Departments of Agriculture are generally sympathetic 
towards the technology, and the prospects for its further commercialisation in this 
country appear promising.159  
Critics and activists who oppose GM technology say that it has contributed to 
increasing regional and global food insecurity; and further, that is poses serious 
threats to biodiversity, ecosystem integrity and human health through inter alia 
contamination of non-GM plants, the large-scale conversion of forests and grasslands 
to GM monocultures, and encouraging increasing levels of herbicide and pesticide 
use.160 Scholars documenting the spatial spread of the technology have also 
                                                          
154 This became possible when Canadian biotech corporation Delta & Pine Land obtained a patent in 
1998 for the development of the so-called ‘genetic use restriction’, or terminator technology’, which 
renders seeds sterile after one planting. While this technology has not been commercially implemented, 
Delta & Pine Land – which was acquired by Monsanto Corporation in June 2007, consistently expressed 
its intention to do so: http://www.banterminator.org/News-Updates/News-Updates/Monsanto-Acquires-
Delta-Pine-Land-and-Terminator, accessed 30.10.08. A consortium of biotech and agribusiness firms 
promoted a law in the Brazilian Congress (268/2007) that would allow for the partial commercialisation 
of terminator technology, and for further research and patenting in Brazil: 
http://www.banterminator.org/News-Updates/News-Updates/Industry-Tries-to-Repeal-Brazil-s-National-
Ban-on-Terminator, accessed 30.10.08. The effort was rejected by the Brazilian Commission on the 
Environment following extensive mobilisations by social and environmental groups: 
http://www.banterminator.org/News-Updates/News-Updates/Brazil-s-Environment-Commission-Rejects-
Effort-to-Roll-back-Ban-on-Terminator, accessed 30.10.08.  
155 See for example the presentation made to the 16th session of the United Nation’s Commission for 
Sustainable Development, entitled, “International Farmers Suicide Crisis”, which stated that ‘[i]n India, 
one farmer committed suicide every 32 minutes between 1997 and 2005’: available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd16/PF/presentations/farmers_relief.pdf, accessed 11.4.12.  
156 The Australian government has ‘[spent] $38.2 million on the national Enabling Technologies Strategy 
to promote [these technologies]’, in the words of one Australian lobby group opposing the further 
expansion of GM in Australia: see Phelps, B., 2011, ‘Gene Ethics Comments: National Food Plan’, 
Friday 2nd September 2011, available at: 
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/2031975/Gene_Ethics.pdf, 30.10.11. 
157 http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/42/executivesummary/default.asp, accessed 
11.10.11. 
158 ‘This deal [worth $10.5 million] would allow Monsanto to insert its GM traits into the best Australian 
wheat and claim ownership of those GM varieties’: ibid. 
159 ‘The Victorian Government aspires to be the largest hub of GM research and development in the Asia 
Pacific region and signed a public private partnership with Dow AgroSciences at the BIO trade show in 
Atlanta, Georgia, in 2009. The Queensland trade commissioner to the USA makes a priority of 
biotechnology promotion’: ibid.  
160 Jansen, K., and Gupta, A., 2009, ‘Anticipating the future: ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ as Unrealised 
Promise?’ Futures, 41, 436-445; Walters, R., 2006, ‘Crime, Bio-Agriculture and the Exploitation of 
Hunger’, British Journal of Criminology, 46, 26-45; Altieri, M., and Pengue, W., 2006, ‘GM Soybean: 
Latin America’s New Coloniser’, Seedling, January 2006, 13-17; Ho et al op cit.; Food and Water Watch, 
2007, ‘Sowing the Seeds of Corporate Agriculture in Africa’ ; Pengue, W., 2005, ‘Transgenic Crops in 
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documented how some governments in the South have come under intense political 
and economic pressure to accept imports of GM products in the form of ‘food aid’ 
and to allow the commercialisation of GM crops in their territories.161 The newly-
formed public-private Alliance for a Green Revolution for Africa (AGRA), led by the 
Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, is a further expression of this dynamic.162 While 
ostensibly aimed at achieving food security for all Africans and contributing to 
economic development by lifting the productivity of Africa’s smallholders, critics 
point to the clear links between the biotech industry and the Gates and Rockefeller 
Foundations, and argue that the real agenda has more to do with creating new 
markets for Northern agribusiness in the spirit of ‘philanthrocapitalism’:  
Underpinning the New Green Revolution and biotechnology agenda in Africa is the neo-
liberal economic push to integrate Africa into the world market economy by creating 
markets for agricultural inputs and products, all in the name of freeing poor African 
farmers from the clutches of hunger and poverty.163 
Given the centrality of finance to contemporary processes of globalising capitalism, 
no analysis of the current ‘global food crisis’ should ignore the role of speculation in 
driving food price volatility and achieving oligopolistic levels of concentration via 
mergers and acquisition.164 Indeed, the ‘food crisis’ is arguably but one manifestation 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Argentina: The Ecological and Social Debt’, Bulletin on Science Technology Society 25, 314-322; Garcia, 
M.A., and Altieri, M., 2005, ‘Transgenic Crops: Implications for Biodiversity and Sustainable 
Agriculture’, Bulletin on Science Technology Society, 25, 335-353; Altieri, M., 2005, ‘The Myth of 
Coexistence: Why Transgenic Crops are not Compatible with Agroecologically Based Systems of 
Production’, Bulletin on Science Technology Society, 25, 361-371; Rosset, P., 2005, ‘Transgenic Crops to 
Address Third World Hunger? A Critical Analysis’, Bulletin on Science Technology Society, 25, 306-313.  
161 Walters op cit., who in his investigation of the various pressures brought to bear on the anti-GM 
government of Zambia by US government agencies and spokespersons, as well as by biotech companies 
themselves, concludes that ‘the ongoing pressure on countries such as Zambia to accept GM technologies 
violates international environment law and serves to remind us how states and corporations exercise and 
exploit law, international relations and power for political and economic gain’: 41. Releases from 
Wikileaks confirm that such practices, involving US diplomats and officials, is widespread: 
http://www.truth-out.org/new-wikileaks-cables-show-us-diplomats-promote-genetically-engineered-
crops-worldwide/1314303978, accessed 15.9.11. During 2011, releases of US diplomatic cables by the 
Wikileaks organisation revealed the existence of US government-funded and promoted ‘biotechnology 
outreach programs’ in many countries in the South ‘where Western biotech agriculture had yet to gain a 
foothold’, as well as sustained diplomatic pressure in European governments to legislate for commercial 
approval of GM crops: Ludwig, M., 2011, ‘New Wikileaks Cables Show US Diplomats Promote 
Genetically Engineered Crops Worldwide’, http://www.truth-out.org/new-wikileaks-cables-show-us-
diplomats-promote-genetically-engineered-crops-worldwide/1314303978, accessed 11.10.11.  
162 Daño, E.C., 2007, ‘Unmasking the New Green Revolution in Africa: Motives, Players and Dynamics’, 
Third World Network, available at 
http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/around_world/aosc_pages/pdf/EED_080130_Green_Revolution.pdf, 
accessed 28.9.11.  
163 Ibid., 56; also Holt-Gimenez, E., 2008, ‘Out of AGRA: The Green Revolution Returns to Africa’, 
Development, 51, 464-471; also Scherer, C., 2011, The Color of Money: Philanthropy and the Green 
Revolutions in India and Sub-Saharan Africa, unpublished Masters thesis, Haverford College, available 
at 
http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/6723/2011SchererC_thesis.pdf?sequence
=8, accessed 28.9.11. On philanthrocapitalism, see Edwards 2008 op cit.  
164 Several do, however. The role of financial speculation is not dealt with at all in Bello’s Food Wars op 
cit., Robert Albritton’s Let Them Eat Junk: How Capitalism Creates Hunger and Obesity (2009, Pluto 
Press, London), Patel’s Stuffed and Starved op cit., and Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe’s Food 
Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community (2009, Fernwood Publishing, Halifax); and it 
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of a generalised crisis of globalising capitalism, which has its immediate roots in a 
globalised accumulation model dependent on ever-increasing levels of debt and asset 
inflation, thus leading to the generation and collapsing of speculative bubbles.165 I 
will consider these dynamics in Chapter 6. At this point my focus concerns the way in 
which regulatory actions by the US government have created the conditions for 
financial speculation in food commodities to grow at such a rapid pace in the early 
part of the 21st century.166 
Contemporary speculation in commodities has its origins in the creation of the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) by trading merchants in 1848 to regulate grain 
trading by allowing producers and buyers to negotiate and agree ‘forward’ or 
‘advance sale’ contracts, the purpose of which was to provide price certainty and 
risk management for farmers, and security of supply for distributors.167 Given certain 
operational difficulties with advance sale contracts, CBOT assumed the role of a 
trading intermediary and advance sale contracts were converted into futures 
contracts, which, unlike advance sale contracts, were themselves tradable 
instruments.168 The justification for futures markets, then as now, is two-fold: the 
contracts provide a hedge against the risk of fluctuating prices; and they ensure 
liquidity in the market. However, in the largely unregulated atmosphere of the 
United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, futures markets became 
arenas for speculative gambling, and contributed to food price volatility, as well as 
to record profits for grain traders such as Cargill.169 
Calls for reform became increasingly loud, and with the advent of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s futures markets were regulated for the first time.170 This 
took the form of placing caps on investments in futures contracts by actors not 
                                                                                                                                                                         
only receives the most cursory mention in Magdoff and Tokar op cit., which otherwise provides extensive 
coverage of most major dynamics: structural adjustment, trade liberalisation, concentration of corporate 
agribusiness, land-grabbing, and agro-fuels.  
165 Harvey 2010 op cit.; Nesvetaliova, A., 2005, ‘United in Debt: Towards a Global Crisis of Debt-Driven 
Finance?’ Science & Society, 69(3) 396-419, who presciently asked in 2005, ‘May it be the case then, that 
the ongoing outbreaks of financial crises signal a potential global repetition of the Great Depression?’: 
416. It was of course the collapse of the ‘sub-prime mortgage bubble’ in 2007 that triggered the onset of 
the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ in 2008, which has (as at October 2011) metastasized into a serious 
sovereign debt crisis in the European Union: Panitch and Glindin op cit. 
166 “In his recent testimony before Congress, hedge fund manager Michael Masters said that institutional 
investors (pension funds, university endowments, sovereignty wealthy funds, etc.) have increased their 
investments in commodities futures from $13 billion in 2003 to $260 billion in March of 2008, and the 
price of 25 commodities has risen by an average of 183% in those five years”: Kane, D., 2008, ‘A Quick, 
Easy Way to Lower World Food Prices, Commentary’, Americas Policy Program, 16.10.08, available at 
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1578, accessed 3.9.10. 
167 Ibid.; Vargas, M., and Chantry, O., 2011, ‘Ploughing through the meanders in Food Speculation’, 
Mundubat, 9, available at 
http://www.odg.cat/navegacas.php?id_pagina=11&id_publicacions=38&publicacions=3, accessed 
24.9.11. 
168 Vargas and Chantry op cit., 10.  
169 Ibid., 12.  
170 Reform initiatives included direct action by farmers and consideration of nationalisation of grain 
trading corporations: “At that time, producer co-operatives tried to organize themselves in such a way as 
to take control of prices, by directly controlling production and marketing. The newspapers of the period 
even recorded that the Administration planned to take control of the five main grain-selling firms, whose 
transactions amounted to over a thousand million dollars per year”: ibid., 12. 
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‘directly involved in agriculture and food’.171 At the same time, this legislation 
declared the trade in commodities via futures contracts to be ‘in the public 
interest’, as ‘providing the means for suitable risk management [and] more 
information on the future evolution of prices through trading in a market that has 
greater liquidity, fairness and financial security’.172  
The first loosening in this regulatory framework came in 1974, when the creation of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission also saw legislative amendments that 
gave the Commission the ability to lift the limits on investments in commodity 
futures contracts by non-industry traders.173 Concerted lobbying by investment banks 
and other financial actors in the late 1980s saw these limits progressively lifted from 
1990 onwards.174 It is these measures that have enabled speculative financial capital 
to invest heavily in commodity futures, after previous bubbles in ‘dot.com’ 
companies and the housing market have burst.175 A related development is the 
extent to which hedge funds and other financial actors are involved in buying up 
farmland in many countries, thereby contributing to the ‘land grab’ phenomenon 
described above.176  
Commodity futures exchanges exist outside the United States, notably in Europe and 
Japan. In Europe, there are restrictions on purchases of contracts for basic grains by 
non-industry traders, but not for coffee, sugar and cocoa.177 In addition, restrictions 
on commodity trading have never applied to industry ‘traders’, which include major 
transnational corporations such as ADM and Cargill, who between them control up to 
80% of all US grain commodity exports.178 This dominant market position, which 
enables them both to set prices and control supply, has enabled these corporations 
to become significant financial speculators in their own right, as well as to work in 
partnership with hedge funds and pension funds by offering them specialised 
financial instruments.179 
Finally, outside the lightly-regulated commodity futures trade, there is the entirely 
private and non-transparent ‘over-the-counter’ trade in financial derivatives, whose 
‘notional value’ is estimated to be worth in the order of $580 trillion as at June 
2010.180 Though commodities account for less than one-half of one percent of this 
                                                          
171 Kane op cit.; Vargas and Chantry op cit., 12.  
172 Commodity Exchange Act 1936, quoted in Vargas and Chantry op cit., 13, who note that this 
legislation thereby played an important role in legitimising the futures trade: 12.  
173 Kane op cit. 
174 Vargas and Chantry op cit., 14, noting how the CBOT wheat market raised these limits for six 
financial institutions from ‘39,000 contracts (equivalent to 5.3 million tonnes0 to 130,000 (17.5 million 
tonnes)’. 
175 Kane op cit.  
176 Vargas and Chantry op cit., 7. 
177 Ibid., 17. Some Spanish banks have popularised commodity futures speculation by creating special 
deposit funds with returns linked to appreciation of these commodities over the deposit term: ibid., 17-
18.. 
178 Ibid., 18.  
179 Ibid., 19-20.  
180 Nesvetaliova op cit., 400; Vargas and Chantry op cit., 30.  
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figure, at $2.85 trillion dollars, this is still a sum large enough to heavily influence 
food price movements.181 
In a conjuncture of perceived multiple challenges to national and global food 
security and apparently recurring waves of food ‘crisis’, certain national 
governments are manouvering to position themselves and their corporations at the 
forefront of efforts to achieve global food security. Efforts to position the United 
States are apparent with the introduction of the Bill for the Global Food Security Act 
2009 into the US Congress.182 Senator Richard Lugar, when introducing the Bill, 
observed that while ‘[f]ood insecurity is a global tragedy [it] is also an opportunity 
for the United States [since we are] the indisputable world leader[s] in agricultural 
production and technology’.183 A key role for biotechnology is explicitly 
contemplated as the Act seeks to make additional funding available for further 
research into genetically modified organisms.184 
‘Crisis as opportunity’ also forms the backdrop for the proposed development of a 
first-even National Food Plan for Australia.185 The National Food Plan was announced 
as a policy commitment by the Australian Labor Party prior to the August 2010 
Federal Election, following meetings with the-then Opposition Spokesperson for 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, and the CEO of Woolworths Ltd, the country’s 
largest supermarket. In December 2010, a National Food Policy Working Group was 
established “as a forum for active communication between the food industry and 
government to foster a common understanding of the industry’s priorities, challenges 
and future outlook across the supply chain”.186 This group, comprised almost entirely 
of big farming, agri-business and retailing interests, with one health representative 
and one consumer representative, is advising on the development of the National 
Food Plan. 187 Critics say it reflects a very narrow view of food and farming, with 
                                                          
181 Different forms of ‘over-the-counter’ derivatives trade have evolved, such as managed futures funds, 
collateralised commodity obligations, and credit default swaps: Vargas and Chantry op cit. 31. These 
forms of derivatives instruments, while highly abstract in appearance, have nevertheless assumed the 
character of ‘near-money’ and ‘can have a direct impact on liquidity levels, which can cause increases in 
asset prices as real interest rates decline’: Nesvetaliova op cit., 401.  
182 US Congress, Bill s.384, ‘Global Food Security Act of 2009’, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-384, accessed 15.5.09.  
183 Senator Lugar’s speech was made on 5 February 2009, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/record.xpd?id=111-s20090205-22&bill=s111-
384#sMonofilemx003Ammx002Fmmx002Fmmx002Fmhomemx002Fmgovtrackmx002Fmdatamx002F
musmx002Fm111mx002Fmcrmx002Fms20090205-22.xmlElementm1m0m0m, accessed 15.5.09.  
184 S.202 ‘Agricultural Research’, amending s.103A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-384, accessed 15.5.09. 
185 Writing his Foreword to the Issues Paper to Inform Development of a National Food Plan, Minister 
for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries Senator Joe Ludwig stated that ‘With the changing face of 
international food markets, Australia must position itself to manage future risks, but equally, to reap 
future gains’: (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2011, Issues Paper to Inform 
Development of a National Food Plan, available at: http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-
food/food/national-food-plan/issues_paper_to_inform_development_of_a_national_food_plan, accessed 
30.6.11, iii).  
186 Ref… A Food Processing Industry Strategy Group is also advising on the development of the Plan. 
187 The members of the Food Policy Advisory Working Group are: Michael Luscombe, Managing 
Director and CEO Woolworths; Michael Byrne, CEO, Linfox Logistics; Dr Alastair Robertson, Deputy 
Chief Executive Officer, CSIRO; Terry O’Brien, Managing Director, Simplot Australia; Simone Tully, 
Owner, OBE Organics; Jock Laurie, President, National Farmers’ Federation; Janine Allis, CEO, Boost 
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community and public interest advocates entirely excluded.188 The Group has met 
twice, with little public information released about what was discussed.  
The ‘Issues Paper to inform the development of the National Food Plan’ was released 
at the end of June, 2011. While taking into account a range of drivers and trends, 
the overall approach is entirely consistent with the market-led approach to food 
security outlined above. As health advocates stated,  
The overall emphasis of the paper is on maximizing food production and on food as a 
commodity. The chapter of the paper on promoting a ‘Competitive, productive and 
efficient food industry’ is by far the biggest chapter and the focus of most of the 
questions for consultation. Of the 48 questions for consultation, 24 questions are related 
to developing a ‘Competitive, productive and efficient food industry’, 4 are related to 
food security, 4 to diet and nutrition, 4 to a ‘sustainable food industry’ (with just one 
question on environmental sustainability). 12 are overarching questions.189  
 
The Issues Paper assumes that ‘Australia is food secure’ because the country exports 
two-thirds of its agricultural produce.190 While some challenges are noted, the 
overwhelming focus of the Paper concerns how Australian food producers and 
processors can enhance their productivity and competitiveness, and look to expand 
export opportunities over the coming years. The underlying assumption is that the 
future will continue to resemble the past in all essential respects.  
In their submissions in response to the Paper, several individuals and institutions took 
issue with such assumptions, arguing that ‘fundamental shifts’ and ‘transformations’ 
are required in order to deal with a national (and global) food system that is largely 
‘broken’.191 The Victorian Eco Innovation Lab, which is the only research body in 
Australia to have comprehensively modelled the impact of multiple critical resource 
constraints in ‘three divergent scenarios for economic development trajectories’ 
over the next three decades, made these points forcefully in its submission:  
                                                                                                                                                                         
Juice; Kate Carnell, CEO, Australian Food and Grocery Council; Malcolm Jackson, CEO, Elders Ltd; 
Nick Stace, CEO, Choice (Australian Consumers Association); Alison Watkins, Managing Director and 
CEO, Graincorp; Jeff Lawrence, ACTU Secretary; Dr Peter Williams, Associate Professor of Nutrition 
and Dietetics at University of Wollongong.  
188 ‘These people [members of the Advisory Group] mostly represent vested interests that will not 
propose or support the necessary transition to more sustainable futures that food security and sovereignty 
require. The public and public interest advocates are marginalised, and this will not produce a good plan 
nor win public allegiance for implementation’: Phelps op cit.  
189 Food Alliance, 2011, ‘Brief on the National Food Plan Issues Paper’, unpublished, direct 
communication with author.  
190 Issues Paper op cit., Foreword.  
191 World Health Organisation Collaborating Centre for Obesity Prevention, 2011, ‘Submission to the 
National Food Plan Issues Paper’, 22.7.11, (Swinburn, B., Deakin University), 
http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/food/national-food-plan/submissions-received/who-
collaborating-centre-for-obesity-prevention-submission, accessed 15.11.11. Professor Swinburn argues 
that ‘TRANSFORMATION of the food system [is required] towards one which is more health-
promoting, environmentally sustainable, equitable and prosperous. This indicates that major, not minor 
changes are needed…’ (capitalisation in original). In a similar vein, Graham Brookman, Joint Managing 
Director of the Food Forest, writes in his submission that ‘the whole food system needs rethinking and 
massive effort needs to go into rebuilding the skills of our agricultural producers such that the nation can 
remain domestically food-secure in a world likely to be racked by extreme weather events, inevitable 
climate change and geopolitical insecurity’: Brookman, G, 2011, ‘Submission to the National Food Plan 
Issues Paper’, (The Food Forest), available at: http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/food/national-
food-plan/submissions-received/the-food-forest, accessed 30.9.11. 
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Substantial, unavoidable and imminent changes in our food supply systems, in Australia 
and globally, require fundamental shifts in how we manage land and resources for food 
production and other critical needs…Although the timing and precise manifestation of 
these changes are inherently uncertain, they are inevitable. The declining availability of 
critical resources, particularly oil and water; increasing instability in the climate 
systems; cumulative decline in quality of soils, water and other ecosystems services; and 
the continuing loss of farmers and productive farm lands make our systems of food 
production and distribution increasingly brittle. These potentially non-linear changes 
mean the past is not necessarily a reliable indicator of the future and care must be 
taken in avoiding “lazy” assumptions about the possibility of continuing in a business as 
usual trajectory.192 
The threat to the general welfare that the obesity pandemic poses is also 
downplayed, with no indication that the government is prepared, for example, to 
intervene in the market to curtail or prohibit the advertising of nutrient-poor, 
energy-dense food to young children.193 The World Health Organisation Collaborating 
Centre for Obesity Prevention, in its submission, argued that the Issues Paper was 
deficient in several respects, including: a failure to acknowledge that ‘there is an 
existing crisis of obesity and other diet-related diseases’; failing to acknowledge the 
‘key role of overconsumption of food, particularly processed energy-dense food, as a 
driver [of] obesity’; failing to be ‘more explicit about food marketing as an 
important component in the food system’; and failing to ‘fram[e] people as 
“citizens” rather than just consumers so that this plan is part of food democracy and 
not just a Food Industry Plan”.194  
The focus on production, trade and export is unsurprising, given the fact that 
successive Australian governments since the early 1980s have promoted these policy 
goals and orientations. Australia is a leading member of the ‘Cairns group’ of 
countries within the WTO, which advocates for more liberalised trade in agriculture 
as in other commodities. Similarly, the relative de-emphasis of health and 
environmental concerns perhaps reflect the origins of the Issues Paper within the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, rather than the Department of Health 
or the Environment. More fundamentally, the emphasis of the Issues Paper reflects, 
as many submissions have noted, a failure to engage with the broader Australian 
community, and instead a privileging of the needs and priorities of the food 
industry.195 Picking up the theme of ‘food democracy’, Patrick Leonard of Slow Food 
Noosa writes: 
                                                          
192 Victorian Eco Innovation Lab (Larsen, K.), 2011, ‘Submission to the National Food Plan’, personal 
communication with the author. The Scenarios modelling report referred to is: VEIL (2011), Victorian 
Food Supply Scenarios: Impacts on Availability of a Nutritious Diet, Victorian Eco-Innovation Lab, 
University of Melbourne, available at: http://www.ecoinnovationlab.com/research/food-supply-scenarios, 
accessed 15.4.11. 
193 Food Alliance op cit.  
194 Swinburn 2011 op cit.  
195 In his comments on behalf of Slow Food Noosa Inc., Patrick Leonard notes how ‘the interests of 
consumers have been ignored or, where mentioned, have been represented from the standpoint of the 
large food retailers’; that ‘there is no analysis or consideration of the millions of tonnes of food that is 
wasted every year’; and that ‘most seriously of all, Ministers appear to have abrogated their responsibility 
to defend the public interest: available at: Leonard, P., 2011, ‘Submission from Patrick Leonard on Behalf 
of Slow Food Noosa Inc.’, available at: http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/food/national-food-
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Perhaps most seriously of all, Ministers appear to have abrogated their responsibility to 
defend the public interest. We live in a democratic country, we elect politicians to 
defend our interests against those who would limit our freedom of choice through 
deception and the manipulation of markets. We also expect Governments to manage 
those things that can best be done on behalf of us all…This consultation paper presents a 
view of Government as the assistants to the big players in the farming and retail 
industries…[W]e do not think the issues in the consultation paper have been correctly 
identified…196 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have outlined and briefly discussed a number of the key 
components that constitute the political-institutional architecture supporting the 
globalising capitalist food system, at the international and national levels. I have 
also examined how this system has been legitimised by a particular discourse of food 
security which links the widely desired goal of ‘good food for all’, as well as the 
eradication of hunger, with the accumulation and profit imperatives of the major 
economic actors in the system. I have explored how this understanding of food 
security is being institutionalised in Australia in the form of an inaugural National 
Food Plan, and how the assumptions that underpin it are strongly opposed by several 
individuals and institutions who have expressed their views to the Federal 
Government in submissions.  
This chapter reveals that the challenges confronting the Food Sovereignty movement 
are formidable, at both the international and national levels, in terms of securing 
favourable, let alone transformative, change in the political-institutional context. 
Prima facie, the balance of forces appears to be heavily tilted in favour of the 
political and economic forces that are presently re-negotiating the terms of the 
hegemony of the globalising capitalist food system, against the backdrop of what 
appears to be an intensifying and (semi-) permanent ‘global food crisis’. In the next 
chapter I will discuss how the leading actors within the Food Sovereignty movement 
are responding to these challenges via the strategy of human rights. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                         
plan/submissions-received/slow-food-noosa-inc, accessed 15.11.11. 
196 Ibid.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Responses to the political-institutional 
context 
 
The equality and anti-discrimination principles [of human rights texts]…make certain 
economic and political organizations incompatible and directly in conflict with the 
advancement of human rights. While authoritarian politics is often [seen as] a source of 
violations of civil and political rights, capitalism…is seldom identified as an obstacle for the 
realization of human rights or as a target of change for the human rights project…. We may 
argue that the implementation of full spectrum of human rights call for a social democratic 
model, if not a substantial democracy…that can be actualized only in a socialist economy. 
The radicalism embedded in such an argument, however, makes human rights less palatable 
to some people. This may explain why the study of human rights has been short on political 
economy and why many advocates of human rights strategically avoid controversy.” 
Zehra F. Kabasaka Arat1 
 
Based on the discussion in the previous chapter, it appears that to date, the 
contemporary ‘global food crisis’ is viewed principally as an opportunity to be 
exploited for further consolidation and expansion of the globalising capitalist food 
system. With a constant focus on the underlying need to open up new arenas for 
accumulation and profit, such as genetically modified technologies, agro-fuels, large-
scale land acquisitions, and the further liberalisation of agricultural trade, the 
political-institutional context entrenches and intensifies the key tensions of over-
production, inequality, and ecological degradation.  
In this chapter, I consider the responses of the Food Sovereignty movement to this 
context, and the tensions to which it substantively contributes. My primary focus 
concerns the effectiveness of the reliance on human rights as a central strategy to 
de-legitimise and resist the further institutionalisation of the globalising capitalist 
food system. The main question that I intend to explore is whether, and to what 
extent, La Via Campesina’s attempts to secure a new United Nations Declaration on 
the rights of peasants will advance the transformative aims of food sovereignty, as I 
outlined them in Chapter 3.  
                                                          
1
 Arat, Z.F.K., 2006, ‘Forging A Global Culture of Human Rights: Origins and Prospects of the 
International Bill of Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 28, 416–437, 424. It is worth noting that this 
highly pertinent comment was not contained in the body of the article’s text, but rather was relegated to a 
footnote, perhaps reflecting, albeit unintentionally, the very reticence to tackle the question of political 
economy to which the author refers. As regards the contribution of socialist, feminist and anti-colonial 
struggles to the development of human rights, see Ishay, M., 2004, The History of Human Rights: From 
Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, and Ishay, M., 
2005, ‘The Socialist Contributions to Human Rights: An Overlooked Legacy’, International Journal of 
Human Rights, 9(2), 225-245. 
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My argument is that the peasants’ rights campaign, and the broader campaign for 
food sovereignty, has been successful in a number of ways. First, and most 
importantly, it has strengthened movement-building processes within La Via 
Campesina and its member organisations, by raising levels of consciousness and class 
solidarity amongst peasants and small farmers. Secondly, it has contributed to raising 
the profile of peasants and small-holder farmers within the work of a number of UN 
agencies, the Special Rapporteurs on the right to food especially, and in placing their 
needs and priorities on the agendas of these agencies. Thirdly, and partly as a result 
of the influential interventions of La Via Campesina and its allies, the normative 
development of the right to food by the Special Rapporteurs has followed a 
trajectory that has strong synergies with food sovereignty principles, such as the 
need for redistributive agrarian reform and the prioritisation of the needs of small-
holder farmers. Fourthly, the efforts being made at the national level in twenty-two 
countries to institutionalise and implement the right to food are broadly supportive 
of the objectives of the peasants’ rights campaign and in accord with food 
sovereignty principles generally. Finally, the institutionalisation of food sovereignty 
in a few countries, such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Nepal, demonstrates that this 
new normative framework is beginning to shift the existing productivist ‘common 
sense’ of global and national food systems organised according to capitalist 
imperatives.  
At the same time, these developments, particularly those at the national level, are 
far from being straight-forward and unproblematic. Unless articulated clearly and 
consistently, and in terms that are relevantly and appropriately contextualised, food 
sovereignty can be a confusing concept that does not contribute to greater levels of 
organisation and mobilisation. The UN agencies within which La Via Campesina has 
achieved some level of influence are those with moral and symbolic power in the 
international system; substantive decisions regarding the direction of the global 
political economy are taken elsewhere, and have, as noted in Chapter 4, been 
hostile to the interests of peasants and small farmers. The effectiveness of the 
human rights system as a strategy for transformative change in the context of 
globalising capitalism is open to serious doubt. Further, as the case study of Ecuador 
reveals, the erection of a legal framework is only the first step towards 
implementation of food sovereignty principles and peasants’ rights; achieving 
substantive and lasting changes requires confronting and overcoming vested political 
and economic interests; and this is turn requires sustained mobilisation and activism. 
This points towards the chapter’s principal conclusion: that the major value of the 
peasants’ rights campaign , and of the broader Food Sovereignty movement, lies in 
its capacity to educate and mobilise peasants and small farmers so that they become 
an organised political force capable of applying the sustained pressure necessary to 
work towards the full and lasting implementation of their rights. Potentially this 
process may prefigure the building a wider, counter-hegemonic, political alliance.  
Hence the development of the thesis argument in this chapter enables me to address 
several of the key research questions posed at the end of Chapter 2. Specifically, the 
examination of the institutional articulation and implementation of food sovereignty 
allows me to draw initial conclusions regarding the extent of engagement with key 
elements of the common sense of the globalising capitalist food system; the degree 
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of coherence of food sovereignty as an alternative social and political projects, some 
of its components, whether they can be implemented, and what barriers exist to 
their implementation; the effectiveness of the campaign for the UN Declaration, the 
changes (legislative and policy) it has brought about, and its costs and benefits; and 
the extent to which food sovereignty, and the right to food, might ground a national-
popular strategy. I will reference these questions at appropriate points through the 
chapter, and return to them in the chapter’s conclusion.  
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. First, I discuss the peasants’ rights 
campaign : its immediate origins in the context of global social movement tactics 
and Indonesian domestic politics; its background in La Via Campesina’s attitudes and 
tactics towards international governance institutions, especially the WTO; the 
normative content of the draft Declaration and the status of its progress through the 
UN human rights machinery; and the extent to which it meets some of the principal 
critiques of human rights as a vehicle for achieving societal transformation. Next, I 
explore the synergies between this campaign and the normative and institutional 
development of the human right to adequate food. Here I discuss in particular the 
work of the two Special Rapporteurs on the right to food, from 2000 to the present, 
as well as attempts to institutionalise the right to food in Guatemala. Third, I 
examine the attempt to institutionalise food sovereignty in Ecuador. Finally, I discuss 
efforts to institutionalise the local food movement in Australia, briefly compare this 
with related developments in the United States and Canada, such as the 
establishment of Food Policy Councils. 
The campaign for peasants’ rights 
This campaign originated in the provinces of Indonesia as well as Jakarta, via 
workshops conducted by the Indonesian Peasant Union with the Indonesian National 
Human Rights Commission over 2000-2002.2 Marc Edelman and Carwill James suggest 
that La Via Campesina’s ‘adoption of a more explicit human rights discourse mirrors 
a shift in the practice of transnational indigenous, anti-privatization, and 
environmentalist movements in the same period, some of whom now call for a 
“Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth”’.3 The argument here is that 
the peasants’ rights campaign , and the broader Food Sovereignty movement for , is 
part of the attempt to secure ‘normative shifts’ as a tactic in the ‘struggle among 
[competing] models’ of global agri-food systems:  
Such normative shifts facilitate external international pressure on governments and 
affect policymaking by international institutions. The creation of international standards 
                                                          
2 Interview with Ali, Indonesian Peasant Union (SPI) organiser, 31.3.09, Jakarta; Saragih, H., 2005, The 
World Peasant Farmers Need a Peasant Farmers Rights Convention: The Way for the United Nations to 
End the Oppression and the Extinction of Peasant Farmers, available at: 
http://www.cetim.ch/en/documents/05-onu2-saraghi.pdf, accessed 3.10.11. See also Edelman, M., and 
James, C., 2011, ‘Peasants’ Rights and the UN System: Quixotic Struggle? Or Emancipatory Idea whose 
Time has come?” Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(1), 81-108, 92-3.  
3 Edelman and James op cit., 92. The call for the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth 
followed the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, held in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, in April 2010, which resulted in the so-called ‘Cochabamba Declaration’: 
http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/, accessed 15.6.10. I discuss this Declaration, 
and its central concept of buen vivir as an alternative to logic of economic growth, in Chapter 2.  
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can also encourage the evolution of national norms by providing a readily available 
template for constitutions and legislation.4  
Arguably, such a normative shift has already been at least partially implicit in the 
extensive and expanding corpus of international human rights law. There are several 
existing international instruments that, at the juridical level, provide substantive 
protection to peasants.5  
Nevertheless, as human rights experts have observed, there is no single instrument 
which draws these rights together in order to meet the specific and unique 
contemporary challenges faced by peasants and small farmers, and which also takes 
into account the profound historical injustices they have experienced.6 Hence the 
first justification for the new Declaration is the deontological claim that, as a matter 
of social and historical justice, governments must address the ‘crime against 
humanity’ constituted by the massive historical and continuing violations of 
peasants’ rights in diverse forms, made all the more compelling given that peasants 
as a group of people constitute a significant percentage of humanity.7 As discussed in 
earlier chapters, this claim draws on the historical tradition of the ‘moral economy 
of the peasant’, but universalises it as against governments and transnational 
                                                          
4 Edelman and James op cit., 91-2, discussing Martines-Torres, M.E., and Rosset, P.M., 2010, ‘La Via 
Campesina: The Birth and Evolution of a Transnational Social Movement’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 
37(1), 149-175, 168-170. This theory of the impacts and significance of ‘norm shifting’ is based on the 
‘boomerang effect’ described by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, according to which domestic 
conflicts are internationalised via venue-shifting with the aim of exerting additional pressure on domestic 
actors, usually national governments, to meet the demands of social movements: 1998, 12-3, discussed in 
Edelman and James op cit., 91.  
5 These include the rights to adequate food, housing and the highest possible standard of health, which 
form part of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the 
provisions on the rights of women living in rural areas of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the protections against arbitrary arrest and detention, and 
the other rights and freedoms contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR); Convention 169 of the International Labour Organisation on the rights of indigenous peoples; 
and the 2008 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. See art.11, ICESRC (right to adequate 
standard of living, including adequate food and housing); art.12 ICESCR (right to highest attainable 
standard of health); arts.6(1), 9, 10, 14, 19, 21 and 22 ICCPR (right to life, right to freedom from 
arbitrary detention, right for persons deprived of liberty to be treated humanely, right to a fair trial, right 
to freedom of expression and association, right to form and join trade unions, right to freedom of 
assembly); art.14 CEDAW (prohibition of discrimination against women living in rural areas regarding 
access to productive resources, work, housing, social security, health, training and education); arts.13-17 
ILO No.169 (rights of indigenous peoples to land and territories); and the rights to self-determination, 
land and territory specified in the 2008 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. For a recent 
discussion of these provisions and their applicability to peasants and small farmers, see Golay, C., 2009, 
The Rights of Peasants, CETIM, Critical Report No.5, available at 
http://cetim.ch/en/publications_cahiers.php, accessed 4.10.11; also United Nations Human Rights 
Council Advisory Committee, 2011, Preliminary study of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee 
on the advancement of the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas, United Nations 
A/HRC/16/163, 18.2.11. 
6 Golay op cit., HRC Advisory Committee 2011 op cit.  
7 La Via Campesina International Coordinating Committee, 2009, ‘Draft Declaration of Rights of 
Peasants – Women and Men’, Seoul, March 2009, available at 
http://viacampesina.net/downloads/PDF/EN-3.pdf, accessed 3.10.09, Recitals I & II. See also Edelman 
and James op cit., 83-4, noting that in this respect La Via Campesina fits into the familiar pattern of the 
expansion of the international human rights system over time, with the incorporation of new groups who 
‘go through a common pattern of identifying themselves as part of the global human condition, asserting 
an equal claim to universal rights, and specifying rights that are particular to their unique situation’: ibid. 
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corporate actors. From the legal and political perspective, the advantage of a new 
Declaration would be ‘to increase coherence and visibility’ of the demands that 
peasants and small farmers are making on national governments.8 
Secondly, the new Declaration is said to be needed to facilitate the proper 
implementation of a number of existing international human rights and other 
obligations, by providing specific content and filling in ‘normative gaps’.9 For 
example, La Via Campesina says that it would constitute the implementation of the 
‘Peasants’ Charter’ that emerged from the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian 
Reform and Rural Development, and its corner-stone of pro-poor agrarian reform; 
and also that it would strengthen the safeguards to protect bio-diversity contained in 
the Convention on Bio-Diversity.10 Perhaps the most glaring ‘normative gap’ in 
existing human rights law is the absence of any clear guarantee of the ‘right to land’ 
and ‘to the means of agricultural production’ for peasants and small-scale farmers.11  
Finally, La Via Campesina and its supporters advance an instrumentalist justification, 
which runs as follows: human social and economic development is dependent on 
agriculture and food; peasants are the people who principally do the work of 
sustaining agricultural systems and rural communities; and so the integrity of 
peasant culture and the viability of their livelihoods must be ensured, for the good of 
all. Related to this justification is the fact that the majority of malnourished persons 
in the world are rural dwellers and small-scale farmers; hence addressing rural 
poverty and dispossession will facilitate the eradication of hunger and the full 
realisation of the right to food; and the way to do this is by recognising and 
upholding peasants’ rights, as part of the transition to food sovereignty.12  
The peasants’ rights campaign  also needs to be contextualised in its country of 
origin.13 During the Suharto dictatorship (1966-1998), the state suppressed 
independent peasant organisations, and a strong strain of virulent anti-communism 
and anti-left politics was implanted within the governing and religious elites.14 As I 
have discussed, food sovereignty is potentially radical in its implications, and is 
                                                          
8 HRC Advisory Committee 2011 op cit., para.70.  
9 Ibid., paras.62-3; La Via Campesina 2009 op cit. 
10 Saragih 2005 op cit., mentioning (in Recital IV) the ICESRC, the Peasant Farmers’ Charter of 1979, 
ILO Convention 169 (regarding control of tribal and indigenous peoples over natural resources), Clause 
8J of the Convention on Bio-Diversity (regarding clarification of the prohibition of patenting of peasant 
and indigenous knowledge), Point 14.60 of Agenda 21 (regarding its failure to mention the rights of 
peasant farmers as central to preserving bio-diversity), and the Cartagena Protocol (strengthening the 
protection of bio-diversity by allowing a right of peasant farmers to ‘refuse seed and plants that could 
harm and pollute the environment’): 9-10.  
11 HRC Advisory Committee 2011 op cit., paras.63, 70.  
12 Saragih op cit.; also Edelman and James op cit., 100; also HRC Advisory Committee 2011 op cit., 
paras.4-6.  
13 While the campaign for Peasants’ Rights began in Indonesia, and has been led more generally by the 
Asian regions of La Via Campesina, it was formally endorsed by La Via Campesina’s peak decision-
making body, the International Coordinating Committee, during its March 2009 meeting in Seoul: 
Edelman and James op cit., 92. This ICC meeting was preceded by an International Conference on 
Peasants’ Rights held in Jakarta in June 2008, which ‘brought together about a hundred delegates drawn 
from 26 countries and representing the various peasant groups that make up La Via Campesina’: Golay 
2009.  
14 Interview with Tejo Pramono, Jakarta, 31.3.09.  
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openly talked about by many groups and activists as part of a post-capitalist political 
project. In Indonesia, such explicit public discussions are beyond the realms of 
political possibility; and so ‘food sovereignty as human rights’ becomes the 
acceptable – perhaps the only – alternative, as La Via Campesina researcher Tejo 
Pramono explains:  
[W]e never bring in the ideology of the left, of communism, or socialism. Yes, it’s 
different, when we’re talking about La Via Campesina; that is actually what we’re 
talking about, in Brazil everyone is talking about communism, about the left. But it 
doesn’t work in Indonesia. So, what we want to do now is – we have to talk about the 
rights of the farmers. We are the majority, but we are landless. Is there any single 
country, or any single corporations in agribusiness that [don’t] have land? So why don’t 
you give us land? You ask us to feed our families, but you don’t give us land. How can – 
what strategy do we use? So we work more on this kind of issue, on rights.15 
Thus, education about rights has become a central movement-building strategy of La 
Via Campesina; and in a country such as Indonesia, the raising of consciousness 
through such education also forms a corner-stone of a long-term political strategy for 
transformative change, as I discuss below. In the terms of my Gramscian 
methodology, the educational work around a politicised understanding of human 
rights can be seen as part of a broader effort to build a national-popular collective 
will. This interpretation is consistent with my principal argument, which is that the 
significance of the peasants’ rights campaign  lies in the contribution it can make it 
countries such as Indonesia to the building of a mass movement for transformative 
political change.  
 
This campaign is reflective of La Via Campesina’s ‘dual-track’ strategy of opposition 
to some international institutions and critical engagement with others. That is, it 
takes a ‘rejectionist’ stance to what it regards as the institutional embodiments of 
‘neoliberal globalisation’ – the IMF, the WB, the WTO, the G8 – whilst forming a 
number of ‘working partnerships’ with what it sees as the more ‘democratic’ 
elements of global governance on food and agriculture, notably the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the 
Committee on World Food Security, and the Human Rights Council.16 Saturnino 
Borras, Marc Edelman and Cristobal Kay argue that ‘La Via Campesina’s capacity for 
combining multiple tactics and strategies, as well as a wide range of forms of action, 
almost certainly contributes to its effectiveness’.17 The problem, however, is that at 
the present time the key decisions regarding the further expansion and consolidation 
of the globalising capitalist food system are largely taken by the ‘neoliberal 
institutions’, as discussed in Chapter 4. The ‘democratic’ institutions within which La 
Via Campesina has secured a measure of influence have only ‘soft’, symbolic power 
                                                          
15 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 31.3.09.  
16 Desmarais 2007, 111-121; Borras, S.M., Edelman, M., and Kay, C., 2008, ‘Transnational Agrarian 
Movements: Origins and Politics, Campaigns and Impact’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(2 & 3), 169-
204, 188, noting that the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP), which represents 
large commercial farming interests, will actively collaborate with all the ‘neoliberal’ institutions and 
generally embraces free trade.  
17 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 188.  
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in the international political system, in contrast to the ‘hard’, coercive power of the 
‘neoliberal institutions’.18  
 
The challenge for La Via Campesina and the Food Sovereignty movement is to 
translate this ‘soft’ power, of which human rights is emblematic, at the international 
level, into substantive and lasting political and economic change at the national and 
sub-national levels. Hence the significance of securing legal and political change 
based on food sovereignty principles, as in Ecuador; and building a rights-based 
consciousness amongst broad layers of the peasantry in pursuit of a ‘national-
popular’ strategy, as in Indonesia. 
 
With respect to the ‘neoliberal’ institutions, La Via Campesina’s aim has been ‘to 
delegitimize [them via] public shaming through confrontational actions’.19 Has such 
de-legitimisation succeeded in altering or slowing down the trajectory of expansion 
of the globalising capitalist food system? Yes, to a certain extent, according to Nettie 
Wiebe, one of the driving forces behind the establishment of La Via Campesina. She 
regards it as a ‘small victory’ that La Via Campesina has managed to throw some 
‘sand in the WTO gears’, as she puts it, even as free trade talks continue to be 
pursued in the bilateral and regional arenas.20  
To this extent, La Via Campesina has, through its direct action interventions in global 
politics, arguably succeeded in contributing to the destabilisation of one of the 
ideological (free trade / trade liberalisation) and institutional (WTO) pillars of the 
globalising capitalist food system.21 Eric Holt-Giménez and Annie Shattuck argue that 
‘slowing the rate of liberalization’ in this way is ‘not trivial’, because it enables ‘the 
                                                          
18 In international relations and global political economy theory, the ‘ “soft power” of attraction and 
emulation’ is contrasted with the ‘ “hard power” of military dominance and economic coercion’: see Cox, 
R., 2004, ‘Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order’, 
New Political Economy, 9(3) 307-323, 309. As Cox notes, the originator of the concept is Joseph S. Nye, 
Jr (1990, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basic Books, New York) who 
defined it as the ‘ “intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions” or those aspects 
of a dominant power that are attractive to people beyond its borders’: Cox op cit., 321, note 5. Cox argues 
that in the context of the War on Terror, ‘the relationship between [US] “hard power” and “soft 
power”…has been inverse rather than complementary’; i.e. as the US has flexed its military muscles 
more aggressively, so it has ‘dissipated the gains [its] ‘soft power’ made in the post-Second World War 
era’: op cit., 312. See also Nye, J.S.Jr., 2002, ‘Limits of American Power’, Political Science Quarterly, 
117(4), 545-559; Nye, J.S., Jr., 2004, Soft Power and the War on Terror, Speech before the Foreign Policy 
Association, Washington DC, May 10, 2004. Human rights and ‘democracy’ are classic examples of ‘soft 
power’: Nye, J.S., Jr., 1999, ‘Redefining the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, 78, 22-35. 
19 Borras et al op cit., 188-9.  
20 “[I]t is a small victory that [the expansion of free trade] hasn’t been able to be managed by one 
agreement or negotiating table. That’s already introduced all kinds of possibilities into the power 
dynamic, which weren’t there as long as there was a small clique of nations negotiating and [presenting 
the rest of the world with a fait accompli]…Even in these bilateral arrangements, you see the same 
corporate players benefiting…But minimally we’ve made their job a little more complex…In the long 
run I have to be very doubtful that even the bilateral arrangements can succeed. A lot of them are so 
uneven, and so tentative in their benefits…it’s not clear to me that they’re well enough grounded, and that 
there’s enough power to hold them in place. That for us is good news because a lot of those agreements 
are just bilateral replicas of what’s happening at the WTO”: interview with the author, 15.9.10 
21 La Via Campesina Global Coordinator Henry Saragih, in his presentation to the 2nd La Via Campesina 
Youth Conference of the East and South-East Asian region, held in Timor Leste from 26.3.09 – 29.03.09, 
stated that the ‘WTO process has come to a standstill. There’s no political momentum to take it forward’.  
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dispossessed time to “adjust to changing conditions without fatally damaging their 
substance, human and economic, physical and moral”.22 In other words, it creates 
some ‘breathing space’ in which to organise for further mobilisation and advances.23 
As such, it represents both an effective political engagement with one of the key 
institutions of the globalising capitalist food system; and an effective ideological 
critique of a central element of the system’s common sense, namely that further 
liberalisation of agricultural trade is the best, if not the only, way to achieve global 
food security. The issue then becomes, assuming that some ‘breathing space’ is 
being created in this way, to what extent can La Via Campesina and the Food 
Sovereignty movement take advantage of it to articulate and implement their 
alternatives? 
This in turn raises the issue as to what those alternatives mean in practice. The 
subject of trade is particularly important, having regard to the impact of trade 
liberalisation on small and peasant farmers. La Via Campesina’s alternative to free 
trade is trade based on food sovereignty principles: fair and transparent trade 
regulated by democratised international institutions, within the broad context of all 
nations working towards greater food self-sufficiency, and being supported in these 
efforts.24 As to what this would mean in practice, the details have not yet been 
developed, although La Via Campesina researcher Tejo Pramono states that the 
emerging Latin American ‘ALBA’ (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) framework of 
‘trade by solidarity’ might constitute a potential model. 25 For Wiebe, the struggle at 
                                                          
22
 Holt-Giménez, E., and Shattuck, A., 2011, ‘Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: 
Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(1), 109-144, 135-6, 
quoting Polanyi, K., 1944, The Great Transformation Beacon Press, Boston, 37.  
23
 As noted in Chapter 3, in the case of the organised labour movement in the advanced capitalist 
countries, these advanced ultimately resulted in substantive de-commodification of the human condition 
via the creation of welfare states: see Epsing-Andersen, G., 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
24 In one of its first texts following the launch of food sovereignty as an alternative to market-driven food 
security, La Via Campesina called for the promotion of ‘initiatives which will contribute to the 
development of fair trade with direct participation of producers and consumers, beginning with an 
international anti-dumping campaign’ (‘Tlaxcala Declaration of the Via Campesina’, Tlaxcala, Mexico, 
April 18-21, 1996, available at: http://www.virtualsask.com/via/lavia.deceng.html, accessed 30.12.11. In 
1999, during the anti-WTO Seattle protests, La Via Campesina launched its demand to ‘get the WTO out 
of agriculture’: La Via Campesina, 1999, ‘Seattle Declaration: Take the WTO out of Agriculture’, 
December 3, 1999, available at: 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57:seattle-declaration-
take-wto-out-of-agriculture&catid=24:10-years-of-wto-is-enough&Itemid=35, accessed 30.12.11. In the 
Seattle Declaration, La Via Campesina called, somewhat contradictorily, for ‘an alternative to the current 
neo-liberal policies and to institutions such as the WTO, WB and the IMF’; and at the same time insisted 
that ‘[w]e must civilize these international policies and institutions’: ibid. The Declaration contained 
some specific demands of a negative character (e.g. cancel the minimum import and mandatory market 
access requirements) and very general demands regarding the need to ‘create genuine international 
democratic mechanisms to regulate food trade while respecting food sovereignty in each country’: ibid. 
Over a dozen years later, at the end of 2011, La Via Campesina is now calling for the abolition of the 
WTO altogether; however concrete proposals and policy frameworks for ‘fair and transparent trade based 
on food sovereignty principles’ are still notable by their absence: La Via Campesina, 2011b, ‘La Via 
Campesina to the Ministerial Meeting: ‘It is Time to End the WTO!’’ December 16, 2011, available at: 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1188:via-campesina-to-
the-ministerial-meeting-qit-is-time-to-end-the-wtoq&catid=24:10-years-of-wto-is-enough&Itemid=35, 
accessed 30.12.11. 
25 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 31.3.09. ALBA’s origins date to proposal made by Venezuelan 
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this stage seems to be mainly a matter of ‘holding ground’ and ‘pushing back’ in 
some areas – creating breathing space, in other words - as opposed to proactively 
creating a different model of agricultural trade:  
I can’t say that there are yet any brilliant successes of implementation of food 
sovereignty-type agreements on the basis of fair and transparent trade. However, there 
are places where we’ve achieved enough push-back that we’ve been able to protect 
certain parts of agriculture.26  
Thus, while the ‘realm of the possible’ has been expanded in the most general and 
abstract sense of a ‘fair and transparent trading system’, there is clearly 
considerable work to be done in terms of its elaboration, let alone its concrete 
implementation. In this crucial respect, food sovereignty as an alternative social and 
political project is (currently) lacking in coherence. Further, in the concrete terms of 
‘protection’ as posed by Wiebe, the general trajectory appears to be one of on-going 
‘de-peasantisation’, which is to say that peasants and small farmers are not ‘holding 
their ground’. There are, however, some scholars who claim that a counter-trend of 
‘re-peasantisation’ is under way in certain places, and I will evaluate those 
arguments in Chapter 7. 
In contrast to the oppositional stance towards the ‘neoliberal’ institutions, the 
strategic thinking that guides the engagements with the ‘more democratic’ 
international institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is that 
the forums that these institutions have created in recent years constitute a dialogic 
space in which La Via Campesina can articulate the needs and priorities of peasants, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
President Hugo Chavez during the 3rd Summit of the Caribbean Heads of State in Margarita during 
December 2001. ALBA came into being with the signing of a joint declaration for its creation in 
December 2004 by Cuba and Venezuela, and at successive Summits through 2005-2009 new members 
joined. Currently there are nine member countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela): 
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/, accessed 30.12.11. ALBA proposes a model of ‘People’s Trade 
Agreements’, juxtaposed to ‘Free Trade Agreements’; and explicitly locates itself as the historical 
inheritor of the ‘grand and unified nation of Latin America and the Caribbean’ vision of Simon Bolivar: 
ibid. Ideologically, the member states of ALBA state that they are commited to a ‘critical stance towards 
neoliberal globalization, the necessity of sustainable development with social justice [and] national 
sovereignty and the right to self-determination’: ibid. For a sympathetic treatment of ALBA in which it is 
regarded as a genuine ‘counter-hegemonic strategy of regional integration in the context of post-
neoliberal process’, see Linares, R., 2011, ‘The ALBA Alliance and the construction of a new Latin 
American regionalism’, paper delivered at the Conference ALBA and the Future of Regional Integration, 
London, England, January 29, 2011, available at: 
http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/fms/MRSite/Research/clarc/IJCS%203_23%20Alba%20conf%20Linares.pd
f, accessed 30.12.11; and also Muhr, T., 2010, Nicaragua: Constructing the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America (ALBA) in Schuerkens, U., (ed.), 2010, Globalization and Transformations of 
Social Inequality, Routledge, New York & Abingdon, Oxon., 115-134. Thomas Muhr argues that ALBA 
embodies a genuinely post-capitalist political project of counter-hegemony, because inter alia its 
‘principles of solidarity, cooperation and complementarity reject capitalist profit-making criteria’; 
translated into practice these principles imply ‘the construction of a social and popular economy that 
considers people as more important than profit’ : ibid. Muhr also notes the synergies between ‘ALBA 
principles and practices’ and a ‘range of UN declarations, above all the 1974 UN Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development, and the 2002 UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Draft Guidelines on a 
Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies’: ibid.  
26 Interview with the author, 15.9.10.  
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and advance food sovereignty as a feasible and necessary alternative to what they 
say is the failing model of neoliberalism.27 The strategy thus appears to be, on the 
one hand, to try to slow the political processes of liberalisation and (perhaps) the 
economic processes of unrestrained capital accumulation through opposition and 
resistance; and on the other, to pursue the campaigns for ‘normative shifts’ in 
sympathetic global governance forums and so create a momentum for change at the 
national level. 
One challenge for La Via Campesina is for it to be able to engage constructively in 
these spaces, without being co-opted by institutions that might use La Via 
Campesina’s ‘participation’ as a form of legitimising an agenda contrary to La Via 
Campesina’s core values and objectives, ‘thus effectively diluting or silencing 
opposition’.28 As a consequence of early experiences of such tactics, the La Via 
Campesina has adopted ‘as a matter of principle’ an insistence on its autonomous 
participation and ‘the right to speak on its own behalf in all spaces’.29 The fact that 
La Via Campesina has ‘been able to gain seats in [several] official venues’ has been 
said to constitute, by itself, a ‘profound change’, which ‘partially undermin[es] the 
hegemony previously enjoyed by more conservative movements’, IFAP especially.30 
Further, it suggests that La Via Campesina is alert to the dangers of trasformismo 
that being subsumed into joint representation in these forums would entail.  
Getting a seat at the table is a first step; the next involves influencing the processes 
and general culture in these forums so that their general orientation is more 
responsive and more supportive of the case being made for food sovereignty and 
peasants’ rights. La Via Campesina’s participation in these venues has had to be 
managed carefully, with constant attention to the dangers of co-optation. For 
example, Tejo Pramono notes how ‘there is a dynamic to the relationship’ with the 
FAO, since ‘the politics within the FAO pull in different directions’.31 Thus, the 2006 
FAO-sponsored International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development 
(ICARRD) was supportive of the La Via Campesina agenda and included references to 
food sovereignty in its final Declaration, and was ‘a major political achievement for 
                                                          
27 In other words, La Via Campesina uses this space to advance its ‘struggle among models’: Martinez-
Torres and Rosset 2010, op cit. 
28 A common way in which some food- and agriculture-related global governance institutions have 
attempted to do this is by ‘conflating IFAP [ the large commercial farmers’ transnational movement] and 
La Via Campesina into just one space’, thereby ‘erasing the fundamental differences between the two 
[movements]’: Desmarais 2007 op cit., 118-121, discussing La Via Campesina’s experience with the 
multi-stakeholder Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR) in May 2000. The ‘GFAR brought 
together…representatives of government departments of agriculture, national and international 
agricultural research institutions, NGOs, [the biotech companies] Monsanto and Novartis, La Via 
Campesina and IFAP. The expressed goal of the conference was to reach a consensus on the future 
direction of agricultural research…GFAR resolved [the] challenge [of overcoming the diametrically 
opposed interests of some participants] by simply fabricating consent’: 118.  
29 Ibid., 120.  
30 Borras et al 2008 op cit., 171.  
31 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 31.3.09. La Via Campesina participates in a civil society forum of 
the FAO as part of the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty, specially created for the 
purpose. The IPC for Food Sovereignty includes 500 rural social movements and NGOs as members, 
including important artisanal fisherfolk networks such as the World Forum of Fish Harvesters and 
Fishworkers, the World Forum of Fisher Peoples, and the International Collective in Support of Fish 
Workers’: Borras et al 2008 op cit., 171. 
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La Via Campesina’.32 However, the Declarations of FAO-sponsored meetings on the 
food crisis in recent years have tended in the opposite direction, endorsing the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa as well as emphasising the need to conclude 
the Doha Development agenda of the WTO.33 This appears to be reflective of ‘the 
apparent weakening of La Via Campesina allies within FAO post-ICARRD (due to 
funding cuts and internal re-organization)’.34 Similarly, since 2005 La Via Campesina 
has played a leading role in shaping a ‘relatively progressive land reform framework’ 
within the Farmers’ Forum of the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD); however, because of internal political configurations within IFAD, this 
influence has not translated to strong and decisive support of the institution as a 
whole for the La Via Campesina positions.35  
While the follow-up to date to the ICARRD and IFAD processes appears disappointing 
from the food sovereignty perspective, and is, as Holt-Giménez and Shattuck argue, 
reflective of the balance of power held by neoliberal tendencies within the WB, La 
Via Campesina’s interventions in these forums are suggestive of a growing confidence 
and international protagonism. Further evidence of this tendency within the UN 
system is the leading role played by La Via Campesina in securing wide-ranging 
reforms to the FAO’s Committee on World Food Security (CWFS), agreed during its 
35th session in October 2009 in the wake of the 2008 global food crisis. La Via 
Campesina now participates actively in this forum, intended to become a principal 
international arena for debate and discussion on food security and nutrition issues, 
via the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty.36  
In what has been hailed as the first international agreement  of its kind, negotiated 
directly between government representatives and affected civil society actors, the 
Committee on World Food Security released in May 2012 its Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context 
of National Food Security.’37 Civil society actors, including  La Via Campesina, have 
                                                          
32 Borras, S.M., 2008, ‘La Via Campesina and its Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change, 8(1 & 2), 258-289, 272. The ICARRD Final Report is available at 
http://www.icarrd.org/sito.html, accessed 3.10.11.  
33 Interview with Tejo Pramono, Jakarta, 31.3.09.  
34 Borras 2008 op cit., noting that these developments within the FAO ‘[do] not bode well [for La Via 
Campesina]’: 272. 
35 Ibid., 270, 272. Borras comments: ‘At IFAD, La Via Campesina allies are located mainly in the Policy 
Division, a relatively weak division politically, because they do not control the fund and do not directly 
interface with country partners. For its part, the more powerful operations division of IFAD, where the 
main fund is directly handled, still lacks a coherent position on land reform, and has maintained broadly 
pro-market tendencies’: 272. 
36 http://www.fao.org/cfs/en/, accessed 3.10.11. The October 2009 reforms intend ‘to make the CFS the 
foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform dealing with food security and nutrition 
and to be a central component in the evolving Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and 
Nutrition. The CFS reforms are designed to focus the Committee’s vision and role on the global 
coordination of efforts to eliminate hunger and ensure food security for all. This includes supporting 
national anti-hunger plans and initiatives; ensuring the all relevant voices are heard in the policy debate 
on food and agriculture; strengthening linkages at regional, national and local levels; and basing decisions 
on scientific evidence and state of the art knowledge”: FAO, 2009, ‘Global platform for food security 
revitalized: Member countries agree to reform Committee on World Food Security’, 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/36446/icode/, accessed 3.10.11.  
37 Available at: http://www.panap.net/sites/default/files/Voluntary-Guidelines-Full-version-FAO-2012.pdf, 
accessed 21.2.13 
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welcomed these Guidelines both as affirmation of the capacity of the participatory 
process of the CWFS to achieve a successful outcome; and for the substantive 
content of the Guidelines themselves.38 The Guidelines place achievement of food 
security and ‘the progressive realisation of the right to food’ as ‘the most important 
goal of good land tenure governance’; and devote special attention  to the needs of 
indigenous peoples, small landholders, and women, enshrining  the principle of ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’ for indigenous communities vulnerable to losing their 
land tenure as a result of legislative or commercial arrangements.39 
At the same time, the Guidelines contain significant omissions and (from the 
perspective of civil society) shortcomings, notably the absence of any reference to 
secure communal access to water, the acceptance of transfer of land tenure through 
market mechanisms without any administrative or legislative safeguards for the poor, 
and the absence of a strong monitoring mechanism.40 Further, the guarantee of 
‘free, prior and informed consent’ only applies to indigenous communities; others 
(such as peasants) are entitled only to ‘participation and consultation’.41 For reasons 
discussed below, these sorts of omissions raise serious questions as to whether the 
Guidelines will make any significant difference on the ground in terms of slowing 
down, let alone halting or reversing, the on-going process of land-grabs.  
According to La Via Campesina researcher Tejo Pramono, the campaign to secure a 
new United Nations Declaration on the rights of peasants is similarly about 
‘occupying the [international] space’.42 There is, in his view, a dual process of 
education taking place in this campaign, which is less to do with legal niceties and 
judicial procedures, and much more to do with consciousness-raising. At the level of 
the United Nations, the presence of La Via Campesina fills an obvious absence, and 
also plays an educative role vis-à-vis the governmental representatives, since ‘there 
is no one there to talk about the realities of peasants’. At the level of the grassroots, 
it is part of building the Food Sovereignty movement, in Indonesia and elsewhere:  
Personally, when I think about peasant rights and human rights, I didn’t come to that 
process through thinking about…the legal process. Yes, we should have the laws, and it 
should be mentioned in the laws…but I do not believe that it will go to the legal process. 
I believe more in raising awareness of the people. In Indonesia we have to talk about the 
political campaign: it’s [only] a [procedural] democracy [at the moment]. Fifty per cent 
or more of the voters are farmers, and their voice is not heard. They need land. The 
democracy is distorted somewhere. It’s good to talk about farmers’ rights, and give some 
                                                          
38 See La Via Campesina, 2012, ‘The Voluntary Guidelines on the Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests 
are Complete’, available at: http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/agrarian-
reform-mainmenu-36/1198-the-voluntary-guidelines-on-the-tenure-of-land-fisheries-and-forests-are-
complete, accessed 21.2.13. 
39 Kropiwnicka, M.A., 2012, ‘A Brief Introduction to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security’, 
ActionAid, available at: http://www.panap.net/sites/default/files/Voluntary-Guidelines-Brief-Introduction-
ActionAid-2012June.pdf, accessed 21.2.13 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Interivew with the author, 31.3.09. .  
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meaning to it….Many people are disappointed with the lack of progress [in Indonesia] 
over the past ten years, and so we have to educate the farmers about these issues.43 
Here, Pramono is discussing the iterative and critical processes of education and 
movement-building that the Indonesian Peasant Union (SPI) is undertaking. As 
mentioned previously, this sort of ‘rights talk’ plays a crucial role in efforts to form 
class consciousness and solidarity amongst peasants in Indonesia and beyond.44 In the 
terms of my research questions, this is the principal benefit of the campaign for the 
UN Declaration. The educative processes associated with the campaign are also 
helping to ground a national-popular strategy within Indonesia, in terms of forming 
the peasantry and allied classes as a mass movement that is capable, over the 
medium-to-long term, of becoming a potent organised political force, eventually 
capable of forming provincial and perhaps a national government in their own right.  
I turn then to consider the normative content of the draft Declaration on peasants’ 
rights. The Declaration is very wide-ranging, containing eleven substantive articles 
and eighty-two sub-sections, each of which specifies a different right. The eleven 
groups of rights claims come under the headings of:  
 gender equality and the right to participate in decisions, policy formation 
processes, etc., that affect peasants’ territories;  
 the right to life and an adequate standard of living;  
 the right to land and territory;  
 the right to seeds, and traditional agricultural knowledge and practices;  
 the right to the means of agricultural production; 
 the right to information and agricultural technology;  
 the freedom to determine price and market for agricultural production;  
 the right to the protection of agricultural values;  
 the right to biological diversity;  
 the right to preserve the environment;  
 the freedoms of association, opinion and expression; and  
 the right to have access to justice.45 
As noted above, some of the claimed rights and freedoms already exist in 
international human rights law, such as the right to an adequate standard of living, 
the right to freedom of association and expression, and the right to access to justice. 
Others, notably the right to own land and produce food, the cluster of rights 
associated with agrarian reform and the means of agricultural production, the 
freedom to determine price and markets, and the right to resist oppression, are 
quite novel. It is therefore somewhat surprising that in a recent discussion of the 
Declaration, Priscilla Claeys construes these rights claims as expressive of a ‘belief in 
an alternative, less urban, less technological, less industrial and less western, 
modernity, and the quest for a ‘natural’, ‘pre-capitalist form’ of existence’.46 On the 
                                                          
43 Ibid.  
44 Panitch, L., and Gindin, S., 2010, Capitalist Crises and the Crisis this Time in Socialist Register 2011, 
Merlin Press, Pontypool, 17.  
45 La Via Campesina 2009a op cit.  
46 Claeys, P., 2012, ‘The Creation of New Rights by the Food Sovereignty Movement: The Challenge of 
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contrary, I would argue that they are expressive of a 21st-century and universalised 
form of the ‘moral economy of the peasant’, which is future-oriented, precisely 
because the norms claimed are universalised; and precisely because underpinning 
these claims is an ecological understanding which posits peasants and farmers are 
stewards of the land who at this point in time have a unique responsibility to heal 
the ecological rift. Where Claeys does make a valuable point  is in her cautioning of 
an exclusivist focus on the needs and special role of peasants:  
Building alliances globally with indigenous groups in the South, consumers in the 
North, agricultural and industrial workers all around the globe will certainly be critical 
to advance the proposed new rights, from above (through constitutional changes, 
public policies, institutions) and / or from below (through alternative food and farming 
practices). But building alliances may become useless if too much of the movement’s 
rights rhetoric revolves around peasants’ distinctiveness, and their quest for 
recognition… Then, Via Campesina might be confronted with a lesson already learned 
by others: rights, when framed as absolutist claims, may inhibit the necessary political 
dialogue with other fragments of society…47  
In the terms of this thesis, this observation links to the Gramscian principle that a 
counter-hegemonic project can only be successful if it can articulate a vision in the 
universal interest, above and beyond the needs and priorities of a particular class or 
sector. This is precisely the question that Via Campesina, and the Food Sovereignty 
movement more generally, needs to address as a matter of urgency.   
In several instances, the Declaration speaks not only of the granting of positive rights 
and entitlements to peasants, but also of their ‘right to reject’ certain economic 
forms and practices, notably land-grabbing, GMO seed, and forms of bio-piracy.48  
This ‘right to reject’ is said to flow from the claimed right of autonomy and self-
determination for peasant communities, and to have antecedents in the ‘right to 
free, prior and informed consent’ that appears in the 2007 Indigenous Rights 
Declaration.49 Conceptually and juridically, it is a novel departure for international 
human rights law, and, as with claims such as the ‘right to the means of production’, 
is ‘indicative of an effort to push existing [human rights] norms beyond their current 
bounds’.50 
The lengthy introduction and preamble to the draft Declaration, in which are recited 
the historical struggles of peasants and the many contemporary forms of suffering 
which they endure, quite effectively describe the contemporary processes of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Institutionalizing Subversion’, Sociology 46(5), 844-860, 851.  
47 Ibid., 854. 
48 See Art.IV(9) (‘the right to reject all kinds of land acquisition and conversion for economic purpose’ – 
a clear reference to land-grabbing); Art.V(2) (the ‘right to reject varieties of the plant which [sic] they 
consider to be dangerous economically, ecologically and culturally’ – a clear reference to genetically-
modified seed);  
and Arts. X(3) & (4) (the ‘right to reject patents threatening biological diversity’ and ‘intellectual 
property rights of knowledge etc. owned or developed by the community’ (– a reference to ‘biopiracy’). 
49 Edelman and James op cit., 100.  
50 Ibid., 93.  
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‘accumulation by dispossession’, and the many forms of economic and ‘extra-
economic’ forms of coercion by which they are accomplished.51  
La Via Campesina is well aware of these forms of coercion, and has formulated its 
response in the shape of a ‘right to reject’ coercive phenomena such as ‘land-grabs’ 
and mega-development projects which are resulting in the expropriation and 
dispossession of many thousands, if not millions, of peasants and rural dwellers.52 
Read as a legal text, an historical document and a critique of the violent practices of 
a hegemonic power formation, the draft Declaration represents a dynamic synthesis 
of the democratic construction of the content of food sovereignty over many years 
by members of La Via Campesina. In this sense it represents, in the terms of my 
research questions, an increase in the coherence and critical insights of the analyses 
and discourses of the Food Sovereignty movement. The comprehensive nature of its 
content is also suggestive of the growing coherence of the food sovereignty 
alternative, and enables observers to delineate its principal components and 
contours.  
In terms of the Declaration’s present status, the path to securing a new Declaration 
on Peasants’ Rights is a long one, and only really gathered any momentum in the 
wake of the 2008 global food crisis.53 Prior to this conjunctural imperative, there 
were certain key institutional innovations within the United Nations which enabled a 
greater receptivity towards La Via Campesina and its campaign. Christophe Golay 
cites the formation of the Human Rights Council in 2006, the subsequent 
establishment of its Advisory Committee in 2008, and the thematic and country-
specific work undertaken over several years by the two Special Rapporteurs on the 
right to food, Jean Zeigler and Olivier de Schutter, in developing the normative 
content of the right to food as strongly supportive of the substance of food 
sovereignty and the peasants’ rights campaign as the most significant changes.54 
Responding to calls from Mr de Schutter to prioritise the global food crisis and its 
impacts on the right to food, the Human Rights Council mandated the Advisory 
Committee to ‘make further recommendations to advance the realization of the 
right to food’.55 In May 2008, the Human Rights Council convened a special session on 
the global food crisis and right to food, and urged States to conduct what are in 
effect ‘right to food impact assessments’ of policies or measures, such as the 
facilitation of land acquisitions, prior to their adoption and implementation.56  
 
                                                          
51 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, it is these processes and forms which characterise contemporary 
globalising capitalism. See Wood 2003 op cit regarding the distinction between economic and extra-
economic forms of coercion.  
52 HRC Advisory Committee 2011 op cit., para.20; Golay op cit., citing as an example of a mega-
development project leading to forcible eviction and displacement the construction of the Narmada Dam 
in India in the 1990s.  
53 Golay op cit. 
54 Ibid. Golay worked as an advisor to Jean Zeigler. 
55 Ibid., citing Resolution 7/14 on the Right to Food adopted by the Human Rights Council on 27.3.08, 
para.34. 
56 Ibid., citing Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/S-7/2, The negative impact of the worsening of 
the world food crisis on the realization of the right to food for all, 17.7.08.  
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In March 2009 La Via Campesina representative and Basque farmer leader Paul 
Nicholson addressed the Human Rights Council on the food crisis and the alternatives 
proposed by La Via Campesina, including the Declaration on peasants’ rights; and 
this was followed by La Via Campesina’s Global Coordinator, Henry Saragih, 
addressing a ‘thematic dialogue’ of the UN General Assembly on the same topic.57 
Also in March 2009 the Human Rights Council debated the recommendations of the 
Advisory Committee on the food crisis, and, as Golay notes,  
[The recommendations] produced a lively debate. Several Latin-American States were in 
favour of a study on the food crisis, the right to food and peasants’ rights, but other 
States (particularly from the West) were against it. A compromise was reached [in 
which] the Advisory Committee [was requested] to undertake a study on “discrimination 
in the context of the right to food, including identification of good practices of anti-
discriminatory policies and strategies.58 
This shift in emphasis away from discussion on new substantive rights of peasants as 
a social class, and towards discrimination, clearly at the insistence of Northern 
states, is perhaps a sign of the resistance of these States to a new Declaration on 
peasants’ rights in anything like the draft presented by La Via Campesina. In terms of 
my Gramscian methodology, it points once more to the dangers of passive revolution 
and trasformismo, which are clearly potential costs of the campaign for the new 
Declaration.  
In its 13th Session, during March 2010, the Human Rights Council, in the context of a 
wide-ranging resolution on the continuing global food crisis and the realisation of the 
right to food, mandated the Advisory Committee to ‘undertake a preliminary study 
on ways and means to further advance the rights of people working in rural areas, 
including women, in particular smallholders engaged in the production of food’.59 
The preliminary study was prepared and delivered to the 16th session of the Human 
Rights Council, during March 2011.60 In essence this study represented a strong 
endorsement of La Via Campesina’s Peasants’ Rights campaign for, including 
expressing support for a new Declaration and Convention.61 At the same time, the 
North-South divide mentioned above appeared to be widening.62  
                                                          
57 Golay op cit.  
58 Ibid., citing Human Rights Council Resolution 10/12, 20.3.09. 
59 Human Rights Council, 2010, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, 13/4: the right to 
food, 13th session, A/HRC/RES/13/4, 14.4.10, para.44. 
60 Human Rights Council Advisory Committee 2011a op cit.  
61 Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 2011a, Update on the preliminary study of the Human 
Rights Council Advisory Committee on the advancement of the rights of peasants and other people 
working in rural areas, prepared by Jean Zeigler on behalf of the drafting group on the right to food of 
the Advisory Committee of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/AC/7/CRP.1. 
62 During the 16th session, La Via Campesina and its two NGO allies on the peasants’ rights campaign, 
FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN) and Centre Europe-Third World (CETIM), hosted a 
‘side-event’ titled ‘The need of increased protection of human rights of peasants’. At that event both Mr 
Zeigler and Mr de Schutter spoke strongly in favour of the need to adopt the new Declaration. A number 
of States also spoke at that event and subsequently when the preliminary report was presented to the 
Chair of the Human Rights Council. While ‘Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group, welcomed the 
Preliminary Study, the European Union [merely] took note of it’, indicating an emerging North-South 
divergence: see HRC Advisory Committee 2011b op cit., para.3; also http://www.un-
ngls.org/spip.php?article3307, accessed 5.10.11. 
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Cognisant of the dangers of passive revolution, Henry Saragih later wrote that 
Under pressure from some European countries, the use of the expression ‘rights of 
peasants’ was replaced by the less threatening ‘rights of people working in rural areas’. 
They [European states] seem to fear giving too much political weight to a large number 
of people whose trade has largely remained outside the capitalist economy.63 
In an Update prepared for the 7th Session of the Advisory Committee during August 
2011, Mr Zeigler reported that of the seven States that had by that date expressed 
their views on the study, only one, Germany, disagreed with the central 
recommendation that a new Declaration was justified.64 Having regard to the 
generally supportive attitude of states and other stakeholders, and taking into 
account the generally negative panorama for the right to food in 2011, especially the 
accelerating global ‘land grab’, Mr Zeigler stated that the key recommendations of 
the study should remain unchanged.65  
Thus far, it appears, the peasants’ rights campaign is progressing quite well; albeit 
with clear risks of passive revolution and trasformismo. However, if the experience 
of the recently-adopted Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is any guide, 
La Via Campesina and its allies are in the early stages of a lengthy process, with no 
guarantee of a successful outcome. The latter Declaration took 25 years from first 
conception to final approval by the UN General Assembly, with determined 
opposition throughout from a handful of Anglo-American countries.66 Nevertheless, 
the Declaration is, in the words of a leading expert in the field of economic, social 
and cultural rights, an ‘historic document’ and a ‘very ambitious text’, which goes 
‘very far in justifying indigenous peoples’ claims to far-reaching autonomy, control 
over lands, veto over development projects which the indigenous consider 
undesirable, and far-reaching claims for restitution or compensation’.67  
                                                          
63 Saragih, H., 2011, ‘Why the International Day of Peasants’ Struggles is Important’, The Guardian, 
18.4.11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/apr/18/international-day-
peasants-rights-grow-food, accessed 5.10.11.  
64 In Germany’s view, there was ‘no legal foundation in international law to recognise the rights to land, 
seeds and the means of production’: HRC Advisory Committee 2011b op cit., para.10. The following 
States had expressed their views by the time of this Update report: South Africa, Ecuador, Luxemburg, 
Germany, Switzerland, Indonesia and Cuba. Switzerland, while not opposing the main recommendation 
directly, wanted to shift the focus to the ‘need to improve the implementation of existing human rights 
instruments’; and also stated that intellectual property rights had an important role in improving food 
security: ibid., para.11. 
65 Ibid., para.25.  
66 Of those 25 years, ,20 consisted of ‘debates and negotiations’ in which States and representatives of 
indigenous peoples spent many hours discussing the precise meaning of concepts such as ‘self-
determination’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘land rights’: see Stavenhagen, R., 2011, ‘How Strong Are the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples?’ Journal of Human Rights, 10(3), 414-421, 420. The entire process leading up to the 
Declaration is recounted in detail in Charters, C., and Stavenhagen, R. (eds), 2009, Making the 
Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, International 
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen. Despite the very drawn-out process, ‘it was not certain 
until the very last minute that the General Assembly [of the United Nations] would proclaim [the final 
Declaration]’, since a bloc of four countries with significant indigenous populations – Australia, Canada, 
the United States and New Zealand – opposed the Declaration at every stage through the drafting process 
and voted against it in the final General Assembly vote: Stavenhangen 2011 op cit., 420; Charters and 
Stavenhagen op cit., 29, 38-41.  
67 Eide, A., 2009, The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the 
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At the same time, the ‘gap between word and action’ on indigenous rights, as with 
other human rights, is likely to persist, due to the lack of ‘state compliance and 
implementation’.68 
Exactly the same can be said about the field of peasants’ rights.69 As Hannah Arendt 
stated over forty years ago, in words that have lost none of their relevance,  
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the 
discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on 
regarding as “inalienable” those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of 
the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless 
themselves.
70  
The inadequacy of the response of the ‘international community’ to legislate in 
response to massive human rights violations has been confirmed by growing numbers 
of quantitative studies which reveal that both the conventional ‘naming and shaming 
strategies’ of leading human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, as well as treaty ratification itself, have little or no positive impact as 
regards human rights performance of nation states.71 This supports a critical 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Charters and Stavenhagen op cit., 
32-47, 41.  
68 The first Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, recently noted 
that there  
[E]xist[s] an implementation gap between indigenous peoples’ human rights standards and their effective 
application. Perhaps there is still demand for more international and domestic legislation, but there is much more 
need for state compliance and implementation of the standards that have already been legislated: Stavenhagen 2011 
op cit., 421.  
69 The concept of human rights has been beset by paradoxes from its inception, foremost among them that 
the century of the triumph of human rights was also the century of their most grotesque and massive 
violation, during two world wars, numerous genocides (both ethnic and political), ethnic cleansings, 
gulags, and countless acts of mass murder, torture, rape, exploitation and oppression: see Douzinas, C., 
2000, The End of Human Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2. 
70 Arendt, H., 1968, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Books, Orlando, Fl., 279.; see also Tony 
Evans (Evans, T., 2005, The Politics of Human Rights, 2nd edition, Pluto Press, London), who comments 
that the gap between word and action on human rights is one of the ‘central puzzles of contemporary 
global politics’: 6; also Douzinas op cit., 2; and O’Connell, P, 2007, ‘On Reconciling Irreconcilables: 
Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, 7(3), 483-509. The ability of 
many human rights scholars and practitioners to continue to make claims of ‘amazing progress’ in human 
rights since World War II notwithstanding the perpetuation and intensification of tremendous human 
misery and suffering is, Tony Evans believes, partly a function of the conflation of the philosophical, 
legal and political discourses of human rights, and more especially the marginalization of the latter and 
the consequent occlusion of economic and geopolitical powers and interests that are intimately connected 
with human rights praxis: Evans 2005 op cit. 2005, 7-8. In general terms the philosophical discourse is 
concerned with the foundations of and justifications for human rights; the legal discourse is focused on 
the status, content, scope and enforceability of the body of national and international law on human 
rights; and finally the political discourse explores ‘the powers and interests associated with particular 
conceptions of rights’: ibid., 7.. 
71 Evans op cit., 6; Baxi op cit., 2, 6-8. Authors undertaking quantitative studies conclude that while 
shaming strategies may result in slight improvements regarding civil and political freedoms, they have 
little positive impact in stopping or deterring campaigns of mass terror, and in some cases may have 
actually made such campaigns worse: see Hafner-Burton, E.M., 2008, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and 
Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem’, International Organization, 62, 698-716; Hafner-
Burton, E.M., and Tsutsui, K., 2005, ‘Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty 
Promises’, American Journal of Sociology, 110(5), 1373-1411; Hafner-Burton, E.M., and Tsutsui, K., 
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perspective on human rights which argues that the ‘root of the problem does not lie 
in perfecting legal instruments’, but in a deeper analysis of the prevailing political 
and economic system, and the way that power is distributed and exercised within 
it.72 
Arguably this history of widespread non-observance of universal human rights has 
demonstrated the ‘deep truth’ of the observation first made by Edmund Burke in the 
year after the French Revolution, namely that ‘only national law can…effectively 
protect rights’.73 Yet, national laws, too, can be a frail protection at best if, as is 
frequently the case, political and economic expediency dictates that ‘universal 
rights’ can and must be dispensed with. Writing more than thirty years ago about the 
state terror then gripping much of Latin America, Julio Barreiro noted how nearly all 
the Latin American states had incorporated the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights into their Constitutions, but that that did not prevent them from violating 
most of its provisions in the most horrific ways on a daily basis.7475 
As regards peasants’ rights and food sovereignty, it is abundantly clear that 
redistributive, agrarian reform, including equitable and secure access to the means 
of production, lies at their core. A suitable legal framework and adequate 
administrative capacity are required to undertake such reform, but what is most 
important is the political will to see the process through, and overcome entrenched 
opposition from landed and corporate interests.76 In some countries, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                         
2007, ‘Justice Lost! The Failure of Human Rights Institutions to Matter Where Needed Most’, Journal of 
Peace Research, 44(4), 407-425; Hafner-Burton, E.M., and J. Ron, J., 2007, ‘Human Rights Institutions: 
Rhetoric and Efficacy’, Journal of Peace Research, 44(4), 379-383. A similar picture emerges in relation 
to the effects of treaty ratification on human rights improvements: see Hathway, O., 2002, ‘Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ The Yale Law Journal, 111(8), 1935-2042, 1940; also Neumayer, E., 
2005, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 49(6), 925-953; also Bierman, M., 2005, ‘The Political Economy of Dignity: Monitoring the 
Advancement of Socio-economic Human Rights in a Globalized Economy’, (paper delivered at the 2nd 
Pan-Hellenic Conference on International Political Economy, seo economisch onderzoek, Discussion 
paper no.43, http://www.seo.nl/assets/binaries/publicaties/disscusion/2005/dp43.pdf, accessed 5.3.08. 
72 Barreiro, J., 1975, ‘In Defence of Human Rights’, Ecumenical Review, 104-110, 107; see also Neil 
Stammers (Stammers, N., 1999, ‘Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights’, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 21(4), 980-1008, 992; also Stammers, N., 1995, “A Critique of Social 
Approaches to Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 17(3), 488-508), who concludes that ‘proposals 
[which argue] that economic and social rights can somehow now be effectively protected on a global 
level solely by a combination of institutional innovation and international law [look] hollow…it might 
prove rather more useful to consider how social movements could renew and re-invigorate the challenge 
to economic power’: 1999 op cit., 1003. Paul O’Connell argues that the ‘loose discourse’ [of much 
human rights scholarship and activism] produced by the failure to properly engage with globalisation 
‘results in the perverse situation whereby human rights advocates end up appealing to the very authors of 
massive human rights violations to assist in ameliorating the worst excesses of their policies’: O’Connell 
op cit., 488. 
73 Douzinas op cit., 143. 
74 In terms that prefigure today’s critics of neoliberal globalization, Barreiro wrote:  
The irrational advance of industrialization…the uncontrolled development of new and powerful economic 
forces…the constantly increasing interference by the military in shaping the destiny of peoples…and an amazing 
development of forces and techniques of repression – these are all inter-related factors, which not only set the 
style for an era but which also give rise to the most serious misgivings about the future of human rights… 
Barreiro op cit., 105.  
75 Ibid., p105. 
76 Borras 2008 op cit., 262, noting that ‘the point of departure [for agrarian reform] is landlord resistance 
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Indonesia, adequate agrarian reform laws exist, including Constitutional provisions, 
but, according to representatives of the Indonesia Peasant Union, there is, as noted 
earlier, no effective implementation. Worse, they say, the legal system is biased 
towards corporations, allowing them to expropriate peasants’ lands with impunity, 
and then criminalising peasants who seek to resist these processes through various 
forms of direct action.77 Further, the model of agrarian reform that is most 
commonly being implemented today by states is the WB’s market-led model, 
notwithstanding the commitment given by states at both the World Food Summit in 
1996 and in the 2006 ICARRD Declaration to a pro-peasant model of agrarian 
reform.78  
Even if La Via Campesina manage to secure a Declaration on peasant rights, and then 
at some future time, a Convention, what difference would it actually make to the 
daily lives of peasants? From the legal perspective, there is, quite simply, almost no 
meaningful and effective enforcement of international ESC rights obligations owed 
by states at the international level.79 As regards human rights violations by non-state 
actors such as transnational corporations, there is no international enforcement 
mechanism whatsoever.80  
                                                                                                                                                                         
to land reform – should it be evaded or confronted?...Neoliberal economists see landlord resistance as 
something to be avoided at all costs…’. In her elucidation, from the text of the International Bill of 
Rights (the 1948 Declaration, and the two Conventions of 1966), of a modernist and politicised ‘human 
rights ideology’ whose goal is ‘equality in dignity’, and which is predicated on social mobilization, Zehra 
Arat argues that this ideology implies inter alia a ‘strong’ and ‘interventionist’ state that is willing to 
place considerable restrictions on the control of the means of production and on the operation of markets, 
especially in labour and agriculture: Arat, Z.F.K, 2008, ‘Human Rights Ideology and the Dimensions of 
Power: A Radical Approach to the State, Property and Discrimination’, Human Rights Quarterly, 30, 906-
932, 919-920, 923-924.  
77 Interviews with the author, Jakarta, 31.3.09; see also Golay 2009 op cit., who cited an Amnesty 
International Memorandum to the Government of Guatemala in 2005, in which it observed that ‘a 
particular characteristic of agrarian disputes in Guatemala is that the full weight of the law and judicial 
system is often levied in order to enforce evictions, but not to issues relating to labour rights of rural 
workers or land tenure of rural communities’.  
78 Golay op cit.  
79 Koen de Feyter, for example, sees the state-centric institutional structure of international human 
rights law as particularly ill-suited to deal with a world where human rights violations occur ‘as a 
consequence of the behaviour of a variety of actors’: 
Globalization has not strengthened the United Nations Geneva human rights institutions. They are arguably less 
effective now than they were during the Cold War…[they] have been unable so far to deal in a meaningful way 
with post-Cold War challenges, such as the impact of the business world and the international economic 
organizations that drive globalization….: 2005, Human rights: Social Justice in the Age of the Market, 
University Press, Dhaka, 5.  
80 Donati, F., and Vidar, M., 2009, International Legal Dimensions of the Right to Food, in Kent, G., (ed) 
2008, Global Obligations for the Right to Food, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 47-88, 77-9. 
Mahmood Monshipouri, Claude E. Welch Jr., and Evan T. Kennedy argue that multinational corporations 
(MNCs) ‘have thus far shown meager interest in the sociocultural welfare or human rights of the vast 
majority of the people living in host countries. MNCs are under no legal—much less ethical—obligations 
to the governments of the countries within which they operate, even as their policies and actions affect 
hundreds of millions of people. Conversely, it is states that are accountable to the transnational business 
forces and economic private regimes set by the MNCs. In the absence of international regulatory 
agencies, MNCs have been entirely free to devise their own rules, creating an environment less hospitable 
or indifferent to human rights’: 2003, ‘Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global 
Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities’, Human Rights Quarterly, 25, 965-989, 987-8. See also 
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The lack of a meaningful enforcement procedure for violations means that the 
human rights system offers ‘few incentives for compliance’; the WTO, by contrast, 
allows for the imposition of economic sanctions against those states that fail to abide 
by the rulings of its dispute resolution panels to amend their national laws.81 The 
adoption by the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2008 of an Optional 
Protocol allowing the submission of individual complaints to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, while of undoubted historic 
significance in terms of remedying this feature of the long-standing imbalance 
between civil and political, and ESC rights, is unlikely to make a substantial 
contribution to the greater observance of ESC rights.82 
In summary, while La Via Campesina and its supporters say that a key reason why the 
Declaration is needed is that ‘such protection as does exist [under the ICESCR and 
other Conventions] is ineffectual and continues to be flouted with impunity’, one 
must be circumspect as to whether a new international instrument will be effective 
to remedy this state of affairs. My argument is that the real battle to be waged is not 
legal, but political and economic; and the peasants’ rights campaign must be judged 
a success or failure according to what extent it contributes to the outcome of this 
battle.  
This leads then to a wider consideration of the role that human rights might or might 
not play in processes of substantive social change. Food sovereignty, as I have 
discussed earlier in the thesis, explicitly seeks to achieve transformative change in 
global and national food systems. This means structural change and class-based 
redistribution, such as comprehensive agrarian reform, in the context of a movement 
that has over time become more explicitly ‘anti-imperialist[,] anti-capitalist [and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Ratner, S.R., ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’, The Yale Law Review, 
111(3), 443-545; Blumberg, P.I., 2002, ‘Asserting Human Rights against Multinational Corporations 
under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems’, The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 50, 493-529; and Teubner, G., 2006, ‘The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by 
‘Private’ Transnational Actors’, The Modern Law Review, 327-346. 
81 There are no sanctions, no international human rights court, and the UN treaty system offers ‘ritual 
condemnation at best’: ibid., 8, 32-33; also Kuper, A., (ed.), 2005, Global Responsibilities: Who Must 
Deliver on Human Rights? Routledge, New York, x-xi. In the case of regional and bilateral free trade 
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the right to sue state parties for alleged 
loss of profit extends to private corporations, and has been successfully exercised against the Mexican 
government by grain transnational corporations Cargill and Archer Daniels Midlands: Public Citizen, 
2011, ‘Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA, CAFTA and Peru FTA’, August 
2011, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart-april-2011.pdf, accessed 5.10.11. 
The successful claims by ADM, Cargill and another US transnational Corn Products International, 
concerned a tax imposed by the Mexican government on beverages sweetened with High Fructose Corn 
Syrup, which these three companies produced, but not with Mexican cane sugar. Mexico ‘argued that the 
tax was legitimate because the US had failed to open its market sufficiently to Mexican cane sugar 
exports’, but the Tribunal rejected this claim, and awarded the three companies US$33.5 million, $77.3 
million and $58.5 million respectively in compensation: ibid. 
82 A campaign for the adoption of this Protocol has been waged by various NGOs for over 30 years: see 
International Coalition for an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. As one commentator has noted, the 
deliberate exclusion of NGOs from the possibility of making complaints under the Protocol, when 
combined with the traditional international law requirement that all available domestic remedies must be 
exhausted, ‘can be seen as a failure when it comes to creating a mechanism that has the best chance of 
being one that will provide access to justice’, given that NGOs are the most likely to make use of the 
Protocol: Mahon, C., 2008, ‘Progress at the Front: The Draft Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, Vol.8(4), 617-647, 646. 
170 
 
even] openly socialist’.83 What are some of the possible risks of pursuing such change 
via the human rights route?  
Several scholars in recent years have expressed scepticism of many aspects of human 
rights activism, or even of the entire human rights project itself. Most of these 
critiques are directed towards what might be termed the ‘individual, liberal’ human 
rights project; that is, the privileging of individual rights and freedoms in the sphere 
of civil and political rights, over collective projects directed more at structural 
change based on economic and social rights.84 Wendy Brown, for example, sees the 
common liberal claim that civil and political rights enable economic and social rights 
as a reversal of modern history ‘in its suggestion that national wealth is produced by 
rather than productive of civil liberties and constitutionalism and in its elision of the 
deformations of colonialism and a global economy in which the wealth of the core 
states is predicated in part on the poverty of the periphery’.85 
This sort of liberal, individualist human rights praxis is seen variously as a form of 
Northern cultural imperialism86; as necessarily entailing the ‘pathologisation of the 
South’ via the ‘disciplinary’ and ‘therapeutic’ imposition of human rights norms87; as 
sustaining neo-liberal globalisation through discourses of ‘rights-based 
development’88, ‘rights-based food security’ and a more general paradigm of ‘trade-
                                                          
83 Holt-Giménez, and Shattuck op cit., 115.  
84 Evans op cit., 17-20; Sellars, K., 2002, The Rise and Rise of Human Rights Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 
1-23. 
85 Brown, W., 2006, ‘“The Most We Can Hope For…”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism’, South 
Atlantic Quarterly, 103(2/3), 451-463, 458-9. The politics that Brown detects here are at once an attempt 
to ‘ward off’ leftist human rights projects that emphasize collective rights such as the right to food and 
housing, together with an elucidation of a ‘political-economic account of what markets need to thrive’, 
which includes the conventional civil and political freedoms but also significantly the addition of 
‘freedom of property’: 457. Though outside the scope of this thesis, critical human rights scholarship has 
also identified the role of liberal-led human rights discourse and advocacy in justifying unilateral military 
actions against ‘rogue states’ in the post-Cold War era: see Sellars op cit. and the essays in Chandler, D. 
(ed.), 2002, Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Relations, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave MacMillan, particularly Laughland, J., Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Achieving Universal 
Justice? and Herman, E., and Peterson, D., Morality’s Avenging Angels: The New Humanitarian 
Crusaders; also Barkawi, T., and Laffey, M., 1999, ‘The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and 
Globalization’, European Journal of International Relations, 5(4), 403-434. There is a growing literature 
on the exploration of what is seen as the emerging new norm of the right of ‘humanitarian intervention’; 
for recent reviews see Woodward, S.L., 2001, ‘Humanitarian War: A New Consensus?’ Disasters, 25(4), 
331-344; Lyon, A.J., and Dolan, C.J., 2007, ‘American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of 
Coevolution’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 3, 46-78; and Bellamy, A.J., 2006, ‘Responsibility to Protect or 
Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’, Ethics and International 
Affairs, 19(2), 31-54. 
86 As in Makua wa Mutua’s (Mutua, M., 2001, Human Rights International NGOs, in Welch, C., (ed.), 
NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia) 
‘savages-victims-saviours’ metaphor, , which in his view embodies the ‘doctrinal grand narrative’ of the 
modern human rights movement: 203-4. According to the terms of this metaphor, says Mutua, human 
rights practice operates in the following way: powerless and usually faceless and voiceless Third World 
victims are brutalized by the culturally-deviant practices of Third World states, and thus require rescuing 
by the ‘good angels’, the ‘redeemers of a benighted world’, principally the United Nations, Northern 
governments, and Northern NGOs: 223. 
87 Pupovac, V., 2001, ‘Misanthropy without Borders: The International Children’s Rights Regime’, 
Disasters, 25(2), 95-112, 101-2. 
88 For feminist perspectives on the risks and opportunities of the emerging discourse of ‘rights-based 
development’ in a number of Southern countries, see Cornwall, A., and Molyneux, M., 2006, ‘The 
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related market-friendly human rights’89; and as justifying the post-Cold War trend of 
growing militarism and ‘humanitarian intervention’.90 The liberal ontology of human 
rights which sees individual empowerment as the route to social change is critiqued 
as a form of fatalistic and politically disempowering ‘anti-politics’, foreclosing as it 
does any discussion over the prevailing political and economic constraints within 
which individual choices can be made.91 
In a similar vein, what Tony Evans calls the ‘legal discourse of human rights’ – the 
focus on laws and institutions – is said to entail anti-democratic consequences, 
substituting as it does legislation, constitutionalism and litigation for political 
contestation as the principal means of determining the shape and content of the 
good society.92 The result of these processes of legal codification has been to reduce 
and narrow human rights to a ‘number of rights that people have which precede 
politics or which are above politics [rather than] rights which are achieved (and 
sustained) through politics’.93  
Further, critics say, the historical experience is that ‘the trajectory of 
institutionalization is always the same, from “change” to “order”, from challenging 
the status quo to sustaining it”.94 Pre-institutionalised demands for rights have a 
radical capacity to re-shape norms and values as part of a counter-hegemonic 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Politics of Rights – Dilemmas for Feminist Praxis: An Introduction’, Third World Quarterly, 27(7), 1175-
1191, as well as the other essays in that special issue of the journal. 
89 Evans op cit., 41-52; Baxi., U., 2006, The Future of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, 2006, 234; Blau, J., and Moncada, A., 2005, Human Rights: Beyond the Liberal Vision, Rowman 
& Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2-16; Barkawi and Laffey op cit.; also de Feyter, K., 2005, Human Rights: 
Social Justice in the Age of the Market, University Press, Dhaka, who sees grave dangers for the broader 
social justice goals of human rights in what he describes as the ‘market-friendly approach to human 
rights’ that prioritizes civil and political rights together with certain aspects of ‘good governance’ that are 
beneficial to the functioning of a market society: 28-9. The portrayal of economic, social and cultural 
rights (ESC) as a ‘positive’ form of freedom derives from a heavily ideological distinction drawn by 
political philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1969, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, Oxford), in 
which he cast these rights as ‘coercive’ because they required substantial government intervention and 
redistribution: 11. He juxtaposed them to the ‘negative’ liberties assured by civil and political rights, 
which simply required of governments not to interfere with accepted spheres of citizen action. Such 
portrayals are reductionist and misleading in several respects, since all human rights impose a series of 
negative and positive obligations on governments, yet they persist. Thus Sandra Fredman (Fredman, S., 
2008, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Oxford) describes ESC rights as the 'Cindarella of the International Human Rights corpus': 2. 
90 Sellars op cit,. Barkawi and Laffey op cit, and see the essays in Chandler op cit. There is a growing 
literature on the exploration of what is seen as the emerging new norm of the right of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’; for recent reviews see Woodward op cit.; Lyon and Dolan op cit; and Bellamy op cit.  
91 Brown 2006 op cit., 456. Much depends, says Brown, on how the ‘global problem’ is framed: if it is 
understood in terms of ‘relatively unchecked’ globaling capitalism, then. 
[O]ther kinds of political projects…may offer a more appropriate and far-reaching remedy for injustice defined 
as suffering and as systematic disenfranchisement from collaborative self-governance…if there are still other 
historical possibilities…then we would do well to take the measure of whether and how the centrality of human 
rights discourse might render those other political possibilities more faint: ibid. 461-2. 
92 Pupovac op cit., 98-100. Conor Gearty (2006, Can Human Rights Survive? Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge) asks: ‘What kind of a war-strategy is it to entrust our greatest emancipatory tasks to 
judges, a sub-category of precisely the kind of well-off, already empowered person who ought to be 
terrified by the prospect of true human rights?”: 12.  
93 Op cit., 71-2; Pupovac op cit., 98-100.  
94 Stammers 1999 op cit., 998.  
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project; this capacity tends to be lost, and rights become progressively more 
conservative, once they are codified in laws and institutionalised.95 The restrictive 
judicial interpretation of the economic and social rights contained in South Africa’s 
ostensibly progressive post-apartheid constitution supports such an analysis.96  
The La Via Campesina peasants’ rights campaign  addresses many of the central 
thrusts of these critiques more or less directly, since it is clearly a form of human 
rights praxis which attempts to assert the demands for greater autonomy and self-
governance of oppressed social classes. In the process it is endeavouring, not to 
support the political and institutional processes that seek to further the expansion of 
globalising capitalism, but to undermine them.97 At the same time, the critiques, 
while arguably themselves ‘excessively bleak’ and relentlessly dismissive of any 
emancipatory role for human rights projects, do reveal the many limitations and risks 
of human rights and law-based strategies as vehicles for social transformation.98 I 
argue that La Via Campesina must remain aware of these limitations and risks of 
passive revolution and trasformismo, which are already becoming apparent as the 
Declaration progresses slowly through the UN machinery; and keep firmly in mind the 
necessity for constant political mobilisation as ultimately the most effective route 
for wider social change.99  
 
                                                          
95 Ibid. Cases that illustrate this tendency include the failure of the equal pay laws in Britain to 
significantly close the gender pay gap during the past three decades, with women working part-time in 
the UK receiving only 60% of the comparable male full-time salary, and in some parts of the country the 
pay gap has widened in recent years: see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3765535.stm, accessed 
22.10.07. Another example is the failure of the anti-discrimination laws to make significant inroads into 
structural racial wealth and income inequalities in the United States following the formal end of 
segregation in the 1960s; the typical African American family has around $8000 of wealth compared to 
$80,000 of wealth for the typical white family, and the income gap has closed approximately 3 points, 
from 59% to 62%, over the past forty years: see 
http://www.blackcommentator.com/119/119_black_wealth.html, accessed 23.11.07. Both statistics will 
likely have worsened since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008.  
96 Pieterse, M., 2007, ‘Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social 
Hardship Revisited’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29, 796-822, 816. Commenting on these developments, 
Pieterse suggests that they seem to confirm the continuing validity of much of Peter Gabel’s 
‘phenomenology of rights consciousness’ critique of the tendency of social movements to be co-opted via 
law-based rights strategies, the essence of which is that rights tend to perpetuate an unjust social order by 
creating the illusion that a more just order has been achieved ‘by virtue of the mere acknowledgement of 
its possibility’: Ibid., 814-6, discussing Gabel, P., 1984, ‘Symposium: A Critique of Rights: The 
Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves’, Texas Law Review, 62, 
1563-1588. . 
97 As such, the praxis of food sovereignty is an expression of what Upendra Baxi terms the 
“insurrectionary practice” of the ‘politics for human rights’, which sees human rights as ‘an arena of 
transformative political practice that disorients, destabilizes, and, at times, even helps destroy deeply 
unjust concentrations of political, social, economic and technological power’, in contrast to the politics of 
human rights’, which ‘treats human rights languages and logics as an ensemble of means for the 
legitimation [of] governance and domination [which] universalizes the powers of the dominant in ways 
that constantly reproduce everywhere human rightlessness and suffering’: Baxi op cit., xiv-xv, 19. 
98
 Gready, P., 2003, ‘The Politics of Human Rights’, Third World Quarterly, 24(4), 745-757, 748; 
Gready, P. (ed), 2004, Fighting for Human Rights, Routledge, London.  
99 As Wendy Brown puts it, “[Human rights] is a politics and it organizes political space, often with the 
aim of monopolizing it. It also stands as a critique of dissonant political projects, converges neatly with 
the requisites of liberal imperialism and global free trade, and legitimates both as well”: 2006 op cit., 461. 
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Food sovereignty, peasants’ rights and the right to adequate food 
In the discussion above concerning the content and status of the draft Declaration on 
peasant’s rights, I have noted how supportive both Special Rapporteurs on the right 
to food have been of this campaign, and of La Via Campesina and food sovereignty 
generally.100 Olivier de Schutter’s understanding – and that of his predecessor Jean 
Ziegler– of the global problematic regarding food and agriculture coincides with that 
of La Via Campesina and the Food Sovereignty movement on every matter of 
significance; and contradicts that of the principal neoliberal governance forums.101 
De Schutter argues that the persistence of global hunger is ‘primarily a problem of a 
lack of access to productive resources such as land and water, of unscrupulous 
employers and traders [and] of an increasingly concentrated input providers 
sector’.102 Above all, it is ‘the result of political factors that condemn small farmers, 
the primary victims of hunger, to poverty’.103 In contrast, G20 leaders have 
proceeded ‘from the misdiagnosis of attributing global hunger to a simple lack of 
food [and] for years focused their efforts solely on increasing agricultural production 
by industrial methods alone’.104 This simplistic ‘solution’ of food security via 
increased production has demonstrably failed, in de Schutter’s view.105 In its place, 
the power and structural inequalities in the food system need to be systematically 
addressed, by a bold reorientation of the food system which strengthens and 
supports the capacity of small-scale farmers to feed themselves and their 
communities, and by ‘support[ing] the capacity of all countries to feed themselves 
                                                          
100 The two Special Rapporteurs to date are Jean Zeigler (2000-2007), and Olivier de Schutter (2008-
present). Formally the Special Rapporteur is appointed by and accountable to the UN Human Rights 
Council, and his mandate is to ‘promote the full realization of the right to food and the adoption of 
measures at the national, regional and international levels’ (Human Rights Council, 2008, 
A/HRC/6/L,5/Rev.1). The extent of their support for the Food Sovereignty movement has developed to 
such an extent that Olivier de Schutter, commenting on the renewal of his mandate for a further three 
years in May 2011, now sees a major part of his role as being to ‘serve’ what he terms the ‘right to food 
movement’; and it is clear from his many reports and press releases that he includes La Via Campesina 
and the Food Sovereignty movement within that movement: De Schutter, O., 2011, ‘New Mandate: 
Message from Olivier de Schutter’, http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/component/content/article/1-
latest-news/1324-breaking-the-impasse-of-food-crises, accessed 4.10.11.. 
101 For example, Zeigler endorsed in 2002 La Via Campesina’s demand for redistributive and 
comprehensive agrarian reform in favour of small-scale producers, especially women, as a key 
mechanism via which the right to food would be achieved: United Nations General Assembly, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the right to food, 27.8.2002, A/57/356, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/546/54/IMG/N0254654.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 
17.8.09, paras.30, 31, 41. In 2004 he critically examined the operation of the liberalised world trade in 
agriculture, and concluded that it was ‘hurting the food security of the poorest and most marginalised, 
and generating ever-greater inequalities’, thereby endorsing La Via Campesina’s critique of this element 
of the common sense of the globalising capitalist food system: United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Zeigler, in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2003/25, 9.2.2004, E/CN.4/2004/10, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/107/77/PDF/G0410777.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 
18.8.09. 
102 Ibid.  
103 de Schutter, O., 2011b, ‘Food Crises: Five Priorities for the G20’, The Guardian, 16.6.11, 
http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/component/content/article/1-latest-news/1394-g20-agriculture-5-
priorities-to-end-food-crises, accessed 4.10.11. 
104
 Ibid. 
105 Ibid.  
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by strategies based on the right to food’.106 This call for a transformative 
reorientation in the global food system towards greater national self-sufficiency 
closely mirrors a central component of food sovereignty, as discussed earlier in the 
chapter. This emerging synthesis between food sovereignty and the normative 
development of the universal right to adequate food is indicative of the increasing 
coherence of the social and political project advanced by the Food Sovereignty 
movement, and its growing political credibility.  
Indeed, given the close philosophical and political affinity between food sovereignty 
and the work of the Special Rapporteurs on the right to food, the coherence and 
substantive normative content of the former could be further advanced by the 
explicit embrace of the Special Rapporteurs’ recommendations by food sovereignty 
advocates. Many of these recommendations clearly advance food sovereignty goals. 
For example, amongst other measures, de Schutter has urged G20 political leaders 
to: 
 regulate and control financial speculation on food commodities;  
 ‘encourage the development of regional storage facilities’;  
 ‘support the provision of public goods’ such as rural infrastructure and 
agricultural extension services; and  
 ‘strengthen global food security governance’ by ensuring that trade and 
investment policies do not contradict or over-ride efforts of the Committee 
on World Food Security to improve global and national food security.107  
During his first mandate, de Schutter produced reports and briefing papers on several 
matters of key significance to La Via Campesina:  
 land acquisitions and land rights108;  
 trade109;  
 seed policies and intellectual property rights;  
 sustainable agriculture and agro-ecology;  
 concentration in the agri-business sector; and  
 commodity speculation.110  
                                                          
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid.  
108 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, de Schutter, O., 2010a, Large-scale Land 
Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of Minimum Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights 
Challenge, A/HRC/13/33/Add.2, March 2010; United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
de Schutter, O., 2010b, Access to Land and the Right to Food, A/65/281, October 2010; United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, De Schutter, O., 2010, ‘Principles for Responsible Investment 
in Agriculture’, keynote address at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 26.4.10. 
109 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, de Schutter, O., 2009, Mission to the World 
Trade Organisation, A/HRC/10/5/Add.2, March 2009; United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, de Schutter, O., 2010d, Human Rights Impact Assessments for Trade and Investment Agreements, 
Report of the Expert Seminar held in Geneva, 23-4.6.10; De Schutter, O., 2009b, International Trade in 
Agriculture and the Right to Food, Occasional Papers No.46, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
110 De Schutter, 2011, Promoting the Right to Food: Activity Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food (May 2008-May 2011), available at: 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20110502_activity-report-2008-2011_en.pdf, 
accessed 15.11.11. 
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He also carried out missions to six countries, promoting the need to adopt measures 
to support the right to food and evaluating the functioning of existing legal and 
institutional frameworks.111 His conclusions invariably accord with the core of the 
food sovereignty perspective and the peasants’ rights campaign, namely that all 
countries should work towards greater levels of food self-sufficiency via supporting 
and strengthening the capacity of peasants and small-scale producers. Amongst his 
many recommendations to national political leaders are the following:  
 that the right to land should be recognised as a human right112;  
 that global trade rules must enable Southern countries to protect their 
farmers from the vastly more productive Northern industrialised producers113;  
 that states must reorient ‘their agricultural systems towards agro-ecological 
modes of production’114; and  
 that states ‘combat excessive concentration in the food chain, or abuses of 
dominant positions acquired by certain actors’.115  
De Schutter’s underlying concern closely mirrors the raison d’être of La Via 
Campesina: 
[H]ow to make a transition: how to move from a system that ruins small-scale farmers in 
order to feed the cities, to a system in which better incomes for rural households slow 
down rural-to-urban migration, improve the bargaining power for urban workers, and 
create multiplier effects on the local economy even beyond agriculture? How to move 
from ways of producing food that create inequality, poverty and environmental 
degradation in rural areas, to sustainable agricultural systems, that can at the same time 
increase incomes of food producers and be more resilient to climate change?] 116  
At the same time, as a political realist, he acknowledges that the achievement of 
such a transition depends above all on the continued political mobilisation of ‘broad-
based social movements and human rights defenders all over the world’, who must 
continue inter alia to ‘resist the current tendency to deprive peasants from the land 
or water on which they depend from [sic] their livelihoods’.117 From this it is easy to 
                                                          
111 Ibid.  
112 de Schutter 2010b op cit. 
113 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, de Schutter, O., 2009, Background 
Document on the Mission to the World Trade Organization, A/HRC/10/005/Add.2, 2.3.09. In this report, 
De Schutter critiques what he terms ‘the illusory notion of a ‘level playing field’, noting that ‘in 2006, 
agricultural labour productivity in the Least Developed Countries was just 46 per cent of the level in 
other developing countries and below 1 per cent of the level in developed countries’, and further, that 
‘these massive differences in productivity are increasing: labour productivity grew by only 18 per cent in 
LDCs between 1983 and 2003, by 41 per cent in other developing countries, and by 62 per cent in 
developed countries. Depending on the kind of equipment available to farmers in LDCs or in developing 
countries, some estimates suggest that the differences in productivity per active labourer between the 
most efficient and the least efficient producers amount to 1/1000 or more’: 8.  
114 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, de Schutter, O., 2011, Agro-ecology and the 
Right to Food, A/HRC/16/49, 8.3.11. 
115 De Schutter, O., 2010e, ‘Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains: The Role of Competition 
Law in Tackling the Abuse of Power’, Briefing Note, December 2010, available at: 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20101201_briefing-note-03_en.pdf, accessed 
20.10.11. 
116 2011a op cit. 
117 Ibid. Emel and Neo note that intensive livestock production is a major source of depletion of 
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see why he conceives the role of his office as being to ‘serve’ the right to food 
movement; and, in the terms of my research questions, to the extent that the 
protagonism of La Via Campesina and its allies in the Food Sovereignty movement 
within the UN agencies has contributed to producing this outcome, it must be 
regarded as a major political and strategic success, which will help to shift the 
balance of forces in the globalising capitalist food system over the coming years.  
One indicator of a shift in the balance of forces is the extent of political changes at 
the national level: from governments that are supportive of the further expansion of 
the globalising capitalist food system, to those that want to resist and roll it back, 
and create spaces for the development of alternative food economies based on food 
sovereignty principles. Is the adoption of national legislative and administrative 
measures to implement the human right to food, as contemplated by human rights 
theory, contributing to such a dynamic?  
The Special Rapporteur has worked with the Right to Food Unit at the FAO, 
established in the wake of the adoption of the 2004 Voluntary guidelines on the right 
to adequate food in the context of national food security, to map out best practice 
for countries on the legal and institutional steps to implement the right to food.118 
The key steps are:  
 incorporating the right to food in national constitutions;  
 passing enabling appropriate legislation, ideally a ‘framework law’;  
 developing participatory ‘national strategies based upon the right to food’;  
 designing appropriate institutions and processes of a participatory nature;  
 monitoring the implementation of the national strategy; and  
 enforcing the right to food through judicial means where necessary.119  
In terms of my research questions and Gramscian methodology, my interest here is to 
determine whether the legislative and administrative changes linked to the right to 
food at the national level are contributing to the wider strategic goals of the Food 
Sovereignty movement. A related question is the extent to which the implementation 
of the right to food might conceivably form part of an effective national-popular 
strategy.  
In 2009, de Schutter reviewed progress towards implementation of the right to food 
at the national level. The results revealed that (as of 2009) ‘24 countries [had] 
included the right to food in their constitution’; three countries had adopted 
framework laws, and a further five were drafting such laws; five countries had 
adopted national food and nutrition security strategies; and four countries had 
                                                                                                                                                                         
groundwater aquifers, especially for the production of animal feed: 2011 op cit., 72.  
118
 De Schutter, O., 2010a, ‘Countries Tackling Hunger with a Right to Food Approach: Significant 
Progress in Implementing the Right to Food at National Scale in Africa, Latin America and South Asia’, 
Briefing Note 1, May 2010, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/Briefing_Note_01_May_2010_EN.pdf, accessed 
16.4.12.  
119 Ibid., see also FAO, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to 
Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, available at: 
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/publi_en.htm, accessed 19.8.09. 
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created new institutions specifically charged with overseeing implementation of the 
right to food.120 Of particular significance, in terms of its scope and achievements, 
was Brazil’s ‘Zero Hunger’ strategy, which had helped bring about a drop of 73% in 
levels of child mortality since 2002.121  
At the municipal level, activist-scholar Frances Moore Lappé has documented how 
Belo Horizonte, Brazil’s fourth-largest city, managed to reduce levels of hunger and 
malnutrition in the city by 50% over 10 years from 1993 by adopting an explicit multi-
dimensional ‘right-to-food’ approach.122 Key elements of this successful strategy 
were:  
 offering local farmers ‘dozens of choices spots of public space on which to 
sell to urban consumers’, thereby improving farmer incomes and food access 
by eliminating retailer mark-ups;  
 establishing 34 fixed-price bulk produce markets at prominent locations;  
 establishing three ‘People’s Restaurants’ with subsidised healthy meals;  
 an extensive network of community and school gardens; and  
 nutrition classes.123  
The annual cost of all the programmes amounted to around two percent of the city’s 
budget.124 Such practical and effective changes clearly further many of the goals of 
the Food Sovereignty movement, and demonstrate how partnerships between 
farmers, food, health and education workers, and community activists can bring 
about rapid progress towards realisation of both the right to food and food 
sovereignty. While such a strategy may not of itself constitute a ‘national-popular 
collective will’ in the Gramscian sense of bringing about transformative change in 
the configurations of political and economic power, it certainly contributes to that 
objective, insofar as it empowers local farmers and fosters a strong sense of 
collective and community spirit.  
On the positive side, de Schutter is encouraged by the speed with which several 
national governments have taken constitutional and legislative action in the five 
years since 2004. The most successful examples, especially Brazil and Ecuador, 
depended on strong and committed social movement mobilisations, which for de 
Schutter ‘confirm[s] the saying that ‘rights are rarely given, they are taken’.125 At 
the same time, he suggests that the adoption of framework laws themselves ‘can be 
a powerful incentive for [NGOs] to mobilise their efforts’. His other conclusions are 
                                                          
120 De Schutter 2010a op cit.  
121 Elements of the strategy include cash payments to poor families and a national free school meals 
programme, which includes a procurement mandate requiring 30% of the food purchased to ‘come from 
small family farms’; in 2009 this amounted to US$418 million dollars’ worth of purchases from this 
sector: ibid.  
122 Lappé, F.M., 2009, ‘The City that Ended Hunger’, Yes! Magazine, 
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/food-for-everyone/the-city-that-ended-hunger, accessed 6.10.11. Belo 
Horizonte has a population of 2.5 million. Significantly, one of the architects of the Zero Hunger 
campaign, José Graziano da Silva, was appointed as the new Director-General of the FAO in January 
2012: see http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/117486/icode/, accessed 3.5.12 
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid.  
125 De Schutter 2010a op cit.  
178 
 
that new institutions must be adequately resourced; the right to food depends on an 
independent judiciary; and that it is not yet possible to assess what contribution 
legal and institutional frameworks based on the right to food make to food 
security.126  
As de Schutter’s review makes clear, there are many obstacles to the effective 
implementation of the right to food at the national level. Guatemala, which has 
adopted a framework law and a national strategy, and established new institutions, 
is a case in point. In terms of my research questions, the experience of efforts to 
implement the right to food in Guatemala demonstrate the existence of numerous 
barriers to the achievement of food sovereignty at the national level, and the 
difficulty in the current conjuncture of overcoming them. While the particular 
history of Guatemala is obviously unique, several of the barriers to the more 
effective implementation of the right to food relate to dynamics within the wider 
globalising capitalist political economy, such as landgrabs connected with the ‘agro-
fuels’ boom; and are therefore of widespread relevance across many countries in the 
South.  
Guatemalans have, in living memory, experienced brutal armed conflict that, from 
1978-1983, reached the scale of genocide against four of the indigenous Mayan 
ethnic and linguistic groups.127 The internal armed conflict, that began shortly after 
the US-inspired overthrow of Guatemala's only post-colonial social democratic 
governments (1944-1954) and ended nearly forty years later in 1996, had its roots in 
a history characterised by exploitation, discrimination and impoverishment of the 
ethnic Mayan majority groups and poor people generally. One of the most conflictual 
social issues throughout Guatemala's modern history concerns access to, and 
ownership of, agricultural and productive land.128 It was the attempt by the second 
social democratic Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1950-54) to 
implement a socially progressive programme of agrarian reform and land 
redistribution that led to his assassination and the overthrow of his government in a 
coup d’état.129  
                                                          
126 Ibid.  
127 Historical Clarification Commission, 1999, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Tz’Inil Na’Tab’Al, Report 
of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations, available at: 
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html, accessed 30.12.11; Human Rights Office of the 
Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999, Guatemala: Never Again! Recovery of Historical Memory Project 
(REMHI): The Official Report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of Guatemala, ODHAG, 
Guatemala City. While the commonly cited figure for the loss of life during Guatemala’s 36-year (1960-
1996) internal armed conflict is 200,000, the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) documented 
42,275 victims, and REMHI 52,427, including arbitrary executions, forced disappearances, torture, rape 
and threats. Based on their documentation of 626 massacres targeting Mayan ethnic communities in 
different parts of the country, the CEH made a finding of genocide against the political and military rulers 
of Guatemala during the period 1978-1983, when the state-sponsored violence reached a crescendo.  
128 Gauster, S., 2007, ‘Eliminating Market Distortions, Perpetuating Rural Inequality: An Evaluation of 
Market-assisted Land Reform in Guatemala’, Third World Quarterly, 28(8), 1519-1536; Eccarius-Kelly, 
V., 2007, ‘Deep and Ragged Scars in Guatemala’, Peace Review, 19, 51-8.  
129 The historical evidence strongly points towards the activity complicity of the US Government and the 
CIA in this particular episode in Guatemala’s history: see Schlesinger, S.E., Kinzer, S., and Coatsworth, 
J.H., 1999, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Mass. 
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The demand for agrarian reform was one of the key factors motivating the leftist 
insurgents who struggled against successive military dictatorships, often with 
substantial support amongst some of the Mayan linguistic groups. Today, however, 
Guatemala continues to be characterised by one of the most unequal land 
distributions in the hemisphere and indeed the world as a whole; and this is 
acknowledged as a key factor behind the continuing high levels of structural poverty 
and inequality, which, amongst other consequences, translate into widespread 
violations of the right to adequate food for a great many poor and indigenous 
Guatemalans.130 Further, land concentration appears to be increasing over time, as 
the population grows and as small-holders are forced to divide their parcels into ever 
smaller units for their children, whilst at the same time 'predatory land 
consolidation', often linked to commodity and agro-fuels production for export 
markets, has been taking place amongst the big landowners.131 
The internal armed conflict in Guatemala was concluded with the signing of 13 Peace 
Accords, one of which was the Agreement on Socioeconomic Aspects and the 
Agrarian Situation.132 This Accord, though subjected to critiques from some Mayan 
organisations in whose view it represented a return to colonialism through the back 
door of 'market-led land reform', nevertheless generated an expectation amongst the 
general population, especially poor and indigenous people, of rising living standards, 
and an obligation on the Government to take prompt and effective action to secure 
such an outcome.133 Contrary to these expectations, however, the socioeconomic 
situation of the most vulnerable and marginalised populations has deteriorated in the 
transitional and post-conflict years, with the percentage of the population 
experiencing malnutrition rising sharply during the post-conflict transition, from 16% 
in 1992, to 25% in 2001.134 As in many other agrarian countries, extreme poverty is 
concentrated in rural areas, and stood at over 31% in 2002, an increase of nearly a 
third in the two years since 2000.135 As is frequently the case, children suffer more 
than other sectors of the population (49% of all children under five suffer 
                                                          
130 Gauster op cit., who notes that, ‘according to the country’s 2003 agricultural census, 2% of the 
country’s farms, with an average of 194 hectares, control 57% of the land, while 87% of all farms, with 
an average size of 1.2 hectares, occupy just 16% of the land’: 1521.  
131 Tanaka, L.S., and Wittman, H., 2002, The Agrarian Question in Guatemala, Land Research Action 
Network, Country Background Paper, available at 
http://www.landaction.org/gallery/GuatemalabackBackgrounder%20PDF.pdf, accessed 26.10.09, 7.  
132 See http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/key-texts.php (accessed 27.10.09) for a full list of 
the various accords and a chronography of the lengthy Peace Process, which commenced in 1987..  
133 Tanaka and Wittman op cit., 6, citing the the statement issued by the Coordination of Organizations of 
Mayan Peoples (COPMAGUA) following the signing of the Accord; also ‘The Human Right to Food in 
Guatemala’, February 2005, ActionAid and FIAN, 4, available at: 
http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/the-human-right-to-food-in-guatemala/pdf, accessed 
15.10.09.  
134 Ibid., citing the FAO State of Food Insecurity in the World 2003. Using different statistical methods, 
the most recent FAO State of Food Insecurity in the World (2009) shows that for the last years for which 
figures were available (2004-6) the proportion of undernourished persons in Guatemala stood at 16%, an 
increase of 2% from 1990-92, whilst the total numbers of undernourished persons was 2.1 million in 
2004-6, up from 1.3 million in 1990-92: 50.  
135 ActionAid and FIAN op cit., 4., citing the 2003 Report on National Human Development of the 
Programme of the United Nations Human Development Programme in Guatemala, 13.  
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malnutrition in Guatemala), and indigenous children most of all, with 69% 
experiencing chronic malnutrition in the first decade of the 21st century.136 
During his visit to the country in January-February 2005, Jean Ziegler observed that 
the historical and contemporary inequalities concerning the lack of access to land 
and other productive resources were at the root of Guatemala’s very high rates of 
malnutrition and food insecurity.137 Specific violations of the right to food found 
during the visit included ‘forced evictions, ongoing expropriation of land from 
indigenous peoples, violations of labour rights, the repression and criminalisation of 
peaceful protest, and the climate of impunity in which violations occur’.138 Ziegler 
was also concerned that further trade liberalization under the Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would ‘result in greater levels of hunger and poverty 
amongst the most vulnerable’.139  
Efforts to tackle hunger and malnutrition had received a higher political profile with 
the election of a new government in 2004, and the establishment of a legal and 
institutional framework for a national food and nutrition security system.140 Ziegler 
was concerned however that the plan failed to ‘address the structural problems of 
land reform, labour rights, and non-discrimination in employment and education’.141 
In 2009, de Schutter visited Guatemala to review the changes made since Ziegler’s 
visit.142 Little progress had been made on the structural inequalities of wealth and 
land distribution, with 2% of the population owning 80% of arable land, 15.2% of the 
population living in extreme poverty, and 3 million ‘suffer[ing] from hunger, which is 
double the number of hungry in 1991’.143 
Affirming La Via Campesina’s critique of the generally negative impacts of trade 
liberalisation, and confirming the expectations of Ziegler, de Schutter found that the 
entry into force of CAFTA in 2006 has ‘been mainly to the benefit of agribusiness 
                                                          
136 Ibid.; also Stefan Hartleben, ‘El Derecho a la Alimentacion y su definicion de conformidad con el 
derecho international de los derechos humanos’, Colectivo Social, Informe Alternativa 2009, 57, citing 
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137 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 2006, The right to 
food: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, Mission to Guatemala, 
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As regards the extent of food insecurity, Mr Ziegler cited Government statistics revealing that 'two-thirds 
of Guatemala's people are too poor to feed themselves adequately [and] one third of Guatemalan families 
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138 Ibid., 3. 
139 Ibid. 
140 The institutional framework consists of CONASAN (the National Council on Food and Nutrition 
Security), SESAN (the Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security), and SINASAN (the National System 
for Food and Nutrition Security, including an early warning system: ibid, para.35.  
141 Ibid., para.35.  
142 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right To Food, de Schutter, O., 2010, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food: Mission to Guatemala, A/HRC/13/33/Add.4, 26.1.10.  
143 Ibid., para.10. In the economy as a whole, he found that 50% of all workers are paid below the 
minimum wage, which in any event is inadequate to meet the costs of a basic food basket: ibid., para.28. . 
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companies’, and to the detriment of small-scale peasant producers.144 In a dynamic 
reflective of trends elsewhere in the global South, forced evictions of peasant and 
indigenous communities were continuing in relation to the rapid expansion of export 
cash crops such as sugar cane and palm oil plantations.145  
As the land area taken by these crops has grown, the production of basic food crops – 
corn, rice, wheat and beans – has decreased by 15.7 per cent (corn) to 64.6% (wheat) 
over recent years.146 These decreases continue a long historical decline. The national 
production of rice and wheat had already been severely affected by free trade and 
structural adjustment policies.147 Repeating the pattern observed elsewhere, the loss 
of domestic production capacity is accompanied by growing dependency on imports, 
and therefore vulnerability to international price fluctuations. Over 90% of imports 
into Guatemala are controlled by five companies, and this market domination saw 
bread prices rise by nearly two-thirds between 2004 and 2008.148  
At the same time, de Schutter stated that he was ‘generally impressed by the level 
of commitment of the government towards the realization of the right to food’.149 
Guatemala, he noted, ‘stands out as one of the first countries to have adopted a 
framework law on the right to food’.150 However, he identified several 
shortcomings.151 Moreover, the existence of a national plan and ‘its excellent legal 
framework’ has not been matched by practical implementation and change.152  
In related policy areas the Guatemalan government’s words are frequently not 
matched by actions. A policy for integrated rural development to promote 
production of domestic food crops ‘was hampered by lack of land, fertilizers, seeds 
and credit’.153 Institutions established to promote land redistribution are 
inadequately resourced and not working effectively; and in fact having the opposite 
                                                          
144 Ibid., paras.21-25, expressing concern about the lack of any government data regarding the impacts of 
this free trade treaty on the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of the population.  
145 The total land area devoted to palm oil rising from 35,000 hectares in 2005, to 65,000 hectares in 
2007, and to an estimated 100,000 hectares in 2010; and the area devoted to sugar cane rising from 
197,000 hectares in 2005 to 308,657 hectares in 2008: ibid., paras.18, 34-6.. 
146 Ibid., para.35.  
147 In the case of rice, the number of national producers has fallen from 14,668 in 1950 to 2,870 in 2003, 
and in the case of wheat, the 45,181 producers in 1979, producing nearly 800,000 tonnes, had fallen to 
4,895 by 2009, producing less than 55,000 tonnes: Gauster, S., and Siguenza, P., 2008, ‘Market Systems, 
Food Prices and State Intervention’ (Sistema de mercado, precios de los aliments e intervención del 
estado), in Social Collective for the Right to Food (Colectivo Social por el Derecho a la Alimentación), 
2008, ‘Alternative Report on the Right to Food in Guatemala’ (Informe Alternative del Derecho a la 
Alimentación en Guatemala 2008), Guatemala, December 2008, 20-37. 
148 De Schutter 2009 op cit., 29-30.  
149 Ibid., para.16.  
150 Ibid., para.39.  
151 For example, while the framework establishes a ‘forum for social consultation and participation’ 
(INCOPAS), the peak institution (CONASAN – National Food and Nutrition Security Council) has taken 
little notice of the proposals elaborated by INCOPAS: .ibid., para.41.  
152 De Schutter commented that: 
 [T]he institutions set up to implement [the framework] appear to have been ineffective in practice. The limited 
powers of CONASAN are generally considered a constraint, while SESAN [Secretatriat for Food and Nutritional 
Security] lacks political weight and has tended to focus on the nutritional aspects of food security rather than on 
issues of equity and sustainability: ibid., 44, noting a general lack of coordination between different 
institutions and hence the risk of duplication.. 
153 Ibid., para.49.  
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effect to that intended, with the trend being towards ‘land re-concentration [as] a 
result of agro-fuel production and the development of mining and hydroelectricity 
projects’.154 While the government has established a minimal safety net for some of 
the most vulnerable families, its overall social spending of six per cent of GDP is 
‘amongst the lowest figures in Central America’, and the amount allocated for the 
food and nutrition plan is 0.25% of GDP, well below the level required for its 
adequate implementation.155  
A positive feature of the Guatemalan right to food framework has been the proactive 
role of the Human Rights Ombudsman in monitoring the implementation of the 
relevant laws. Unfortunately, the Ombudsman’s budget was cut by 20% in 2009, thus 
impacting that office’s ‘ability to report consistently and in a timely manner on the 
realization of the right to food’.156  
At the conclusion of his visit in 2005, Ziegler called for a ‘comprehensive rural 
development strategy’, with a particular focus on ‘investment in small-scale peasant 
agriculture’, in order to reverse ‘the model of exclusionary development and export-
oriented agriculture that has created and is deepening extreme inequality in the 
ownership of resources’.157 
As is clear from de Schutter’s visit in 2009, nothing of the kind has happened. While 
a legal right-to-food framework has been established and institutionalised, it has 
clearly been unable to make any significant inroads in the very high – and increasing 
- levels of malnutrition and food insecurity. Moreover, the persistence of several 
structural factors, in particular the entry into force of CAFTA, the rapid expansion of 
agro-fuel and other cash crop plantations, the effective freezing of the minimum 
wage and the widespread failure to comply with the legal minimum, and the failure 
to address or resolve the agrarian situation, are further entrenching malnutrition and 
food insecurity.158  
This serves to highlight the limitations of law as a vehicle for transformative change 
in the face of deeply entrenched structural inequalities and the lack of a highly 
organised and mass social movement that can effectively pressure the government to 
follow through on its legal commitments. While a social movement based around the 
right to food is emerging in Guatemala, consistent with De Schutter’s expectations, 
its capacity to effectively pressure the government to devote the resources 
necessary to properly implement its right to food legislation is clearly limited; and it 
                                                          
154 Ibid., para.55.  
155 Ibid., para.82-84, noting that Guatemala’s tax take of 9.9% of GDP remains well below the 12.5% 
target specified in the 1996 Peace Accords.  
156 Ibid., paras.62-3.  
157 Ibid., paras 57-8, especially para 58(j). Zeigler’s comments coincide closely with the demands made 
by the cross-sectoral Agrarian Platform in recent years for the '[dismantling of] the agro-export model 
[and the] democratiz[ation] [of] access to land and land tenure [as well as the] diversif[ication] of the 
economy’: LRAN op cit., 16. 
158 Ibid.. In one case the US group Green Earth Fuels, which is owned by investment fund managers 
Carlyle Group, Goldman Sachs and Riverstone Holdings, acquired 25 thousand hectares across three 
departments for biodiesel production based on palm oil: 36.  
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could hardly be said, at least at this stage, to be contributing to the formation of an 
effective ‘national-popular strategy’.159  
In the case of Guatemala, the capacity of the state itself to make the necessary 
changes must be questioned, weakened as it is by years of military and authoritarian 
rule and the culture of impunity that has characterised the post-conflict stage, 
combined with the insidious and corrupting influence of a burgeoning trade in illegal 
narcotics. All these factors must be regarded as serious obstacles to the 
implementation of the right to food – and by extension, food sovereignty – in 
Guatemala. To them must be added the dynamics of a liberalised agricultural trade 
and commodity speculation, which is fuelling the demand for export crops such as 
sugar cane and palm oil, and thereby further undermining food sovereignty 
objectives. In the absence of broader change within the globalising capitalist food 
system in which the potential for such speculative booms is curtailed, the prospects 
for the realisation of the right to food and food sovereignty in Guatemala – and other 
countries which are subject to the same speculative pressures – appear mixed at 
best.  
The institutionalisation of food sovereignty at the national level: Ecuador 
Ecuador is one of the 24 countries to have enshrined the right to food in its new 
Constitution of 2008; and it is one of the half dozen countries to have included the 
promotion of food sovereignty alongside this right.160 Ecuador is also the first country 
in Latin America to have expressly incorporated in its new Constitution an alternative 
development paradigm based on an indigenous (non-Occidental) concept: ‘buen 
vivir’, or ‘living well’.161  
                                                          
159 In 2008 a new civil society alliance was formed in order to monitor the performance of the 
Guatemalan state with respect to the implementation of the right to food: the Social Collective for the 
Right to Food (Colectivo Social por el Derechos a la Alimentación). The members of this Collective are 
the International Centre for Human Rights Investigations (CIIDH), the Coordinator of NGOs and 
Cooperatives (CONGCOOP), the Interdiocesan Land Pastoral (PTI), the National Network for the 
Defense of Food Sovereignty in Guatemala (REDSAG), the National Food Table (MNA), and the 
Campaign for a Guatemala without Hunger. In 2008 it published an ‘Alternative Report on the Right to 
Food in Guatemala’, which is available at: http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/informe-
alternativo-del-derecho-a-la-alimentacion-en-guatemala/pdf, accessed 26.10.09.  
160 Republic of Ecuador, 2008, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 20.10.08, available in English at: 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html, accessed 6.10.11. The relevant article 
is Art.13, which reads:  
“Persons and community groups have the right to safe and permanent access to healthy, sufficient and 
nutritional food, preferably produced locally and in keeping with their various identities and cultural 
traditions. The Ecuadorian State shall promote food sovereignty.” 
The other countries to have legislated for food sovereignty, and / or incorporated it into their constitutions 
are (at 2011): Nepal, Venezuela, Mali, Bolivia, and Senegal.  
161 Cortez, D., 2009, ‘La Construccion Social del “Buen Vivir” (Sumak Kawsay) en Ecuador: Genealogy 
of Design and Political Proposal for Life’, available at 
http://www.amawtaywasi.edu.ec/web/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=103&func=fileinfo&id
=26&lang=ki, accessed 15.12.11. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical core of buen vivir is the 
recovery and support of harmonious relations between humanity and nature: the recovery of 
connectedness, and the overcoming of the alienation that characterises historical and contemporary 
globalising capitalism. Social and indigenous peoples’ movements thus juxtapose buen vivir to the 
growth-based development paradigm that underpins processes of capital accumulation. In Chapters 6 and 
7 I will consider what buen vivir might mean in practice as an alternative development paradigm, in the 
further development of Ecuador as a case study. 
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The following discussion will focus on these research questions: what has the 
institutionalisation of food sovereignty in Ecuador meant to date, in terms of 
securing concrete gains towards the achievement of the goals of the food sovereignty 
movement? What have been the obstacles to the implementation of the food 
sovereignty legislation, have they been overcome, and if not, will they be overcome?  
After setting out the content of Ecuador’s 2009 ‘Organic Law of the Food Sovereignty 
Regime’ (‘Framework Law’), I explore the current status of its implementation. This 
analysis is based on an in-depth interview with Ricardo Intriago, President of the 
Ecuadoran Federation of Agricultural Centres and Farmers’ Organisations, who sits on 
the newly established Ecuadoran National Food Sovereignty Conference, and is one 
of the foremost social actors in Ecuador promoting the peasant conception and 
implementation of food sovereignty. 
By way of preliminary remarks, it is worth noting that, by itself, the constitutional 
inclusion of food sovereignty and its legislation in a Framework Law is a significant 
achievement; and evidences the extent to which La Via Campesina and the Food 
Sovereignty movement have brought about a ‘normative shift’ – and thus a 
destabilisation of the prevailing common sense – around food and agriculture.162 
Further, the passage of legislation for food sovereignty speaks to the growing 
coherence of this paradigm, and, in the Ecuadoran context, its strong popular 
support and political credibility. In contrast to Guatemala, it is possible to say with 
some confidence that food sovereignty in Ecuador forms part of an effective 
‘national popular collective will’, which is led by the powerful pan-indigenous 
movement and finds a unifying expression in the concept of buen vivir. All these 
achievements point to a substantive shift in the balance of forces vis-à-vis the 
globalising capitalist food system and its supporters within Ecuador. Such 
observations are important in terms of the conclusions I will reach in this thesis.  
As one of the first food sovereignty laws in the world, the Framework Law is 
significant for several reasons. First, it reveals how a national legislature has 
conceptualised food sovereignty and delineated its contours and priorities in law. 
Secondly, the ‘food sovereignty regime’ whose establishment this law contemplates, 
provides an example of how the principles of food sovereignty can be feasibly 
institutionalised at the national level. Thirdly, the various obligations it imposes on 
the Ecuadoran state provide a yardstick by which the Ecuadoran government can be 
held to account by peasant and social movements regarding the degree of 
implementation, and, as Olivier de Schutter suggested as regards the right to food, a 
rallying point of mobilisation in the event that the government is dragging its heels. 
In the Introduction and Chapter 3, I have set out a conceptualisation of food 
sovereignty as cohering in practice around three pillars:  
 support for peasant and smaller-scale producers, especially through 
redistributive agrarian reform;  
                                                          
162 Other countries to have included the promotion of food sovereignty in their constitutions include 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nepal. 
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 the utilisation of agro-ecological production methodologies, in order to 
overcome the harmful environmental effects of industrialised monocultural 
agriculture and to create greater levels of autonomy for smaller-scale 
producers, and; 
 the development of more localised food systems, with an emphasis on direct 
forms of exchange between producers and consumers, in pursuit of the 
achievement of greater levels of domestic food self-sufficiency. 
The Framework Law reflects all these basic orientations of food sovereignty. Thus, 
several of its provisions mention explicitly the goals of: 
 national self-sufficiency in basic foods, and the avoidance of dependencies 
on imported foods (Art.1, 22, 23);  
 privileging and providing material support to small-scale production and 
artisanal fishing (Arts.1, 3(c), 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 30);  
 promoting the ‘social and environmental functions’ of land, including 
redistributive agrarian reform and rural development strategies (Arts.2, 3(b), 
3(d), 6, 9-15, 17-20);  
 promoting sustainable forms of agriculture, especially agro-ecology and 
organic production, in order to protect agro-biodiversity (Arts.1, 3(a), 3(d), 
4, 6, 7, 13(d), 14); and  
 the optimisation of public health through the commercialisation, storage and 
consumption of healthy, nationally-produced foods, including via direct 
forms of exchange between producers and consumers (Arts.1, 2, 3(d), 21-22, 
24-25, 27-30).  
In addition, other provisions emphasis the need for the recovery and protection of 
traditional knowledge and food-related practices, including all native seeds and 
plant germplasm, and the prohibition of their patenting or other forms of 
commercial appropriation (Arts.7, 8, 9); as well as the prohibition of genetically-
modified organisms in Ecuador, except where the President and the National 
Assembly determine that their introduction is in the ‘national interest’ (Art.26). 
The law’s scope is accordingly very wide-ranging, and, as Article 2 provides, covers: 
 land use and planning;  
 protection of watersheds and biodiversity;  
 seeds and the protection of traditional knowledge and practices;  
 the provision of financing, technical and other forms of support for smaller-
scale producers;  
 agrarian reform;  
 rural development and employment generation;  
 food value-adding and storage;  
 infrastructure and mechanisms of storage, distribution and consumption; and  
 food safety and quality.  
From a food systems perspective, the only element not expressly addressed concerns 
the adoption of measures to minimise waste and promote recycling, although 
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arguably this might be covered, at least partially, through the prominence given to 
agro-ecology. The law thus not only synthesises and delineates in a systematic 
fashion the content of food sovereignty, but also speaks to the growing coherence 
and critical insight of the work carried out by La Via Campesina and its allies in the 
Food Sovereignty movement, in self-consciously developing this paradigm as a 
credible alternative social and political project to the globalising capitalist food 
system since 1995. In what might be understood as a process of reciprocal, iterative 
and symbiotic development, how food sovereignty is actualised in Ecuador will in 
turn inform the further articulation and concretisation of food sovereignty principles 
in other national and local contexts.  
The implementation of food sovereignty is intended to be undertaken with the 
‘widest possible social participation, via processes of public deliberation promoted 
by the State and by civil society, and articulated by the Food and Nutritional 
Sovereignty System (SISAN) in the various levels of government’ (Art.31). The key 
institution is the National Food Sovereignty Conference (‘the Conference’) which is 
intended to serve as a ‘forum for debate, deliberation and the generation of 
proposals, by civil society, for the elaboration of the Law which will develop food 
sovereignty’ (Art.32). Hence the current law establishes a framework, which sets out 
the objectives and the principles according to which further implementing laws in 
specific areas will be enacted. The Conference consists of eight members from 
different sectors of civil society, including peasant organisations (Art.33). Amongst 
other functions that may subsequently be specified, the Conference is empowered to 
encourage dialogue in order to formulate civil society proposals, promote 
investigations and studies into the problematic of food sovereignty in Ecuador, and 
release reports and alternatives for the new food sovereignty law (Art.34).  
In addition to the principles of broad social participation and national food self-
sufficiency, the implementation of food sovereignty in Ecuador must be in accord 
with several other key principles. These include: solidarity; self-determination; 
transparency; non-discrimination; sustainability; gender equity as regards access to 
the means of production; equity; and social, economic and inter-cultural inclusion 
(Art.4). Thus prima facie, the Framework Law appears to represent the 
democratisation of the food system in Ecuador, which is a major success of the 
global movement for food sovereignty, and clearly one capable of being replicated in 
other national contexts, depending on prevailing political configurations.163  
                                                          
163 Ecuador’s near-neighbour, Venezuela, is another example of a Latin American state which has moved 
strongly towards the direction of implementing the principles of food sovereignty. As documented by 
Christina Schiavoni and William Camacaro (Schiavoni, C. ,and Camacaro, W., 2009, ‘The Venezuelan 
Effort to Build a New Food and Agriculture System’, Monthly Review, 61(3), 129-141), in recent years 
the Venezuelan government has prioritised the goal of becoming self-sufficient in food production, 
through the provision of credit, storage facilities, training and technical assistance, infrastructure and 
equipment, better access to land, and government-supported distribution networks to smaller-scale 
farmers and fishers, as well as a national school meals program, guaranteed healthy lunches for workers, 
and more than 6,000 community kitchens serving nutritious meals to the most vulnerable sectors of the 
population: ibid. In terms of land reform, an estimated 2.7 million hectares have been redistributed to 
farmers since the passage of the Law of the Land in 2001; and agriculture credit has increased from ‘$164 
million in 1999 to $7.6 billion in 2008’: ibid. The results to date show a 24% increase in Venezuela’s total 
food output in the ten years to 2007; with the country ‘reaching self-sufficiency in its two most important 
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In contradistinction to a ‘market-led’ process of food security, the development of 
food sovereignty as contemplated by the Framework Law is highly dependent on an 
activist and interventionist state.164 Further, it explicitly contemplates numerous 
measures to protect domestic agriculture, in opposition to the ‘free trade’ model 
promoted through the WTO and other global governance forums.  
Article 3 sets out six sets of obligations of the Ecuadoran State as regards the 
implementation of the requirements of food sovereignty. Specifically, the State 
must: 
 encourage sustainable agriculture and a transition towards a new agri-food 
development model;  
 establish incentives for productive land use and disincentives towards the 
creation and maintenance of land monopolies and centralisation;  
 encourage the formation of associations of micro-businesses and smaller-
scale producers, within ‘the framework of a social and solidarity economy’;  
 encourage the consumption of healthy and nutritious food produced 
according to organic and agro-ecological methods, and avoid the expansion 
of monocultures and the use of food crops for biofuels;  
 adopt fiscal, customs and tariff policies to protect domestic agriculture; and  
 promote social participation and public deliberation in the formulation of 
laws and policies for food sovereignty, and in their implementation.  
In terms of the implementation to date of the Framework Law, it must first be noted 
that many of the provisions of the 2008 Ecuadoran Constitution, including the 
promotion of food sovereignty and the enactment of the Framework Law, were the 
outcome of a protracted process of social and political struggle by peasant 
organisations and Ecuadoran social movements, notably the Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), ‘one of the strongest indigenous social 
movements in Latin America’.165 According to Ricardo Intriago:  
 
These achievements were won by the social and peasant organisations, pressuring the 
government. In other words, it’s a political result, of social struggle, that the President 
could not resist, at a certain moment in time…When we speak of [GMOs] it was the 
organised Ecuadoran social movement who protested and prohibited [the entry of GMOS] 
into Ecuador. What [President Rafael] Correa’s government did was to [insert in the 
Framework Law] the second part of that article, which says, ‘except at the request of 
the President or the National Assembly for reasons of national security’.
166  
                                                                                                                                                                         
grains, corn and rice’, in 2008, as well as in pork; near self-sufficiency in beef, chicken and eggs; and a 
‘900 per cent increase in milk production to 1.96 million tons, fulfilling 55 per cent of national demand’: 
ibid.  
164 In this respect it confirms Zehra Arat’s expectations of the politicised ‘human rights ideology’ that she 
detected in the International Bill of Rights: 2008 op cit.  
165 Biekart, K., 2005, ‘Seven Theses on Latin American Social Movements and Political Change: A 
Tribute to André Gunder Frank’, The European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 
October 2005, http://www.tni.org/es/archives/act/1329, accessed 6.10.11.  
166 Verbal response to written interview questions, 15.8.11, translated by the author from Spanish to 
English.  
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In his view, Correa’s government, even though it has passed the Framework Law and 
established the Conference, neither understands the types of changes required by 
genuine food sovereignty nor is particularly sympathetic to them. The government’s 
attitude to agro-ecology which, as discussed, is widely seen as a foundational pillar 
of food sovereignty, makes this clear:  
Correa’s government doesn’t believe in agro-ecology, because Correa is an economist. 
And as an economist, he believes in numbers. So he sees everything in terms of 
productivity, whilst sustainable agriculture can’t be seen only in [those terms]. It’s seen 
also [in terms of] utility, in nature. But instead Correa emphasises ‘productivity in the 
countryside’.
167  
Similar observations are made by Tejo Pramono in relation to the Indonesian 
government which, although it has not legislated for food sovereignty like Ecuador, 
has nonetheless given some rhetorical support to the concept, as it ‘was a good 
strong term for the government to respond to the [global] food crisis, to say [that] 
we need a strong system of food’.168 However, according to Pramono, their 
understanding of food sovereignty is limited, and contradictory:  
[We briefed] the Minister of Agriculture many times, but he doesn’t understand the 
picture of food sovereignty. They understand – the word is nice, sovereignty – but they 
do not have the picture that food should be provided by the farmers, meaning agrarian 
reform; that they have to protect [small farmers] from imports, that they should not 
liberalize, that they should produce locally, organically – they do not understand the soul 
of food sovereignty.169 
Given that the Framework Law expressly incorporates many elements of the ‘soul of 
food sovereignty’, it would seem that significant progress had been achieved in 
Ecuador. However, for Intriago, constitutional recognition and a Framework law for 
food sovereignty are merely the first steps. The challenge that he, his members and 
their allies are currently engaged in is to secure the meaningful implementation of 
the food sovereignty law. He describes them as being engaged in a ‘permanent 
struggle’ to achieve their desired outcomes; and yet their campaigns have had 
important results in terms of raising awareness and encouraging participation and 
mobilisation.170 In political terms, these mobilisations have allowed them to ‘win 
spaces’ inside the government, such as a seat on the Conference; and thereby to 
‘take decisions from inside’, making proposals for legislative and policy measures to 
implement food sovereignty in Ecuador. All these actions and alliances point to the 
existence of an effective ‘national-popular’ strategy in Ecuador, and one that, as 
previously indicated, appears to have overcome purely corporate and sectoral 
interests, in order to advance a transformative political project (buen vivir) in the 
universal interest.  
 
 
                                                          
167 Ibid.  
168 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 31.3.09.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Oral answers to written questions submitted by the author, 15.8.10.  
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The Government, however, has to date accorded a low priority to the Conference: 
[The Conference was established and since then has passed] a year, eight months, with 
no budget…We had no office, they gave us an office which they’d borrowed, we had no 
equipment, no technical assistance, we had no means of feeding ourselves in Quito…How 
much more clear can it be, that the government doesn’t want to fight for food 
sovereignty, if the first institution that [was established] had no budget for more than a 
year? Where the government puts its money, that’s where its priorities lie.171  
In addition to this clear lack of political will in favour of food sovereignty, Correa’s 
productivist approach to agriculture is leading the government to support other 
policies which are undermining food sovereignty, says Intriago. He cites two trends in 
particular. The first is the government’s encouragement of concentration of 
landholdings on the Ecuadoran coast, where the agro-export crops – sugar cane, 
coffee, bananas, rice, cacao – are grown; and its reluctance to embark on a program 
of redistributive agrarian reform. The second is the importation of agro-chemicals 
from Venezuela, which the Ecuadoran government makes available at subsidised 
prices to peasant producers. While the Federation is trying to promote agro-ecology 
and freedom from dependence on chemicals, in accordance with the terms of the 
food sovereignty law, the Ecuadoran government is, according to Intriago, 
encouraging such dependence in the name of boosting agricultural productivity.172  
A further obstacle to the implementation of the Framework Law has been, in 
Intriago’s view, the lack of detailed knowledge of the law amongst the citizenry as a 
whole. This comes back again, he says, to the lack of support for food sovereignty in 
the government, which has not undertaken any measures to promote the law widely 
and make its content and its goals known, contrary to the law’s express provisions 
which call, as noted earlier, for the ‘widest possible social participation’ in the 
implementation of food sovereignty. Moreover,  
[T]he public institutions of the State are not complying either with the [food 
sovereignty] law or with the Constitution. The very same Ministry of Agriculture is acting 
totally, completely in opposition to what the law and the Constitution says. They do not 
respect Mother Earth, when the Constitution says respect Pacha Mama. The Environment 
Ministry is developing programs to bring [GMOs] to Ecuador, when the Constitution 
forbids exactly that.173 
Confronted with this political reality, the peasant and social organisations have no 
option but to maintain their struggle to force these Ministries, and the government in 
general, to comply with its own laws and with the Constitution. The problem, says 
                                                          
171 Ibid.  
172 This form of co-operation between the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan governments contradicts 
Venezuela’s own commitments to the promotion of agroecology. According to Schiviano and Camacaro 
(2009 op cit.), the ‘2008 Law for Integrated Agricultural Health officially established agroecology as the 
scientific basis for sustainable agriculture in Venezuela and mandated the phasing out of toxic 
agrochemicals’: ibid. Further, the existence of such accords between member states of ALBA must raise 
questions as to what extent this treaty is promoting genuine autonomy and self-determination on the 
principles of cooperation and solidarity, as opposed to replicating forms of dependency established during 
colonial and neo-liberal eras.  
173 Ibid.  
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Intriago, is that there is no formal, legal mechanism of accountability, which citizens 
and civil society can use to force the Ministries to obey the law:  
To achieve the law’s implementation, we have a long path in front of us. Ultimately 
what it means is to get rid of all the people who are currently occupying the key 
positions and not implementing the law, and put in their place conscientious individuals 
who will respect the law and implement it. But for now, implementation is a very big 
problem.174  
To be able to do this requires the exercise of political power, which in turn arguably 
requires direct participation in government. Leaders of the Indonesian Peasant Union 
are coming to this conclusion, as Pramono observes:  
For the peasants’ organisation to have their own political party – that is what we 
want to have, because then we could influence, we could change and decide upon 
policies.175 
Nowhere is the need for influence over the political process, either through holding 
political power directly, or through mobilising social forces, more apparent than with 
respect to redistributive agrarian reform, which is widely understood to be a 
necessary pre-condition to the achievement of food sovereignty. At the present 
time, the Ecuadoran peasant movement is formulating proposals for such reform 
within the auspices of the Conference, as contemplated by the Framework Law. The 
previous attempt at agrarian reform in Ecuador, says Intriago, was a ‘failure’:  
The landlords and the government managed to secure their lands, and now they’re 
stronger than ever. But with the new agrarian reform, what’s going to happen, is that 
we’re going to take away once more the land from the landlords, and give it to the small 
producers. Between here and there are many difficulties. First of all is that the 
Government doesn’t want to make a radical program of agrarian reform in favour of the 
small producers. So to start with we have a fight with the government.176 
Both the Constitution and the Framework Law (Article 6) prohibit latifundios, or 
large plantations. However, neither specify how large a farm has to be before it will 
be regarded as a latifundio; and so this is a question that must be resolved politically 
in the context of the current agrarian reform process. The social movements are 
proposing that the maximum size should be 250 hectares, which will affect the 
holdings of approximately 2,500 families. The Federation, and Intriago, would like to 
see a more radical reform, which puts a limit of 20 or 30 hectares for each 
landowner:  
We shouldn’t have very rich people in the countryside, because they don’t believe in 
[caring for] our natural resources.177 
Intriago expects a major political struggle when the Agrarian Reform law finally 
comes before the National Assembly. As noted in Chapter 4, many previous attempts 
at redistributive agrarian reform around the world have failed due to the entrenched 
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opposition of land-owning elites, and the refusal, or the inability, of governments to 
confront them effectively. How this issue plays out in Ecuador will be crucial in 
determining whether the ‘balance of forces’ have shifted sufficiently at the national 
level to allow for the full implementation of food sovereignty. I will consider this 
question further in Chapter 7.  
The institutionalisation of local food in Australia 
Food localisation is a key pillar of food sovereignty. The Ecuadoran Framework Law 
confirms this interpretation, calling as it does for ‘autonomous, de-centralised 
governments to provide the necessary infrastructure for direct commercialisation 
and exchange between small producers and consumers, to the benefit of both 
groups, as a new relation of a social and solidarity economy.’178 Expressions of the 
local food movement in the Northern countries like the US and Australia, such as 
farmers’ markets, community gardens and community-supported agriculture 
initiatives, arguably embody, in principle at least, the envisioned ‘social and 
solidarity economy’.179 As I discuss briefly later in the thesis, further manifestations 
of this economy, such as new theorisations of the commons, the growing praxis of 
the co-operative movement, and attempted syntheses such as ‘economic democracy’ 
and ‘inclusive democracy’, may provide fruitful directions for the progressive 
development of the Food Sovereignty movement.180 
In Australia, farmers’ markets and community gardens enjoy some measure of 
institutional and political support at the local and state government level. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, these local food initiatives have expanded substantially in 
the past decade; and this expansion has been made possible by favourable planning 
and zoning decisions taken primarily at the local government level. Unlike the United 
States, however, these local food initiatives do not enjoy, as yet, any political or 
institutional support at the Federal level. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Federal 
Department of Agriculture in Australia remains firmly committed to the productivist, 
free trade view of food and farming, if the content of its Issues Paper on a National 
Food Plan is a reliable indication of current thinking within the Department.  
In the case of the Coffs Coast, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Coffs Harbour City 
Council has supported the formation of a regional Local Food Alliance, in the context 
of a project funded by the NSW State Government. It has not yet, however, sought to 
expand this Alliance into a more permanent and inclusive body that could serve to 
guide food policy formation in the region over the coming years. The obvious models 
here are the one hundred-plus multi-sectoral Food Policy Councils which have been 
established in North America over the past few decades.181 As a participant-observer 
                                                          
178 Article 21, paragraph 2.  
179 Mance 2007 op cit.  
180 de Peuter, G., and Dyer-Witherford, N., 2010, ‘Commons and Cooperatives’, Affinities: A Journal of 
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181 Food First, 2009, ‘Development Report No 21: Food Policy Councils, Lessons Learned’, available at 
http://www.foodfirst.org/en/foodpolicycouncils-lessons, accessed 10.2.10; Schiff, R., 2007, Food policy 
councils: an examination of organisational structure, process, and contribution to alternative food 
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in the Local Food Alliance, my assessment is that the project-based nature of the 
Alliance, and its focus on project ‘outcomes’ and ‘deliverables’ in the strict terms of 
the grant, has thus far rendered it rather inward-looking and inhibited its capacity to 
reach out and involve other stakeholders not directly involved in the project 
activities.  
Food Connect in Brisbane has to date been similarly focused on its own, enterprise-
oriented, goals. At the same time, the founder Robert Pekin has for several years 
been deeply concerned about some of the strategic challenges facing food 
production in Australia, such as the loss of prime agricultural land to urban 
development and mining, and the demographic crisis facing Australia’s farmers. He 
has also been approached by several local governments since 2008 to provide 
consultancy advice regarding the establishment of policy frameworks for more 
localised food systems. Like Coffs Harbour, a growing number of local governments in 
Australia are looking to food localisation as an area where they can take policy and 
practical actions to address the challenges posed by climate change and peak oil. 
In order to support these local governments and diversify its business model, Food 
Connect developed a consultancy arm, Think Food, in December 2010. During 2011 
Think Food has worked on consultancy projects with councils in NSW, Queensland 
and Victoria, in order to scope opportunities for localising food systems, and to 
develop strategic frameworks for sustainable agricultural systems. Conversations 
with senior managers in state government Health Departments have also revealed 
considerable sympathy for these sorts of initiatives, evidencing a willingness on the 
part of this part of State government to explore alternatives to the dominant modes 
of food production and distribution in Australia.182  
What emerges from this picture is that there is an uneven and highly variable 
‘bottom-up’ process of institutionalisation of local food in certain parts of Australia, 
dependent on active and motivated community and social enterprise leaders working 
with sympathetic officers at the local government and (in some instances) State 
Health department levels. As discussed in Chapter 3, the NSW Department of 
Environment funded a number of local food initiatives across the state from 2008-
2011 as part of its Urban Sustainability Programme. Continuation of this support is 
not guaranteed, and as yet there is no systematic political or institutional support at 
either the State or Federal levels in Australia for food localisation as a policy and 
political priority.  
Food Connect, together with other leaders of the local food movement in Australia 
such as the Australian City Farms and Community Gardens Network, and Friends of 
the Earth Adelaide, joined together in August 2010 to form the Australian Food 
Sovereignty Alliance, introducing food sovereignty into Australian debates around 
food and farming for the first time.183 The impact to date of the Alliance on Federal 
government policy cannot be assessed, as the National Food Plan is still under 
                                                                                                                                                                         
movements, unpublished PhD thesis, available at: http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/293/, 
accessed 10.10.11. 
182 Personal communications with the author, September-October 2011. 
183 http://australian.foodsovereigntyalliance.org/, accessed 15.01.11. 
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development.184 Representatives of the Alliance have had two meetings with senior 
figures in the Australian Greens, who have indicated considerable sympathy for food 
sovereignty principles and values; and expressed agreement with the political 
demand to recognise at the Federal level, for the first time, the non-export and non-
commodity sector of food and farming in Australia.185  
In this, the development of the political process in Australia in the past 18 months 
has some parallels with developed in Canada over the past five years. There, a 
number of local food initiatives (Food Policy Councils, Food Charters, farmers’ 
markets and so on) were scaled up politically into a participatory policy framework 
under the auspices of the ‘People’s Food Policy Project’.186 This Project, which took 
place over two years and involved, amongst other things, the participation of 3,500 
Canadians in 250 ‘kitchen table’ discussions, produced ten policy discussion papers, 
and a synthesis summary report.187 It called for a ‘healthy, fair and ecological food 
system’ for Canada, and was based explicitly on the principles of food sovereignty, 
developed in a participatory manner by the Canadian food movement. The 
document’s key recommendations called for food relocalisation; a transition to agro-
ecology; a strong poverty elimination programme to enable access to good food for 
all; a nationally-funded children and food strategy; and the active involvement of 
the public, ‘especially the most marginalised’, in food system design and 
governance.188 
Similar recommendations were incorporated by the New Democrats party in their 
Food for Thought policy platform which they took to the Canadian Federal election 
in March 2011.189 Also based on a lengthy (18 months) process of public discussion 
and consultation, the key themes of this document concerned: universal access to 
healthy food; support local food production via, for example, more farmers’ markets 
and the targeted use of government procurement policies; and provide incentives 
and support for young people to enter farming, including making arable land 
available to them.190 Like the People’s Food Policy Project, this document was also 
based on the principles of food sovereignty, evidencing substantial public and 
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political support for these principles across a reasonably broad spectrum of Canadian 
society. While food sovereignty is certainly not the policy of the current Canadian 
federal government, it is the policy of the official opposition.191 This is a significant 
achievement for a political movement that has not yet been in existence for two 
decades.  
In terms of my research questions, these Canadian developments, and to a lesser 
extent those in Australia, evidence the growing coherence of food sovereignty as a 
political project; its emerging political credibility; and its capacity to contribute to 
the formation of a ‘national popular collective will’, in the North as well as the 
South. At the same time, there are formidable barriers to the substantive 
implementation of food sovereignty principles in contexts such as Canada and 
Australia, where jurisdictional complexity and a firmly entrenched political bias in 
favour of key tenets of neoliberalism, such as the commitment to free trade, mean 
that ‘[d]espite the imperative for change, the forces aligned in [favour] of the status 
quo are powerful’.192  
Concluding observations 
To mount an effective counter-hegemonic political project, a social movement must 
be capable of shifting the balance of political and economic forces that sustain a 
hegemonic power formation. In the context of the globalising capitalist food system, 
these forces include the complex of global governance institutions discussed in 
Chapter 4, together with national governments, most especially those of the core 
capitalist bloc led by the United States. Counter-hegemonic politics also entails 
engaging with the ‘common sense’ that naturalises the existing state of affairs, and 
developing a new ‘good sense’ that can supplant this common sense. 
The Food Sovereignty movement , led by La Via Campesina, has responded to the 
attempted institutionalisation of trade liberalisation and the further 
commodification of natural resources and social relations around food and farming 
through a combination of opposition and proposition. Together with other social 
movement actors, it has managed to ‘throw sand in the WTO gears’ and ‘slow down 
the process of liberalisation’ by forcing it into bilateral and regional forums, rather 
than the ‘single table’ of the WTO.193 At the same time, insufficient progress has 
been made thus far in the elaboration of food sovereignty-based ‘fair and 
transparent’ trade arrangements; and this must be regarded as a missed opportunity.  
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La Via Campesina has also responded to intensifying processes of commodification 
with the assertion of the collective and individual rights of peasants and small 
farmers. It is attempting to institutionalise these rights demands through the UN 
human rights mechanisms, in the form of a new Declaration on peasant rights. This 
campaign has garnered the support of some states, as well as the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food. The normative content being given to the right to 
food by the Special Rapporteur coincides with the substance of food sovereignty on 
all significant points: the centrality of agrarian reform; the need to protect and 
support small farmers; the necessary transition to agro-ecological methods of 
production; and the prioritisation of domestic production for domestic production, 
rather than production of commodities for export. Hence I have distilled as the core 
content of food sovereignty its three pillars: redistributive agrarian reform, agro-
ecology, and food localisation.  
While I will develop this argument further over the next two chapters, the peasants’ 
rights and Food Sovereignty campaigns have, in my assessment, significantly 
destabilised the ‘common sense’ of the globalising capitalist food system, which is 
that only large-scale, industrialised, export-oriented agriculture can ‘feed the 
world’. Further, they constitute an emerging ‘good sense’ around food and farming; 
one that is linked to tangible actions to address climate change and resource 
constraints, and one that proposes a feasible strategy to eliminate hunger and 
malnutrition. Evidence for these normative shifts can also be seen in the rapid 
development and partial institutionalisation of the local food movement in countries 
such as Australia, the US and Canada; whilst recognising that formidable political 
(and economic) barriers exist in those countries, at the Federal level especially, to 
the further implementation of food sovereignty principles.  
At the same time, human rights campaigns have significant limitations as a means to 
achieve transformative social and political change, because they can and do have 
contradictory effects. Laws, treaties and Declarations do not of themselves achieve 
lasting and transformative change. The contrasting cases of Guatemala and Brazil 
amply demonstrate that, while a right to food legal and institutional framework is 
important, what really matters is the political will and commitment, including the 
devotion of adequate financial resources, to see its full implementation across all 
relevant sectors of society.  
This is where the real value and significance of the Peasants’ Rights campaign , and 
food sovereignty, lies. The naming and assertion of the rights of peasants is an 
educative and consciousness-raising tool, which is enabling peasants and small 
farmers to take pride in their history and identity. In the process, a rights-based 
education builds class consciousness and solidarity, thereby constructing the 
foundations for a long-term project of social, political and economic transformation:  
Our biggest challenge and threat is a more liberalised political and economic system in 
Indonesia. Now the system does not support the peasants’ struggle. The opportunity is 
that the peasants are the majority in Indonesia – 60-70%. Our opportunity is how to 
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consolidate them into the base for political power; that can change our political and 
economic system. I am optimistic, but this is a long struggle.194 
At issue here are questions of moral and political agency, and, conversely, of 
paternalism and dependency. I argue that the granting of rights from above, or 
outside of, the political process, denies agency and subjectivity, and thus can work 
to undermine democratic processes and the building of successful movements.195 By 
contrast, rights secured in the course of political struggle are more likely to be 
empowering, since historical experience shows that genuine dignity amongst the 
oppressed can be gained in the act of becoming conscious that one is being denied 
one’s rights, and in struggling with comrades to reverse this state of affairs. In 
recounting the many successes of the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement (MST – a 
powerful and influential member of La Via Campesina), its co-founder João Pedro 
Stedile comments that:  
The most important thing that we have built over these last twenty-five years is that 
when someone joins the MST, he or she stops walking with their head down, and acquires 
dignity, and thinks with their brains, organizing their comrades in struggle.
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Further, just as individual dignity can be redeemed through collective struggle, it is 
through such struggle that the broader social objectives of greater justice and 
equality are advanced. As the current Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has 
said, “Rights are rarely given; they are taken”.197 The observations of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., bear repetition on this point:  
Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable. Even a superficial look at history 
reveals that no social advance rolls in on the wheels of inevitability. Every step toward 
the goal of justice requires sacrifice, suffering and struggle; the tireless exertions and 
passionate concern of dedicated individuals…198 
As the above quote implies, and as Ricardo Intriago confirms, such struggles are, in 
effect, ‘permanent’. Food Sovereignty is further advanced - in political and 
institutional terms – in Ecuador than almost anywhere else in the world. Yet, even 
there, the political and economic obstacles in the path of its fuller implementation 
remain formidable.  
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Chapter 6 
The socio-economic and ecological 
context 
“All great waves of capital accumulation have unfolded through a greatly expanded 
ecological surplus, manifested in cheap food, cheap energy and cheap inputs.”1 
“The expansion of industrial agro-foods crippled food production in the Global South and 
emptied the countryside of valuable human resources…as long as cheap, subsidized grain 
from the industrial north kept flowing, the agri-foods complex grew, consolidating control 
of the world’s food systems in the hands of fewer and fewer grain, seed, chemical and 
petroleum companies. Today three companies, Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill, and Bunge 
control the world’s grain trade…”2 
Accumulation of wealth at one pole…is, at the same time, accumulation of misery, agony 
of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole… 
Karl Marx, Capital3 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the nature of the principal social relations in the globalising 
capitalist food system, and some of the principal mechanisms which cause the 
system to generate the key tensions of over-production, inequalities and 
environmental destruction. I also consider emerging understandings of the key 
ecological constraints on the system’s further development.  
In terms of social relations, the system is characterised by oligopolistic levels of 
concentration of ownership and power in a few transnational corporations, 
disempowered and dwindling numbers of farmers, highly-exploited and vulnerable 
workers in many of its sectors, and rising levels of ‘addictive preferences’ as regards 
consumption of unhealthy food products. The mechanisms which produce and 
sustain these relations, and thereby contribute to dynamics of over-production and 
                                                          
1 Moore, J., 2010, ‘The End of the Road? Agricultural Revolutions in Capitalist World Ecology, 1450-
2010’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 10( 3), 389–413, 392. See also Bridge, G., 2011, Past Peak Oil: 
Political Economy of Energy Crises in in Peet, R., Robbins, P., and Watts, M., (eds.), 2011, Global 
Political Ecology, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 307-324, who states that  
The effective subsidies that fossil fuels provide have…underpinned huge gains in labor productivity (as fuel-
based machines substitute for human labor), an unprecedented concentration of productive powers that enable 
massive economies of scale, and a deepening of the exploitation of nature. As such, the application of ever-
greater fossil fuel inputs has been a primary means by which prodigious increases in the production of 
renewable and non-renewable resources have been maintained over the last 200 years, in the face of declining 
quality of raw materials and the exhaustion of localized stocks’: 311-312.  
2 Holt-Gímenez, E., and Peabody, L., 2008, ‘From Food Rebellions to Food Sovereignty: Urgent Call to 
Fix a Broken Food System’, Food First Backgrounder, 14(1). 
3 Volume 1, in Tucker, (ed)., 1978, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Edition, W.W. Norton & Company, 
New York, 430.  
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inequality, include coercive and violent processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
of the land and water resources of farmers and rural communities; the widespread 
use of immigrant and vulnerable labour forces; and the aggressive marketing of 
‘energy-dense, nutrient-poor’ food products. While always immanent within 
capitalist societies, the dynamics of over-production and inequality have been 
substantially intensified in recent decades during the contemporary era of the 
financialisation of globalising capitalism. The same dynamics have also contributed 
to the widespread ecological destruction associated with the spread of the 
globalising capitalist food system.  
The food system, both historically and contemporaneously, has played a central role 
in the expansion of capital accumulation generally, via the production of ‘cheap 
food’, with negative ecological and ill-health costs externalised to wider society. In 
the second half of this chapter, I discuss suggestions by some commentators that, 
because of emerging ecological constraints, the system may be approaching the 
exhaustion of its further possibilities of development. These constraints include the 
cumulative impacts of accelerated biodiversity loss; growing levels of soil 
degradation; the anticipated impacts of a warming climate; and a high degree of 
reliance on fossil fuels, both for transport fuels and for agro-chemical inputs. A 
corollary is that, unlike previous eras of agricultural crisis and transition, there are 
no new transformative technological innovations, nor subsidies of cheap energy, 
which will open up large new fields of accumulation, and so usher in a new phase of 
capitalism based on the renewal and perpetuation of the accumulation complex of 
‘cheap food’.4  
The principal social relations of the globalising capitalist food system 
In this section, I outline first the oligopolistic and oligopsonic character of the 
globalising capitalist food system.5 Next, I discuss the principal impacts upon the 
leading transnational corporate actors brought about by the financialisation of 
globalising capitalism in recent decades. Thirdly, I consider how the concentration 
of corporate power, now over-determined by the imperatives of financialisation, 
organizes and structures the nature of the system’s social relations as they affect 
farmers, workers and consumers. Finally, I briefly discuss how the currently 
organised forms of social relations intensify the key tensions of over-production and 
inequalities.  
The theory of oligopoly suggests that when a relatively small number of firms are 
dominant in a particular industry or sector, they will exercise their preponderant 
market power as sellers in the form of an ‘oligopolistic bargain’ or ‘collusion’ in 
order to ‘maximize joint profits’, for example by adopting the practice of 
‘dominant-firm pricing’ or by denying new markets and stifling competition.6 
                                                          
4 Moore 2010 op cit. 
5 Oligopolistic concentration applies where economic actors are sellers; oligopsonic concentration is 
where economic actors are buyers. 
6 Stigler, G.J., 1964, ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’, The Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), 44-61; Caves, 
R.E., and Porter, M.E., 1978, ‘Market Structure, Oligopoly and Stability of Market Shares’, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 26(4), 289-313; Eckbo, B.E., 1985, ‘Mergers and the Market Concentration 
Doctrine: Evidence from the Capital Market’, Journal of Business, 58(3), 325-349; Dickes, L.A., and 
Dickes, A.L., 2003, ‘Oligopolists Then and Now: A Study of the Meatpacking Industry”, Journal of 
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Oligopsonic (buyer) power can be exercised, for example, when the actions of a 
small group of purchasing firms directly or indirectly dictate the terms according to 
which suppliers can participate in the market through ‘vertical pricing games’.7 
While there are various models used to detect when an oligopoly exists, a 
commonly-accepted indicator of oligopolistic power is a high level of concentration 
within a particular industry or industry sector, often expressed as the ‘four-firm 
concentration ratio’.8 I will use this ratio as indicative of the degree to which 
concentration exists in the globalizing capitalist food system.  
While levels of concentration vary across sectors, and at the global level and within 
particular countries, the clear trend is towards concentration across the system as a 
whole.9 The leading groups of agri-food corporations have, for reasons connected 
with the vagaries of agriculture and its high-risk nature, tended to focus their 
activities in sectors other than farming itself: inputs (proprietary seeds, agro-
chemicals); processing, packaging and manufacturing; grain trading; and retailing.10 
This is not to say that concentration has not occurred at the farm level; on the 
contrary, due to the perpetual dynamic of over-production and the relative 
powerlessness of farmers, the numbers of farms have declined significantly, 
especially in highly commoditised sectors; and the remaining farms have increased 
in size, following a relentless logic of ‘get big or get out’.11 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Economics and Economic Education Research, 4(1), 95-110; Sexton, R.J., and Zhang, M., 2006, An 
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7 Rogers, R.T., and Sexton, R.J., 1994, ‘Assessing the Importance of Oligopsony Power in Agricultural 
Markets’, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76(5), 1143-1150; Griffith, G.R., 2004, ‘The Impact of 
Supermarkets on Farm Suppliers’, The Australian Economic Review, 37(3), 329-336; Cotterill, R.W., 
2006, ‘Antitrust Analysis of Supermarkets: Global Concerns Playing out in Local Markets”, The 
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 50(1), 17-32.  
8 That is, an oligopolistic situation is held to exist when four firms or fewer hold greater than 40% of 
total market share in the industry or sector: Caves and Porter op cit., Eckbo op cit.  
9 Patel 2007 op cit., 12-14, discussing the ‘hourglass’ representation of concentration of market power in 
the European and US food systems.  
10 Albritton 2009 op cit., 25.While levels of concentration are nothing like an oligopolistic situation, in 
countries such as the US and Australia, the very clear trend over the course of the 20th century is a 
steadily declining number of farmers, and a steady increase in the size of the average farm. In Australia, 
official statistics revealed a net loss of 54,000 farmers between 1986-1996, a decline of 21.6%, or an 
average of 2.75% per annum: http://www.anra.gov.au/topics/people/pubs/adjust-fact-sheet/farmer-
change.html, accessed 26.10.11. In the 2006 national census, a further decline of 9% in the number of 
farming families was recorded from 2001-2006: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 7104.0.55.001 – 
Agriculture in Focus: Farming Families, Australia, 2006, available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/7104.0.55.001/, accessed 26.10.11. The National Land 
and Water Resources Audit ‘forecasts a decline of between 30 and 55 per cent in farmer numbers by 
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http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/report/human-settlements-1.html, accessed 
26.10.11.  
11 Livestock production is a prime example: ‘The defining feature of the contemporary meat industry is 
its unceasing concentration and intensification – fewer but bigger farms or factories, with more 
specialisation of feed and other inputs, and fewer farm workers…in the United States alone, the number 
of pig farms decreased drastically from 2 million in 1950 to 73,600 in 2005, while the production of pigs 
in the same period rose from 80 million to 100 million’: Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 68.  
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At the corporate level, the concentration of ownership has largely taken place via 
an ongoing series of mergers and acquisitions, facilitated by the financialisation of 
capitalism, which, as discussed below, has become a sine qua non for the continued 
growth and expansion of the system in its current form.  
With the rise in the past few decades of transnational supermarket corporations, 
and their establishment of vertically-integrated and standardised national and 
international commodity supply chains, the economic power of these giant retailers 
has grown significantly vis-à-vis other actors in the system.12In 2007 the leading ten 
supermarket chains accounted for about 12% of the $5.1 trillion in global retail sales 
that year; the top 100 global retailers shared 35% of all sales.13 The top three 
supermarket chains – Walmart, Carrefour, and Tesco – ‘account for 50% of the Top 
[Ten’s] revenues’, and sales of the Top Ten have risen nearly 50% since 2002.14  
The degree of corporation concentration in the inputs, processing and retailing 
sectors illustrates the general trajectory.15 To begin with, in the ‘global proprietary 
seed market’ (that is, seeds which are sold under patent licenses), the market share 
of the top ten multinationals had reached 67% by 2007, with the top three 
corporations – Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta – capturing 47% collectively.16  
In the agro-chemicals sector, the ten leading pesticide multinationals had 89% of 
global herbicide and fungicide sales in 2007, with the top six corporations – Bayer, 
                                                          
12 Burch, D., and Lawrence, G., 2005, ‘Supermarket Own Brands, Supply Chains and the Transformation 
of the Agri-Food System’, International Journal of the Sociology of Agriculture, 13(1), 1-18. Within the 
global corporate food chain as a whole, the grocery retailers are by far the largest players in terms of 
sales volume, with the top ten retailers grossing more than double the combined annual sales volume of 
the top ten food manufacturers, and nearly fifteen times the combined sales of the seeds and 
agrochemicals companies: ETC Group (Action Group on Erosion, Biotechnology and Concentration), 
2008, ‘Who Owns Nature? Corporate Power and the Final Frontier in the Commodification of Life’, 
Communiqué Issue #100, November 2008, 
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pub_id=707, accessed 2.12.08, 18; these 
proportions have altered only slightly since 2002, with the top 10 seed and agrochemicals corporations 
achieving greater growth over this five year period than the other sectors. The power of the giant 
retailers is epitomized by the world’s leading grocery retailer, the US transnational corporation WalMart, 
which is also the world’s largest corporation by turnover, with an annual net income of $16.4 billion, and 
more than two million employees globally, according to the Financial Times (FT) Global 500 list of the 
world’s biggest corporations: see http://media.ft.com/cms/33558890-98d4-11e0-bd66-00144feab49a.pdf, 
accessed 26.10.11. 
13 Ibid., 22, citing statistics produced by Planet Retail.  
14 Ibid. 18, 22.  
15 The trend towards concentration in agri-food sectors is reflective of the broader trend towards ‘the 
increasing consolidation of oligopolistic, monopoly, and transnational power within a few centralised 
multinational corporations’ during the era of neoliberalism: see Harvey, D., 2006, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 80, who notes how this reality contradicts the rhetorical 
flourishes regarding the ‘virtues of competition’ 
16 ETC Group op cit., 11. According to ETC, the global propriety seed market represents 82% of the 
‘total commercial seed market worldwide’, which was valued at $26.7 bn in 2007: ibid. Monsanto, with 
a 2011 turnover of $10.5 billion and net income of $1.1 billion, currently enjoys near-monopoly status in 
the genetically-engineered seed market, with ‘87% of the total world area devoted to genetically 
engineered seeds in 2007’ being planted with GM seeds and traits developed by the company. The global 
worth of GM crops, at $6.9 billion, is small, but has grown rapidly from a zero base at the beginning of 
the 1990s: ETC Group op cit., 13. On the FT Global 500 list, which orders corporations according to 
their market value, Monsanto ranks at 213, Syngenta ranks at 293, with a turnover of $12.9 billion and 
net income of $1.5 billion. . 
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Syngenta, BASF, Dow AgroSciences, Monsanto and DuPont – responsible for 75% of 
sales between them.17 The levels of growth and the extent of corporate 
concentration in the input sectors of agriculture are expressive of the decades-long 
trend of ‘appropriationism’ - ‘the process by which corporate agribusiness reduces 
the importance of nature in farm production’ - which I mentioned in Chapter 3.18 
Oligopolistic and oligopsonic dominance is somewhat less pronounced at the global 
level in food processing and manufacturing industries and in grocery retailing, but it 
is nevertheless observable and the trend is towards increasing concentration, fuelled 
by an ongoing process of mergers and acquisitions.19 Recent analysis suggests a 
lower level of concentration amongst packaged food companies, but a higher degree 
of concentration amongst soft drink companies, with the top ten companies 
accounting for over 50% of global sales, and two companies – Coca-Cola and PepsiCo 
– capturing 37.4% of all sales.20 Transnational meat packing corporations such as the 
US-based Tyson and Smithfield are rapidly expanding their operations, with the 
result that ‘more meat is being produced by fewer farms in fewer places’.21  
One important sector in which oligopolistic control is especially marked is in the 
production of high-fructose corn syrup: three corporations – Archer Daniels Midland, 
Cargill, and Tate & Lyle - control over 90% of the market; and three soft drink 
manufacturers – Coca Cola, Pepsi Co and Cadbury Schweppes – purchase 60% of total 
production.22 As discussed in Chapter 4, these levels of market concentration are a 
significant impediment to the effective regulation of a product, the excessive 
consumption of which is a major contributor to the global obesity pandemic.  
At the national level, the degree of concentration can be substantially higher. It is 
particularly marked in food and beverage manufacturing in the US, with a 1997 
                                                          
17 ETC Group 2008 op cit., 15, citing Agrow World Crop Protection News, August 2008. Sales growth in 
pesticides exceeded eight percent in 2007 to reach $38.6bn for the sector as a whole, driven in part by 
increased crop plantings destined as livestock feed and as feedstock for the rapidly emerging agro-fuel 
sector: Ibid. For similar reasons growth in the chemical fertilizer sector has also been strong in recent 
years, increasing nearly a third from 1996 to 2008, and with profitability achieving record levels due to a 
greater than six-fold rise in fertilizer prices, from $245 a ton in January 2007 to $1,600 a ton by August 
2008: 17. At least part of this meteoric price rise can be attributed to increasing market awareness of 
natural resource constraints in the form of ‘peaks’ in the global production of both fossil fuels and – 
especially salient in the case of chemical fertilizers – phosphorous: see Déry, P., and Anderson, B., 2008, 
‘Peak Phosphorous’, published on the Energy Bulletin, 13.08.07, 
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/33164, accessed 20.04.09. 
18 Goodman, D., Bernardo, S., and Wilkinson, J., 1988, From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory of 
Agro-Industrial Development, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, cited in Pfeffer, M.J., 1992, ‘Sustainable 
Agriculture in Historical Perspective’, Agriculture and Human Values, 9(4), 4-11. By 2007 the top ten 
food and beverage manufacturing corporations controlled ‘26% of the global market for packaged food 
products – a 14% increase since 2004’: Sexton and Zhang op cit.,156-7.  
19 ETC Group op cit., 21, relying on data supplied by the food industry research and consultancy group 
Leatherhead Food International.  
20 Alexander, E., Yach, D., and Mensah, G.A., 2011, ‘Major Multinational Food and Beverage 
Companies and Informal Sector Contributions to Global Food Consumption: Implications for Nutrition 
Policy’, Global Health, 7, 26-34. 
21 Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 69.  
22 Patel op cit., 115; Gillespie, D., Sweet Poison: Why Sugar Makes us Fat, Penguin, Camberwell, Vic., 
189-191. Together, these six companies generated almost $17.5 billion in profits in 2006, ‘most of it as a 
direct result of government subsidisation [of corn production in the US]’: Gillespie op cit., 191.. 
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study finding ‘notably high degrees of oligopoly power’ across 33 out of 36 food 
industries tested.23 Meatpacking in the US is now ‘more concentrated than at any 
time in the twentieth century’, with three major firms (ConAgra, Iowa Beef Packers, 
and Cargill) dominating the beef and pork processing and packing sectors.24 
Retail market dominance is especially pronounced in Australia, with the two major 
chains, Coles and Woolworths, operate a virtual duopoly in this sector, accounting 
for as much as 80% of all grocery sales, according to some estimates, while in 1975, 
the figure was 30%.25 Similarly in the UK, market research revealed that four 
companies – Tesco, Morrisons, Sainsbury and Asda – controlled almost 75% of the 
domestic grocery market by 2006.26  
As already indicated, the transformations in the globalising capitalist food system 
over recent decades cannot be understood apart from wider transformations in the 
globalising capitalist economy, and in particular the financialisation of capitalism. 
This section will be divided into two parts; the first will deal briefly with the general 
capitalist turn to financialisation; and the second will examine some of the specific 
ways in which financialisation has transformed the globalising capitalist food system.  
Finance-driven capitalism describes a phase of capitalism in which the interests 
collectively represented by finance (including the various types of financial 
institutions and major investors) come to dominate patterns of trade, investment 
and commercial activity to such an extent that maximisation of short-term profit, 
for its own sake, becomes clearly observable as the over-riding economic 
imperative.27 Giovanni Arrighi links the rise of finance-driven capitalism to periods in 
                                                          
23 Applying the new empirical industrial organization model to test for degrees of oligopoly power 
across 40 food and tobacco industry sectors, and using data from 1972-1987, Sanjib Bhuyan and 
Rigoberto Lopez (1997, ‘Oligopoly Power in the Food and Tobacco Industries’, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economy, 79, 1035-1043) found that ‘statistically significant oligopoly power’ existed ‘in 
all but three of [the] industries’ tested, with especially high levels of concentration in the cereals 
preparation, flour and grain milling, soft drinks, condensed and evaporated milk and pickled sauces 
industries: 1038.  
24 Dickes et al op cit., 100; also Welsh, R., Hubbell, B., and Carpentier, C.L., 2003, ‘Agro-food System 
Restructuring and the Geographic Concentration of US Swine Production’, Environment and Planning 
A, 35, 215-229. Emel and Neo write that ‘In the United States, several leading companies now control 
most of the supply of meat in the country. In 2005, the top three beef packers…controlled more than 80 
per cent of the market, while the pork packing industry was 64 per cent controlled by four companies, up 
from 40 per cent in1990’: 2011 op cit., 68.  
25 White, L., 2008, ‘Coles, Woolworths still dominate’, Weekly Times Now, 3.11.08, 
http://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/article/2008/11/03/20101_latest-news.html, accessed 4.12.08. The 
figure of 80% comes from a June 2007 report prepared by accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers for 
the National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia (The economic contribution of small-to-medium 
sized grocery retailers to the Australian economy, with a particular focus on Western Australia, 
http://www.narga.net.au/documents/2007/Economic_contribution_%20SMEs_NARGA.pdf, accessed 
4.12.08); the supermarkets claim their share is only 54%.  
26 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4785544.stm, accessed 26.10.11, reporting on research by 
TNS Worldpanel.  
27 Thorstein Veblen, who drew a basic distinction between tangible capital (goods and machinery) and 
intangible capital (money), saw ‘the central goal of modern industrial capitalism [as being] to create an 
income stream either from productive activity or from the financial capitalization of assets or by the 
disruption of productive activity, with a view to maximizing the rate of return on invested capital, both 
tangible and intangible’: Cornehls, J., 2004, ‘Veblen's Theory of Finance Capitalism and Contemporary 
Corporate America’, Journal of Economic Issues, 38(10), 29-58, 34. Likewise Marx, making the same 
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which ‘major expansions of world trade and production have resulted in an over-
accumulation of capital beyond the normal channels of profitable investment’.28 
During such periods surplus capital has found profitable outlets through inter alia 
‘greater specialisation in financial intermediation’, with a consequent surge in 
credit and speculation.29 Arrighi notes how such specialisation enables ‘the 
organising centres of the expansion…to reaffirm, for a while at least, their 
dominance over world-scale processes of capital accumulation’.30 At the same time, 
the ‘recurrent dominance of finance capital is [also] a sign of autumn’; in other 
words, an early indicator that a period of hegemony in global capitalism is coming to 
an end.31 
Neo-Marxist accounts suggest that the turn to finance in the mid-1970s can be 
explained by reference to three main sets of considerations. The first was the need 
to restore the conditions of profitability in the economies of the global North, 
especially the US, which had entered a period of prolonged ‘stag-flation’ by the 
early 1970s as the post-war settlement of ‘embedded liberalism’ showed signs of 
being ‘clearly exhausted’.32 The second was the restoration of class power and 
privilege, in the face of growing militancy of organised labour movements.33 The 
third was the perceived need amongst US elites to restore US hegemony in the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
distinction, saw that ‘[t]he circulation of money is…an end in itself, for the expansion of value takes 
place only within this constantly renewed movement’; in his notes on this section of Capital, Tucker 
quotes from Aristotle’s treatise on the difference between the Oeconomic, which is ‘the art of gaining a 
livelihood’, from the Chrematistic, which, as the ‘art of making money’, strives for unlimited riches: 
Tucker, (ed.), 1978, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2
nd
 Edition, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 333-4. 
See also Demir, F., 2007, ‘The Rise of Rentier Capitalism and the Financialization of Real Sectors in 
Developing Countries’, Review of Radical Political Economics, 39(3), 351-359.  
28 Arrighi, G., 1999, ‘The Global Market’, Journal of World Systems Research, 5(2), 217-251, 224-5. 
29 Arrighi cites those periods dominated by the Genoese diaspora in the 16th century, Holland in the 18th 
century, Britain in the Edwardian era, and the United States from 1980 onwards: ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 225-6, citing Fernand Braudel. Such signs are apparent today, with the US and Europe mired in 
the most severe financial and economic crisis since the 1930s, and growing speculation about the ‘centre 
of geopolitical gravity’ shifting from West to East, with attention focused on China as the potential new 
global hegemon: Harvey 2003 op cit., noting at the same time that the prospects that the US will 
‘peacefully accept and adapt to the phenomenal growth of East Asia and recognise…that we are in the 
midst of a major transition towards Asia as the hegemonic centre of global power’ are ‘hard to imagine’: 
77. Further, there are doubts as to what extent contemporary export-oriented Chinese state capitalism is 
sustainable, even within its own terms. Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett (“China, Capitalist 
Accumulation, And Labor”, Monthly Review, May 2007, 59(1) 17-39) argue that as capitalist 
accumulation in China progresses, so will unemployment and underemployment, and that accumulation 
by dispossession in terms of poor peasants being thrown off their land is a central part of this process, 
leading to increased social tensions: 34-5. 
32 Harvey, D., 2005, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 11-12; Harvey, 
D., 2003, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 61. Harvey includes as the reasons for 
the exhaustion of embedded liberalism as an accumulation model the costs of the Vietnam War and the 
growing power of Japan and Germany as centres of world manufacturing: 2003 op cit., 61.  
33 As growth stalled and ‘asset values collapsed’, that implicit feature of the post-war settlement which 
required that ‘the economic power of the upper classes be restrained and labour be accorded a much 
larger share of the economic pie’ became a direct threat to the political and economic survival of the 
ruling classes: Harvey 2003 op cit., 15-16; also Dumenil and Levy 2001, Dumenil 2004.  
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international political economy, in the context of the rise of Germany and Japan as 
the most dynamic centres of world manufacturing.34 
The transition to finance-driven capital meant in turn a shift in ‘the balance of 
power and interests within the bourgeoisie from production activities to institutions 
of finance capital’.35 As I discuss below, amongst other impacts this led to a collapse 
in the power of organised labour and a stagnation or decline in average wages in 
many countries of the North, which for a period was offset by rising asset values and 
the mass availability of cheap credit. At the same time, levels of income inequality 
in these countries reached historically unprecedented levels, leading to rising social 
tensions that are now (in 2011) beginning to find expression in the context of the 
unfolding ‘Global Financial Crisis’ that began in 2007. 
‘Accumulation by dispossession’ is geographer David Harvey’s description of those 
contemporary processes of capitalist accumulation that are based on predation, 
fraud and violence.36 Harvey bases his formulation on Marx’s description of 
primitive, or original, capitalist accumulation. 37 This referred principally (though far 
from exclusively) to proletarianisation, the process which, in Marx’s words, ‘takes 
away from the labourer the possession of his means of production [and 
reproduction]’ – typically this would be land - and through which ‘wage-labour is 
created’.38 While the conversion of poor peasants into landless workers is a key 
aspect of contemporary accumulation by dispossession, this is but one of its 
manifestations.  
Harvey and other neo-Marxist political economists place particular emphasis on the 
ways in which debt and credit have been employed to further accumulation by 
dispossession in the era of financial capitalism, with the proffering, during 
successive financial crises, of ‘stabilisation’ loans and ‘structural adjustment 
packages’ to indebted Southern countries.39 These crises had – and continue to have 
                                                          
34
 The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and the subsequent loosening of capital controls, 
allowed US banks, in the wake of the first oil crisis of 1973, to  
Gain the monopoly privilege of recycling the petrodollars into the world economy…New York became the 
financial centre of the global economy…Threatened in the realm of production, the US had countered by 
asserting its hegemony through finance”: Harvey 2003 op cit., 62. 
35 Ibid., 63. In the process, the US ‘was complicit in [further] undermining its dominance in 
manufacturing’ as the contemporary era of globalised production and distribution began in earnest, and 
‘wave after wave of deindustrialization hit industry after industry and region after region’ in the former 
heartlands of world manufacturing: ibid., 64. . 
36 Harvey 2003 op cit., 145-6. 
37 Ibid., 431-3.. 
38 Ibid., 432. Within the original primitive accumulations would be included the enclosures of the 
commons in England, the conversion of peasants into workers (‘proletarianization’), the invasion of 
South America and the removal of millions of tons of silver through slave labour, the ‘conquest and 
looting of the East Indies’, and the trans-Atlantic trade in slaves, which cumulatively facilitated the 
economic wealth of both Europe and the United States: See Marx, K., 1867, Capital, Volume 1, in 
Tucker, (ed.), 714, 751; Galeano, E., 1997, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of 
a Continent (trans. Belfrage, C), Monthly Review Press, New York; Rodney, W., 1973, How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, Dar-es-Salaam; Boateng, O., 2005, ‘How 
Africa Developed Europe’, New Africa, October 2005, pp10-13. 
39
 Harvey suggests that many of these crises were in fact ‘orchestrated, managed and controlled to 
rationalise the system’, via the ‘periodic creation of a stock of devalued, and in many instances 
undervalued, assets in some part of the world, which [could] be put to profitable use by the capital 
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– an explicitly redistributive operation, in terms of transfers of wealth from South to 
North, and from poor to rich.40 An estimated $US4.6 trillion had been transferred 
from Southern countries to Northern financial institutions from 1980-2005 via ‘debt 
and financial crises’.41  
The financialisation of capitalism has assumed particular forms in relation to the 
globalising capitalist food system. In the first place, it has facilitated a growing 
process of mergers and acquisitions in the food sector, leading to increasing levels 
of consolidation, thus reinforcing the trends towards oligopoly and oligopsony.42  
                                                                                                                                                                        
surpluses that [lacked] opportunities elsewhere’: 2003 op cit., 147; see also Nesvetaliova, A., 2005, 
‘United in Debt: Towards a Global Crisis of Debt-Driven Finance?’ Science & Society, 69(3), 396-419, 
Foster, J.B., 2007, ‘The Financialization of Capitalism’, Monthly Review, 58(11), 1-12. Thus Harvey 
argues that during regional financial crises, such as the Asian crisis of 1997-8,  
Valuable assets are thrown out of circulation and devalued. They lie fallow and dormant until surplus capital 
seizes upon them to breath new life into capital accumulation…One of the prime functions of state 
interventions and of international institutions is to orchestrate devaluations in ways that permit accumulation 
by dispossession without sparking a general collapse. This is the essence of what a structural adjustment 
programme administered by the IMF is all about: ibid., 151.  
40“Crisis creation, management and manipulation on the world stage has evolved into the fine art of 
deliberative redistribution of wealth from poor countries to the rich”: Harvey 2006 op cit., 162.  
41 Ibid. Interest payments on compounding debt, as discussed in Chapter 4, constitute one portion of this 
sum; capital flight, made possible by the liberalisation of cross-border capital flows, is another. 
Estimates suggest that as much as 40% of African savings are held outside the country, with outflows 
continuing at $15bn a year, around the same amount that Africa receives in aid: Williams, S., 2005, 
‘Capital Flight’, African Business, 312, 20. In 1990 capital flight ‘as a share of GDP was 80.3% in sub-
Saharan Africa, 94.9% in the Middle East and North Africa, and 30.8% in Latin America and the 
Caribbean’: Sakuragawa, M., and Hamada, K., 2001, ‘Capital Flight, North-South Lending, and Stages 
of Development’, International Economic Review, 42(1), 1-24, 1. In their statistical analysis of estimates 
of capital flight from 25 heavily indebted sub-Saharan African countries in the period 1970-1996, James 
Boyce and Leonce Ndikumana (2001, ‘Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimates of Capital Flight from 
Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996’, The Journal of Development Studies, 
38(2), 27-56) conclude that the total capital flight, including imputed interest earnings, amounted to 
$285 billion, significantly exceeding the combined external debt of $178 billion in 1996, and thus 
making these countries net creditors vis a vis the rest of the world. See also Crotty, J., and Lee, K-K., 
2002, ‘Is Financial Liberalization Good for Developing Nations? The case of South Korea in the 1990s’, 
Review of Radical Political Economics, 34, 327-334. As regards the global financial crisis that began in 
2007, the first audit by the US General Accounting Office of transfers made by the US Federal Reserve 
Bank found that $16 trillion had been ‘secretly transferred’ to US private and foreign banks: 
http://michael-hudson.com/2011/07/save-the-gambling-bankers/, accessed 24.10.11. 
42 Welsh et al op cit., 217. ‘The aggregate value of global food industry mergers and acquisitions was 
roughly $200 billion’ in 2007, double the value in 2005: ETC Group, ‘Who Owns Nature?’ op cit., 10. 
Across all sectors, the value of mergers and acquisitions rose from $1.38 trillion in 2003, to $2.7 trillion 
in 2005, and $4.48 trillion in 2007: ibid. David Harvey explains how mergers and acquisitions ‘both 
friendly and hostile’ have ‘long been big business’, and are ‘frequently’ financed via banks and 
investment houses: 2010, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 49-50. Monsanto Corporation, for example, achieved its position of dominance in the 
proprietary and genetically modified seed sector via the acquisition of nearly two dozen smaller seed 
companies: Di Sabato Guerrante, R, de Souza Antunes, A.M., and Periera, J., 2010, ‘An Analysis of the 
Growth Trajectory of Monsanto’, iBusiness 2, 223-231, 226-7. The authors also highlight the importance 
of strategic joint ventures and purchases of certain technologies in their analysis of Monsanto’s growth 
and expansion from 1901 to 2008. Grain trader Cargill made 48 acquisitions, and took stakes in a further 
22 companies, from 1982 to 2011: http://www.alacrastore.com/mergers-acquisitions/Cargill_Inc-503340, 
accessed 20.10.11. Cargill also made 30 ‘divestitures’ during this period. Fellow grain trading and meat-
packing giant Archer Daniels Midlands made 47 acquisitions and took stakes in a further 32 companies 
during the same period: http://www.alacrastore.com/mergers-
acquisitions/Archer_Daniels_Midland_Company-1001140, accessed 20.10.11. ADM made 13 
206 
 
Secondly, financialisation in practice requires that businesses focus on maximising 
shareholder value, which in turn means that food companies are competing not only 
in their core products, but also ‘on financial markets to deliver the fastest and 
biggest possible rates of return to ‘impatient’ financial capital.’43 Hence the 
globalising capitalist food system is now subjected to the discipline of ‘a rate of 
profit established not in industry but in finance’.44 Annual profit expectations of 15% 
or more can only be achieved by ‘high leverage (debt) and / or by cranking up the 
rate of exploitation [of workers and the environment]’.45  
This time intensification has a number of consequences. First, agriculture itself, 
already speeded up through the processes of industrialisation, is now further 
quickened by the pressures of financialisation.46 Farmers must now produce 
according to a production schedule dictated by supermarkets and the profit 
expectations of financial markets; not according to the seasons and the ‘natural’ 
growth patterns of plants and animals.47 Secondly, corporations want approvals for 
new production processes and products as quickly as possible, so that they can begin 
to recover the costs of research and development.48 This may lead to the approval 
of products that have been inadequately tested for toxicity or environmental safety: 
GMOs, arguably, are a case in point.49  
Thirdly, much of food itself has become ‘fast’, ‘convenient’ and ‘pre-packaged’, to 
suit ‘busy’ lifestyles where frequently both parents work and have neither the time 
nor the inclination to cook ‘slow’ meals.50 The expansion of McDonalds, from its 
commencement in 1955, to 31,000 restaurants worldwide in 2011, serving 47 million 
customers daily and employing 1.5 million people, is emblematic of the 
extraordinary rise of the fast food industry.51 Fourthly, workers in different sectors 
of food and agriculture are subjected to onerous picking, packing, slaughtering, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
divestitures during this period. Australian retailing giant Coles was bought by Wesfarmers Ltd in 2007, 
continuing a long tradition of growth by acquisition for the former farmers’ co-operative, combined with 
an explicit focus on ‘growing long-term value for shareholders’ and ‘an unwillingness to be deflected 
from it’: Kaye, C., and Yuwono, J., 2003, ‘Conglomerate Discount of Premium? How Some Diversified 
Companies Create Exceptional Value’, Marakon Associates, available at: 
http://www.nd.edu/~cba/cc/pdf/Doyle_Portfolio%20decision%20making.pdf, accessed 20.10.11, quoting 
Wesfarmers Chief Executive Michael Chaney. Coles’ rival Woolworths made 27 acquisitions and took 
stakes in five companies from 1981 to 2011: http://www.alacrastore.com/mergers-
acquisitions/Woolworths_Limited-1018443, accessed 20.10.11. Woolworths made 23 divestitures during 
this period.  
43 Rossman (2007, 5), quoted by Burch, G., and Lawrence, D., 2009, ‘Towards a Third Food Regime: 
Behind the Transformation’, Agriculture and Human Values, 26, 267-279, 271.  
44 Moore op cit., 390.  
45 Rossman, P., 2010, ‘What ‘Financialisation’ means for Food Workers”, ETC Seedling, January 2010, 
quoting the CEO of Deutsche Bank, Josef Ackermann, who called in 2006 for a 20 per cent return on 
investment, and then in 2007 stated that ‘25% is not enough’.  
46 Albritton op cit., 33. 
47 One example among many is the selective breeding of broiler chickens in factory farms, so that 
whereas two generations ago a bird would take three months to reach maturity, now they are slaughtered 
at 42 days: Foer op cit. 
48 Albritton op cit., 32.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid. 
51 http://www.mcdonalds.ca/en/aboutus/faq.aspx, accessed 20.10.11; Schlosser, E., 2002, Fast Food 
Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal, HarperCollins Publishers, New York. 
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production and serving schedules, with the result that in many countries food sector 
jobs are amongst the most hazardous occupations.52  
Fifthly, the pressure to ‘return value to shareholders’ diverts resources from 
productive investments and research and development, and enhances the tendency 
towards job reductions and downwards pressure on terms and conditions.53 Finally, 
the intensified profit timeline and expectations of finance capital result in 
intensified competition. This can lead to price wars and heavy discounting by 
retailers, which has negative impacts on producers and suppliers.54 It also means, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and further below, that food companies will aggressively 
market and promote their products to existing and potential consumers, including 
young children, regardless of the health and social impacts.55  
The drive to maximise short-term returns has been further heightened by the direct 
investment and acquisition of food businesses by a range of financial institutions. As 
Geoffrey Burch and David Lawrence observe, this has taken multiple forms, from 
investment vehicles operated by superannuation and hedge funds (at times in 
partnership with the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation) to acquire 
land and invest in the inputs and logistics sectors, to the direct acquisition of stakes 
in food companies, and their wholesale purchase, by investment banks and private 
equity firms, to purchases of farmland by Sovereign Wealth Funds.56 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, large-scale land acquisitions (leases and purchases) have 
come under increasing scrutiny, following a dramatic escalation in the pace and 
scale of acquisitions in several sub-Saharan African countries in the wake of the 2008 
food price crisis.57 Some of these acquisitions have been carried out by sovereign 
wealth funds of food importing countries, looking to obtain secure supplies of basic 
                                                          
52 Compa, L., 2005, Blood, Sweat and Fear: Workers’ Rights in US Meat and Poultry Plants, Human 
Rights Watch, New York.  
53 Rossman op cit.  
54 As in the 2011 Australian ‘milk price war’ commenced by Coles, which is alleged to be negatively 
impacting on dairy producers as the costs of discounting are passed back down the supply chain: ‘Jaspers 
Brush Dairy Farmer Paul Tims says there will be no Local Dairy Industry if the Milk Price War 
Continues’: http://www.2st.com.au/index.php/news/25859-milk-price-war-hits-local-dairy-farmers-hard, 
accessed 20.10.11. 
55 Nestle, M., 2002, Food Politics op cit. I discuss the issue of advertising of unhealthy food products 
further below.  
56 Op cit., 271-2.  
57 Academic, institutional and civil society participants at the Global Land Grabbing Conference 
organised by the Land Deals Policy Institute and hosted by the Institute for Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex from 6-8 April, 2010, estimated that total land acquisitions ‘in 2008-9 for large-
scale commodity production or extraction’ was close to 80 million hectares, compared to ‘an average of 
4 million hectares per year for the previous forty years’: ‘Update from the International Conference on 
Global Land Grabbing’, http://www.iss.nl/Menupages/Research-Networks/The-Land-Deal-Politics-
Initiative-LDPI/LDPI-news-and-events/Update-from-the-International-Conference-on-Global-Land-
Grabbing, accessed 20.10.11. In a series of investigative reports based on documentation from the land 
contracts themselves, the Oakland Institute estimates that around 60 million hectares were acquired in 
Africa during 2009 alone: ‘Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Hedge Funds Create 
Volatility in Global Food Supply with Land Grabs Across Africa’, Oakland Institute, Media Release, 
7.6.11, available at http://media.oaklandinstitute.org/press-release-understanding-land-investment-deals-
africa, accessed 20.10.11. 
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grains outside global markets.58 Others have been carried out by financial 
institutions such as hedge and pension funds, and investment banks; and are 
directed at commodity production, especially biofuels, in order to generate both 
short and longer-term financial returns in an anticipated era of rising commodity 
prices, thereby providing a hedge against inflation.59  
Hedge funds have also been very active in commodity speculation.60 As discussed in 
Chapter 4, this has been facilitated by de-regulation of the investment banking 
sector in the United States.61 With the volume of investments by index funds 
increasing by over 1000% in the five years to 2008, the impact on prices of basic 
commodities is clearly established.62 Whether these speculative investments are the 
main cause of contemporary food price inflation, as some argue, or whether the 
diversion of grain to agro-fuels is the main cause, is to an extent immaterial.63 The 
context for the Food Sovereignty movements is that speculation on commodity 
futures is a major cause of food price inflation; and further, that this speculation 
and consequent price movements are substantially divorced from underlying ‘supply 
and demand fundamentals’.64 The expectation is that in the absence of any 
                                                          
58 Brown, L., 2011, ‘The New Geopolitics of Food’, Foreign Policy, May/June 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food?page=0,2, accessed 
21.10.11; GRAIN, 2008, ‘Seized! The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial Security’, GRAIN. 
GRAIN mentions Saudi Arabia, Japan, China, India, Korea, Libya and Egypt as food-importing 
countries involved in land acquisitions for food security purposes. See also de Schutter, O., 2011, ‘How 
Not to Think of Land-grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-scale Investments in Farmland’, The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 38(2), 249-279, 251. De Schutter points out that the ‘outsourcing of food production’ by 
food-importing nations has been underway for several years, especially by Japan and China: ibid.  
59 De Schutter 2011 op cit., 251. GRAIN 2008 op cit., GRAIN 2011, ‘Pension Funds: Key Players in the 
Global Farmland Grab’, 20.6.11, http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4287-pension-funds-key-players-
in-the-global-farmland-grab, accessed 21.10.11. GRAIN reports that pension funds, which collectively 
hold an estimated $23 trillion in assets, currently have around ‘$5 - $15 billion’ of their $100 billion 
commodity portfolio invested in farmland acquisitions, however this is expected to double by 2015. 
Pension fund managers are looking to diversify their investment portfolios and securing rising and 
guaranteed income streams over the longer term: 2011 op cit.  
60 Burch and Lawrence 2009 op cit., 272-3; McMichael, P., 2009, ‘A Food Regime Analysis of the 
‘World Food Crisis’’, Agriculture and Human Values, 26, 281-295, 282; Ghosh, J., 2010, ‘The Unnatural 
Coupling: Food and Global Finance’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(1), 72-86; Andreosso-
O’Callaghan, B., and Zolin, M.B., 2010, ‘Long-Term Cereal Price Changes: How Important is the 
Speculative Element?’ Transition Studies Review, 17(4), 624-637; UNCTAD, 2009, Price Information in 
Financialized Commodity Markets: The role of information, UNCTAD, New York .  
61 In particular the lifting of ‘position limits’ on the amount of commodity futures contract that any 
market participant can hold: see Masters, M.W., and White, A.K., 2011, How Institutional Investors Are 
Driving Up Food and Energy Prices in Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2011, Excessive 
Speculation in Agriculture Commodities: Selected Writings from 2008-2011, IATP, New York. 
62 ‘From the beginning of 2004 to [2008], Index Speculators have poured $173 billion into [the 25 largest 
and most important] commodities…this has caused futures prices to rise dramatically as the 
commodities futures markets were forced to expand in order to absorb this influx of money’: Masters 
and White ibid.  
63 Ghosh (2010 op cit.) argues that commodity speculation was the main cause; Andreosso-O’Callaghan 
and Zolin (2010 op cit.) argue that agro-fuels were the principal cause, although they acknowledge that 
commodity speculation was a significant contributing factor.  
64 Masters and White op cit. This de-linkage is made clear by UNCTAD, whose 2009 analysis revealed 
that the ‘so-called efficient market hypothesis’, which holds that ‘commodity price movements…reflect 
nothing but information on fundamentals [of supply and demand]’, ‘does not apply to the present 
commodity futures market’, which is driven more by ‘herding behaviour’. Ghosh also argues forcefully 
that market fundamentals were unrelated to recent food price volatility, given that global aggregate 
demand has increased ‘very little, and less than both production and supply’, with China and India in 
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effective regulatory action, in particular to re-impose position limits on speculative 
investments, ‘investor money will continue to flow unimpeded into the commodities 
futures markets and the upward pressure on prices will remain’.65  
Another dimension of the financialisation of the food system are private equity 
takeovers of food companies. The goal of such acquisitions is to ‘realise shareholder 
value’ over ‘a 3-5 year time frame by leveraging the assets of a company in the 
short term and making capital gains’.66 David Burch and Geoffrey Lawrence observe 
that there are three principal mechanisms for doing this: asset-stripping; 
restructuring (for example, by introducing ‘flexibility’ into the workforce) and re-
floating; and by borrowing against the company’s assets.67  
Burch and Lawrence describe what they term a process of ‘financialisation in 
reverse’; that is, the diversification of agri-food corporations into the financial 
sphere, such as supermarkets offering credit cards and opening banks, and grain-
trading corporations developing their own private equity investment funds.68 This 
represents the internalisation of the logic of financialisation, as agri-food 
corporations begin to see themselves as, and behave like, financial intermediaries; 
and is an indication that this logic is becoming – or is already – a, if not the, 
dominant force in the globalising capitalist food system.  
Further, this logic organises spheres of life beyond the contractual and employment 
relations between economic actors in the capitalist food system. As a ‘market 
rationality’ which constructs citizens as ‘rational economic actors in every sphere of 
life’, it is a ‘totalizing ideology’ that ‘saturates the consciousness’, in the rich and 
dynamic Gramscian sense of cultural hegemony and common sense.69  
Social relations of the system and its tensions 
In this section I briefly discuss how the dynamics outlined above – oligopolistic 
concentration, financialisation, accumulation by dispossession - translate into 
particular forms and patterns of social relations regarding farmers, food sector 
workers, and consumers. My main concern in this section is to make explicit how 
these social relations express and reproduce the key tensions of over-production and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
particular ‘exhibit[ing] falling food grain consumption both in per capita terms as well as in the 
aggregate’: 2010 op cit., 80. 
65 Masters and White op cit; Burch and Lawrence 2009 op cit., 273. Ghosh recommends either ‘very 
strict limits’, or the complete banning, of commodity futures speculation by financial actors: op cit., 85.  
66 Burch and Lawrence 2009 op cit., 273-5.  
67 Ibid., 273. Citing the example of the take-over of UK supermarket chain Somerfield in 2005 by Apax 
Partners Worldwide, the authors note how a private equity take-over usually involves all three strategies: 
ibid., 274. As well as resulting in further concentration and consolidation in food industry sectors, a 
common impact of these takeovers, identified by Burch and Lawrence in the Apax case, is downwards 
pressure on terms and conditions of food sector workers: ibid., 274. The authors note how Apax 
outsourced most of the IT functions of Somerfield to ‘a subsidiary of the Tata conglomerate in India – 
for a saving of £2mn’, and withdrew from ‘the Ethical Trading Initiative’ citing the need to ‘reconsider 
its short and medium term business priorities’: ibid. 
68 Ibid., 276-7.  
69 Brown, W., 2006, ‘American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservativism and De-Democratization’, 
Political Theory, 34(6), 690-714, 696; Williams, R., 1980, Problems in Materialism and Culture: 
Selected Essays London: Verso-New Left Books, 1980, 37. The relevant passage is quoted in full in 
Chapter 2.  
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inequality that characterise the globalising capitalist food system. Accordingly I will 
preface the discussion with a brief synopsis of the general intensification of over-
production and inequality during the contemporary era of finance-driven capitalism; 
bearing in mind that both these dynamics, but especially over-production, also 
contribute to the third key tension of ecological destruction.  
Also known as ‘over-accumulation’, ‘excess capacity’, and ‘under-consumption’, 
over-production, conceived as ‘the widening gap between the growing productive 
potential of the system and the capacity of consumers to purchase its output’, has 
become a persistent structural feature of the global economy since the turn to 
finance-driven capitalism in the late 1970s.70 The rise of China as a major centre of 
world manufacturing has aggravated the tendency; and the crisis of over-production 
has translated into a long-term decline in global economic growth rates, which have 
halved from 1980 onwards compared with the period 1960-1980.71 Excesses of 
capacity have therefore become endemic throughout many sectors in the global 
economy.72 While it may be perceived as a ‘rational choice’ for corporations to stay 
in unprofitable sectors in the expectation that others will exit and profitability will 
return when the sectors become oligopolistic through mergers and acquisitions, even 
this strategy is often not working as expected.73 
In relation to farming, agrarian political economy has revealed ‘two fundamental 
tendencies of agricultural production’ which strongly contribute to the dynamic of 
commodity over-production.74 The first is the tendency of farmers to ‘harvest and 
sell their crop no matter what the price consequences’, because ‘[g]etting some 
return is better than none’.75 The second is that because people can only eat so 
much food, ‘markets for food [are inelastic]’; the combined effect of both 
tendencies is that commodity farmers find themselves relegated to the status of 
‘price-takers’, which often means absorbing losses.76 Farmers have responded, as 
                                                          
70 Bello, W., 2005, Dilemmas of Domination, Metropolitan Books, New York, 4,  
71 Ibid., 79; Navarro, V., 2006, ‘The Worldwide Class Struggle’, Monthly Review, 58(4), 18-33, 22-3. 
When the data for China are excluded, the picture that emerges for the South as a whole is one of 
stagnation; from an annual GDP per capita rate of 3.2% from 1961-1980, to a mere 0.7% from 1981-
1999: Navarro op cit., 23, citing World Bank figures.  
72 Bello 2005 op cit., noting that the capacity of the global computer industry is rising at 40% per annum, 
‘far above projected increases in demand’, the world auto industry is selling only 74% of the cars made, 
there is a 20% excess capacity in steel, and fibre-optic networks are operating at only 2.5% of their 
capacity: 85.  
73 ‘[E]limination of the competition [has not] mean[t] elimination of excess capacity’: Bello 2005 op cit., 
86-7. Observing these structural tendencies and the failures of new technologies to deliver decisive 
productivity gains, some commentators perceptively observed back in 2005 that the global economy 
appeared to be headed on the downward curve of a Kondratieff ‘long wave’, towards a ‘prolonged period 
of jobless recovery, stagnant growth, deflation and perhaps even a depression’: Shilling, A.G., 1998, 
Deflation, Lakeview, Short Hills, NJ, quoted in Bello 2005 op cit., 97.  
74
 Guthman 2011 op cit., 53. While I have focused on terrestrial food production and other forms of 
agriculture (e.g. textile production and biofuels) in this thesis, the depletion of many of the world’s 
principal oceanic fisheries is a powerful and further illustration of the dynamic of over-production and 
depletion of natural resource bases inherent to globalising capitalism. Becky Mansfield, 2011, 
“Modern”Iindustrial Fishing and the Crisis of Overfishing in Peet, R., Robbins, P., and Watts, M., 
(eds.), 2011, Global Political Ecology, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 84-99, 85.  
75 Ibid., noting that Karl Kautsky was amongst the first to identify this tendency in his 1898 work, The 
Agrarian Question.  
76 Ibid.  
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Julie Guthman notes, via three main strategies: extensification (bringing more land 
under cultivation); intensification (increasing productivity through the 
industrialisation of farming); and shifting to higher-value crops.77 Ultimately all 
three strategies have only provided temporary resolutions to the predicament of 
being a price-taker; and hence there has been no exit from the ‘classic treadmill of 
production’ and the dynamic of over-production.78 The result, as I discuss below, has 
been declining terms of trade for farmers, and a dwindling farm population. 
This leads to a consideration of inequality, as the second key tension of the 
globalising capitalist food system. Confirmation of Dumenil and Levy’s portrayal of 
neoliberalism as a class project to restore the wealth and privilege of the upper 
fractions of the capitalist class is provided by a brief survey of the sharpening 
inequalities in wealth and income distributions between and within countries and 
regions.79 The United Nations 2005 Report on the World’s Social Situation found that 
while the world's richest decile saw their per capita GDP increase 86% from 1960-
1995 to $US30,700, the world's poorest decile saw their income decline by 49% over 
the same period to $US214.80 The gap between the richest and poorest 20 countries 
has similarly grown by nearly 300% from 1960-62 to 2000-2002.81 Meanwhile, the 
total number of people in poverty rose by nearly 300 million between 1981 and 
2001, to reach 2.735 billion.82 While the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy 
(and to a lesser extent, of the Indian economy) has slightly improved on a macro-
level total income disparities between the Global South and North (and brought 
about a significant reduction in the global rate of absolute poverty), the gulf is still 
vast, and every region of the world apart from those two countries has seen its per 
capita income levels ‘steadily declining relative to the average per capita income in 
the wealthier OECD countries’.83  
Studies also strongly indicate that income inequality within countries has also 
increased.84 This is true of both developed and developing countries, with countries 
where neo-liberalism has been most extensively applied registering increases in the 
Gini measure of inequality in excess of ten points over the past three decades.85 The 
case of the United States, as the leading capitalist country, is illustrative of the 
                                                          
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
79 2001 op cit.; also Navarro 2006 op cit.  
80 Radetzki, M., and Jonsson, B., 2002, ‘The Expanding Global Income Gap: How Reliable is the 
Evidence?’ European Journal of Development Research, 14(1), 243-263. The gap between the two 
increased from 40:1 to 140:1, or 263%. This calculation was based using exchange rate determined per 
capita GDP, rather than the World Bank preferred (though much criticised) method of purchasing power 
parity (PPP) GDP, which gives a much more benign increase of 28% in the gap between the richest and 
the poorest deciles.  
81 World Social Report 2005 op cit., Figure III.2 
82 World Social Report 2005 op cit., 55. 
83 Ibid., para.145. East Asia and Pacific saw a relative improvement, from a 1.5% share of OECD per 
capita income in 1980, to 3.3% in 2001; the South Asian share increased from 1.2% to 1.6% over the 
same period: ibid.  
84 Using the World Income Inequality Database, Cornia, Addison and Kiiski (2004) found that in a study 
of 73 countries, 29 countries reported high levels of income inequality by the early 1980s, and that 
number had risen to 48 by the late 1990s. Only nine countries saw a decline in income inequality: cited 
in World Social Report 2005 op cit., para.148.  
85 Ibid., para.149. 
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trend. The ratio of Chief Executive Officer remuneration to average workers’ 
salaries in large US corporations increased by over 1000%, from 30:1 in 1970 to 400:1 
in 2000.86 Financial liberalization has seen a huge rise in the numbers of super-rich.87 
In absolute terms, the top 1% of the population increased their amount of net worth 
by 103% between 1983 and 2007; their income increase over the same period was 
127%.88 The richest of the rich – the top 0.1% and 0.01% of the population – saw their 
shares of national income rise 400% and 500% respectively, between 1975-2008.89 
The bottom 80% of the population suffered a substantial decline in both net worth 
and income, from 18.7% and 48% respectively in 1982, to 15.1% and 38.5% in 2007.90 
Extrapolating these trends to the global level, the concentration of global income in 
the top 1% of the world’s population is indeed striking; this fraction had by 2005 
captured 57% of total global income; a share that has likely risen in the subsequent 
few years.91 According to the 2011 Forbes ‘rich list’, as at March 2011 there were 
1,210 billionaires, with a total net worth of $4.5 trillion, well in excess of the 
collective wealth held by the poorest 3 billion inhabitants in the world.92  
                                                          
86 Harvey 2006 op cit., 149; the author comments that this pattern has been replicated elsewhere. 
Similarly Thus in Britain median earnings of chief executives of large companies rose 20% in 2005/6, 
whilst average pay rose 3% over the same period: Peston, R., 2008, ‘Pointing Fingers at the Plutocrats’, 
Daily Telegraph, 27.1.08, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml;jsessionid=RIXYZJVPKKINBQFIQMFCFF4AVCBQYI
V0?xml=/money/2008/01/26/ccpeston126.xml, accessed 29.1.08. For the largest 365 US corporations, 
the ratio of CEO to average worker earnings had reached 500:1 by 2007: Wilkinson, R., and Pickett, K., 
2010, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin Books, London, 250. . 
87 Within the United States, the numbers of millionaires trebled from 1983 to 2007 (2,411 to 7,274), the 
number of ‘pentamillionaires’ ($5 million or more) quadrupled (247 to 1,466), and the numbers of 
‘decamillionaires’ ($10 million or more) rose by nearly 800% (66 to 464): Wolff 2007 op cit., 46. The 
speculative activity of the hedge fund managers brings enormous rewards: in 2006, ten individual hedge 
fund managers earned more than $500 million each, whilst five earned more than $900 million each; 
these five individuals being George Soros $950m, Edward Lampert $1.3bn, Kenneth Griffin $1.4bn and 
James Simons $1.7bn: Peston, R., 2008, “Hedge funds: The new global super powers”, Daily Telegraph, 
28.1.08, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/01/27/cnpeston127.xml&CMP=ILC-
mostviewedbox, accessed 29.1.08. 
88 As a share of national income, the top 1% rose to 20% by 2000, and then to 21.3% in 2007, up from 
12.8% in 1982; Wolff, W.N., 2007, ‘Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising 
Debt and the Middle Class Squeeze’, Working Paper No.502, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College, 12; Wolff, E.N., 2010, ‘Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt 
and the Middle-Class Squeeze – An Update to 2007’, Working Paper No.589, Levy Economics Institute 
of Bard College, 44-45. Wolff has an additional measure of ‘non-home wealth’, which shows an even 
starker absolute gain amongst the top 1%; and an 88% increase from 1983, and a 94% increase for the 
top 20%, of the population, which by 2004 held 92.5% of total non-home wealth.  
89 Bakija, J., Cole, A., and Heim, B.T., 2010, ‘Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of 
Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from the US Tax Return Data’, available at: 
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf, accessed 
3.1.12.  
90 Wolff 2007 op cit., 45. The decline was especially precipitous amongst the lowest 40%, whose 
absolute wealth declined by 63% over the period, and as a share of the national total declined from an 
already low 0.9% in 1983 to a mere 0.2% by 2007; their share of national income declined from 12.3% 
in 1982 to 9.6% in 2007: ibid., 44, 46 . 
91 Milanovic, B., 2005, Worlds’ Apart, Princeton University Press, cited in Navarro 2006 op cit., 23.  
92 http://www.forbes.com/wealth/billionaires, accessed 20.10.11. As Professor James Petras notes, these 
individuals – who constitute one one-hundredth million of the world’s population – own more wealth 
than the poorest 3 billion people on the planet: http://petras.lahaine.org, accessed 3.10.07. The 2011 
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The experience of inequality by farmers and food workers assumes particular 
dimensions, having regard to the centrality of the complex of ‘cheap food’ for the 
globalising capitalist economy as a whole. Farmers hold relatively little economic 
power in the globalising capitalist food system, being reduced in many cases to the 
status of contract workers, supplying a product according to price and specifications 
that are determined higher up in ‘vertically-integrated food supply chains’, usually 
to the specification standards of supermarkets and fast food companies.93 They have 
been subjected to a relentless cost-price squeeze which has seen their terms of 
trade steadily worsen since 1950.94 The tendency of supermarkets to continually 
lengthen payment terms to suppliers, as well as engage in other coercive practices, 
only intensifies this dynamic.95  
The logic of the system, intensified via financialisation, mandates constant 
efficiencies and higher levels of productivity, which, as discussed below, translates 
into the simplification and homogenisation of diverse physical landscapes into 
agricultural monocultures.96 Most value in the food supply chain is extracted post-
farm sales. The very low 11.6% ‘farm and agribusiness’ share of the US food dollar in 
2011 (Figure [2]) represents the continuation of a steep decline from 1980 
onwards.97  
                                                                                                                                                                        
figure represents a 27% increase from 2006, during a period when the ‘global financial crisis’ pushed 
tens of millions of people below the poverty line: seei“World Bank says GFC drove millions to poverty, 
cites that fragile recovery is underway”, International Business Times, 22.7.2010, 
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/37409/20100722/world-bank-wb-gfc-poverty-fragile-recovery-uncertainty-
latin-america-mexico-education-infrastructure.htm, accessed 20.10.11. 
93 ‘The farmer’s job is simply to implement the input package [hybridized seeds, pesticides, chemical 
fertilisers, an irrigation system and a variety of tractors and mechanical inputs] in order to produce the 
[commodity] that the [end-client – supermarket or fast-food company] has contracted the farmer to 
produce’: Albritton 2009 op cit., 130. See also Friedmann, H., 2009, ‘Discussion: Moving Food Regimes 
Forward: Reflections on Symposium Essays’, Agriculture and Human Values, 26, 335-344, 336; and 
Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 68. Julie Guthman notes how this dynamic is very far advanced in poultry 
production in the impoverished rural communities of the American south: 2011 op cit., 62. 
94 Ibid. In Australia, the impacts of this cost-price squeeze meant that by 2000-1, ‘farmers had to produce 
four times the volume to receive half, in real terms, what they did in 1950-1’: Henzell, T., 2007, 
Agriculture in Australia, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood. The decline in terms of trade slowed to 0.9 
per cent per annum from 1991-2006, from the previous rate of 2.7 per cent per annum from 1953-1990: 
Mullen, J., 2007, ‘The Importance of Productivity Growth in Australian Agriculture’, Paper delivered to 
the 51st Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, 13-
16.2.2007, available at: http://www.agrifood.info/connections/2007/Mullen%281%29.pdf, accessed 
21.10.11.  
95 Burch and Lawrence op cit., who note that while supermarkets typically had delayed payment periods 
of 20-30 days in 1998, ten years later this had stretched out to ’88 days and growing’: 276. Other 
documented coercive practices of supermarkets include seeking or imposing retrospective discounts on 
suppliers, requiring compensation from suppliers if the supermarket’s profit is less than anticipated, and 
requiring a supplier to buy back unsold items: Mills, G., 2003, ‘Buying Power of Supermarkets’, 
Agenda, 10(2), 145-162, 151, discussing the findings of the 2000 UK Competition Commission report: 
‘Supermarkets: A Report on the Supply of Groceries from Multiple Stores in the United Kingdom’. 
These sorts of practices led Australian businessman Dick Smith to describe contemporary supermarket 
behaviour in Australia towards its suppliers as ‘thuggery’ in an interview broadcast on national television 
on 27.9.11: http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/business/items/201109/s3327292.htm, accessed 21.10.11. 
96 Albritton 2009 op cit., 66.  
97 Secton and Zhang 2006 op cit., 155, who report that the ‘farm share of the US Department of 
Agriculture’s market basket [the precursor of the food dollar] remained stable at about 40 percent from 
1960 through 1980 but has declined rapidly since then to 30 percent in 1990 and 22 percent in 1998’.  
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Figure [2] Distribution of US food dollar, 2011 
The steadily worsening terms of trade for farmers has led to a sharp fall in their 
numbers across the North and the South.98 Figure [3] below shows a decline in 
excess of 70 per cent in employment levels in agriculture in the US from 1950 to 
2010.  
 
Figure [3] Levels of employment in agriculture and manufacturing in the US, 1950-2010 
Reproduced from Dr Mark J Perry.99 
                                                          
98 In its Global Employment Trends Report 2011, the International Labour Organisation comments that 
the ‘long-term trend’ is one ‘in which employment in agriculture is on a steady downward march in 
terms of the share of total employment, while employment in services has steadily risen…Employment 
in services surpassed employment in agriculture in 2001 and the gap between the two has grown ever 
since’: 20. The US ‘loses on average approximately 20,000 farms per year…largely because the smaller 
family farm cannot compete with large industrial farms’: Albritton 2009 op cit., 128; see also 
McMichael 2005 op cit., 58, citing Hobsbawm, E., 1992, ‘The Crisis of Today’s Ideologies’, New Left 
Review, 192, 55-64. 
99 http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2011/06/since-1948-weve-lost-twice-as-many.html, accessed 18.10.11. 
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While agriculture’s share of total global employment has been decreasing, if the 
numbers of workers in food processing, packing, transport, service and retailing are 
included, then the food sector as a whole is the world’s largest economic sector.100 
However, the ‘cheap food’ imperative, over-determined by financialisation, means 
that the trend is towards heightened levels of exploitation of workers in most of 
these sectors.  
Agricultural and farm work is characterised by long hours, hard manual labour, and 
low pay, making it the lowest paid of all occupations in most countries.101 In many 
Northern countries the work is carried out by newly arrived immigrants, some of 
whom with irregular or ‘illegal’ migration status, and therefore subject to even 
greater exploitation.102 Meanwhile in some agricultural sectors in the South – notably 
the sugar cane plantations in Brazil – contemporary conditions are described by 
some as ‘modern-day slavery’, continuing earlier patterns of super-exploitation in 
the South that underwrote the cheap food complex for the 19th century Industrial 
Revolution.103 
Work in the retail and fast food sectors is similarly characterised by relatively high 
degrees of exploitation, with rates of turnover in the latter reaching as high as 300 
or 400 per cent per annum.104 As discussed below, workers in abattoirs and meat-
packing plants in America are subjected to very demanding production schedules, 
making this industry now one of the most dangerous in the country.105 In food 
processing and manufacturing, the drive for efficiencies, productivity and 
‘maximising returns to shareholders’ has led to substantial job cuts, and downwards 
pressure on terms and conditions through outsourcing and casualization.106 
Inequality also assumes certain dimensions in the sphere of consumption. The 
converse tension of over-production is under-consumption: namely, that the working 
populations worldwide will lack the purchasing power and / or the desire to 
                                                          
100 Albritton 2009 op cit., 125.  
101 Ibid., 126.  
102 ‘[A]s of 2005, over 90 per cent of all field workers in California were undocumented [and the] 
average income [of these workers was $7,500 per year…well below the poverty line of $10,488 for a 
single person’: Albritton 2009 op cit., 127. Albritton also notes that these workers are greatly at risk of 
exposure to dangerously high levels of toxic chemicals, with their death rate ‘five times higher than the 
average for all other industries taken as a whole’: ibid.  
103 Patel 2007 op cit., 87-8, citing Davis, M., 2001, Late Victorian Holocausts, El Niño Famines and the 
Making of the Third World, Verso, London. The ILO estimates that 12.3 million people currently work in 
conditions of forced labour at the global level. In Brazil an estimated 25,000-50,000 workers, mainly 
illiterate, landless migrants, are forced into slave labour: FIAN 2008 op cit., 21-2; Patel 2007 op cit., 
193-4, who notes that practices of slavery also extend in Brazil to the soy export industry.  
104 Albritton op cit., 132-3.  
105 ‘Because the conditions are so dreadful (processing plants have almost 100 percent turnover 
annually), workers have to be recruited from desperate populations of illegal immigrants and even those 
who have yet to migrate’: Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 74.  
106 Rossman 2011op cit. Rossman notes that. following leveraged buy outs and acquisitions, food 
companies ‘now employ fewer and fewer workers to produce their branded products [as] [o]utsourcing 
and casualization have become key tools for enhancing exploitation in the quest for super-profits’. He 
cites the example of Unilever – ‘the world’s largest food company’ – which embarked on a ‘Path to 
Growth’ strategy in 2000 that aimed to return €46 billion from 2000-2010. This was largely achieved via 
a halving of its global workforce, from 300,000 in 2000, to 148,000 in 2010, alongside outsourcing of 
many functions, and casualization of the remaining workforce. 
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consume the products of the globalising capitalist food system in sufficient 
quantities to maintain profitability.107 The system has two primary, closely related, 
mechanisms for managing this tension. The first is to ensure that the products are 
affordable, via the subsidised complex of ‘cheap food’.108 While many forms of 
‘cheap food’ are contrary to optimal human health if consumed on a frequent basis, 
research has demonstrated that due to the high levels of sugar they typically 
contain, these foods appear to have quasi-addictive properties.109 Hence the second 
mechanism for managing the ‘over-production, under-consumption’ dialectic is the 
widespread promotion, through the technologies of television, advertising and 
marketing, of a ‘market-induced akrasia, or weakness of will’, amongst large 
numbers of consumers, encouraging them to express ‘addictive [shopping] 
preferences’ for these products.110  
Sugar and sugar-substitutes, notably high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), have become 
ubiquitous in the contemporary food system. From the introduction of cane sugar 
into the Western diet in the early 19th century, annual per capita consumption rose 
steadily to around 25 kg (in the US) by 1885, and to 50kg by the early 1930s.111 Per 
capita sugar consumption then plateaued until the early 1970s, when the discovery 
of HFCS revolutionised the food industry and caused fructose per capita consumption 
to rise significantly.112  
Since it is much sweeter than sugar, cheaper to produce, more stable and in liquid 
form, the discovery of HFCS in 1969 – combined with the use of palm oil and the 
lecithin (stabiliser) made from processed soy - has proved invaluable to the rapid 
growth of transnational supermarket chains, in terms of prolonging the shelf-life of 
the great bulk of supermarket items, as well as in improving their taste, appearance 
and ‘mouthfeel’.113 From the mid-1970s, HFCS was being added to a wide range of 
soft drink beverages and processed food products.114 By the turn of the 21st century, 
over forty percent of the US corn crop was being converted into HFCS, flowing from 
                                                          
107 Albritton 2009 op cit., 41-3, 68-71. Gavin Bridge notes how the crisis of under-consumption that 
characterised the 1930s Great Depression was resolved (in part) with the availability of abundant oil, 
then being discovered and produced in great quantities the United States: ‘Through expanding 
automobility, suburbanization, and development of a mass market for consumer durables, demand for oil 
was effectively built – via physical engineering and socio-cultural convention – into the social and 
geographical structure of urban, national and international economies’: 2011 op cit., 313.  
108 Moore 2010 op cit. I discuss this further below.  
109 Albritton 2009 op cit., 95-6. Gillespie, D., Sweet Poison: Why Sugar Makes us Fat, Penguin, 
Camberwell, discussing evolutionary biology which demonstrates how modern humans evolved to 
express a preference for sweet (and therefore high energy) foods in nature: 14-16.  
110 McMurty 2003 op cit., arguing that the ubiquitous marketing and advertising of such commodities 
undermines the ‘mythology’ of ‘consumer sovereignty’ that forms the basis of much contemporary neo-
classical economic theory: 381.  
111 The annual consumption of sugar per capita rose 7-fold in Great Britain between 1815 and 1955, from 
7 kg to 50 kg: Gillespie op cit., 8, 88-9.  
112 Ibid., 89.  
113 Critser, G., 2003, Fat Land: How Americans Become the Fattest People in the World, Penguin, 
London, 10-12, 14-15. Patel notes that by 1999 ‘the average American consumed around 64 dry-weight 
pounds of [HCFS] a year’ (115), and that lecithin is now ‘a component in nearly three-quarters of 
products on supermarket shelves, and in most products sold by the fast food industry’: 166.  
114 Patel op cit.,, 114-5. 
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the mills of the three companies that control over 90% of the HFCS market, 
throughout the products of the soft drink and fast-food companies.115 
The cheap (subsidised) cost of HFCS enabled soft drink manufacturers and fast food 
companies to pursue a variety of marketing and pricing strategies to entice 
consumers to purchase more of their products. A key marketing device was ‘super-
sizing’, which was first adopted by McDonalds in the US in the 1970s, and then 
spread rapidly throughout these sectors. The new sales strategies not only increased 
profits, they also increased calories: average adult daily caloric intake in the US rose 
from 1876 calories in 1977, to 2043 calories in 1995.116 In a passage that reveals the 
how the perception of ‘cheap food’ constitutes the common sense of the system, 
Greg Critser notes that by 1999: 
Kids had come to see bigger everything - bigger sodas, bigger snacks, bigger candy, 
and even bigger doughnuts – as the norm…anything could be made a lot bigger for 
just a tad more.117 
Super-sizing has been accompanied by the heavy promotion of fast food and soft 
drink products. Leading US academic nutritionist Marion Nestle, in her investigation 
into the social, economic and political power of food manufacturers, reported that 
in 1999, $US11 billion was spent on direct advertising of packaged food products, 
and that ‘[f]or every dollar spent [directly], the companies spend another two on 
discount incentives’, so that the true advertising and promotional budget in the US 
in 1999 was $US33 billion.118 Nestle continues:  
Nearly 70% of food advertising is for convenience foods, candy and snacks, alcoholic 
beverages, soft drinks and desserts, whereas just 2.2% is for fruits, vegetables, grains or 
beans...Advertising costs for any single, nationally distributed food product far exceed 
(often by 10 to 50 times) federal expenditures for promotion of the [Healthy Food] 
Pyramid or to encourage people to eat more fruit and vegetables.119 
Having regard to the under-consumption tendency, the role played by the 
advertising and marketing industries in encouraging continual mass consumption is 
now fundamental to the health of industrialised economies.120 Advertising on a large 
scale has become essential to securing and maintaining sales figures in a highly 
competitive environment. ‘Food sales increase with the intensity, repetition and 
visibility of the advertising message’, notes Nestle, and strong sales are also 
associated with the making of nutritional and health claims. This dynamic can be 
traced in significant part to an excess of processed and manufactured food products. 
                                                          
115 McMichael 2004 op cit., 59; Gillespie op cit., 191, Patel op cit., 115.  
116
 Critser op cit., 28. 
117 Ibid.  
118 Nestle 2002 op cit, 11-14. The biggest 10 producers of packaged foods in the US in 1999 were: 
Nestlé, Unilever, Philip Morris, Pepsico, Group Danone, H.J. Heinz, Nabisco, Kellogg, General Mills, 
and Campbell Soup. As Nestle notes, the direct advertising spend is only a fraction of total food sales, 
which for these ten companies exceeded $US155 billion for 1999: ibid. 
119 Ibid., 21-2.  
120 Indeed it has been for many decades. Shortly after the Second World War retailing analyst Victor 
Lebow described how the logic of mass production would necessitate the creation of a culture of mass 
consumption: cited in Smith, R., 2005, ‘The Engine of Eco Collapse’, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 
16(4), 19-35, 30. 
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More generally, as discussed in Chapter 2, a basic systemic imperative of capitalism 
is expansion and growth (in quantitative terms); and this now depends to a large 
extent on the continual promotion of ‘competitive consumption’ via the 
technologies of advertising, irrespective of the extent to which this detracts from 
individual and societal well-being.121  
A growing trend is the direct promotion of fast and processed foods, and beverages, 
to young children.122 Children are exposed to food advertising through magazines, 
packaging, supermarket displays, sponsorship of sports teams, and new social media 
– but above all on television.123 Research indicates a correlation between higher 
levels of television viewing and childhood obesity; and has also detected 
concentrated promotion of ‘non-core’ food during popular children’s programs.124 
Further, there is now ‘clear and robust evidence that unhealthy food advertising 
influences the types of foods children prefer, request and eat’; and, having regard 
to its ubiquity, this advertising ‘undermines the effectiveness of strategies to 
improve children’s diets, such as healthy eating media campaigns and school-based 
nutrition programs.’125 At the global level, food companies spend $500 promoting 
energy-dense, nutrient-poor foods for every $1 spent by the World Health 
Organisation to promote healthy foods.126  
  
                                                          
121 Panayotakis 2011 op cit. 47-50; Kaplan, J., 2008, ‘The Gospel of Consumption: and the Better Future 
we Left Behind’, Orion Magazine, May / June 2008, available at: 
http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/2962/, accessed 22.12.11. 
122 In August 2010 the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity, based at Yale University, reported that 
American children aged 2-11 were exposed, on average, to 4,494 food, beverage and restaurant 
advertisements during 2008 – more than 12 every day. Teenagers (ages 12-17) were exposed to 5,353 
food, beverage and restaurant advertisements each day: Harris, J.L., Weinberg, M.E., Schwartz, M.B., 
Ross, C., Ostroff, J., and Brownell, K.D., 2010, ‘Trends in Television Food Advertising: Progress in 
Reducing Unhealthy Marketing to Young People?’ Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity, Yale 
University, 
http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/reports/RuddReport_TVFoodAdvertising_2.
10.pdf, accessed 30.5.11.  
123 MacKay, S., Antonopoulos, N., Martin, J., and Swinburn, B.A., 2011, ‘A Comprehensive Approach to 
Protect Children from Unhealthy Food Promotion and Advertising’, Obesity Policy Coalition, 
Melbourne, http://www.opc.org.au/downloads/positionpapers/Protecting-children-
email1_FINAL_13.04.11.pdf, accessed 27.5.11. The OPC is a ‘partnership between Cancer Council 
Victoria, Diabetes Australia-Victoria, VicHealth and the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre 
for Obesity Prevention at Deakin University’: ibid. The April 2011 proposal is endorsed by the Coalition 
on Food Advertising to Children, the Australian Medical Association, and the Australian Chronic 
Disease Prevention Alliance. See also National Preventative Health Taskforce, Obesity Working Group, 
2009, Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020, Technical Report 1, Obesity in Australia: a need for 
urgent action, Commonwealth of Australia.  
124 Ibid.  
125 MacKay et al op cit. While the food industry spent $33 billion promoting its products in 1999, the 
United States Department of Agriculture spent $333.3 million on nutrition education and promotion in 
1997, a mere 1% of the total advertising spend of the private food sector in 1999: Gallo, A.E., 1999, 
Food Advertising in the United States, USDA, AIB-750. 
126 Consumers International, 2009, ‘Left Wanting More: Food Company Policies on Marketing to 
Children’, London, March 2009, available at 
http://www.junkfoodgeneration.org/documents/Left_wanting_more.pdf, accessed 1.6.09. Such levels of 
advertising expenditure suggest that advertising, like credit and finance, has come to assume an 
‘infrastructural role’ in the continued operation of contemporary mass consumer capitalism, cf Howard 
and King 2008 op cit.  
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The results of this advertising are observable in sharply increased levels of 
consumption of unhealthy food products amongst children and adults. In Australia, 
average soft drink consumption for all age groups has more than doubled since the 
1970s, with nearly a quarter of children (aged 2-12) having ‘been reported to drink 
more soft drink every day than water’.127 More generally, the year-on-year growth in 
sales for the fast food sector is remarkable; by 2004, US consumers were spending 
$US148.6 billion on fast food, nearly a 50% increase since 1999. Per capita US 
consumers were spending an average $492 each per year on fast food.128 Meanwhile, 
national nutritional surveys show that very few Australian children are eating the 
recommended amounts of fruit and vegetables each day, and the ‘vast majority’ are 
eating too much sugar and saturated fat, with deleterious consequences for their 
health, well-being and enjoyment of life.129 
How the system’s social relations generate over-production and inequalities 
The system is organised according to the rationalities of efficiency and productivity; 
it is operationalized by the application of the technologies of industrialisation and 
chemistry; and its basic imperatives are the ceaseless expansion of capital 
accumulation and profit. Both imperatives have been intensified by processes of 
financialisation and the associated corporate concentration within the major agri-
food sectors. All social relations are therefore directed towards securing enhanced 
productivity, thereby entrenching the dynamic of over-production; and continued 
growth in profits, thereby intensifying forms and processes of dispossession and 
exploitation of farmers, workers and consumers, and heightening the key systemic 
tension of inequality.130 
As previously discussed, the logic of the system points very clearly in the direction 
of economies of scale. The bigger farms – and in the South, plantations - are the 
ones that can meet the demands of the supermarket for large, consistent and 
standardised volumes; and hence they are the ones that survive in this environment. 
At the same time, economies of scale and the wholesale application of an industrial 
(and now financial) logic to farming have generated exponential increases in 
agricultural productivity in the North, with a ‘near tripling of global cereal output’ 
from 1950 to 1990.131 This productivity revolution has, however, come at the cost of 
the collapse (until very recently) in the world price of commodities, and a 
consequent large decline in farm sector employment in the North (see figure [3] 
above); and ongoing ‘de-peasantisation’ in the South.132 
                                                          
127 Ibid., 9. 
128 Followed by Canadians, with $387 per capita spending. Australians were in third place in terms of 
global per capita spend on fast food, with each Australian spending an average $US279 on these food 
items in 2004: ‘Top Fast Food Countries’: http://www.suite101.com/content/top-fast-food-countries-
a29881, accessed 27.5.11.  
129 Ibid, citing the 2007 Australian National Children’s Nutrition and Physical Activity Survey, which 
found that only 3% of 4-8 year olds were consuming the recommended 2-4 daily servings of vegetables 
(excluding potatoes), 2% of 9-13 year olds, and no 14-16 year-olds.  
130 At the same time, the culture of ‘competitive consumption’ on which contemporary capitalism 
depends increasingly appears to be at odds with human well-being in psychological terms: Panayotakis 
2011 op cit., 50-56. 
131 Moore op cit., 398, citing Weis 2007, FAO 2002, Warman 2003. 
132 The price of basic grains fell 60% in real terms between 1960 and 2000: Moore op cit., 398. The rise 
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As I have discussed, much of the increased volume of grains has been diverted to 
animal feed, facilitating the tremendous growth of the factory farming system and 
the fast food industry. The former has grown so rapidly that Americans now eat on 
average 150 times more chicken than eighty years previously; 10 billion animals are 
processed through the system each year in the US; and fifty billion poultry birds are 
farmed worldwide each year.133 These extraordinary levels of production are made 
possible by meting out extreme levels of cruelty to the animals themselves, as well 
as insisting upon the super-exploitation of workers in these operations.134  
Competition for limited supermarket shelf space in processed and packaged foods 
means that each year sees increasing numbers of these products; research for the 
United States Department of Agriculture found that in the decade from 1998-2007, 
‘the number of new product introductions rose by 181 per cent.’135 Commercial 
experience shows that the most heavily promoted products achieve the best sales.136 
The end result of structurally entrenched over-production, when combined with the 
equally structurally-entrenched complex of cheap food, is phenomenal levels of food 
waste, perhaps as much as 40-50% in the OECD countries.137 When added to the 
amount of grain that is diverted to biofuels and animal feed, it becomes clear that 
the contemporary world is characterised not by a food shortage, but by over-
abundance. 
Land use conversions, brought about by the large-scale shift to export-oriented 
agriculture and commodity production, have led to hundreds of millions of small and 
subsistence farmers, and indigenous communities, being displaced from their lands 
and migrating towards rapidly expanding rural slums and shanty-towns.138 Much of 
this rural-urban migration is linked to the persistent poverty that most rural dwellers 
endure. As with many of the impacts of structural adjustment, peasant 
displacement frequently occurs as a result of violent coercion.139  
                                                                                                                                                                        
of the factory farm system has led to a 90% decline in the number of pig farms in the US: Foer 2009 op 
cit., 162; Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 68-9. 
133 Ibid., 15, 136-7.  
134 Ibid. 130-5.  
135 Martinez, S., 2008, Twenty Years of Competition Reshape the US Food Marketing System, Amber 
Waves, USDA, Economic Research Service, April 2008, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/April08/PDF/FoodMarketing.pdf, accessed 30.5.11.  
136 Nestle 2002 op cit.  
137 “Throughout the developed world, food is treated as a disposable commodity, disconnected from the 
social and environmental impact of its production”: Stuart, T., 2009, Waste: Uncovering the Global Food 
Scandal, Penguin Books, London, xvi.  
138 The twentieth century has been the century of urbanization: 13% of the global population lived in 
cities in the year 1900, rising to 29% in 1950, and 49% in 2005: UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs Population Division, 2005, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WUP2005/2005wup.htm, accessed 27.10.08.  
139 Massive protests in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba following the World Bank-sponsored 
privatization of the state water company and 200% price rises were met with hundreds of heavily armed 
riot police: Dangl, B., 2006, The Price of Fire: Resource Wares and Social Movements in Bolivia, AK 
Press, Edinburgh, 55-74. Rodwan Abouharb and David Cingranelli’s study of the human rights effects of 
442 World Bank Structural Adjustment Agreements from 1981-2000 found conclusively that ‘receiving 
and implementing a SAA from the World Bank had the net effect of worsening government respect for 
all types of physical integrity rights [the prohibition against torture, extra-judicial killing, disappearances 
and arbitrary imprisonment]: op cit., 255. For example the data set showed that there was a 26% increase 
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Olivier de Schutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, and right to 
food NGOs such as FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN), have 
documented ‘soaring’ levels of violations of the right to food and water, together 
with the ‘subsequent repression of human rights defenders – both those attempting 
to assert their rights and those who support them’.140 This is a reference to what La 
Via Campesina calls the ‘criminalisation of peasant struggles’.141 
Land grabs 
In what is being termed ‘a new scramble for Africa akin to the frenzy that followed 
the Berlin conference of 1885 and the partitioning and colonization of [the 
continent]’,  sovereign wealth funds, transnational corporations and private 
financial institutions are acquiring millions of hectares of farmland in numerous sub-
Saharan countries.142 While estimates of the numbers of acquisitions and the total 
                                                                                                                                                                        
in the likelihood of torture in a country implementing a structural adjustment agreement as compared 
with a country not implementing one, controlling for other factors: ibid. These results confirmed similar 
findings from an analysis conducted previously in relation to IMF agreements: see Camp Keith, L., and 
Poe, S.C., 2000, The United States, the IMF and Human Rights in The United States and Human Rights, 
in Forsythe, D.F., (ed.), University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, cited in Abouharb and Cingranelli op cit. 
The global peasant and small farmers movement La Via Campesina reported in June 2008 that ‘in 
Indonesia, on the 29th of Januray 2008, 35 security guards of the National Plantation PTPN IV Adolina 
backed by 70 police officers from Deli Serdan district destroyed 30 hectares of land planted with corn 
and casava belonging to small farmers…The company has cleared the land in order to grow palm oil…In 
Brazil, it is estimated that 4,340 families have been expelled from their land by private companies in 
2007, 28 people were assassinated and 259 people received death threats in land conflicts…’: ‘The 
Hidden Face of the Global Food Crisis: Massive Farmers Rights Violations’, 21.06.08, 
http://www.viacampesina.org/main_en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=567&Itemid=40
, accessed 27.10.08; see also Friends of the Earth, 2005, ‘The Oil for Ape Scandal: How Palm Oil is 
Threatening the Orang-utan’, www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/oil_for_ape_full.pdf, accessed 27.10.08.  
140 FIAN Annual Report 2008.  
141 La Via Campesina, 2006, ‘Annual Report: Violations of Peasants’ Human Rights’. In this 2006 report, 
La Via Campesina sought to show how violations of economic and social rights are linked with 
violations of civil and political rights, so that once peasant organisations and leaders ‘begin to assert their 
rights, they face persecution or even assassination’: 4. Referring to cases in Brazil, Guatemala, 
Honduras, the Phillipines, Colombia and Indonesia, La Via Campesina says there is a clearly observable 
pattern of impunity for violations of peasants’ rights committed by landlords and agri-business. In Brazil 
‘more than 1,425 rural workers, leaders and activists related to social movements fighting for land and 
agrarian reform have been murdered over the past 20 years’, but [as at 2006] only 79 cases have been 
legally processed, with 69 convictions: 3. Conversely, the full force of the law is often brought against 
those peasant leaders and activists who attempt to defend their rights: 22. The violent repression by state 
and private security forces of members of peasant organisations in the Bajo Aguán Valley on the Atlantic 
coast of Honduras, who have struggling to reclaim their lands fraudulently taken by palm oil exporters, 
is a contemporary illustration of this dynamic: see FIAN, Honduras: Human Rights Violations in Bajo 
Aguán, International Fact Finding Mission Report. FIAN and La Via Campesina formed part of a six-
organisation human rights fact-finding mission that visited Honduras during February-March 2011, to 
investigate allegations of widespread violations of human rights in the Bajo Aguán land conflict. The 
mission found that between January 2010 and March 2011, 25 peasant leaders and activists were 
murdered, with ‘little or no progress’ being made in the investigations of these acts, which ‘are moving 
towards being treated with complete impunity’; a ‘generalised atmosphere of fear and terror caused by 
continual threats and harassment’, including personal threats of violence, threatening phone calls, 
continual surveillance, ‘kidnapping, torture and sexual abuse’, the burning of houses and firing shots in 
the night’ and a concerted State campaign of criminalisation to ‘silence and instil fear in the peasant 
movement, and weaken their demands’: 19-23, 31.  
142 Okure, A., 2012, ‘A New Scramble for Africa: Land Grab and Dispossession of People’, Africa Faith 
and Justice Network, 11.7.12, available at: http://www.afjn.org/focus-campaigns/other/other-continental-
issues/161-agriculture/1067-a-new-scramble-for-africa-land-grab-a-dispossession-of-people.html, 
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area of land acquired vary, the figures involved are substantial. GRAIN, for example, 
has documented 416 cases between 2002 and 2012, of which 228 are in Africa; 293 
are for biofuel production, covering in excess of 17 million hectares.143 The Land 
Deal Politics Initiative (Cornell University) which has conducted two international 
academic workshops on the topic (2011 and 2012), has begun an interdisciplinary 
global land deals mapping exercise.144  
The land-grab phenomenon appears to have two principal drivers. On the one hand, 
governments in food importing countries such as Saudi Arabia, wish to secure 
adequate land with reliable water access in order to feed their growing populations. 
On the other, speculators and transnational corporations see these acquisitions as 
investment opportunities in order to generate commodities for export, whether they 
be food crops of feedstock for biofuels. Either way, as critics have pointed out, the 
net effect is that poor communities in the target countries are losing access to land 
and means of livelihood.145 
 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter locates the land-
grab phenomenon within the wider context of the historical trends towards the 
integration of small-holder farmers into the globalising capitalist food system: first 
via vertical integration into global supply chains through direct contracting 
arrangements, and now through the direct acquisition of farmland.146 He argues 
that, contrary to the expectations of the World Bank, which has made available 
billions of dollars via its lending facilities to help finance many of the deals, and 
other promoters of greater levels of ‘foreign investment’ of this type, the most 
likely impact of these acquisitions will not be to improve the livelihoods of rural 
commitments and the greater realisation of the right to food, but rather the 
increasing commodification and concentration of land, in the shape of a global 
agrarian ‘counter-reform’. In this, land grabs are yet another ‘cutting edge’ of the 
many processes of accumulation by dispossession that constitute contemporary 
globalising capitalism.147 
Citing Karl Polanyi’s warnings regarding the dangers of such excessive 
commodification of land  and labour, de Schutter argues that what is now required 
is ‘a vision that goes beyond disciplining land deals and providing policymakers with 
a checklist of how to destroy the global peasantry responsibly.’148 In his view, 
‘voluntary approaches to discipline land-grabbing are bound to fail’ because ‘both 
the investors and the governments in host countries have every incentive to shield 
                                                                                                                                                                        
accessed 22.2.13.  
143 GRAIN, 2012, ‘Land grabbing and food sovereignty in West and Central Africa’, available at: 
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4575-land-grabbing-and-food-sovereignty-in-west-and-central-africa 
accessed 22.2.13.; GRAIN, 2013, ‘Land grabbing for biofuels must stop’, 21.2.13, available at: 
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4653-land-grabbing-for-biofuels-must-stop, accessed 22.2.13. 
144 See http://www.cornell-landproject.org/, accessed 22.2.13. 
145 GRAIN, 2008,, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’, GRAIN Briefing, 
October 2008; also Willingham, R., 2012, ‘Land grab leaves a billion hungry’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
4.10.12, available at: http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/land-grab-leaves-a-billion-hungry-
20121004-271la.html, accessed 22.2.13.  
146 2011 op cit., 251.  
147 Harvey 2003 op cit.  
148 2011 op cit., 275.  
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the deals they negotiate from outside scrutiny.’149 Such incentives are in effect 
structural imperatives of contemporary capitalism, as I have demonstrated 
throughout the thesis. While we must wait to see whether the newly-agreed 
Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure (discussed in Chapter 5) have any noticeable 
impact in terms of slowing large-scale land acquisitions or ensuring that their 
benefits flow primarily to local communities, there are strong grounds for 
scepticism. 
The millions of small farmers who have thus far managed to stay on the land have 
become trapped in spiralling cycles of poverty which means, paradoxically, that 
they constitute 50% or more of all people suffering malnutrition.150 Farmers growing 
for export have fallen victim to the dynamics of the commodities markets, in which 
the growing purchasing power of multinational buyers like Nestle and the huge 
supermarket chains has translated into falling prices for small primary producers.151 
Most of the benefits of the primary commodity chain accrue to intermediaries, food 
processors and retailers who ‘add value’ along the way; or alternatively to the giant 
industrial and highly capitalised farms ‘that are able to produce vast amounts of 
produce with a low profit [margin]’.152 
Meanwhile, diseases linked to malnutrition cause more than half of the annual 10.4 
million deaths of children under five.153 Malnourished children are also likely to 
experience stunted physical and mental growth, and consequently have lower levels 
of educational achievement.154 If not dealt with in a timely and comprehensive 
fashion, childhood malnutrition amounts in effect to a life sentence of suffering, 
with a high probability of reduced life expectancy.155 
In the case of certain crops (food and non-food) that are highly dependent on 
inputs, small farmers have often had to go heavily into debt in order to continue 
production, placing themselves in extremely vulnerable situations. This is especially 
the case with cotton production in general – a ‘market [that] is heavily distorted by 
                                                          
149 Ibid., 274.  
150 Ong’wen and Wright op cit., 31.  
151 Coffee is a clear example. According to statistics published by the International Coffee Organisation, 
growers in Kenya received nearly $2.20 per lb for Arabic coffee in January 1977 
(http://www.ico.org/asp/display7.asp, accessed 27.10.08). By December 2000, that had fallen to $0.47, 
dropping to $0.35 by December 2003 (http://www.ico.org/asp/pdf/PRGROW-2000-03.pdf, accessed 
27.10.08). The World Bank’s price index on a selected basket of commodities shows declines of 40-
600%, with the most dramatic price fall being for Robusta coffee: a kilogram fetched $4.11 in 1980, 
$1.18 in 1990, and $0.63 in 2001: cited in Ong’wen and Wright op cit., 34.  
152 Ong’wen and Wright op cit., 32-5. 
153 Kent, G., 2005, Freedom from Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food, Georgetown University 
Press, Washington DC, 16.  
154
 Ibid., 7-8, noting that the UN System Standing Committee on Nutrition reports at least 150 million 
underweight and 200 million stunted school children globally. The Report of the 35
th
 Session of the 
Standing Committee on Nutrition in Hanoi, Vietnam, held from 3-6 March 2008, describes how 
‘[e]vidence links stunting to cognitive development, school performance and educational achievement 
and a child’s height for age is the best predictor of human capital’; Dr Mercedes de Onis of the World 
Health Organisation reported the global prevalence of stunting at 32%, with 178 million infants suffering 
from it: 5.  
155 Malnutrition is ‘strongly linked to many different forms of disease…It…inhibits mental and physical 
development’; it is by far the single leading cause of mortality globally (12% of all deaths – 50 million – 
in 1990), with the status of childhood ‘being the biggest risk factor of all’: Kent op cit., 15-16.  
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subsidized cotton from the United States’ – and with Monsanto’s genetically 
modified BT cotton in particular.156 As regards the latter, small cotton farmers have 
found themselves having to borrow heavily to buy expensive patented seed, and the 
company’s Round-Up Ready pesticide that must be applied to the plants, only to be 
faced with financial ruin after the crops have not performed as promised. According 
to some estimates, as many as 150,000 Indian cotton farmers have killed themselves 
in these circumstances between 1997 and 2005.157 Meanwhile, the enhanced 
productivity of the super-productive industrial farmers in the United States has also 
generated a ‘slow-burn’ suicide epidemic.158 
A further example of the dialectic of over-production and inequality in the 
globalising capitalist food system is provided by the meat-packing industry in the 
United States. The intensification of production in this industry in recent years has 
reached unbearable levels.159 As a result, ‘[m]eatpacking work has extraordinarily 
high rates of injury [and] [e]mployers put workers at predictable risk of serious 
physical injury even though the means to avoid such injury are known and 
feasible’.160 Repetitive strain injuries are commonplace, and ‘long overtime hours’ 
are enforced on ‘pain of dismissal’.161 Migrant, often undocumented, labour is 
commonplace, making union organising difficult; a dynamic reinforced by very high 
rates of labour turnover.162  
As already discussed, the over-production of a handful commodities has generated 
the conditions for the rapid expansion of globalising packaged and fast food 
industries, whose products in turn have contributed substantially to the current 
obesity pandemic. Children who are overweight, and most especially those who are 
obese, are also likely to experience shorter and diminished lives through being prone 
to suffer a wide range of degenerative diseases including diabetes, hypertension, 
coronary heart disease, various types of cancers, and strokes.163 In Australia, as in 
other rich countries, obesity and its associated diseases disproportionately impact 
                                                          
156 Ibid., 36-7. 
157 Sainath, P., 2007, ‘Neoliberalism’s Price Tag: 150,000 Farm Suicides in India from 1997 Through 
2005’, Counterpunch, November 17 / 18, 2007, http://www.counterpunch.org/sainath11172007.html, 
accessed 27.10.08, who considers that this figure is likely to be a serious underestimate since it only 
counts those with title to land, thus excluding women and tenant farmers.  
158 The relentless logic of industrialisation in the name of efficiency and productivity is exacting a heavy 
psychological toll: “In 1950, one farmworker supplied every 15.5 consumers. Today, it's one for every 
140. This is depressing to both the communities that valued the contribution of their small farmers and to 
the famers themselves. (American farmers are four times more likely to commit suicide than the general 
population). Just about everything – feed, water, lighting, heating, ventilation, even slaughter – is now 
automated”: Foer op cit., 162. 
159 ‘What once were hundreds of head processed per day are now thousands; what were thousands are 
now tens of thousands per day. One worker described the reality of the line in her foreman’s order: 
“Speed, Ruth, work for speed! One cut! One cut!” Said another, “People can’t take it, always harder, 
harder, harder”’: Comba 2005 op cit. 
160 ‘Nearly every worker interviewed for this report bore physical signs of a serious injury suffered from 
working in a meat or poultry plant. Automated lines carrying dead animals and their parts for 
disassembly move too fast for worker safety’: ibid. 
161 Repeating thousands of cutting motions during each work shift puts enormous stress on workers’ 
hands, wrists, arms, shoulders and back: Comba op cit., Foer op cit, 131, 231-2.  
162 Ibid.  
163 Lang & Heasman op cit., 63-70.  
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lower socio-economic groups.164 Further, there appears to be a clear correlation 
between levels of inequality and rates of obesity, with the United States having an 
incidence of obesity more than 12 times that observed in Japan.165 Research 
suggests that there is a relationship between chronic stress – common amongst 
people in lower socio-economic groups in highly stratified (i.e. unequal) societies – 
and over-eating, a phenomenon known as ‘comfort-eating’.166 This builds on 
evidence indicating that, as suggested above, much advertising is often directed at 
creating feelings of inadequacy in order to perpetuate a treadmill of competitive 
(i.e., status-driven) consumption. At the same time, the medicalization and 
individualisation of obesity has opened up new fields of accumulation for the 
pharmaceutical and dieting industries.167 
The ecological constraints of the globalising capitalist food system 
I have discussed above the oligopolistic configuration of the main economic actors in 
the system and the nature of the system’s principal sets of social relations, paying 
particular emphasis to the impacts of financialisation on these relations, as well as 
on the key tensions of over-production and inequality. In this final section I examine 
the nature of the ecological constraints that the system is faced with; and how 
these constraints impact upon the system’s possibilities of further development in 
the coming period.  
In Chapter 2 I outlined the thesis of the ‘metabolic rift’, as recently developed by 
John Bellamy Foster and his colleagues. In this section I consider the principal 
ecological constraints that have been suggested as boundaries to the system’s 
further expansion and development, as distinct from barriers to be overcome 
through (for example) the application of new technologies. Finally I will briefly 
discuss a recent political ecology perspective which conceives capitalism’s 
successive phases as ‘ecological regimes’ dependent on the generation of ‘ecological 
surpluses’.168  
Capitalism is remarkable for its refusal to acknowledge any boundaries or limits to 
its further and indefinite expansion, irrespective of the apparent extent of 
                                                          
164 “[I]t was the poor, the underserved, and the underrepresented who were most at risk from excess 
fat…Poverty. Class. Income. Over and over, these emerged as the key determinants of obesity and 
weight-related disease…there was a new trend that saw significant numbers of the middle and upper 
middle class also experiencing huge weight gains. But the basic numbers were – and are – clear and 
consistent: the largest concentrations of the obese, regardless of race, ethnicity, and gender, reside in the 
poorest sections of the nation…”: Critser op cit., 109, 116. See also National Preventative Health 
Taskforce, Obesity Working Group, 2009, Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020, Technical Report 
1, Obesity in Australia: a need for urgent action, Commonwealth of Australia, which found that ‘Obesity 
is particularly prevalent among men and women in the most disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, 
people without post-school qualifications, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and among 
many people born overseas’. 
165 Wilkinson, R., and Pickett, K., 2009, The Sprit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin 
Books, London, 91, 89-102. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Gillespie op cit., who notes that ‘Australia, the UK and the US all spend more than 60 per cent of 
their respective health-care budgets on the treatment and ‘prevention’ of symptoms and diseases that the 
evidence shows are caused by fructose’; with drug companies being ‘the largest direct beneficiaries of 
this spending’: 185-6. 
168 Moore 2010 op cit.  
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environmental destruction that its processes of production engender. There are few 
sectors where this tendency is more evident than industrialised agriculture. A 
defining ecological characteristic of the globalising capitalist food system is the 
predominance of agricultural monocultures over large portions of the arable land 
surface of the earth.169 These monocultures have produced what have become 
known as ‘green deserts’: vast expanses of single crops or forest plantations that are 
largely devoid of the life that previously existed where they now stand.170 The 
phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the southern cone countries of South 
America, where tens of millions of hectares have been devoted in recent decades 
principally to genetically modified soy (agro-fuels and animal feed), and eucalyptus 
(agro-fuels).171 The expansion of such monocultures are contingent on the rapid de-
                                                          
169 ‘More land was converted to cropland in the 30 years after 1950 than in the 150 years between 1700 
and 1850. Cultivated systems (areas where at least 30% of the landscape is in croplands, shifting 
cultivation, confined livestock production, or freshwater aquaculture) now cover one quarter of Earth’s 
terrestrial surface’: MEA 2005, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, 
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf, accessed 31.10.08, 2. 
170 For example in 2004 the Alert Against the Green Desert Network, a Brazillian coalition of ‘more than 
100 entities of the social movements, local leaders and representatives of traditional and indigenous 
populations of the States of Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro’, issued a ‘Manifesto 
against the Green Desert and in Favour of Life’, in which they denounced the ‘socio-environmental 
disaster caused in the last 35 years by the eucalyptus and pine monocultures, associated to the iron and 
steel and cellulose sectors, that affect several ecosystems and people of our territory, thus impoverishing 
our biological, social and cultural diversity, and causing expropriation, unemployment, exodus and 
hunger’: http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Brazil/manifesto.html, accessed 27.10.08. See also Böhm. S., 
and Brei, V., 2008, ‘The Hegemony of Development: Of Pulp Fictions and Green Deserts’, Marketing 
Theory, 8(4), 339-365; and Altieri, M., and Pengue, W., 2006, ‘GM Soybean: Latin America’s New 
Coloniser’, Seedling, January 2006. Green desertification is distinct from ‘desertification’ in general, 
which is a major environmental challenge in its own right, affecting up to 2 billion people who live in 
the 41% of the planet’s surface that constitutes ‘drylands’, that is, all those lands ‘where the climate is 
classified as dry subhumid, semiarid, arid, or hyper-arid’: MEA 2005, Ecosystems and Human Well-
Being: Desertification Synthesis, 
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.355.aspx.pdf, accessed 31.10.08. Industrial 
agriculture also contributes to desertification via livestock overgrazing: Barker op cit., 11. 
171
 Altieri and Pengue note that the land devoted to soy cultivation in Brazil has ‘grown on average at 
3.2% or 320,000 hectares a year since 1995’, and as at 2006 was the largest crop in the country, 
‘covering 21% of the cultivated land’; while in neighbouring Paraguay, soy covers ‘more than 25% of all 
agricultural land’. The race to plant soy has been even more rapid in Argentina, ‘where 5.6 million 
hectares of non-agricultural [mainly forest] land has been converted to [soy] in less than ten years’: ibid. 
Such developments are amongst the principal factors leading the members of the Stratigraphy 
Commission of the Royal London Geological Society to officially confirm the dawning of the 
‘anthropocene age’, announced by what many scientists describe as the greatest mass species extinction 
event since the disappearance of the dinosaurs: “The projected temperature rise will certainly cause 
changes in habitat beyon environmental tolerance for many taxa…The effects will be more severe than 
in past glacial-interglacial transitions because, with the anthropogenic fragmentation of natural 
ecosystems, “escape” routes are fewer. The combination of extinctions, global species migrations…and 
the widespread replacement of natural vegetation with agricultural monocultures is producing a 
distinctive contemporary biostratigraphic signal. These effects are permanent, as future evolution will 
take place from surviving (and frequently anthropogenically relocated) stocks”: Zalasiewicz, J., 
Williams, M., Smith, A., Barry, T.L., Coe, A.L., Brown, P.R., Brenchley, P., Cantrill, D., Gibbard, P., 
Gregory, F.J., Hounslow, M.W., Kerr, A.C., Pearson, P., Knox, R., Powell, J., Waters, C., Marshall, J., 
Oates, M., Rawson, P., and Stone, P., 2008, ‘Are We Now Living in the Anthropocene?’ GSA Today, 
28(2), 4-8; also Davis, M., 2008, ‘Living on the Ice Shelf: Humanity’s Melt Down’, 26/6/2008, 
http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/tomdispatch/2008/06/welcome-to-the-anthropocene.html, 
accessed 5.08.08. On current trends it is estimated that around 50% of all living species will have 
disappeared by the end of this century: in August 2008 the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources announced in its ‘Red List’ of threatened species that 48% of all primates 
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forestation of old-growth forests from 1850 onwards, and their replacement with 
radically simplified landscapes and ecosystems suited to the requirements of capital 
accumulation.172 The negative consequences of this loss of biodiversity are well 
documented and increasingly well-understood within the natural sciences and 
beyond.173 In the first place, the various ecological services provided by a bio-
diverse ecosystem – prevention of soil erosion, groundwater replenishment and flood 
prevention, nutrient recycling, ‘control of local microclimate, regulation of local 
hydrological processes, regulation of the abundance of undesirable organisms, and 
detoxification of noxious chemicals’ – disappear.174 Secondly, their absence means 
that the equivalent services must be compensated for, to some extent, via external 
inputs, which take the form of fossil fuel-based fertilisers, pesticides, and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
are now at risk of extinction: see ‘Primates Face ‘Extinction Crisis’’, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7541192.stm, accessed 5.08.08.. 
172 As much as ‘10 million square kilometers in croplands were gained globally during this period [1850- 
the present], primarily from conversion of forests and grasslands’: Steffen et al op cit., 96. Miguel Altieri 
observes that:  
Modern agriculture implies the simplification of the structure of the environment over vast areas, replacing 
nature’s diversity with a small number of cultivated plants and domesticated animals. In fact, the world’s 
agricultural landscapes are planted mostly with some 12 species of grain crops, 23 vegetable crop species, and 
about 35 fruit and nut crop species…i.e., no more than 70 plant species spread over approximately 1440 
million ha of presently cultivated land in the world, a sharp contrast with the diversity of plant species found 
within 1 ha of a tropical rain forest, which typically contains over 100 species of trees... Genetically, modern 
agriculture is shockingly dependent on a handful of varieties for its major crops…Researchers have repeatedly 
warned about the extreme vulnerability associated with this genetic uniformity….For example, in the US, 60–
70% of the total bean area is planted with 2–3 bean varieties, 72% of the potato area with four varieties and 
53% of the cotton area with three varieties.  
Altieri, M.A., 1999, ‘The Ecological Role of Biodiversity in Agro-ecosystems’, Agriculture, Ecosystems 
and Environment, 74, 19-31, 20. 
173
 The issue received international prominence at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 when the Convention 
on Biological Diversity was signed by 150 government leaders with the aim of ‘promoting sustainable 
development’: http://www.cbd.int/convention/, accessed 31.10.08. In 2002 the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, although it produced little by way of concrete 
outcomes and plans to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss: http://www.worldsummit2002.org/ , accessed 
31.10.08. The cause of promoting and protecting biodiversity received a boost with the publication in 
2005 of the UN-sponsored Millenium Ecosystem Assessment reports, the outcome of four years of work 
by 1360 experts from around the globe: http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/index.aspx, accessed 
31.10.08. The first main finding of the MEA was that  
Over the past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any 
comparable period of time in human history, largely to meet rapidly growing demands for food, fresh water, 
timber, fiber, and fuel. This has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on 
Earth:  
MEA 2005, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, op cit. On 3 January 2006 Dr. Ahmed 
Djoghlaf, Executive Secretary Of The Convention On Biological Diversity, issued a statement ‘[t]o [the] 
Citizens Of The World’ in which he emphasized that 
Two thirds of the services provided by nature to humankind are in decline, worldwide’, and further that 
‘[h]uman activity is putting such strain on the natural functions of Earth that the ability of the planet’s 
ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted: 
 http://www.cbd.int/doc/press/2006/pr-2006-01-2010-en.pdf, accessed 31.10.08. There appears to be 
little sign of a change in these trends. In September 2008 the World Wildlife Fund released its Living 
Planet Report which showed a decline in the Living Planet Index – a measure of biodiversity based on 
the tracking of populations of 1,313 vertebrate species from across the world – of 30% since 1970: 
http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publications/living_planet_report/living_planet_report_graphi
cs/lpi_interactive/, accessed 25.10.11. 
174
 Altieri 1999 op cit., 19. 
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herbicides, as well as extensive irrigation.175 However the application of these 
chemicals over time tends to compound the problems associated with the initial 
biodiversity loss, so that this form of agriculture becomes progressively more 
dependent on higher levels of inputs even as it depletes and pollutes water tables 
and worsens the quality of the soils.176 Intensive livestock operations have a 
particularly debilitating effect on the quality and integrity of nearby waterways.177  
Thirdly, genetic simplification and loss of biodiversity makes crops more vulnerable 
to pests and diseases. Repeated applications of the same pesticides and herbicides 
over many years has led to certain weeds and pests developing resistances that 
make them more of an environmental menace that they might otherwise have 
been.178 GM crops are also said to pose their own special threats to biodiversity 
through the risk of cross-pollination with wild species.179 
In addition to the loss of biodiversity, globalized industrial agriculture contributes as 
much as 33% of all greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), taking into account land 
conversions, de-forestation, techniques such as deep ploughing and the heavy 
applications of chemical fertilisers and pesticides, and the methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions of factory farmed animals.180 Further, a substantial amount of the 
                                                          
175
 These being the constituent elements of the Green Revolution. In relation to pesticide applications, 
their rate of increase grew globally in excess of ‘10% per year until the 1980s, when it slowed to about 
3% growth per year’, whilst chemical fertiliser use is expected to continue to grow until 2010: Steffen et 
al op cit., 87. Further, ‘[s]ince 1960, flows of reactive (biologically available) nitrogen in terrestrial 
ecosystems have doubled, and flows of phosphorus have tripled. More than half of all the synthetic 
nitrogen fertilizer, which was first manufactured in 1913, ever used on the planet has been used since 
1985’: MEA Synthesis report op cit,., 2. As regards water, the MEA Synthesis report states that ‘[t] The 
amount of water impounded behind dams quadrupled since 1960, and three to six times as much water is 
held in reservoirs as in natural rivers. Water withdrawals from rivers and lakes doubled since 1960; most 
water use (70% worldwide) is for agriculture’: op cit., 2.  
176 D.R. Montgomery, 2007, ‘Is Agriculture Eroding Civilization's Foundation?’ GSA Today, 17(10), 4-9; 
also Vandana Shiva’s Closing Address to the Soil Association Conference 
http://transitionculture.org/2007/02/13/vandana-shivas-closing-address-to-the-soil-association-
conference/, accessed 27.10.08. Intensified applications of chemicals also carries potential consequences 
for human health, as higher chemical residues are left on the food. 
177 Animal waste can harm water quality through surface runoff, leaching into soils and groundwater, direct 
discharges, and spills…Nutrients…sediment (erosion), pesticides, antibiotics, heavy metals, chemical disinfectants, 
and pharmaceuticals such as hormones are primary constituents of intensively produced animal facilities…Even 
under extensive production modes, streams and groundwater can be polluted by nitrogen from excreta’:  
Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 72-3.  
178 http://www.irac-online.org/documents/thefacts.pdf, accessed 1.7.09. Particular concerns have been 
raised about the appearance of so-called 'superweeds' that have developed resistance to Monsanto's 
glyphosate (RoundUp), the sale of which have increased substantially following the commercialisation 
of several genetically-modified crops in the 1990s: see B. Hindo, 2008, ‘Report Raises Alarm over 
'Superweeds'’, Busineness Week, 13.2.08, http://www.columbia.org/pdf_files/centerforfoodsafety36.pdf, 
accessed 1.07.09; also M-W. Ho, J. Cummins and P. Saunders, 2007, ‘GM Food Nightmare Unfolding in 
the Regulatory Sham’, Microbial Ecology in Heath and Disease, 19(2), 66-77. . 
179 Ho, Cummins and Saunders op cit.; Ong’wen and Wright op cit., 43-5; also Miller, G., 2008, 
‘Nanotechnology – the New Threat to Food’, Friends of the Earth, http://nano.foe.org.au/node/198, 
accessed 31.10.08.  
180 Barker, D., 2007, ‘The Rise and Predictable Fall of Globalized, Industrial Agriculture’, International 
Forum on Globalization, www.ifg.org/pdf/ag%20report.pdf, accessed 31.10.08, 10-11. Steffen et al 
comment that “[t]he most important land-use/cover change in terms of the carbon cycle is tropical 
deforestation and conversion to agriculture, which removes carbon from both the biomass of the trees 
through burning of the slash and from the soil through subsequent oxidation and erosion”: op cit., 121. 
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greenhouse emissions are produced through the sheer waste of the present 
globalised system of food production and distribution.181 Most climate modelling 
suggests that warming of one degree or greater will have significant negative 
impacts on crop yields in many parts of the world, so in this sense contemporary 
capitalist agriculture appears to be caught in a genuine contradiction, where its own 
practices are undermining the conditions for its future growth and development.182 
The context for contemporary debates about cheap food and capital accumulation 
are the projections, based on current demographic trends and changing dietary 
patterns, above all the putative ‘meatification’ of diets in China and India, that 
world food production will have to increase very substantially in the coming 
period.183 The commonly cited figure is the FAO’s 2009 claim that the world will 
have to produce 70% more food by 2050.184 Further, the new revolution in 
agricultural productivity will have to be achieved against the backdrop of a 70% 
decline in world crop production growth in the past twenty years.185 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Of all sectors of the global economy, “[a]gricultural activities generate the largest share, 58 percent, of 
the world’s anthropogenic non-carbon dioxide (non-CO2) emissions (84 percent of nitrous oxide (N2O), 
47 percent of methane (CH4)), and make up roughly 14 percent of all anthropogenic GHG emissions”: 
Beach, R.H., DeAngelo, B.J., Rose, S., Li, C., Salas, W., and Stephen J. DelGrosso, S.J., 2006, 
‘Mitigation Potential and Costs for Global Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, 
http://www.johnquiggin.com/rsmg/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2006/09/beach%20ag%20abatement.pdf, accessed 27.10.08. The GHG burden of 
capitalist industrialised agriculture is ‘projected to increase significantly over the next 20 years, 
especially in Asia, Latin America and Africa, due to increased demand for agricultural products as a 
result of population growth, rising per capita caloric intake, and changing dietary preferences’: World 
meat demand ‘has tripled since 1961’ (Steffen et al op cit., 86); and factory farming on its own is 
estimated to be responsible for up to 18 per cent of all greenhouse gas emissions, meaning that 
‘omnivores contribute seven times the volume of GHGs that vegans do’: Safran Foer, J., 2008, Eating 
Animals, Hamish Hamilton, Camberwell, Vic., 58. 
181 “In 2004 the United Kingdom exported 17,600 tons of chocolate-covered wafers and imported 
17,200, exported 85,652 tons of potatoes and imported 43,993, and exported 27,125 tons of milk and 
cream while importing 25,720”: Ong’Wen, O., and Wright, S., 2007, ‘Small Farmers and the Future of 
Sustainable Agriculture’, EcoFair Trade Dialogue, Discussion Paper No.7,  
182 Mark Lynas (2007, Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet, Fourth Estate, London) undertook a 
survey of peer-reviewed science to chart the anticipated impacts of each degree of warming on the major 
geographical regions of the planet. At one degree, ‘the western US could once again be plagued by 
perennial droughts – devastating agriculture and driving out human inhabitants on a scale far larger than 
the 1930s [dustbowl] calamity’: 9. At four degrees, China’s ‘[y]ields of staple crops like rice, wheat and 
maize will decline by nearly 40 per cent’; in India ‘it will simply be too hot for most crops to survive’; 
and as a general observation ‘it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that mass starvation will be a 
permanent danger for much of the human race…With major global breadbaskets dusty and abandoned, 
rising demand will be chasing rapidly diminishing supply’: 185-7.  
183 While the global population has doubled since the early 1960s, the tonnage of meat for human 
consumption has risen four-fold, to 276 million tons by 2006: Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 68.  
184 FAO, 2009, How to Feed the World in 2050, available at: http://www.fao.org/wsfs/forum2050/wsfs-
background-documents/issues-briefs/en/, accessed 18.10.11. Interestingly, the 70% total food increase 
exactly matches the anticipated 70% increase in meat consumption, from 275 million tonnes in 2007 to 
465 million tons in 2050: Weis op cit., 328, citing Halweil 2008. In some formulations, this is interpreted 
to mean that ‘more food will have to be produced [over the next thirty years] than in the last 10,000 
years’: United Nations University, Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU–INWEH), 
Proceedings of the International Forum Celebrating the Centenary of Conservation and Restoration of 
Soil and Vegetation, Selfoss, Iceland, August 31– September 4, 2007, cited in Turzi, M., 2011, ‘The 
Soybean Republic’, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Spring-Summer 2011, 59-68, 60. 
185 The FAO’s current projected increase for world crop production from 1979/1999 to 2030 is only 55%, 
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This slowdown in crop production growth confirms that the yield increases of the 
Green Revolution are exhausting themselves.186 This trend, when combined with 
commodity speculation and the agro-fuels boom, has produced an historically 
unprecedented run-up in food prices in recent years, with very noticeable spikes in 
2008 and 2011 (Figure [5]).  
 
 
 
Figure [5] FAO Food Price Index
187 
Further, there is, as Figure [6] shows, a close correlation between the FAO Index 
and the global oil price:  
                                                                                                                                                                        
as compared with an achieved increase of 126% from 1965-1999: FAO 2009 op cit.  
186 The critical view is that such increases were in important respects illusory, because they were 
premised on financially unsustainable and ecologically destructive levels of agri-chemical inputs and 
intensive irrigation. 
187 Available at: http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/, accessed 
18.10.11. 
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Figure [6] FAO Food Price and Brent Crude Oil Price, 2000-2011
188 
Correlation does not, of course, equate to causation; however as discussed below, 
there are good reasons to believe that a causal relation exists, given the high level 
of dependence of industrialised agriculture on fossil fuel sources of energy.189 The 
seeming end of the era of ‘cheap’ energy constitutes the cutting edge of what Tony 
Weis calls ‘accelerating biophysical contradictions’ that puts the sustainability and 
profitability of the globalising capitalist food system over the medium term into 
considerable question.190 
The origins of these biophysical contradictions can be traced to the 
institutionalisation by neoclassical economics of the practice of cost externalisation, 
in which ‘nature’ is treated, not as a factor of production that must be paid and 
accounted for like labour or rent or inputs, but as a ‘free gift’.191 Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this means that there is no limit in free market doctrine as to how far 
social goods, such as water and air quality, can decline.192 Contemporary orthodox 
economics, in its ‘life-blind accounting’, effectively obscures from view virtually the 
                                                          
188 Ali, S., and Eidelman, V., 2011, ‘The Surge in Food Prices: What’s Different this Time?’ International 
Economic Bulletin, 21.4.11, available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/21/surge%2Din%2Dfood%2Dprices%2Dwhat%2Ds%2Ddifferen
t%2Dthis%2Dtime/ex7 , accessed 18.10.11. 
189 Weis argues that the inflation-inducing dynamics expected as the first impacts of peak were clearly 
visible in the run-up to the food price crisis of 2008, ‘when there was a relatively parallel movement 
between indexes of fertiliser and oil costs and food prices’: Weis, T., 2010, ‘The Accelerating 
Biophysical Contradictions of Industrial Capitalist Agriculture’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(3), 
315-341, 324. 
190 Ibid., 319. 
191 Patel, R., 2010, The Value of Nothing, Black Inc., Melbourne, 43-4; Albritton op cit., 28; Moore 2010 
op cit.; Moore, J., 2008, ‘Ecological Crises and the Agrarian Question in World-Historical Perspective’, 
Monthly Review, November 2008, 53-62, 56; Waring 1998 – feminist critique of the ignoring and 
undervaluing of the ‘caring labour’ provided by women. 
192 McMurty, J., 1997, ‘The Contradictions of Free Market Doctrine: Is There a Solution?’ Journal of 
Business Ethics, 16(7), 645-662, 648.  
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entirety of the foundations which makes ‘economic’ activity possible in the first 
place.193  
These externalities constitute ‘a vast series of implicit subsidies to cheap industrial 
food’ which, combined with the large explicit subsidies discussed in Chapter 4, 
greatly enhance the competitiveness of the globalising capitalist food system vis-à-
vis ‘more labour-intensive agricultural systems’.194 Such subsidies are therefore both 
a major driver of both over-production and the intensification of inequalities. Weis 
distinguishes between those externalities that can be socialised and do not ‘pos[e] a 
threat to the operative logic of the system’; and other externalised costs which 
‘mask the deterioration of the very biophysical foundations of agriculture’, and 
which are therefore ‘deeply contradictory’.195 Amongst the former he includes the 
burden of dietary-related ill-health and food-related disease threats, factory-farm 
related pollution, injuries to workers, and the ethical mistreatment of animals in 
factory farms.196 The latter include ‘soil erosion and salinization’; the drawdown of 
global freshwater supplies; biodiversity and ‘ecosystem services’ loss; the 
contribution of industrialised agriculture to climate change; and ‘the intractable 
dependence of industrial methods upon a finite resource base, particularly fossilised 
biomass’.197  
Highlighting this fossil-fuel dependency, Weis places much emphasis on the 
apparently immanent phenomenon of ‘Peak Oil’. Owing to the need to ‘simplify, 
standardize and mechanize agriculture, and increase productivity per worker, plant 
and animal’, the level of the dependence on fossil fuels has reached the point where 
‘an average 10 calories of fossil fuels’ are now required to produce a single calorie 
of food in the industrialised capitalist food system.198 Geological studies predict, in 
                                                          
193 This would include:  
[A]ll of the ecosystem services and resources which are sources and sinks of unpaid and despoiling 
exploitation by the monetized economy’s for-profit circuits, all of the past and current research and 
development of and by the public sector institutions and free and unpriced inquiry, all of the unpaid labour of 
homemakers and of the other work given beyond money wages, all of the public sectors of free goods of every 
kind…all of the non-priced school, hospital, pension and other public services we depend on, all of the 
historical heritage and web of communities which are not priced or saleable…[All this] complex substructure 
of the life economy is voided by the neo-classical market value calculus… 
McMurty, J., 2003, ‘The Life-Blind Structure of the Neoclassical Paradigm: A Critique of Bernard 
Hodgson's Economics As a Moral Science’, Journal of Business Ethics, 44(4), 377-389, 386.  
194 Weis 2010 op cit., 316  
195 Ibid.  
196 The rearing of pigs – ‘an animal more intelligent than dogs’ – in factory farms is especially cruel: 
‘The animals often experience crippling because of the metal or concrete floors, and sow’s legs 
eventually break down under the stress of being forced to overproduce piglets…The piglets can be 
grown stacked on top of each other in crates…’: Yarger (1996) quoted in Emel and Neo 2011 op cit., 74.  
197 Ibid.  
198 Ibid., 321. Weis suggests that the ratio is likely higher as regards the production of meat in the factory 
farmed animal system, which is by itself one of the principal contributors to greenhouse gas emissions 
(Safran Foer op cit.) Historical data shows that global economic and population growth, as well as the 
creation and maintenance of the high levels of material comfort which are now taken for granted in 
modern industrial societies, have to a very important extent been made possible by the abundance of 
cheaply recoverable oil and natural gas that has been readily available and accessible since World War II: 
For example the work of German physicist Professor Reiner Kummel, American ecologist Professor 
Charles Hall and their colleagues revealed that conventional (neoclassical) economic modeling had 
grossly under-emphasised – by a factor of 10 - the role played by hydrocarbon energy as a motor of 
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the short term, the increasing scarcity of easily recoverable oil as global demand 
outstrips discovery, production and then supply.199 The increasing resort to more 
difficult, dangerous and more highly polluting sources of fossil fuel energy, such as 
deep-sea drilling, coal-seam gas ‘fracking’, and tar sands, as well as the turn to 
agro-fuels as a liquid fuels substitute, appears to support the conclusion that the 
world is either rapidly approaching the global peak of oil production, or has passed 
it.200  
The tradition of political ecology requires the researcher to integrate scientific 
discovery and knowledge with a sceptical and reflexive stance towards the socio-
economic and political implications of this knowledge, and in particular the use 
being made of it by ruling elites.201 This is especially important with claims 
regarding ‘natural limits’ and ‘the creation of scarcity’ which, as Gavin Bridge 
notes, ‘is the heart of capitalist society, whereas for peak oil it is a natural 
condition’.202 Conventional, ‘naturalist’ accounts of Peak Oil as geologically 
determined are, in Bridge’s analysis, ‘politically problematic’, because they  
[F]oreclose arguments about the social organization of oil production, the limited 
time-horizon of a market-based energy policy, or the ways in which the social 
                                                                                                                                                                        
economic growth, with a correspondingly large over-emphasis of the importance of capital, labour and 
technological advances: Hall, C., Lindenberger, D., Kummel, R., Kroeger, T., and Wolfgang, E., 2001, 
‘The Need to Reintegrate the Natural Sciences with Economics’, BioScience, August 2001, discussed in 
Strahan, D., 2007, The Last Oil Shock: A Survival Guide to the Imminent Extinction of Petroleum Man, 
John Murray, London, 119-124. Kummel and Hall’s paper was complemented by physicist and engineer 
Professor Robert Ayres’ examination of the impact on economic growth of gains in thermodynamic 
efficiency in energy usage during the 20th century: Ayres, R.U., and Warr, B., 2004, ‘Accounting for 
Growth: The Role of Physical Work’, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, February 2004, 
discussed in Strahan op cit., 122-3. Gavin Bridge (Bridge, G., 2011, Past Peak Oil: Political Economy of 
Energy Crises in Peet, R., Robbins, P., and Watts, M., (eds.), 2011, Global Political Ecology, Routledge, 
Abingdon, Oxon., 307-324) notes how the available data ‘evidences the strong, positive correlation 
between energy consumption and economic output for [dozens of] countries’, and globally, ‘where 
economic output and total commercial primary energy supply have both risen about 16-fold in the last 
100 years’: 307. See also Heinberg, R., 2010, The End of Growth: Adapting to Our New Economic 
Reality, Post Carbon Institute; Martenson, C., 2011, The Crash Course: The Unsustainable Future of 
Our Economy, Energy and Environment, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ. 
199 Thus, according to the US Army Corps of Engineers in 2005, 
The doubling of oil prices from 2003-2005 is not an anomaly, but a picture of the future. Oil production is 
approaching its peak; low growth in availability can be expected for the next 5 to 10 years. As worldwide 
petroleum production peaks, geopolitics and market economics will cause even more significant price 
increases and security risks. One can only speculate at the outcome from this scenario as world petroleum 
production declines…  
Fournier, D.F., and Westervelt, E.T., 2005, Energy Trends and Their Implications for US Army 
Installations, US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Sept.2005, 
cited in Strahan op cit., 205. 
200 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the world passed the ‘conventional peak’ of 
crude oil in 2006, however the IEA forecasts that ‘total liquids’ (i.e. crude oil from fields yet to be 
developed and / or yet to be found, natural gas liquids and ‘unconventional oil’) will continue to increase 
as far ahead as 2035: Staniford, S., 2010, ‘IEA Acknowledges Peak Oil’, 
http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2010-11-11/iea-acknowledges-peak-oil, accessed 18.10.11.  
201 Peet et al op cit.  
202 Op cit, 316.  
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metabolism of oil via the hydrocarbon commodity chain has effectively excluded 
many of oil’s social and environmental costs from the calculus of market price.203  
In his exploration of the ‘materialities of oil’ – the ‘biophysical characteristics and 
material forms of oil as it flows in and through society and the way these are 
productive of particular forms of social relations’ – Bridge highlights that the 
‘scarcity of oil [is] not a generalized physical shortage but a shortage relative to 
modes of living’.204 In an ‘oil-constrained’ future in which scarcity is socially and 
politically constructed, access to oil, and the benefits it confers, will be contingent 
on existing distributions of political and economic power; and indeed whether 
society continues to be organised primarily according to a ‘fossil fuel mode of 
production’.205 From this critical perspective, Peak Oil should be understood as an 
opportunity to politicise and shape debates around the necessary ‘energy transition’ 
to ‘low-carbon pathways’ and even ‘post-growth’ societies, rather than as a 
‘natural’ imperative to uncritically accept and replicate the ‘future-as-catastrophe’ 
discourse that constitutes much of the popular presentation of the topic.206 As 
Bridge notes, the ‘crisis’ of the ‘fossil fuel mode of production’ is located ‘not in 
any post-peak apocalypse, but [rather] in the everyday “normal” operation of the 
contemporary oil economy’.207  
At present, Weis argues that the global food ‘crisis’ – and by extension the 
contemporary ‘energy crisis’ - is very firmly seen as an opportunity for transnational 
agri-business and finance capital; his assessment is that the basic operative logic of 
the system ‘remains as yet unshaken’.208 The implications of the critical perspective 
on peak oil as outlined above is that the Food Sovereignty movement is faced with 
an important and historical opportunity to intervene in emerging popular 
understandings of what will likely be a key terrain of political-economic contestation 
in the coming period.  
Periods of crisis and their resolution are of course hardly novel in the history of 
capitalism. As I discussed in Chapter 2, Jason Moore’s thesis that the ‘productivity 
and plunder’ of successive agricultural revolutions, and the consequent generation 
of an ‘ecological surplus’, have created the conditions for ‘long waves’ of capitalist 
accumulation, suggests that periodic ‘developmental crises’ emerge in capitalist 
development which these revolutions resolve.209  
                                                          
203 Ibid.  
204 Ibid., 317.  
205 Ibid. 321, citing Huber 2009 op cit. See also Bakker, K., 2011, The Social Construction of Scarcity: 
the case of Water in Western India in Peet, R., Robbins, P., and Watts, M., (eds.), 2011, Global Political 
Ecology, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 371-386.  
206 Bridge 2011 op cit., 321. For example, a study prepared for German army on the implications of peak 
oil and leaked to the German newspaper Der Spiegel, and then widely re-circulated on the internet, 
forecast a range of ‘catastrophic’ consequences: Schulz, S., 2010, ‘Military Study Warns of a Potentially 
Drastic Oil Crisis’, Der Spiegel, 1.9.10, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715138,00.html, accessed 18.10.11.  
207 Op cit., 321.  
208 Weis op cit., 332.  
209 Moore 2010 op cit. 
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Following this reasoning, the issue now is whether the ‘global food price crisis’ that 
began in 2008 is becoming an epochal crisis, not only for the food system but for 
capitalism as a whole; whether the historically unprecedented commodity price rises 
of the past few years are threatening to bring to a definitive end consecutive 
centuries of ‘cheap food’.210 The forms of ‘productivity and plunder’ attempted to 
date have not (yet) achieved the desired results. Biotechnology has failed to 
produce the promised major yield increases; and may even be causing yields to fall 
by intensifying the loss of biodiversity and contributing to the evolution of 
superweeds.211 The scope for further plunder, in terms of bringing more arable land 
into the circuits of capitalist agriculture, is relatively limited.212 Perversely, yet 
predictably, where agricultural extensification and intensification are taking place 
on a large scale, as in the ‘Republic of Soy’ in the southern cone of South America, 
they are not alleviating the problem of a declining ecological surplus, but rather 
intensifying it.213 That is, the manner in which the globalising capitalist food system 
is now expanding – through rapid de-forestation, and by expropriating vast acreages 
of arable land for agro-fuel production – is both accelerating the system’s 
‘biophysical contradictions’ (soil degradation loss, end of cheap energy, climate 
change, biodiversity loss) and making high food prices a permanent feature of the 
                                                          
210 Moore 2010 op cit., 398, describing the ‘unravelling of the cheap food regime [in] 2003] as ‘the 
signal crisis of neoliberalism as an ecological regime…the moment at which the [regime] has reached its 
tipping point in the production of the relative ecological surplus…A terminal crisis awaits’.  
211 According to the first detailed evaluation of the ‘yield effect of [genetic engineering, GE] after more 
than 20 years of research and 13 years of commercialisation in the United States’, is that ‘GE has done 
little to increase overall crop yields’: Gurian-Sherman, D., 2009, ‘Failure to Yield: Evaluating the 
Performance of Genetically Engineered Crops’, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA; Altieri, 
M., A., and Rosset, P., 1999, ‘Strengthening the Case for Why Biotechnology will not help the 
Developing World: A Response to McGloughlin’, AgBioForum, 2(3 & 4), 226-236, 229; Pretty, J., 2001, 
‘The Rapid Emergence of Genetic Modification in World Agriculture: Contested Risks and Benefits’, 
Environmental Conservation, 28, 248-262; Rosset, P.M., 2005, ‘Transgenic Crops to Address Third 
World Hunger? A Critical Analysis’, Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, 25(4), 306-313; cf 
Sanvido, O., Romeis, J., and Bigler, F., 2007, ‘Ecological Impacts of Genetically-Modified Crops: Ten 
Years of Research and Commercial Cultivation’, Advances in Biochemical Engineering / Biotechnology, 
107, 235-278. 
212 While the Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates that only a third of the world’s total arable 
land is currently under cultivation, much of the remainder is marginal or otherwise constrained land in 
Africa and South America that is unsuitable to the commercial, mechanised production that characterises 
capitalist agriculture: FAO, World Agriculture: Towards 2015 / 2030, Chapter 3, Crop Production and 
Natural Resource Use, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4252e/y4252e06.htm, accessed 
18.10.11. Thus, while there are potentially 2 billion hectares available for rain-fed crop production, over 
60 per cent of it ‘suffers from one or more soil and terrain constraints [and] much of the land balance 
cannot be considered to be a resource that is readily usable for food production on demand’. Further, 
‘arable land per capita has fallen by more than half over the past half-century, declining from 0.46 ha per 
person in 1961 to 0.21 ha per person in 2006’; the impacts of increased population with contemporary 
dynamics of land degradation mean that ‘the obvious outcome is that arable land per capita will continue 
to fall’: Weis op cit., 327, citing FAOSTAT.  
213 The Republic of Soy is comprised of an estimated 50 million hectares of land in In Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia devoted to GM soy monocultures destined for processing and export 
either as animal feed for factory farms or as agro-fuels: Altieri, M., and Pengue, W., 2006, ‘GM 
Soybean: Latin America’s new coloniser’, Seedling, January 2006; It is ‘an integrated network of 
production, processing and distribution organized according to the needs of transnational [corporations] 
to leverage cost advantages across borders, raise efficiency, and take advantage of production-related 
infrastructural developments’: Turzi 2011 op cit. 
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global political economy, thereby intensifying the system’s social contradictions at 
the same time.214 
Concluding remarks 
The globalising capitalist food system is organised to further the goal of capital 
accumulation; ‘feeding the world’ in its entirety clothes the system with ideological 
legitimacy, but is in no way central to its operational logic and internal dynamics. It 
is for this reason that Moore makes the important point that ‘[g]lobalizing 
malnutrition does not add up to a “food crisis” [because] [s]o long as hunger can be 
corralled, and imposed on the very poorest of the world, there is no great 
problem’.215 In other words, there may well be a humanitarian ‘food crisis’ in the 
moral and ethical sense of spreading malnutrition, but this will only become a crisis 
for capitalism if the ecological surplus cannot continue to be produced, and 
profitability comes under sustained pressure as a consequence. The same reasoning 
applies to the obesity pandemic which, paradoxically, has served to open up new 
fields of accumulation for pharmaceutical corporations.  
At the same time, Moore, in his singular focus on the world-ecological development 
of capitalist agriculture, overlooks the subjective element in the unfolding crisis: 
the capacity of the poor and dispossessed, through the means of political 
mobilisation and class struggle, to make the humanitarian crisis into a broader 
political crisis of legitimacy for the system as a whole.216 Similarly Weis, in drawing 
the distinction between contradictory and non-contradictory externalities, also runs 
the risk of occluding and thereby minimising the prospects of effective agency based 
inter alia on the growing perception of the system as irrational, unjust and radically 
unsustainable. 
This of course is exactly what the Food Sovereignty movement is attempting to do. 
There is however clearly a need for the movement to be sensitive to the objective 
dynamics of capital accumulation, as Moore, Weis and others have analysed them, 
and to incorporate such analysis into the movement’s critiques and strategies. 
Beyond the work of analysis and critique, the Food Sovereignty movement needs to 
develop political and economic proposals that offer a genuinely transformative 
                                                          
214 For most  
‘[F]irst-generation’ agro-fuels, the net energy return is ‘invariably at best thin, at worst negative…Based on 
output per land area, it is estimated that roughly two-fifths of all cropland in the USA and EU would need to 
be devoted to biofuels to substitute only 10 per cent of current oil consumption…In short, rather than 
providing a partial fix for the crisis of liquid energy, the current biofuel boom is based upon an irrational 
biophysical budget and threats to worsen rather than reduce anthropogenic climate change: it at once fortifies 
the operative logic of industrial capitalist agriculture and exaggerates its contradictions’: ibid., 325-6. 
215 Moore op cit., 399, observing that ‘[t]he great boom of the long twentieth century was constructed on 
the mass graves of the ‘late Victorian holocausts’. John McMurty (1997 op cit.) similarly observes that 
‘need without effective demand counts for nothing’ and ‘is not recognised’ by the market: 645. ‘It 
follows’, he continues, ‘that people without the money to purchase goods do not have under the rules of 
the free market the right to live’: 646.  
216 Habermas, J., 1975, Legitimation Crisis, Beacon Press, Boston, Mass.; O'Connor, J., 1987, The 
Meaning of Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Habermas’ conception of a 
legitimation crisis is whether the combination of social, economic and political circumstances are such 
as to potentially place in doubt the continued functional and symbolic integration of the particular 
system under consideration without the bringing about of major changes in both its form and its 
substance.  
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alternative to the current trajectories of the globalising capitalist food system; and 
an alternative that responds to the necessities of, and therefore appeals to, growing 
numbers of subordinate classes and groups, and not simply to the immediate 
priorities of farmers. I consider the extent to which this is or is not being done in 
Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
Responses to the socio-economic and 
ecological context 
Small Farmers Cool the Planet!  
La Via Campesina, 2010 
 
 
In Chapter 6, I discussed the economic and ecological context of the globalising 
capitalist food system, focusing attention on the stability of the socio-economic 
configurations that constitute the system, as well as the system’s key socio-
economic and ecological tensions. In terms of the key Gramscian question regarding 
the ‘effective reality’ and the balance of forces, the main conclusion to be drawn 
from the discussion of the context is that, while the configurations of large 
economic actors at the centre of the system appear both stable and powerful, this 
stability and power rests on an increasingly fragile ecological basis. Further, while 
the system’s basic operative logic appears not to be encountering any serious 
challenges, and indeed seems to have been reinforced and even strengthened by 
the contemporary global food and financial crises, there are good reasons to believe 
that the cheap food complex on which this logic depends for its continuity may be 
approaching the end of its possibilities for further development, within the confines 
of the capitalist food system.  
In this chapter the analysis shifts once more to the question of the effectiveness of 
the agency of the actors that constitute the Food Sovereignty movement. I argue 
that food sovereignty proponents have begun to articulate a coherent political-
economic project that, if implemented on a sufficiently large scale, would result in 
substantively transformed social relations around food and farming. As a matter of 
praxis, elements of this project have been and are being implemented in diverse 
places around the world, providing tangible demonstrations of what a new food 
system would mean in practice.  
At the same time, the theoretical exposition of food sovereignty is in its relative 
infancy. In this chapter I indicate some potential avenues of research and praxis, 
linked to the conceptualisation of economic democracy, cooperatives, and the 
commons, which I discuss further in the Conclusion. These linkages may prove 
fruitful not only in giving greater theoretical depth and coherence to food 
sovereignty; but also – consistent with a Gramscian theory of politics – of great 
value in terms of political strategy, as regards the articulation of a project or 
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projects in the universal interest, and the building of cross-class and cross-sectoral 
alliances.  
The discussion of my case studies, supported by the secondary literature, reveals a 
number of obstacles to the further development of the counter-hegemonic 
potential of the Food Sovereignty movement. These obstacles take various forms, 
according to the geographical and historical context. In countries such as the US 
and Australia there are, within the current market mechanisms for food distribution 
and sale, significant difficulties in scaling up what to date have been essentially 
small-scale and niche experiments in food localisation. Further, there is potential 
for local food initiatives to be co-opted into the principal circuits of the capitalist 
food system, and the general ideology of neoliberalism, as simply another 
‘purchasing choice’, catering to the market segment described by ‘lifestyles of 
health and sustainability’. More generally, there are legitimate concerns regarding 
the extent to which consumer behaviours can effect social change, if not 
consciously linked to a political praxis that has transformation as its long-term goal.  
In countries such as Ecuador, Guatemala, and Indonesia, the principal obstacles 
concern the difficulties in effecting genuinely redistributive agrarian reform 
processes, combined with a continued pro-export orientation of several national 
governments. As discussed in previous chapters, amongst other impacts, this has 
resulted, when overlaid with the growing financialisation of the food system in 
recent years, in phenomena such as the wave of land acquisitions for agro-export 
and speculative purposes.  
These obstacles and limitations notwithstanding, my assessment is that food 
sovereignty proponents have exercised, and are exercising, effective agency by 
expanding the realm of the possible, and shifting the existing disposition of forces 
to the extent of demonstrating the viability of elements of an alternative system 
based on new forms of food production and food-based social relations. At this 
point in time, many of the elements of this alternative system are still in embryonic 
stage and do not yet pose any serious threat to the dominance of the principal 
socio-economic configurations of the globalising capitalist food system. 
Nevertheless, if one looks towards the trajectory of the movement, as distinct from 
its actual impact to date, the potential to effect transformative change is 
significant and increasing.1 Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 6, objective 
economic and ecological conditions are pushing in the direction of the greater 
realisation of this potential.  
Organisation of the chapter 
First, I present, by reference to my case studies, the primary literature of Via 
Campesina and the secondary academic literature, an outline of the political 
economic model that food sovereignty might be said to represent. I focus on the 
nature of the social relations that are contemplated in a food sovereignty model, 
and contrast these with the social relations prevailing under the globalising 
                                                          
1 Following Amory Starr’s (Starr, A., 2010, ‘Local Food: A Social Movement?’ Cultural Studies, 
Critical Methodologies, 10(6), 479-490, 486-7) approach to the analysis of local food – and by 
extension, Food Sovereignty – as a social movement.  
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capitalist food system. By reference to a brief discussion of recent work regarding 
economic democracy, I also draw attention to some of the existing shortcomings 
within food sovereignty theory and political-economic praxis.  
Secondly, I examine the theory and praxis of agro-ecology, which in my thesis 
constitutes one of the three central pillars – both as a matter of theory and praxis - 
of food sovereignty. The capacity of agro-ecology to achieve sustained yields is an 
issue that bears directly on its legitimacy, and therefore on its potential to 
challenge the common sense that only large-scale, mechanised and technologically 
‘sophisticated’ capitalist industrialised agriculture can ‘feed the world’; and thus 
its potential to challenge the hegmony of the globalising capitalist food system.  
Thirdly, I consider the question as to whether, and to what extent, ‘re-
peasantisation’ is taking place, having regard to the nature of the system’s social 
relations as discussed in Chapter 6. The clear historical trajectory for the past 100 
years has been, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, the progressive exodus of farmers 
and peasants from the countryside. The halting and reversal of this dynamic is 
crucial to the counter-hegemonic aspirations of food sovereignty. In this discussion I 
will return once more to the question of agrarian reform, which is another of the 
central pillars of food sovereignty.  
Next, I turn to the Australian case studies, and the examination of food localisation 
as the third crucial pillar of food sovereignty. Locating them with the growth in 
recent years of local food initiatives around Australia and internationally, I discuss 
the economic and ecological significance of the local food movement on the Coffs 
Coast and of Food Connect, with a particular focus on the thought and practice of 
Food Connect’s founder, Robert Pekin. I also discuss the obstacles and barriers to 
scaling up that Food Connect has encountered, the strategies it has adopted to 
overcome these, and the degree of success it has achieved to date. Finally I 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of the emergent Food Hub movement, as a 
likely next iteration of the Food Connect model in Australia. 
The Gramscian method suggests that change needs to be based from within the 
prevailing common sense which, in countries such as Australia and the US and, is 
formed within the material and discursive contours of market-based consumerism. 
The Food Connect case study shows that purchasing choices can serve as an entry 
point into a broader community of interest, dedicated to lasting and transformative 
social change. In this way food purchasing decisions can in themselves be 
politicising; but whether they assume that form is highly contextual and contingent; 
both on the character of the social relations in which these decisions take place, 
and on the degree of transformative intentionality that they embody. 
The political-economic model of food sovereignty 
In discussing what the political-economy of food sovereignty might look like, we 
need to consider questions regarding the basic productive forces and nature of 
social relations within that economy, as well as (at least in broad outline) 
governance structures and decision-making processes. We also need to consider the 
scale at which such an economic model can feasibly operate.  
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Earlier in the thesis, I discussed recent theoretical conceptualisations of food 
sovereignty, each of which contained different emphases and points of departure. I 
noted that food sovereignty calls for democratised, localised and de-commodified 
food systems, founded on the principle of ‘radical egalitarianism’ which entails, 
amongst other things, the eradication of ‘class power’.2 The cluster of rights claims 
which La Via Campesina has advanced in its campaign for a new UN Declaration on 
Peasants’ Rights and in its articulations of food sovereignty, concerning inter alia 
the right to the means of agricultural production, the right to produce food for 
domestic and communal consumption, the right of environmental stewardship and 
the right to adequate incomes, proceed from its ‘peasant ontology and 
epistemology’.3 These rights are said to constitute the core of an ‘agrarian 
citizenship’, based on an ‘ecological rather than an economic rationality’.4 In this 
sense, the emergence of La Via Campesina and its project of food sovereignty as a 
‘critical agrarian modernism’ is said to constitute the politically conscious 
emergence of the global peasantry as a ‘class for itself’.5  
In Chapters 3 and 5 I demonstrated that, from its emergence in the mid-1990s with 
the relatively limited, reformist objective of trying to slow down or halt the 
liberalisation of global agricultural trade, and an insistence upon the participation 
of peasants and small farmers in the formulation of food and agricultural policies, 
the successive iterations of food sovereignty appear to be converting it into a 
political-economic project with radical and transformative ambitions.6 These 
ambitions are not mere rhetorical flourishes; rather, they are finding their practical 
expression in a variety of forms. In particular, the growing embrace within La Via 
Campesina of agro-ecology as a foundational pillar of food sovereignty is now 
explicitly being identified with an emerging post-capitalist, pro-socialist political-
economic project, drawing on the pan-indigenous concept and cosmology of buen 
vivir as the fundamental social objective that ought to guide all political and 
                                                          
2 Wittman, H., Desmarais, A.A., and Wiebe, N., 2010, Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature 
and Community, Fernwood Publishing, Black Point, Nova Scotia; Patel, R., 2010, What Does Food 
Sovereignty Look Like? in Wittman et al op cit., 194.  
3 McMichael, P., 2008a, ‘Peasants Make their Own History, But Not Just as They Please’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change, 8(1 & 2), 205-228.  
4 McMichael, P., 2010, Reconnecting Agriculture and the Environment: Food Sovereignty and the 
Agrarian Basis of Ecological Citizenship in Wittman et al op cit., 91-105; Wittman, H., 2009a, 
‘Reframing Agrarian Citizenship: Land, Life and Power in Brazil’, Journal of Rural Studies 25, 120-
130; Wittman, H., 2009b, ‘Reworking the Metabolic Rift: La Via Campesina, Agrarian Citizenship and 
Food Sovereignty’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(4), 805-826. 
5 Peet, R., and Hartwick, E., 1999, Theories of Development, Guildford Press, New York, 208; Bello, 
W., 2009, Food Wars, Verso, London.  
6 For example, the ‘Tlaxcala Declaration’ (International Conference of the Via Campesina, Tlaxcala, 
Mexico, April 18-21, 1996, available at http://www.virtualsask.com/via/lavia.deceng.html, accessed 
7.11.11) stated that ‘[La Via Campesina] is determined to influence the World Trade Organization in 
order to promote changes to the existing trade agreement. International trade agreements must take the 
interests of peasants and small farmers into full account…”: ibid. La Via Campesina’s position 
statement on food sovereignty, presented at the 1996 World Food Summit (The Right to Produce and 
Access to Land, available at: 
http://www.voiceoftheturtle.org/library/1996%20Declaration%20of%20Food%20Sovereignty.pdf, 
accessed 7.11.11), called for an end to the practice of dumping, the regulation of food prices, the 
forgiveness of debts, the control of speculative capital and a ‘strictly enforced Code of Conduct for 
transnational corporations’: ibid.  
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economic activity, replacing the capitalist rationality of endless economic growth 
irrespective of social and environmental costs.  
As I discussed in Chapter 2, buen vivir is explicitly juxtaposed to the profit- and 
capital accumulation-maximising imperatives of capitalism.7 This cosmology can be 
conceived as one attempt to overcome the ‘ecological rift’ that is, as Tony Weis 
puts it, ‘constitutive of capitalist agriculture’.8 Its embrace as a fundamentally 
different ordering principle for society might simultaneously begin to heal not only 
this ecological rift that flows from humanity’s alienation from nature; but also the 
social rift that flows from humanity’s alienation from itself, as observed in 
intensifying levels of inequality and the contemporary treadmill of ‘competitive 
consumption’.9 In the course of this chapter and the Conclusion, I develop these 
arguments further by suggesting that food sovereignty is an important expression of 
a growing consciousness that the recovery of substantive connectedness – with 
nature, with each other - is essential if human societies are to successfully respond 
to the gravity of the challenges with which we are faced.10  
Contemporary capitalism, as I conceived it in the Introduction, and as I have 
chartered its development in relation to food and agriculture in Chapters 4 and 6, is 
predicated on the maintenance and extension of the experience of atomisation and 
alienation. This atomisation and alienation is ontological, and has deep historical 
roots.1112 All the core features of capitalism - the employment relation; the well-
developed institutions of private property, centred on the private ownership of the 
means of production; the development of impersonal markets as the principal 
means of exchange of goods and services; the high degree of market compulsion to 
obtain the necessities of life – are predicated, it would seem, on the conception of 
‘the individual as the proprietor or owner of his own person or capacities’.13  
In the globalising capitalist food system, producers and consumers meet each other 
anonymously, and at great distance, via the ‘cash nexus’ of the supermarket shelf. 
Ultimately this is the core of the common sense that sustains the hegemony of the 
                                                          
7 La Via Campesina, 2011, ‘Final Declaration of the 2nd Continental Encounter of Agroecology Trainers 
in La Via Campesina’, Chimaltenango, Guatemala, 8 August 2011, available at: 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1105:2nd-latin-american-
encounter-on-agroecology&catid=23:agrarian-reform&Itemid=36, accessed 15.9.11. 
8 Weis, T., 2010, ‘The Accelerating Biophysical Contradictions of Industrial Capitalist Agriculture’, 
Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(3), 315-341. 
9 Panayotakis 2011 op cit. 
10 Eistenstein, C., 2007, The Ascent of Humanity, Pananthea Press, Harrisburg, PA.  
11 Historically, the transition from feudalism to capitalism was, as is well known, made possible by the 
separation of English peasants from the land, and their forced conversion into wage labourers: Melman, 
S., 1999, After Capitalism: From Managerialism to Workplace Democracy, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 
35-44, who describes the enclosures as the ‘founding alienation’ that gave birth to capitalism. Melman 
notes how attempts by the new generations of workers to organise themselves to better their conditions 
were proscribed as a ‘heinous crime’ as early as the 1349 Statute of Labourers, which remained in force 
in various iterations until 1825: 42.  
12
 CB MacPherson provides a persuasive account that the liberal theory of ‘possessive individualism’, 
derived from Hobbes and Locke, forms a central part of the ontology on which contemporary capitalist 
market society is based: MacPherson, C.B., 1962, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: 
From Hobbes to Locke, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 4-5.  
13 Ibid.; Howard, M., and King,.. 2008, The Rise of Neoliberalism in Advanced Capitalist Economies: A 
Materialist Analysis, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 43-49.  
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globalising capitalist food system: the appearance of alienation and separation, 
naturalised as the norm and ‘saturating the consciousness’, because affirmed daily 
through lived experience. A key part of the transformative potential of food 
sovereignty lies in the offering of an alternative ontology. The new cosmology of 
buen vivir, based on connectedness, not separation; on mutual respect, not self-
interested exploitation; and on quality, not quantity, via the abandonment of GDP, 
offers a promising avenue for the grounded practice of this ontology. Food is what 
constitutes us: we are - physically, emotionally, spiritually - what we eat. Through 
food and the daily practice of eating we can perpetuate the experience of 
alienation and separation; or we can begin to re-establish connectedness, and in 
the process start to heal the ecological and social rift. The potential of food 
sovereignty lies in its capacity to create a multitude of possibilities in which the 
daily experience of eating can tend towards connectedness. As connectedness 
through food becomes increasingly the norm, the common sense of the globalising 
capitalist food system will, arguably, struggle to compete with this emerging ‘good 
sense’. In my assessment, this is perhaps the most fruitful way in which Food 
Sovereignty can realise its counter-hegemonic potential.  
In calling for a localised and de-commodified food system, food sovereignty 
proponents do seem to grasp this potential, although as yet it does not appear to 
have been theorised in these terms. However, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, food 
sovereignty proponents have on the whole failed – and, as suggested earlier, this is 
likely due to the farmer-based origins of the discourse – to address systematically a 
central issue, in terms of the key tension of intensifying inequalities, of wage labour 
and employment relations.14 Food sovereignty calls for democratised food systems 
in terms of farmers determining, or at a minimum participating in the 
determination of, what is produced, in what quantities, for whom, at what price 
and in what markets; but it has not (as yet) made the logically parallel call for 
widening economic and workplace democracy.15  
In this respect, interestingly enough, the actual practice of local food may be 
running ahead of the theory, since food co-operatives (of both consumers and 
producers) appear to be experiencing a resurgence in the United States.16 One of 
the distinguishing features of co-operatives, of course, is that typically they are not 
                                                          
14 Borras 2008 op cit; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck op cit.  
15 Panayotakis 2011 op cit.; Dahl, R., 1985, A Preface to Economic Democracy, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, CA; Schweickart, D., 1992, ‘Economic Democracy: A Worthy Socialism that Would 
Really Work’, Science and Society, 56(1), 9-38; Melman, S., 1999, After Capitalism: From 
Managerialism to Workplace Democracy, Alfred A. Knopf, New York; Engler, A., 2010, Economic 
Democracy: The Working Class Alternative to Capitalism, Fernwood Publishing, Halifax & Winnipeg; 
Best, S. (ed.), 2009, ‘Global Capitalism and the Demise of the Left: Renewing Radicalism through 
Inclusive Democracy’, Special Issue of the International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, 5(1); 
Foutopolous, T., 2008, ‘The Myths about the Economic Crisis, the Reformist Left and Economic 
Democracy’, The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, 4(4) (October 2008); Jossa, B., 2004, 
‘Schweickart and Economic Democracy’, Review of Radical Political Economics, 36(4), 546-561.  
16 Tucker, V., 2010, ‘Food Co-ops Enjoy Resurgence’, Morning Sentinel, 26.4.10, 
http://www.onlinesentinel.com/news/food-co-ops-groups-enjoy-resurgence_2010-04-25.html, accessed 
22.11.11. 
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based on employment relationships; and so in that respect represent a de-
commodification of labour, and (arguably) a step towards workplace democracy.17  
Further, while food sovereignty directly contests the ethics and morality of a 
system of food production based on the commodity, which for Marx was the 
‘cellular form’ of capitalism, it has not systematically elaborated an alternative 
‘cellular form’ – such as the commons - that might form the basis of an alternative 
political economy.18 As Greig de Peuter and Nick Dyer-Witherford point out,  
Commons has become a concept connecting multifarious struggles against capital’s 
old but ongoing primitive accumulation and its new horizons of futuristic, high-tech 
accumulation. Beyond resistance to enclosures, commons politics involve renewed 
attention on the forms of association through which communities can govern shared 
resources…Commons discourse resumes older discussions about “public goods”, but 
breaks new ground, both in the range of ecological, biogenetic, and cultural 
domains it addresses, and in its interest in the possibilities for the organization of 
resources from below, rather than according to the models of command economies 
or bureaucratic welfare states.19 
As is the case with the call for democratised and localised food systems, food 
sovereignty frequently asserts commons rights and property forms: the right to 
communal and customary forms of land ownership; the right to save and share seed; 
and the right to reject the privatisation of water and other natural resources, being 
notable examples. Hence there are significant opportunities for theoretical and 
practical linkages with the growing commons movement.  
Explicitly incorporating within the development of food sovereignty the theory and 
praxis of the commons and forms of economic democracy represent significant 
opportunities. In terms of my research questions posed at the end of Chapter 2, 
such linkages would both deepen the critique that food sovereignty makes of the 
globalising capitalist food system; and render more coherent the content and 
practice of food sovereignty as a truly transformative and systemic alternative. 
Further, as a matter of political strategy and movement building, it is essential that 
food sovereignty expand its sphere of concern beyond farmers in the core capitalist 
countries, where farmers have shrunk to a tiny percentage of the total population. I 
pursue these points further below. 
On the following page, I set out in tabular form the productive forces and social 
relations contemplated in an ‘ideal type’ food system organised according to Food 
Sovereignty principles as I have analysed them in this thesis, compared with those 
prevailing in the globalising capitalist food system (see table [1] below).  
                                                          
17 de Peuter, G., and Dyer-Witherford, N., 2010, ‘Commons and Cooperatives’, Affinities: A Journal of 
Radical Theory, Culture and Action, 4(1), 30-56. Melman 1999, op cit., sets out the ‘core values of 
workplace democracy’ as 1) ‘disalienated decision-making’ in place of ‘managerialist decision-making’, 
2) solidarity amongst workers and the articulation of common social goals and values, in place of 
‘predatory competition for accumulation’, 3) mutual trust, and 4) equality: 435. ‘Disalienation’ 
describes ‘workers’ actions to restore power to affect their work, and their places in occupations and 
communities’: 3.  
18 De Peuter, G and Dyer-Witherford 2010 op cit.  
19 Ibid., 31. 
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 Productive Forces Social Relations Governance Structures 
Globalising 
Capitalist Food 
System 
 
Core organising 
principle: 
Alienation 
Land: Large-scale 
farms / plantations 
 
 
Other resources: 
Soil, water, 
simplified 
ecosystems 
 
Labour: Decreasing 
numbers of 
capitalist farmers; 
wage labour  
 
Capital (non-
finance): Large-
scale machinery, 
new technologies 
(e.g. GMOs), agro-
chemicals  
 
Capital (finance): 
investment banking, 
hedge funds, 
private equity 
Land concentration 
/ accumulation by 
dispossession 
 
Externalisation of 
costs 
 
 
High degree of 
exploitation of 
farmers and wage 
labour 
 
 
Concentration of 
ownership – 
oligopolies and 
monopolies 
 
 
Profit-orientation of 
finance capital 
causes multiple 
processes of 
accumulation by 
dispossession 
International: World 
Trade Organisation / 
Regional & Bilateral 
trade agreements 
World Bank (e.g. 
Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural 
Investment) 
 
National: Strong & 
enforceable systems of 
private property rights 
in land and intellectual 
property. 
Decisions about 
production volumes and 
food types are largely 
left to the market, with 
minimal government 
interference apart from 
food safety regulations 
that benefit agri-
business 
Food 
Sovereignty 
 
Core organising 
principle: 
Connectedness 
Land: Smaller-
scale, de-
centralised 
concentrations of 
land 
 
Other resources: 
Soil, water, bio-
diverse ecosystems 
Labour: 
Independent small-
scale farmers, 
peasant co-
operatives 
Capital (non-
finance): 
‘appropriate’-scale 
technologies, agro-
ecology, smaller-
scale mechanisation 
Capital (finance): 
state-backed loans 
and credit; co-
operative / 
community 
financing 
mechanisms  
Agrarian reform: 
expropriation of 
large land-owners 
 
 
 
 
Internalisation of 
costs 
 
Wage labour 
Agrarian citizenship 
 
 
 
 
Peer-to-peer 
learning, supported 
by state extension 
services 
 
 
Production 
organised according 
to an ‘ecological 
rationality’ 
International: 
Democratised United 
Nations, Reformed 
Committee on World 
Food Security, 
Convention on the 
Rights of Peasants 
 
 
 
National: State support 
for smaller producers 
within right to food / 
food sovereignty 
framework, including 
new institutions & laws; 
democratised & 
localised food systems, 
with small farmers 
involved in 
determinations 
regarding what to 
produce, where it is 
sold, and for what price 
Table [1] : The political economy of food: globalising capitalist food system & food 
sovereignty compared. 
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It is apparent from this comparison that the political economy of food sovereignty 
differs substantially from that of the globalising capitalist food system in several 
crucial respects. While the latter is concerned with large volumes of commodities 
destined for export, and pays little attention to the social or ecological 
consequences of production, the former emphasises food produced for domestic 
consumption by smaller-scale farmers. Further, it seeks to begin to internalise all 
the costs of production, by simultaneously emphasising the need for fair prices for 
producers, and the adoption of farming practices that minimise harmful ecological 
and environmental impacts. Conceptually, the transition is from a linear, extractive 
and wasteful system, organised according to the principle of alienation, towards an 
integrated and regenerative system, organised according to connectedness. Food 
sovereignty seeks to break down the atomisation and alienation that is inherent to 
the capitalist food system, by bringing people together in direct forms of social 
relations and exchanges, and by taking steps towards democratising the food 
system, whilst enabling diversity in place of homogenisation and standardisation.  
The achievement of these goals is much more complicated than simply ‘raising the 
price of food, or even the farm-gate price of food’, because, as Nettie Wiebe 
explains, such a measure on its own, without wider transformations in the 
prevailing market logic and regulatory frameworks, would lead to ‘perverse’ social 
and environmental outcomes.20 In the first instance, the higher prices would create 
an immediate incentive for farmers nearing retirement age to sell their farm and 
‘take the money and run’.21 That would simply reinforce the dynamic of farm 
concentration, because the barriers to entry for young people in agriculture, 
beginning with the cost of purchasing a working farm, are so high as to be 
insurmountable in most cases. This in turn contributes to the demographic crisis of 
an aging and shrinking farming population in the North, which I discussed in Chapter 
6.22  
Secondly, an increase in commodity prices also acts as incentive to increased 
production, which in conventional, chemically-based agriculture, means either 
bringing more land under cultivation, or intensifying production through the 
addition of more chemical fertilisers, or both.23 In either case, the ecological and 
environmental outcomes are likely to be negative, as observed for example in 
enhanced rates of deforestation, soil degradation, and so on, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. Further, more extensive production in the South frequently comes at the 
expense of the well-being rural communities and peasant producers, via processes 
of accumulation by dispossession.  
So in order to ‘price food in such a way that farmers can make a living growing it’, 
Wiebe argues that a more wide-ranging set of economic, political and cultural 
changes are required that entail ‘valuing small-scale production, valuing diversity 
                                                          
20 Interview with the author, 15.9.10.  
21 Ibid.  
22 As Wiebe puts it, ‘If you just raise the price, instead of securing your farming population, you actually 
get a retirement wave and you shrink your farming population. That’s a perverse outcome, but that’s 
actually logically how it happens’: ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
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and paying for diversity, and demanding knowledge about and [building] 
relationships [around] the source of [our] food’.24 She cites farmers’ markets as an 
example of a mechanism of exchange ‘where consumers are actually prepared to 
pay more for food just to know where it’s come from, and to know that it’s come 
from nearby’.25 She identifies another obstacle to the viability of small farmers in 
the form of regulations (for example, on the sale of meat at community events) 
that explicitly favour large-scale agribusiness. On issues such as these, Wiebe 
recognises the need for farmers to ‘work in solidarity with other parts of the 
citizenry, who can push for the political changes, in order to make the economics 
work for us and them simultaneously, if they’re demanding better food produced 
locally’.26 
Will farmers’ markets, farmer-consumer alliances and the like be sufficient to shift 
the existing disposition of forces? As I discussed in Chapter 3, the transformative 
potential of this sort of consumer-driven approach to food localisation cannot be 
taken for granted. Its utility as a strategy for systemic change, in a recessionary 
economic climate characterised by a growing turn to austerity in many parts of the 
North, and sharp increases in basic cost of living expenses such as electricity, 
housing, transport and food, must be seriously doubted.27 In current economic 
conditions, simply asking consumers to ‘pay more’ for local food at farmers’ 
markets will arguably further entrench and broaden a perception of ‘local food’ as 
a niche movement that is limited to the well-off middle classes who can afford to 
make lifestyle choices based on ‘health and sustainability’. Potentially it could 
harden and widen the already-existing divide between ‘rich eaters’ and ‘poor 
eaters’.28  
It is here that a basic antagonism arises between the class interests of farmers, and 
those of lower-, and lower-middle income, working classes in the North, within the 
context of the prevailing globalising capitalist food system. Farmers, as Wiebe 
explains, need a liveable income from food production. For many years, the system 
of ‘cheap food’ has not delivered that outcome for large numbers of them, which 
results in most farmers having to rely on off-farm income sources to remain on their 
properties, and also in significant numbers of farmers abandoning the land.29 A (now 
retired) fruit grower from the Coffs Coast region explains how the basic economics 
                                                          
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid; also Wittman, H., 2009, “Reworking the Metabolic Rift: La Via Campesina, Agrarian 
Citizenship, and Food Sovereignty”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(4), 805-826, 814-6, who cites 
leading La Via Campesina activist Paul Nicholson as stating that ‘We work on consumer-producer 
relationships leading to a different agricultural model’: ibid., 814.  
27 Research undertaken for the thesis amongst several providers of emergency food and other relief in 
the Coffs Habour region revealed sharp increases (50% of more) since 2009 in demand for these 
services.  
28 Dixon, J., Omwega, A.M., Friel, S., Burns, C., Donati, K., and Carlisle, R., 2007, ‘The Health Equity 
Dimensions of Urban Food Systems’, Journal of Urban Health, 84(1), 118-129; Dixon, J. and Broom, 
D.H., 2008, The Seven Deadly Sins of Obesity: How the Modern World is Making Us Fat, UNSW Press, 
Crows Nest.  
29 According to Michael Burt, regional organiser for the NSW Farmers’ Association, mid-North Coast, 
90% of NSW FA members in the region are dependent on off-farm sources of income: interview with 
the author, 20.2.11. 
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of food production in countries such as Australia – the ‘cost-price squeeze’ – has 
simply ‘chased the [smaller] farmer out of the industry’, and has also resulted in a 
declining agricultural workforce:  
[In the 1950s and 1960s], we could afford to hire workers and pay ourselves a fair wage, 
because we were getting a decent price from the wholesalers. These days you just 
could not afford to do that, because the price hasn't gone up while the costs have. I 
heard the other week that they were getting $8 a box [of bananas]. I can remember in 
the mid-1950s we were getting £8 a box – that's $16, and the wages were £5 a week. 
You only needed one case of bananas a week to pay the wages. And in those days we 
might do 100 cases of bananas a week. In mid-winter we might only cut every second 
week. But wages were just no trouble at all. If you needed extra work, you'd just go 
along to the pub and get a bloke, and they'd give you a hand…30 
The class antagonism expresses itself in the reality that, as the declining terms of 
trade for farmers have been disastrous for them, the delivery of ‘cheap food’ to 
consumers has inter alia freed up a greater portion of disposable income for 
discretionary spending, and thereby constituted a foundational pillar of modern 
consumer capitalism. ‘Cheap food’ is the business model underpinning mass 
consumer supermarkets, and has become reinforced by advertising promotions in 
the context of recessionary conditions.31 One clear expression of the consumer 
preference for ‘cheap food’ is the expansion of low-cost, ‘home-brand’ items in 
supermarket shelves.32 For example, the de-regulation of the dairy industry in 
Australia in the late 1990s saw the major supermarket chains launch their own 
generic low-cost home-brand fresh milk; and in the space of four years the 
percentage of milk sales captured by these products had doubled.33 By 2009-2010, 
these generic milk products accounted for 50% of all sales of drinking milk in 
Australia; and this market share has further increased with the launch by Coles of 
its ‘milk price war’ in early 2011.34 
                                                          
30 Bill O’Donnell, interview with the author, 7.12.10. 
31 Condon, J., 2011, ‘Coles ‘Down, Down’ Campaign Sends Sales Growth Soaring’, Beef Central, 
28.7.11, http://www.beefcentral.com/trade/domestic-trade/article/400, accessed 7.11.11. This article 
quotes Coles managing director Ian McLeod as saying that ‘Our customers have responded positively to 
our ‘Down, Down’ campaign to reduce shelf prices on the products they buy most against a backdrop of 
rising costs of living that has adversely affected consumer sentiment and industry sales’: ibid.  
32 See Round, D.K., 2006, ‘The Power of Two: Squaring off with Australia’s Largest Supermarket 
Chains’, The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 50(1), 51-64, for a discussion 
of the growing trend towards cheaper home-branded products, amongst other aspects of supermarket 
restructuring. 
33 Jacenko, A., and Gunasekera, D., 2005, ‘Australia’s Retail Food Sector: Some Preliminary 
Observations’, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, ABARE Conference Paper 
05.11 delivered at the Pacific Food System Outlook 2005-06, Kunming, China, 11-13 May 2005, 
available at http://adl.brs.gov.au/data/warehouse/pe_abarebrs99001186/PC13141.pdf, accessed 7.11.11. 
The authors comment that ‘[i]t is clear that the lower price has been a major factor in consumers 
switching to generic milk’: 5.  
34 Senate Economics References Committee, 2011, The Impacts of Supermarket Price Decisions on the 
Dairy Industry, Final Report, November 2011, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/dairy_industry_supermarket_2011/report/repo
rt.pdf, accessed 7.11.11. The Senate Committtee cited figures from Dairy Australia, showing a 5% 
increase in the market share of home-brand milk between December 2010 and April 2011: ibid., 44. 
Other reports suggest that the impact of the price war has been much greater, with ‘branded sales [of 
milk] plummeting [by] as much as 26.2%’: ‘Norco Endures Milk Price War’, The Northern Star, 
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Accordingly, the extent to which many consumers would support calls by farmers 
for price rises is at best uncertain; and at worst, wishful thinking. In any event, the 
deeply entrenched dynamic of over-production, and the rise of supermarkets to 
dominance in the food supply chain means, as discussed in Chapter 6, that farmers 
participating in this system are ‘price takers’.35 Thus, one of the many attractions 
of exchange venues such as farmers’ markets is that farmers, freed from the 
constraints imposed by supermarket supply chains, are more empowered to set 
their own prices. However, while farmers’ markets may arguably prefigure a new 
food system based on food sovereignty principles, on their own they will not reach 
the scale required to bring about systemic transformation, when supermarkets 
account for the large majority of food purchases of most consumers in the North.36  
This is why the Food Sovereignty movement needs to deepen its analysis and 
critique of the basic logic and common sense of the globalising capitalist food 
system. Specifically, it needs to be able to move beyond its (understandable) focus 
on the particular situation of farmers, in order to include the interests of working 
people as a whole, but especially the lower and lower-middle class socio-economic 
groups. It needs to do this to render its theory and literature more coherent, 
recognising the existence of the cheap food complex at the heart of contemporary 
capitalism, and examining its contradictions and implications. Further, as I have 
argued consistently, the Food Sovereignty movement must, as a matter of political 
strategy, be able to forge broad-based and mass alliances with many sectors in the 
North, having regard to the effective political impotence of smaller (non-corporate) 
farmers.  
The failure to date to systematically tackle the question of wage labour means that 
statements in key international texts to the effect that ‘food sovereignty implies 
new social relations free of oppression and inequality between…social and economic 
classes’ are at present little more than rhetorical flourishes.37 As I argued earlier, 
food sovereignty is missing an important opportunity to integrate itself with 
emerging theoretical and practical advances in the fields of economic and 
workplace democracy, and the commons.38 A key political insight which informs the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
23.8.11, http://www.northernstar.com.au/story/2011/08/23/norco-endures-milk-price-war-lismore-
business/, accessed 7.11.11. 
35 “In a climate of routine over-supply, as has characterized much of what goes on in basic commodity 
farming, high profits [for farmers] only come when someone else’s misfortune reduces such supply 
through pests, drought, and other ‘acts of God’”: Guthman 2011 op cit., 53.  
36 In Australia this market share is approaching 80%, while in Canada the top five supermarkets account 
for 56% of all sales: Jacenko and Gunasekera op cit., 3. The concerns about the limited potential of 
farmers’ markets as a vehicle for transformation in the contemporary food system mirror those 
expressed by Marx about the tendency of expressions of the early co-operative movement to assume 
‘dwarfish forms’ which would ‘never transform capitalist societies’: cited in De Peuter and Dyer-
Witherford op cit., 33. As a result, Marx – and the emergent worker-based movements that became the 
socialist internationals – placed primary emphasis on the seizure of political power, rather than on the 
implementation of workplace democracy in the form of co-operatives. 
37 From the Declaration of Nyéléni,Sélingué, Mali, 27.2.11, available at 
http://www.nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290, accessed 15.12.08.  
38 Dahl 1985 op cit; Schweickart 1992 op cit.; Schweickart, D., 2002, After Capitalism, Rowman & 
Littlefield, Lanham, MA; Melman op cit; Ellerman, D., 1997, The Democratic Firm, World Bank, 
available at: www.ellerman.org/Davids-Stuff/Books/demofirm.doc, accessed 14.12.11; Engler 2010 op 
cit..  
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call for economic democracy is the recognition that, in modern liberal democracies, 
the separation between political and economic power means that political 
democracy, in the form of periodic elections and voting, is more formal than 
substantive.39 Democratising the economy is thereby seen as a necessary condition 
in order to progress towards the realisation of a substantive democracy.40 This is 
essentially a core demand of food sovereignty as regards agriculture, albeit 
expressed in vague and general terms.  
While there are various theoretical frameworks and proposals for democratising the 
economy, a common feature amongst many is the necessity of transforming the 
wage labour relation that lies at the heart of capitalism as an economic system. In 
other words, economy democracy takes place, first and foremost, within the 
individual workplace, either in the form of worker self-management of firms, or in 
the form of worker ownership (and control) of firms.41 The history and 
contemporary practice of worker cooperatives, particularly in countries such as 
Argentina and Venezuela, and in the Basque region of Spain, are seen as the 
practical and historical embodiment of economic democracy.42 Significantly, trends 
towards worker-ownership and co-operatives have also emerged in the so-called 
‘rust-belt’, de-industrialising regions of the United States in recent years, such as 
Ohio.43 
Unsurprisingly there are numerous theoretical and tactical debates within this 
field.44 Food sovereignty activists and intellectuals, focused as they have been on 
the situation of small farmers affected by the expanding capitalist food system, 
have developed the theoretical content of food sovereignty in parallel to these 
                                                          
39 De Peuter, and Dyer-Witherford op cit., Foutopolous 2008 op cit. 
40 As Seymour Melman puts it, ‘to really make a difference [in terms of wealth distribution], the social 
relations that underlie the hierarchical control of the economy must be changed’: 2001 op cit., 6.  
41
 Schweickart (op cit.) and Jossa (2004 op cit.) argue for the former; Ellerman (op cit.) for the latter. 
  
42 In Argentina, the ‘recovered factory’ movement that emerged in the wake of the 2001 financial 
collapse saw many bankrupt firms occupied and put into production by their former employees: De 
Peuter and Dyer-Witherford op cit.; Venezuela has seen an exponential increase in cooperatives during 
the first decade of the 21st century, as a result of policies put in place by the government of Hugo 
Chavez; and the Mondragon cooperatives of the Basque country have grown from modest beginnings in 
1955 to reach the status of the top ten business entities in Spain: De Peuter, and Dyer-Witherford op cit.  
43
 Alperovitz, G., 2011, ‘America Beyond Capitalism: How Thousands of Co-ops, Worker-owned 
Businesses, Land Trusts, and Municipal Enterprises are quietly beginning to Democratize the Deep 
Substructure of the American Economic System’, 
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2011/1111alperovitz.html, accessed 10.1.12. Alperovitz 
highlights in particular the ‘Cleveland model’ of economic democracy promotion, which ‘involve[s] an 
integrated complex of worker-owned co-operative enterprises targeted in significant part at the $3 
billion purchasing power of such large scale “anchor institutions” as the Cleveland Clinic, University 
Hospital, and Case Western Reserve University’: ibid. In a demonstration of what Euclides Mance calls 
the integrated operation of the ‘solidarity economy’, the ‘[Cleveland] complex also includes a revolving 
fund so that profits made by the businesses help establish new ventures as time goes on’: ibid.  
44 These debates touch on issues such as the role of the market in determining production decisions and 
setting prices; how investment decisions are to be made and financed; the linkages between the 
emerging commons movement and workers cooperatives; and the extent to which cooperatives have 
played a genuinely transformative social and political role, or whether they have simply been co-opted 
by, and thus complemented, the expansion of the dominant capitalist economy..  
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debates, even though there are many synergies and numerous points of 
intersection.  
Thus in terms of my research questions posed at the end of Chapter 2, the 
theoretical development of food sovereignty in isolation from wider schools of 
contemporary thought similarly aimed at transformative praxis suggests some 
omissions and weaknesses. First, it means that the full implications of the cheap 
food complex, which is a key element of the common sense of the globalising 
capitalist food system, has not been consistently, critically and systematically 
addressed in the elaboration of critiques. This is a serious omission, since it is the 
modern expression of the cheap food paradigm which helps explain much of the 
oppression and suffering that farmers worldwide have endured, and are enduring. 
Secondly, while the analyses and discourses of the food sovereignty movement have 
been increasing in coherence, much remains to be done as regards the situation of 
workers, and the antagonism identified above between workers and farmers as 
regards cheap food. Thirdly, these lacunae detract from the normative appeal and 
credibility of food sovereignty as the emerging ‘good sense’. The failure to date to 
systematically integrate a discussion of economic alternatives to the wage labour 
relation forecloses the possibility of a theoretically rigorous discussion about how to 
reconfigure the food system away from the ‘cheap food’ dynamic. Finally, these 
omissions also impede the development of a ‘national popular’ strategy and the 
formation of effective alliances and political relationships in Northern countries 
where farmers are a tiny minority of the working population.  
The theory and praxis of agro-ecology 
In contrast to the failure to engage in debates about economic democracy and the 
commons, the theory and praxis of agro-ecology is an area in which food 
sovereignty activists and intellectuals have demonstrated the capacity to combine a 
radical and coherent critique of the globalising capitalist food system with 
alternative methodologies that overcome the tensions of over-production, 
inequality and ecological destructiveness. Agro-ecology, conceived as ‘the 
application of ecological concepts and principles to the design and management of 
sustainable agro-ecosystems’, is a method of agricultural practice that eschews the 
uncritical embrace of corporate-led ‘high’ technology and large-scale 
mechanisation, in favour of a reliance on building and sustaining local human 
capacity and peer-based exchanges of knowledge.45  
According to one of the world’s leading researchers and practitioners in the field, 
Professor Miguel Altieri, agro-ecology is aimed at developing ‘agricultural systems in 
which ecological interactions and synergisms between biological components 
provide the mechanisms for system to sponsor its own soil fertility, productivity and 
crop protection’.46 In other words, farming systems operated according to agro-
ecological principles increasingly become self-sustaining, thereby reducing farmers’ 
dependence on synthetic inputs, whilst diversifying their production and raising 
                                                          
45 Altieri, M.A., 2010, Scaling up Agroecological Approaches for Food Sovereignty in Latin America in 
Wittman et al op cit., 121.  
46 Ibid., citing Alteri, M.A., 1995, Agro-ecology: The Science of Sustainable Agriculture, Westview 
Press, Boulder, CO. 
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yields.47 These practices represent what Jules Pretty terms ‘sustainable 
intensification’; that is, ‘making better use of existing resources and technologies’ 
in order to increase agricultural production.48  
It is this capacity to combine high levels of production, whilst progressively 
reducing the ecologically destructive impacts of agriculture that gives agro-ecology 
its potentially ‘revolutionary’ character.49 Arguably it is through agro-ecology that 
the resolution to the dilemma posed by the capitalist food system’s encounter with 
the limits to its ‘cheap food’ complex will be resolved: not within the terms of that 
system, but via the combination of a different set of productive forces, based on a 
different set of social relations, and operating according to an increasingly non-
capitalist logic. Agro-ecology is paradigmatically a production methodology 
grounded in the organising principle of connectedness; and as such represents in my 
assessment a serious systemic challenge to the alienation of large-scale capitalist 
agriculture. Its growing embrace and implementation would represent an important 
shift in the existing disposition of forces.  
In a recent article, Altieri and Victor Toledo trace the development of what they 
term the ‘agro-ecological revolution’ across Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, Central America 
and the Andean region over the past few decades.50 In the process, they identify 
and describe the ‘cognitive, technological and social’ dimensions of this revolution, 
which interact in a mutually supportive dynamic to sustain and strengthen its 
growth and impact.  
As a ‘highly knowledge-intensive’ set of methodologies that have their roots in 
ancestral indigenous cultures, agro-ecology is expressive of a ‘peasant 
epistemology’ because it is ‘developed on the basis of farmers’ knowledge and 
experimentation’.51 The knowledge and innovations associated with agro-ecological 
techniques have spread principally through peer-based farmer-to-farmer networks; 
and these networks in turn are being supported by continent-wide academic and 
NGO collaborations.52 Amongst a number of ‘epistemological innovations’ associated 
with agro-ecology, Altieri and Toledo mention its trans-disciplinary and holistic 
character (‘joining political ecology, ecological economics and ethnoecology’); its 
abandonment of value-neutrality and its ‘self-reflexive’ character; its embrace of a 
‘long-term vision’; and its dialogic and participatory character, valuing ‘local 
wisdom and traditions’ in order to ‘constant[ly] create new knowledge’.53 These 
horizontal and de-centralised forms of knowledge-sharing epitomise the 
                                                          
47 Ibid.; also Altieri, M.A., 2010, Agroecology, Small Farms, and Food Sovereignty in Tokar, B., and 
Magdoff, F., 2009 op cit., 253-266, 265.  
48 Pretty, J., 2010, Can Agriculture Feed 9 Billion People? In Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 283-298, 288.  
49 Altieri, M.A., and Toledo, V.M., 2011, ‘The Agroecological Revolution in Latin America: Rescuing 
Nature, Ensuring Food Sovereignty and Empowering Peasants’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(3), 
587-612. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid., 588.  
52 Altieri and Toledo mention the Sociedad Cientifica Latinoamericana de Agroecologia (SOCLA – 
Latin American Scientific Society of Agro-ecology), ‘composed of about 360 professors and 
researchers’; and the Moviemiento Agroecologico Latinoamericano (MAELA, Latin American Agro-
ecology movement), ‘grouping hundreds of NGOs advocating for agro-ecological change’: ibid., 607.  
53 Altieri and Toledo op cit., 598. 
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connectedness of this methodology, which contrasts with the dis-empowering and 
atomising effects of proprietary-based knowledge systems that form the basis of 
contemporary capitalist agriculture. 
In the Australian context, former Colac dairy farmer Robert Pekin explains how 
knowledge that was previously held and shared amongst dairy farmers, with the 
support of long-standing and well-trusted agricultural extension officers, became 
outsourced and privatised as a result of processes of farm concentration and 
commercialisation:  
Before [in the 1960s and 1970s], it was all hands to the deck. But by the early 1990s, all 
the [private] support infrastructure that had been established to help agriculture was in 
place. You didn’t have to go far to find a consultant to help you with your fertiliser 
regime, or your cow regime, herd improvement, all of those things, which [previously] 
was all done by the community, or through people knowing who had a good bull, or who 
had a good pasture regime…The farmers all held that knowledge, or they knew 
someone who had the skill on how [for example] to do a soil test. That [knowledge] was 
all privatised…it was actually owned by the fertiliser companies…they’d organise the 
whole show for you, the delivery [of the chemicals], the spreading, everything. The 
farmer didn’t have to do a thing. Farmers became more specialised [and] dependent on 
the companies.54 
Interestingly, almost exactly the same point is made by Ricardo Intriago, President 
of the Federation of Agricultural Centres and Farmers Organisations of Coastal 
Ecuador, in relation to the impact of the Green Revolution on small farmers in 
Ecuador:  
Now, the majority [of small farmers] have access [to Green Revolution technologies], 
and what was created was a dependency not just on the fertilisers, but also on 
machinery and on advisers…Because it all came as a package: chemical fertilisers, 
seeds, and an adviser who would show you how to use these fertilisers…All of this was a 
system for the commercialisation of products…They were the teachers of the farmers. 
When we have food sovereignty, the farmers will be the teachers of agriculture for all 
of us.55 
In this system of privatisation and commodification of knowledge, the technology 
generated is highly specialised, and all of it is geared, not towards the integrity and 
well-being of the farming system as a whole, but to the deepening of the farmer’s 
dependence on commercial products with the primary aim being maximisation of 
production for profit. Farmers were subjected to a barrage of propaganda to 
embrace it, as Robert Pekin recalls: 
[At that time] I remember that the chemical companies were highly visible. Dominant, 
to the point where you’d go to a night on calving…and you’d walk into a little old hall, 
and the place would be plastered with chemical company ads. A chemical company rep 
would be standing there, and the night would have been supported and run by a 
chemical company. So if the night was about calving, it’d all be about using formula, 
and using this drug and that drug, a chemical regime to rear your calves. Every 
[information evening or field day] you went to would be dominated by chemical 
                                                          
54 Interview with the author, 3.11.11.  
55 Interview with the author via Skype, 15.8.11.  
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companies. It was all about boosting productivity, and making more money, [but only] 
if you used their stuff. [The products] were expensive, and it was all highly scientific. I 
remember being mesmerised, because they had some chemist, or some scientist there, 
explaining in quite complex terms, the way [for example] the rumen worked in a cow, 
and how this particular little drug would trigger this biological reaction – and you’d be 
asleep, cos’ it was just bloody boring! It had nothing to do with farming, it was just 
about how to manipulate a cow’s gut to produce more milk.56 
In contrast, the techniques associated with agro-ecology are an expression of what 
Ernst Friedrich Schumacher calls ‘intermediate’ or ‘appropriate, people-centred’, 
and locally-controlled, technology.57 As a labour and knowledge-intensive, rather 
than capital intensive, mode of production, agro-ecology encourages the 
development of ‘autochthonous technologies’ based on ‘diversity, synergy, 
recycling and integration’, as well as locally-available energy resources.58 This leads 
Altieri and Toledo to argue that not only does agro-ecology support the 
achievement of food sovereignty, but also ‘technological sovereignty’ and ‘energy 
sovereignty’.59 One example of this technology, amongst many, is the elaborate 
system of terraced cultivation developed by the pre-Columbian and pre-historic 
Andean cultures of Peru, which ‘provided tillable land, controlled [soil] erosion, and 
protected crops during freezing nights’.60 Another example, in the Australian 
context, is the recent emergence of ‘pasture cropping’ amongst cereal and 
livestock farmers; in this adaptation, born out of the necessity of adapting to harsh 
drought conditions, cereal crops are sown directly into pastures, thereby 
eliminating the need for tillage, substantially reducing inputs, restoring soil 
fertility, maintaining yields, and helping to secure financial viability for farmers.61  
The social and political dimensions of agro-ecology flow from the collaborative, co-
operative and communal character of its epistemology and technologies: its 
connectedness. Practices that are rooted in local customs and traditions; which 
require for their development and ‘diffusion constant farmer participation [and 
interaction]’; and which have a sound economic rationale in the form of reduced 
reliance on external inputs, are likely to be conducive to social movement 
mobilisation and organisation, as has in fact occurred in many countries in Latin 
America, Brazil especially.62 The collaborative construction and sharing of 
knowledge and practices constitutes a concrete manifestation of the ‘circulation of 
                                                          
56 Interview with the author, 3.11.11. 
57 Schumacher, E.F., 1972, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, Blond & 
Briggs,  
58 Altieri and Toledo op cit., 588, 607.  
59 Technological sovereignty is conceived as ‘the exploit[ation] [of] environmental services derived 
from biodiverse agroecosystems [using] locally available resources [that] farmers are able to produce 
without external inputs’: ibid ., 607. ‘Energy sovereignty’ is ‘the right for people inhabiting farms, 
cooperatives or rural communities to have access to sufficient energy within ecological limits from local 
and sustainable sources, such as plant biomass producer on farm, without sacrificing food crops’: ibid.  
60 Ibid., 603.  
61 Pasture cropping is described by its originators, Bruce Maynard and Colin Seis, as ‘profitable 
regenerative agriculture’: http://www.pasturecropping.com/, accessed 7.11.11. In an interview with the 
author, Food Connect Founder Robert Pekin described how he was an early embracer of pasture 
cropping in the early 1990s.  
62 Altieri and Toledo op cit., 599.  
255 
 
the commons’63; and its linkage to social movement formation demonstrates the 
inherent synergies between forms of economic democracy and effective political 
praxis.64 
More generally, and as a necessary foundation for social movement formation, 
these practices contribute to building and strengthening a sense of community, 
because of their fundamentally social nature. Robert Pekin recalls how he and a 
small group of like-minded Colac dairy farmers swam against the tide of corporate-
driven chemicalisation, by individually and collectively informing themselves about 
alternative practices; and in the process began to recover a sense of community 
that the processes of farm concentration in the 1980s had partially eradicated: 
[Before I went away in the late 1970s when we changed] from walk-through dairies to 
herring-bone dairies, [a]t a certain time of year, that’s all I remember doing, for quite 
a few years: either a heap of people building our dairy, or we would be off building 
everyone else’s dairies. I just remember that camaraderie, that spirit of community, 
and obviously footy, and tennis, and cricket, and dancing and horse-riding…By the time 
I’d come back [after 13 years away] that pretty much didn’t exist any more…farms 
were getting bigger and bigger, footy clubs were folding…All that sense of community, 
and collaboration, had started to go. Not so much because you didn’t want it to 
happen, but you just weren’t as close, there just weren’t as many farmers…So [in 
response to the onslaught by chemical companies] a group of 13-14 of us began 
gathering [and] we would find people with specialist skills and knowledge on compost 
making, and how to acupuncture cows, and all sorts of things. We would meet up in a 
hall on Lavers Hill, and spend the whole day there, and the families would come, and 
we would picnic – it was a whole different setting. It was really inclusive.65  
In this quote, Pekin puts his finger on several themes that I have addressed in the 
course of this thesis. First, there is what US farmer, poet, novelist and social 
commentator and critic Wendell Berry terms the ‘fundamental conflict between the 
interests of farmers and farming, and the interests of agribusiness corporations’.66 
The second, closely related, theme is the commodification of food and agriculture, 
and the consequent loss of autonomy experienced by farmers. The third – which I 
discuss briefly here and in the Conclusion – is Berry’s notion that in order for ‘good 
farming’ – that is, ‘farming that does not destroy either farmland or farm people’ – 
to take place, there must be a ‘proper’ or ‘correct’ ratio between the number of 
                                                          
63 De Peuter and Dyer-Witherford op cit.  
64 Costas Panayotakis (2011 op cit.) makes the argument that while the ‘anti-democractic’ nature of 
capitalist firms stunts the development of democratic skills and capacities amongst the working 
population and thus militates against effective engagement in the wider political process, the practice of 
economic democracy in the form of worker-run co-operatives would ‘nurture ordinary people’s 
democratic skills’ and ‘cultivate ordinary people’s ability to govern themselves’: 8. He envisages a 
‘virtuous circle’ coming into existence ‘as the democratization of the state can facilitate the spread of 
democratically run institutions, while the democratic skills ordinary people acquire in such institutions 
can equip them to fight more effectively for progressive social change that democratizes the state even 
further. The creative tension between reforms aimed at democratizing the state, on the one hand, and 
building autonomous institutions, such as worker co-operatives, on the other, can therefore trigger a 
process of social change with the potential to transform the debate between competing visions of a non-
capitalsit, economically democratic social order from an academic question to an issue of immediate 
political relevance’: ibid.  
65 Interview with the author, 3.11.11. 
66 Berry, W., 2002, Stupidity in Concentration, 17. 
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farmers and farmworkers, and the number and size of farms; combined with a 
‘proper ratio between plants and animals’.67 
Achieving these ratios will, in Berry’s view, ensure that the 'fertility cycle is kept 
complete'.68 In the process, environmental problems that are endemic to industrial 
agriculture, such as soil erosion and compaction, the pollution of nearby 
waterways, and the proliferation of toxic animal waste, will be progressively 
reduced.69 Conversely, the linearity of industrial agriculture – its alienation and 
separation - means that by definition waste is intrinsic to its production methods, 
leading inevitability to 'exhaustion and contamination' of natural resources.70 Thus, 
what further strengthens the normative appeal of agro-ecology for progressive and 
radical agrarian movements is its ecologically benign and regenerative nature. As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, it is this feature of agro-ecology which has enabled 
La Via Campesina to link its promotion of Food Sovereignty in recent years to the 
broader climate justice movement, with the claim that ‘Small Farmers Cool the 
Planet’.71 Given that capitalist agriculture is arguably the major contributor to 
anthropogenic climate change, such a claim, if it can be substantiated, is politically 
significant for at least three reasons.  
In the first instance, it serves as a powerful critique of the irrationality and sheer 
wastefulness of the globalising capitalist food system, when contrasted with an 
existing and viable alternative, thus undermining the common sense on which the 
system is based.72 Understood holistically, the waste this system generates includes 
not only multiple direct and indirect forms of pollution and contamination, but also 
the waste of solar and animal energy, as well as human energy, knowledge and 
                                                          
67 Ibid., also 1978, Agricultural Solutions for Agricultural Problems, 27-8.  
68 Berry, Agricultural Solutions for Agricultural Problems, 27-8, op cit. Although he is no Marxist, such 
a statement clearly recalls Marx’s assertion that a ‘rational agriculture is incompatible with capitalism’; 
and further that this rational agriculture required a proper balance in the population between town and 
country.  
69 Berry, 2002, Stupidity in Concentration, 13. Jonthan Safran Foer (2009, Eating Animals, Camberwell, 
Vic: Hamish Hamilton), discusses at some length the vast volumes of untreated animal manure 
produced annually on American factory farms, and its consequences for human and ecosystem health: 
174-181. Thus, the average US pig factory farm produces '7.2 million pounds of manure annually, a 
typical broiler factory will produce 6.6 million pounds, and a typical cattle feedlot 344 million 
pounds...All told, farmed animals in the US produce 130 times as much waste as the human population 
– roughly 87,000 pounds of shit per second. The polluting strength of this shit is 160 times greater than 
raw municipal sewage. And yet there is almost no waste-treatment infrastructure for farmed animals...”: 
174. In terms of industry practices regarding disposal or, more accurately, dispersal, Foer writes: “When 
the football field-sized cesspools are approaching overflowing, Smithfield ['America's leading pork 
producer'], like others in the industry, spray the liquefied manure onto fields. Or sometimes they simply 
spray it straight up into the air, a geyser of shit wafting fine fecal mists that create swirling gases 
capable of causing severe nuerological damage. Communities living near these factory farms complain 
about problems with persistent nosebleeds, earaches, chronic diarrhea, and burning lungs”: 176. 
70 Berry, Agricultural Solutions for Agricultural Problems op cit., 23. 
71 La Via Campesina, 2009, Small-scale Sustainable Farmers are Cooling Down the Earth, Jakarta, 
available at: http://viacampesina.net/downloads/PAPER5/EN/paper5-EN.pdf, accessed 7.11.11. 
72 Vandermeer, J., Smith, G., Perfecto, I., and Quintero, E., 2009, ‘Effects of Industrial Agriculture on 
Global Warming and the Potential of Small-Scale Agroecological Techniques to Reverse those Effects: 
A Report to Via Campesina’, New World Agriculture and Ecology Group.  
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capacities.73 In the industrialisation of agriculture, Berry observes a paradoxical and 
ultimately self-defeating transformation, expressive of the ecological rift:  
 
 [F]arming, which is inherently cyclic, capable of regenerating and reproducing itself 
indefinitely, becomes...destructive and self-exhausting when transformed into an 
industry.74 
Secondly, the ecological benefits of agro-ecology constitute a powerful defence of 
peasant agriculture, strengthening the claims of food sovereignty to embody the 
new ‘good sense’, and providing justification for claims that such agriculture should 
be recognised and supported by governments and international institutions.75 
Implicitly drawing on the traditions of ‘agricultural energetics’ dating back to the 
1880s, La Via Campesina makes the justifiable claim that the capitalist 
industrialisation of agriculture has transformed it from being a net producer of 
energy to being a net consumer.76 Conversely, agro-ecological production that does 
not involve large-scale deforestation and land-clearing, and which does not rely on 
heavy machinery and large amounts of synthetic inputs, not only consumes far less 
fossil fuels, but also, through the increase of organic matter in soils, increases their 
carbon capture potential.77 Further, not only does agro-ecology appear to mitigate 
the severity of climate change through emissions reductions; its practices and 
techniques have demonstrated a far higher level of resilience to extreme weather 
events in recent years.78 
The lesser reliance on fossil fuels points to a third reason for the political 
significance of agro-ecology: its capacity to function productively within the 
emerging resource constraints which capitalist agriculture is encountering in the 
form of ‘biophysical contradictions’.79 Forms of agriculture that can reliably 
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 Berry Energy in Agriculture, op cit., 63-4. For Berry, the abandonment of the practices of crop 
rotation and cover crops leads to the waste of solar energy; the unnatural confinement of animals in 
feedlot operations results in the waste of animal energy; and human energy, knowledge and abilities is 
dissipated via the loss of farmers' knowledge and skill, the mass unemployment that de-ruralisation has 
generated and continues to generate, and the ill-health produced through over-consumption of 
industrialised food.  
74Ibid.  
75 Martinez-Alier, J., 2011, ‘The EROI of Agriculture and its Use by the Via Campesina’, The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 38(1), 145-160, 149; also Wittman 2009 op cit,.  
76 Martinez-Alier op cit., 152-5, discussing the research undertaken by Ukranian doctor and narodnik 
activist S.A. Podolinsky. 
77 Vandermeer et al op cit. The carbon sequestration potential of ecological forms of agriculture (such as 
pasture cropping) is only recently being understood and researched, with the ‘Carbon Farming 
Coalition’ formed in Australia in 2006 to promote such practices: see 
http://www.carboncoalition.com.au/CarbonFarmers/WhatisCarbonFarming.html, accessed 7.11.11. The 
Carbon Farming Coalition, it should be said, is not an anti-capitalist grouping; and indeed wants to 
secure access to carbon trading markets for farmers who adopt agro-ecological techniques such as 
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agriculture, and is a matter to which I return in the Conclusion to the thesis.  
78 Altieri and Toledo op cit., 596-7, noting that ‘[a] survey conducted in Central American hillsides after 
Hurricane Mitch [in 1998] showed that farmers using diversification practices such as cover crops, 
intercropping and agroforestry suffered less damage than their conventional monoculture 
neighbours…It was found that sustainable plots had 20-40 percent more topsoil, greater soil moisture 
and less erosion and experienced lower economic losses than their conventional neighbours’.  
79 Weis 2009 op cit.  
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produce diverse crops in the midst of a resource-constrained and climatically-
changing world, and which can restore fertility to soils degraded by the practices of 
capitalist agriculture over decades, should, at least in theory, be highly prized and 
supported by governments cognisant of their obligations to ensure the universal 
right to food to all their citizens.80  
However, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, in a world patterned by globalising 
capitalism, many governments – and most especially those of the core capitalist 
nations – currently place most value on, and direct most support towards, capitalist 
and large-scale industrialised forms of agriculture. The reorientation of state 
support towards sustainable forms of agriculture is necessary to facilitate the 
transition because, as Jules Pretty points out, the transition itself is not a ‘costless 
process’; and requires in particular that ‘farmers invest in learning’.81 It is here that 
the social, economic and political dimensions of agro-ecology become essential to 
the consolidation and expansion of its epistemic and technological advances. The 
sharing of knowledge and its continual co-creation leads to further technological 
innovations and experimentation with new economic forms, notably cooperatives. 
The small group of dairy farmers that Robert Pekin belonged to in Colac, while 
deepening their knowledge and practice of non-chemical production methodologies, 
also established a local dairy co-operative in order to counter the consolidation and 
corporatisation of the existing cooperatives.82 Cooperatives, and collective forms of 
self-management, have been central to maintaining the viability of the newly-
settled communities following land occupations by militants of the Brazilian 
Landless Workers Movement.83 Technological and economic innovations support the 
economic viability of farmers, allowing them to stay on the land, enhancing their 
confidence and generating mutual solidarity.  
These dynamics support movement building, which as Altieri and Toledo note, has 
contributed to political changes that have been broadly supportive, in some places, 
of the demands of small farmers in many Latin American countries.84 Of course this 
dynamic is neither uniform nor universal; as noted in Chapter 5, while Ecuador’s 
Rafael Correa appears highly progressive from a distance, those working to 
implement food sovereignty in that country have observed his lack of sympathy 
                                                          
80 Kirschenmann, F., 2010, Do Increased Energy Costs Offer Opportunities for a New Agriculture? in 
Magdoff and Tokar op cit., 224-240; also Pimentel, D., 2010, Reducing Energy Inputs in the 
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towards, and understanding of, smallholder agriculture based on agro-ecological 
principles.85 Furthermore, the advance of agro-ecology is being accompanied by the 
arguably more rapid advance of industrial-scale capitalist agriculture, in the form of 
the expanding ‘green deserts’ of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.86 As 
Ricardo Intriago stated, whether or not the movement for the ‘scaling up’ of agro-
ecology succeeds or not will depend on the actions of the social movements 
themselves in building their movements, educating the public, and maintaining 
constant pressure on their governments to support the expansion of this production 
methodology. 87  
Put another way, the progress of agro-ecology and the broader Food Sovereignty 
movement , in Latin America as elsewhere, is contingent on the growing practice of 
‘agrarian citizenship’, as manifested in the ‘participation in material and political 
struggles’ in a ‘contested space for dialectical negotiation between nature, state 
and society’.88 As one aspect of the practice of this citizenship, agro-ecology 
practitioners and researchers are fulfilling the educative role of the organic 
intellectuals in building a counter-hegemonic social and political force.89 
Effective counter-hegemony depends on destabilising the prevailing common sense. 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, a key ideological justification for the further 
expansion of the globalising capitalist food system is the claim that only large-scale, 
mechanised agriculture can ‘feed the world’; and in particular, that only such 
agriculture can deliver the anticipated 70% increase in food production that will be 
required to meet the world’s food demands by 2050. Agro-ecological practices are 
either dismissed as marginal to this effort, or else they are co-opted in various ways 
so that they pose no threat to the advance of the system. Co-option has arguably 
been the fate, for example, of significant parts of organic and fair-trade 
agriculture: the former because it has mirrored the capitalist practice of large-scale 
input dependent monocultures, albeit with the difference that the inputs are 
certified organic, rather than chemicals; and the latter because it integrates small 
farmers in the South into global markets, subjects them to the disciplining effects 
of price volatility, and diminishes local food sovereignty aspirations in the process.90 
Agro-ecology might be one of the ways in which we can ‘cool the planet’, adapt to 
the extreme weather events that will come with a changing climate, and produce 
food in a post-peak oil world, but can it meet the challenge of producing sufficient 
food for a global population now in excess of seven billion? The first response to this 
question is that peasant farmers following these types of practices have ‘fed much 
of the world for centuries and continue to feed people across the planet’.91 
                                                          
85 Interview with Ricardo Intriago.  
86 See Chapter 6 for a discussion on the advance of green deserts. 
87 “Tenemos que conscientizar a la gente para que peleen por eso – porque si no hay consciencia, 
¿Quién va a pelear?”, which translates as “We have to raise consciousness and educate the people about 
this – because if there is no consciousness, who is going to fight?” Interview with the author, 15.8.11; 
see also Altieri and Toledo op cit., 608-9; Wittman op cit., 820.  
88 Wittman op cit., 820.  
89 See Chapter 2, p26.  
90 Altieri 2009 op cit., 265-6.  
91 Ibid., 255.  
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Conversely, it must also be remembered that, in global population terms, the 
globalising capitalist food system presently includes somewhere between 25 to 50% 
of the global human population92, and has to date managed to integrate only a 
similar percentage of the world’s annual biomass into the monetized global market 
economy.93 Some estimates put the percentage of global agricultural production 
accounted for by the capitalist system at no more than ten percent, which leads 
critics to assert that what passes for global agricultural trade is in fact ‘an 
international trade of surpluses of milk, cereals and meat dumped primarily by the 
[European Union], the [United States] and other members of the Cairns group’; 
what Tony Weis calls the ‘grain-livestock complex’.94  
Taking these statistics into account, it becomes clear that the corporate-led food 
system is still a minority actor as regards the basic task of ensuring the daily 
sustenance of the global human population as a whole. Somewhere between half 
and three-quarters of the world’s people are, rather, fed primarily by peasant, 
smallholder and various forms of small-scale urban agriculture.95 Bearing in mind 
Gibson-Graham’s admonition to ‘read for difference rather than domination’, this 
reality problematizes the portrayal of the capitalist food system as ‘dominant’; and 
casts substantial doubt on the assertion that only this form of agriculture can – or, 
for that matter, does – ‘feed the world’.96 Seen in this light, the vision of corporate-
led and technicised world agriculture can be read as a narrative constructed by the 
powerful of an ‘imagined econom[y] of globalization’; and as such it is a project 
that is immanent and contingent, not achieved and inevitable.97  
The second response is that agro-ecology, on its own terms as a developing set of 
production principles and methodologies, is demonstrating the capacity to out-
perform large-scale capitalist monocultures. Yield increases are achieved through 
techniques such as integrated nutrient management, agroforestry, water 
harvesting, crop and farm diversification, and the integration of livestock into 
farming systems, as well through the reduction of ‘losses due to weeds, insects and 
                                                          
92 McMichael 2004 op cit., 62. 
93 ETC Group op cit., 3.  
94 McMichael 2004 op cit., 63, citing La Via Campesina, 2001, ‘Our World is Not for Sale: Priority to 
People’s Food Sovereignty’; also Weis, T., 2007, The Global Food Economy: The Battle for the Future 
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95 Ibid., 9, citing ‘The Resources Centre on Urban Agriculture and Food Security’, 
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 Gibson-Graham, J.K., 1996, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political 
Economy, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
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diseases’.98 Research conducted during the 1990s suggested that small farms 
operating as polycultures according to agro-ecological methods achieved total 
production yields up to 60% higher than conventional capitalist agricultural 
monocultures.99 The largest study conducted to date, involving ‘286 projects in 57 
[developing] countries’, found average yield increases in farms using agro-
ecological methods to be in excess of 79%, compared with conventional methods.100 
Discussing the study’s results, Pretty concludes that: 
We do not yet know for sure whether a transition toward the sustainable intensification 
of agriculture, delivering greater benefits at the scale occurring in these projects, will 
result in enough food to meet the current food needs in developing countries, let alone 
the future needs after continued population growth and adoption of more urban and 
meat-rich diets. But what we are seeing is highly promising, especially for the poorest. 
There is also scope for additional confidence, as evidence indicates that productivity 
can grow over time if the farm ecosystem is enhanced, communities are strengthened 
and organized towards positive goals, and human knowledge, nutrition and health are 
improved. Sustainable agriculture systems appear to become more productive when 
human capacity increases, particularly in the form of farmers’ capacity to innovate and 
adapt their farm systems for sustainable outcomes.
101 
In other words, there appears to be a virtuous circle between increasing human 
capacity, and the capacity of the land to feed people; and if this assumption is 
correct, the future is open. The passage quoted highlights a further response to the 
‘can agro-ecology feed the world’ question. As I have demonstrated throughout the 
thesis, the capitalist organisation of agriculture and the food system is failing to 
eradicate hunger and malnutrition, and, in the current context of economic and 
financial crisis, and the financialisation of the food system, is in fact increasing 
these forms of inequality. Agro-ecology, by contrast, has the virtue of making a 
substantial contribution to meeting the food needs of the poorest sectors of 
society. Higher yields, diverse income streams and freedom from the need to 
purchase expensive inputs translate into higher farm incomes, which in turn can 
boost local job creation and reduce rural poverty.102 This is why the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food has embraced it as a key means by which the 
universal right to food will be realised.103 For the same reasons, La Via Campesina 
agro-ecology trainers argue that ‘peasant, indigenous and community-based agro-
ecological farming [is] a cornerstone in the construction of food sovereignty’.104  
                                                          
98 De Schutter, O., 2011, Agro-ecology and the Right to Food, op cit.; Altieri and Toledo op cit, 595.  
99 Altieri and Toledo op cit., 595. 
100 Pretty op cit., 292-3.  
101 Ibid., 296.  
102 Ibid.  
103 De Schutter 2011 op cit.  
104 La Via Campesina, 2011a, ‘Final Declaration of the 2nd Continental Encounter of Agroecology 
Trainers in La Via Campesina’, Chimaltenango, Guatemala, 8 August 2011, available at: 
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In terms of my research questions, the theoretical and practical development of 
agro-ecology evidences a deep and critical engagement with the common sense of 
the globalising capitalist food system. It points strongly towards the convincing-ness 
of food sovereignty as a coherent, even necessary, alternative. In a growing number 
of countries, especially in Latin America, it is contributing to the formation of 
national-popular strategies and alliances that in some cases, such as Ecuador, are 
finding political and institutional support and expression. At the same time, the 
reality of co-option is clearly present and the struggle for a ‘genuine peasant-based 
agro-ecology’ is a permanent one.105  
Change on the ground: the extent of ‘re-peasantisation’ 
As I have made clear throughout the thesis, the movement for food sovereignty was 
initiated by peasants and small farmers, and continues to be led by them. As the 
uniting narrative of La Via Campesina, it is in the first instance, and to some extent 
in the final analysis, a defensive strategy, aimed at enabling peasants and small 
farmers to continue to live, work and reproduce themselves and their communities 
as peasants and small farmers. It follows that a key arbiter of the success or 
otherwise of the movement is the extent to which the conditions of the global 
peasantry, both quantitatively in terms of sheer size, and qualitatively in terms of 
dignified livelihood opportunities, have been improved. The qualitative issues I have 
considered elsewhere: here the focus shifts to the quantitative aspect of the 
question. 
Nettie Wiebe, when asked to identify the single greatest failure to date of La Via 
Campesina, nominated ‘the inability to hold our ground, literally, as the 
displacement of small farmers and rural communities continues and the corporate 
concentration ramps up’.106 What she is describing is the perceived failure of La Via 
Campesina to halt the centuries-long process of ‘de-peasantisation’, which I 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. Amongst scholars of both liberal and radical 
persuasions, the ‘death of the peasantry’ was assumed to be consequent on the 
global trend of the 20th century towards urbanisation, and is regarded as a defining 
feature of capitalist (and state socialist) modernisation.107  
Yet the question persists: has the peasantry in fact ‘died’? If not, is it in the process 
of dying? Undoubtedly, there has been a decades-long trend towards declining rural 
and farming populations across the world as a percentage of the total population of 
each country, with the trend especially notable in the core capitalist countries 
where the industrialization of agriculture and the ideologies of ‘efficiency’ and 
‘productivity’ have been most comprehensively embraced. At the same time, the 
                                                          
105 Ibid.  
106 Interview with the author, 15.9.10.  
107 Both Weis (2007 op cit., 24-5) and Bello (2009, Food Wars, op cit., 12) cite with varying degrees of 
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genetically modified technology: Collier, P., 2008, ‘The Politics of Hunger: How Illusion and Greed Fan 
the Food Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, 87(6), 67-80.  
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peasantry has persisted in many places, so that at a global level there are still 450 
million farms, ‘85% of which are smallholder farms of less than 2 hectares’, with 
the bulk of these producing for subsistence or local market consumption.108 Further, 
while the proprietary seed market is indeed dominated by corporations, 
‘approximately three-quarters of the world’s farmers routinely save seeds from 
their harvest and grow locally-bred varieties’.109 
Paradoxically, it is arguably the case that ‘there are far more peasants than ever 
before’ in terms of total numbers, rather than as a proportion of the total 
population; with estimates suggesting that as much as ‘two-fifths of humanity’ still 
lived in small-farm households at the end of the 1990s.110 Recent research suggests 
that the numbers of ‘small farmers increased by 220 million [worldwide] between 
1990 and 1999’.111 In part, this is a simple function of a still rapidly growing global 
population in the post-World War II era. At the same time, this outcome would 
appear to contradict the comfortable generalisation that all impoverished peasants 
will opt for wage labour at the first opportunity.112 It would also suggest that at the 
macro level Nettie Wiebe is perhaps too pessimistic in her assessment of the failure 
of the peasantry to hold its ground. Amongst other factors, successful programs of 
redistributive land reform consolidate the peasantry and enhance its growth, which 
is one of the reasons why such reform is a central demand across most peasant 
organisations in the South.113  
Of particular interest are trends in the United States, as measured by the most 
recent (2007) Agricultural Census conducted by the US Department of Agriculture.114 
This Census found that in the five year period 2002-2007, 300,000 new farms 
commenced operation, with a ‘net increase of 75,810 farms’, representing a rate of 
increase of slightly under one per cent per year.115 Just as significant as the net 
increase in farm numbers was the nature of the new farms, being smaller, having 
‘more diversified production’, and run by ‘younger operators’.116 
The Census also assessed economic aspects of farm production including ‘organic, 
value-added, and speciality production, all of which are on the rise’.117 It therefore 
appears that a significant proportion of new farms are operating according to agro-
ecological methodologies. It is also the case that many would be selling into local 
markets and community-supported agricultural initiatives, both of which have 
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experienced an exponential rise in the US in the past two decades, as I discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
The Census reveals a ‘continuation in the trend towards more small and very large 
farms and fewer mid-sized operations’, with the ‘majority of US farms [being] 
smaller operations’, with many dependent on off-farm income.118 What appears to 
be happening is that farm consolidation at the large commercial end of the sector is 
proceeding fairly rapidly, while at the same time the emergence of the local food 
movement is supporting, albeit at a small and tentative scale, an incipient process 
of re-ruralisation and a ‘new agrarianism’.119 While the new generation of US 
farmers may not be ‘peasants’ in the traditional understanding of the term, many, 
if not most, would fall within the description of the farming populations that La Via 
Campesina, and the Food Sovereignty movement, would seek to defend in their 
political economy of food. One manifestation of the ‘new agrarian’ movement in 
the United States is the slight growth in young, inexperienced farmers, many from 
urban backgrounds, who are choosing farming vocations over urban-based 
careers.120 Another is the renewal of highly depressed post-industrial areas through 
a remarkable growth in urban agriculture.121 Nettie Wiebe makes the point that 
imaginative forms of land tenure-ship can be important in terms of removing the 
barriers to entry of young people into farming:  
[The NFU initiatives] have had a very good impact in terms of opening young people’s 
imaginations, that they might farm. So what you get now – and we have several of 
these around Saskatoon – you have plots of land that are being rented by groups of 
young people who go out and farm small portions. They don’t actually invest in the 
land, they haven’t got hundreds of thousands of dollars to invest obviously – they rent 
and share equipment, and rent small plots, and are starting to farm. For me, that’s 
very encouraging…[While the conventional agricultural model requiring huge 
investments] is [now] unviable, the possibility of restructuring policy, to have smaller 
operations, and in many cases shared and cooperative operations managed and run by 
young people, that seems to be a much better prospect.122 
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One of the innovations identified here by Wiebe is landsharing, which as I discuss 
below, is also a feature of the local food movement on the Coffs Coast. As with 
agro-ecology, such practices of sharing and co-operation can be conceptualised as 
emergent examples of the ‘circulation of the commons’.123 The trends towards 
diversified production and value-adding are consistent with similar trends identified 
in Europe by Dutch scholar Jan Douwe van der Ploeg.124 As I discussed earlier in the 
thesis, van der Ploeg conceptualises the peasantry by what he terms the ‘peasant 
condition’.125 Above all, this condition describes a ‘struggle for autonomy’ on the 
basis of expanding a ‘self-controlled and self-managed resource base, which in turn 
allows for those forms of co-production of man and living nature that interact with 
the market, allow for survival and for further prospects’.126 Since the resource base 
is expanded inter alia through soil fertility, the linkage to agro-ecology is explicit.  
Van der Ploeg identifies multiple processes of re-peasantisation in diverse sites, 
embodied in various acts of resistance that he groups together as expressions of the 
‘peasant principle’.127 These acts include both overt struggles, such as the land 
occupations of the MST in Brazil and the street protests of La Via Campesina against 
the WTO, but also the constitution of new forms of food-related transactions 
between producers and consumers, based on ‘relations of reciprocity’ and by 
reference to ‘use value, not exchange value’.128 For van der Ploeg, expressions of 
the local food movement such as Community-Supported Agriculture are to be 
understood as ‘acts of insubordination to Empire’, and as forms of ‘production and 
action [based] on innovativeness [and] on autonomous cooperation between 
producing [and consuming] subjects’.129 
In terms of my research questions, the evidence – albeit preliminary and tentative – 
for the existence of both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of re-
peasantisation does suggest that the food sovereignty demands for the ‘right to 
farm’ and the ‘right for small farmers to produce food for their communities’ are 
achieving a certain impact. Such a conclusion is strengthened in cases, such as the 
resettlement over 25 years of 350,000 landless families by the Brazilian Landless 
Workers’ Movement (MST) through processes of social struggle and negotiation, 
where effective processes of redistributive land reform are supported by social and 
economic mechanisms – access to credit, housing, training, local markets and so on 
– that guarantee new generations of peasants and small farmers a dignified and 
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secure livelihood.130 At the same time, achieving such outcomes is a constant 
struggle, with agrarian reform processes in Brazil as in many other regions 
effectively grinding to a halt in recent years even as capitalist agribusiness 
continues to expand.131 However even though objectively the balance of forces still 
favours the globalising capitalist food system, the food sovereignty perspective of 
integral rural development, combining agrarian reform, agro-ecology and the 
building of co-operative social and economic structures, can form the basis of a 
transformative, broad-based national-popular alliance. 
Food re-localisation – the third pillar of food sovereignty 
As stated above, local food economies are seen as one manifestation of re-
peasantisation; and indeed I have argued in this thesis that they constitute the third 
pillar of food sovereignty, together with redistributive agrarian reform and agro-
ecology. In the context of the institutionalisation of food sovereignty in Ecuador, 
Ricardo Intriago makes the following observations:  
In general, the [Food Sovereignty] law is excellent. The law sets the standard for small 
farmers, small fishers, and so on…Further, it speaks of the popular and solidarity 
economy, that is, the relation between the countryside and the city, whereby small 
farmers can sell directly to consumers…The law says that in each municipality public 
spaces must be made available for the fair trade in food, where farmers sell to 
consumers. [Unfortunately] not a single municipality in the country has implemented 
this [provision].132 
This ‘popular and solidarity economy’ is understood, in the Australian context, as 
the local food economy. In the remainder of the chapter, I will discuss two aspects 
of the development of this economy: a diversity of local food initiatives on the 
Coffs Coast; and the Food Connect model of Community-Shared Agriculture.  
Local food on the Coffs Coast 
In Chapter 3 I outlined the range of local food initiatives that are being developed 
on the Coffs Coast, and in Chapter 5 I discussed the extent to which they have 
received institutional and financial support. In this section I consider their economic 
and ecological impacts. I preface this discussion with the observation that the focus 
of the inquiry concerns the extent of the connectedness, and the trajectories and 
potentialities of these initiatives, rather than a quantitative assessment of the 
percentage of market share that local food initiatives have captured to date.133 
Here I am foreshadowing my conclusion that, in Gramscian terms, the Food 
Sovereignty movement is not yet a counter-hegemonic force, but that it arguably 
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has the potential to become one; and I am concerned to tease out the extent and 
trajectory of that potential.  
The local food economy consists, in its purest form, of local production for local 
consumption. Ideally, from the food systems perspective, local fresh production 
would support local processors and value-adders, who would in turn supply locally-
owned retailers; and the nutrient cycle would be closed with local composting 
businesses recycling food waste and returning it to local farmers, growers and 
gardeners.134 The transport of produce from farms to processors and shops would 
again be coordinated through locally-owned and run transport businesses and 
wholesalers, whose businesses would constitute essential infrastructure for the 
efficient functioning of the local food economy.  
Working alongside this monetised local food economy would be other, non-
monetary expressions of local food. These would typically take different forms of 
self- and community- provisioning, such as backyard gardening, community gardens, 
school gardens, kerbside plantings, guerrilla gardening, edible streetscapes, and 
food swaps. These expressions of local food usually don’t make a direct monetary 
contribution to the local food economy, but they contribute indirectly by raising the 
visibility of local food and disseminating the values of a new culture based on more 
intimate connections with food. In other words, they begin to undermine the 
‘common sense’ of the capitalist food system based on alienation and the cheap 
food complex (‘food from nowhere’), and to diffuse the new ‘good sense’ of food 
that is socially fair, ecologically healing, and connected.135 They are further 
manifestations of the ‘circulation of the commons’ in an emergent solidarity 
economy. 
We have then, in the ideal scenario, a web of mutually supportive activities with 
multiple actors working to support each other in different ways and at different 
points within what can be conceptualised as a local food system. For local 
producers to sell locally, they need local markets and retail outlets; and for those 
businesses to be successful, they must in turn be supported by adequate local 
demand. To what extent do the current activities on the Coffs Coast approximate 
this ideal?  
In terms of production, the larger volumes in the main categories – beef, dairy, 
bananas, blueberries, garlic – are shipped out of the region to the centralised 
wholesale markets in Brisbane and Sydney; and then some of the produce returns to 
the region (together with produce from many other regions) via the same markets. 
The big supermarket chains have centralised their own distribution systems, and 
(with few exceptions) do not source produce locally.136  
While the great majority of the food economy is not local, there are nevertheless 
clearly discernible local elements, and degrees of connectedness, which begin to 
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comprise a functioning local food economy. There are three key sets of actors here. 
The first are a few Coffs Harbour-based wholesalers who make a deliberate policy 
of sourcing some or all of their produce from local growers, rather than from the 
centralised wholesale markets in Brisbane and Sydney. The second are small 
retailers, and locally-owned wholefood stores, cafes and restaurants, that similarly 
privilege local produce. And the last is the small but growing network of growers’ 
markets in a number of centres in the region.  
One wholesaler, Golden Dawn, has operated in Coffs Harbour for more than fifty 
years, and has traditionally serviced the local banana industry. This industry was, 
until the 1970s, Australia’s largest source of bananas.137 Golden Dawn only 
purchases locally grown produce.138 However, because it supplies the larger 
retailers, which have in recent years introduced more stringent accreditation 
requirements, they can only deal with the large commercial growers. Hence they 
operate with one foot inside an incipient local food economy, supporting local 
producers and facilitating local distribution; and one foot outside it, by supplying 
both local and non-local retailers.  
A & D wholesalers, is more firmly integrated into the emerging local food economy. 
They source as much local produce as they can, and they supply locally-owned small 
grocers, restaurants and resorts. For both A & D, and the growers, the motivations 
are financial, as the owner, Felipe, explains:  
The [big growers] will ring me and say we’ve got Lebanese Cucumbers, Sydney [market] 
are quoting $40, Brisbane $38, but with you we don’t have to pay the freight, you’re 
taking everything, the boxes don’t have to be new, they can be second-hand. We’ll 
charge you $30. The benefit to me is I save money, it’s a fresher product, and I’m 
buying locally. And not only am I buying locally, I’m selling locally, and it’s being 
consumed by locals. I sell to restaurants, pubs, fruit and veg stores...I’d definitely like 
to see more local produce…We [the three main wholesalers] all source as much local 
[produce] as we can. If anyone walks in here with something, I will buy it…139  
Felipe has made certain adjustments, such as second-hand boxes, which facilitate 
local growers supplying him. Amongst his customers, Felipe detects a preference for 
local produce amongst locally-owned and operated businesses:  
The owners of businesses are the ones who care, the ones who know their business. 
Stefano from Fiascos [restaurant], he tastes his parsley, if the taste’s not right, he 
doesn’t want it. He never complains about price, just quality. If it’s local, he’ll take it, 
as long as the quality is good. Kim from Happy Frog pushes local – Bonville Fresh, 
Farmers’ Direct, Anuka – everyone wants local, they put it on their menu, it’s a 
marketing tool, they use it a lot.140 
The comment about Stefano highlights my earlier point: part of the transition to 
Food Sovereignty involves the transition from quantity (cheap food) to quality (good 
                                                          
137 “30 years ago we supplied 85% of Australia’s bananas. Today it’d be less than 3%, when 
Queensland’s not affected by an event”: Interview with Dave Norbury, Golden Dawn manager, 10.3.11. 
138 Ibid.  
139 Interview with the author, 8.3.11.  
140 Ibid.  
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food). As an expression of Food Sovereignty, the trend towards food localisation 
supports this transition. Significantly, it does so by working within the existing 
(capitalist) market structures.  
As elsewhere in Australia, the retail market for fresh produce is dominated by the 
major supermarkets; however an independent grocery sector does exist. In 2009 
local business woman Kim Towner started the Happy Frog, a Coffs Harbour café / 
grocer selling fresh, dry and value-added produce. She started this business because 
she saw that, even though the two weekly Coffs growers’ markets were doing well, 
there was ‘still nowhere you [could] go and buy the local fruit and veg all the 
time’.141 Her ‘point of difference’ in the market was both local produce and 
sustainability. At first, she did deal directly with a lot of growers, but then found 
that too difficult to maintain for all her produce, so she turned to Felipe at A & D 
instead, knowing that he offered a wide range of local produce.142 
Thus we can see here firmly established networks and relationships between 
growers, wholesalers, retailers; and between retailers and their customers. 
Connectedness, the key organising principle of food sovereignty, is clearly 
observable.  
Farmers markets are a new and rapidly growing phenomenon in Australia, with the 
Australian Farmers’ Markets Association (AFMA) reporting that since the first market 
commenced trading in 1999, in excess of 150 markets now (2011) operate around 
the country.143 There are, as discussed in Chapter 3, two weekly growers’ markets 
in Coffs Harbour (one run by the Council, the other by Kim Towner), and one 
fortnightly market in Bellingen.144 
The social connectivity and multi-functionality of farmers’ markets – in terms of 
healthy eating, food security, and local economic development - were highlighted 
                                                          
141 Interview with the author, 25.3.11.  
142 He’s got a list of what he’s got that’s local – so we get the local stuff first, even if it’s a bit dearer. 
And he’ll know, he’ll say that’s Zuni’s strawberries, and that’s Dave’s lettuce, and so on. We know who 
they all are anyway, and we still get direct lettuce, herbs, beans, zucchinis, tomatoes, sometimes 
capsicums, bananas, citrus in season, potaotos and pumpkins: ibid.  
143 Australian Farmers’ Markets Association, 2011, ‘Creating Appetite for Farmers’ Markets in 
Australia: National Food Plan Submission’, available at: 
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/2006869/Australian_Farmers_Markets_Association.
pdf, accessed 11.11.11.  
144 In 2010 a new market was established in Taylor’s Arm, a small rural community in the Nambucca 
Valley Shire, in the southern part of the Coffs Coast region. These markets are highly prized for their 
conviviality, atmosphere, and their contribution to community life, as Michael Burt, convenor of the 
NSW Farmers’ Association, says of the Taylors’ Arm market:  
We don’t have enough local stallholders as yet, but it’s just been great for the community out there. There are 
some market gardeners with stalls there – where we are, it’s a lot of beef. But the atmosphere is just great – 
it’s the best thing that’s ever happened out there, we really needed it. You can get great local coffee, and 
bacon and egg rolls – it’s fantastic. It’s once a fortnight, pulling good numbers in. We’ve sold out of our 
finger limes there. 
Interview with the author, 28.3.11. 
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by the AFMA in their submission to the Federal Government on its proposed National 
Food Plan.145 
Farmers’ and growers’ markets also make a direct economic contribution to their 
local economies. A Rapid Market Assessment of the Coffs Harbour growers’ market 
showed that an estimated 2,600 patrons shopped at the market during its eight 
hours of operation, spending a total of $61,230 at the market itself, and additional 
$110,942 on additional shopping and other activities in the city centre. Averaged 
over the year, this meant that in excess of $3 million was spent at the market, and 
a further $5.77 million on additional shopping and activities.146  
These findings are consistent with research undertaken for the Victorian Farmers’ 
Market Association into inter alia the visitation patterns and shopping behaviours of 
farmers’ market customers, as well as the economic and social impacts of farmers’ 
markets in Victoria.147  
One area of potential connectivity, highlighted in the passage from the AFMA 
submission quoted above, is between farmers’ markets and food security networks; 
that is, charitable providers of emergency food relief to families and individuals in 
need. In the United States, where such practices are well established, this takes the 
form of farmers’ markets setting up systems which allow recipients of emergency 
government food relief (known as ‘food stamps’) to redeem these vouchers for 
fresh local produce, thereby improving health outcomes and supporting local 
growers and farmers.148 Nothing similar has as yet been established in Australia, 
even as demand for the Australian equivalent of food stamps – food vouchers – has 
                                                          
145 “Farmers’ markets deliver fresh food to urban and rural communities. They have the capacity to 
educate people about healthy eating, and can contribute to a reduction in obesity…They can underpin 
food security networks and can act as the hub of local food systems. Farmers’ markets can connect CSA 
farms with consumers, also providing a commercial outlet for…community and school gardens. 
Farmers’ markets can promote food groups, food trails and farmgate fresh food outlets and can vitally 
connect isolated farmers with their peers and new customers”: AFMA op cit.  
146 A Rapid Market Assessment is ‘a collaborative learning process in which a team of market managers 
and others study a host market’, gathering information to learn more about the market through two 
principle methods, attendance counts and dot survey: Lev, L., Brewer, L., and Stephenson, G., 2008, 
‘Tools for Rapid Market Assessments’, Special Report 1088-E, Oregon Small Farms Technical Report 
No.6. The attendance count involves stationing researchers at each entry point to the market, and 
counting all who enter for 20 minutes during each hour of the market’s operation: ibid. The Rapid 
Market Assessment of the Coffs Harbour Farmers Market was undertaken by the market’s manager, the 
author, and two other volunteers, on 15.4.11. The results are held by the author and the Council, 
however they are as yet unpublished.  
147 Victorian Farmers’ Markets Association, 2010, ‘Market Research Project Report’, October 2010. In 
terms of visitation patterns, this research reported that one or more persons from 53% of all Victorian 
households visited a farmers’ market at least once a year, with 25% of all households reporting a 
visitation frequency of at least once a month. The average spend by each customer at the market and 
surrounding local businesses was estimated at $70, representing a weekly contribution of $2 million into 
the local Victorian economy: ibid. The $2 million figure is based on an estimated 35,000 weekly patrons 
of farmers’ markets across Victoria. 
148 One such example is the ‘Philly Food Bucks program’, a collaboration between the Food Trust and 
the Philadelphia Department of Public Health, which augments the value of food stamps by an 
additional $2 in the form of the ‘Philly Food Bucks’: 
http://www.thefoodtrust.org/php/programs/farmers.market.program.php, accessed 11.11.11. An 
estimated 2 million food stamp recipients in the US participate in such programs: 
http://www.abc.net.au/rural/news/content/201110/s3337921.htm, accessed 11.11.11.  
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risen sharply in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis.149 The Coffs Coast region is 
no exception to this trend, however the potential synergies between emergency 
relief and local fresh produce have yet to be explored.150 
In terms of the trajectories for local food on the Coffs Coast, the first observation 
to be made is that the developments in this region are, as I have consistently 
argued in this thesis, part of a much larger and quite dynamic national and 
international trend. That trend, as I discussed in Chapter 3, is clearly in an 
expansionary phase: farmers’ markets are being continually established, 
community-supported agriculture initiatives are constantly emerging, the demand 
for community gardens is rising, and increasing numbers of individuals are growing 
food themselves in their own gardens.  
The Permablitz movement is but one expression of this expansionary trend.151 The 
first Permablitz was held in Melbourne in 2006, and since then well over 100 have 
been held around Australia; and the movement has spread internationally, with 
Permablitz groups now formed in Istanbul, Hawaii, Sintra (Portugal), Dallas Texas, 
Montreal and Calgary.152 As it encourages a measure of self-reliance and the 
acquisition of the skills necessary to accomplish such a goal, Permablitzes and 
related events directly contribute to wider processes of de-commodification that 
challenge the logic and rationality of the globalising capitalist food system. 
Similarly, they are manifestations of the solidarity economy which is the immanent 
political-economic tendency of food sovereignty.  
It is no coincidence that these expressions of the solidarity economy are increasing 
at a time of economic hardship and austerity. In the United States, sales of food 
gardening products reached $3 billion in both 2009 and 2010, representing a 20% 
increase on the pre-crisis figures of 2008.153 Similarly, consumer spending on food-
related gardening in the United Kingdom rose 10% in 2009, clearly driven by 
government austerity, according to one retail analyst:  
The impact of recession on the consumer mindset will be a lasting fillip to the 
gardening sub-sector. A heightened austerity is driving a trend towards ‘grow your 
                                                          
149 The Australian Council for Social Services found that, on a national level, community providers of 
emergency relief reported a 22% increase in demand for their services over 12 months, and a 
consequent 19% increase in the numbers of eligible recipients that they had to turn away because of 
lack of capacity to meet the rising demand: ACOSS, 2011, ‘Australian Community Sector Survey’, 
available at: 
http://www.acoss.org.au/media/release/community_sector_unable_to_keep_up_with_demand_for_servi
ces_acoss_report, accessed 11.11.11.  
150 Emergency Food Relief providers - such as St Vincents de Paul, the Salvation Army, and Lifehouse 
Church - in the Coffs Harbour region, interviewed by the author in February and March 2011, reported a 
sharp rise in demand for all forms of emergency relief (electricity and medical assistance as well as food 
vouchers) since 2009. This is consistent with the ACOSS research, cited above.  
151 www.permablitz.net, accessed 12.10.10.  
152 http://www.permablitz.net/regional-groups, accessed 11.11.11.   
153 National Gardening Association, 2011, ‘Food Gardening Sales Total $3 billion for the Second Year in 
a Row: People are Doing More Lawn and Garden Activities themselves and Hiring Fewer Services’, 
available at: http://assoc.garden.org/press/press.php?q=show&id=3457&pr=pr_research, accessed 
11.11.11.  
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own’, while the inexpensive nature of gardening as a pastime saw it grow in 
popularity amongst more frugal consumers.
154  
Expectations about the short-to-medium term future of the globalising capitalist 
economy of course diverge significantly, from those who believe that growth has 
essentially come to an end, permanently; to those who argue that the recovery will 
soon be on the way.155 However, with even the new Head of the International 
Monetary Fund issuing dire warnings about the global economy facing a ‘lost 
decade’ of ‘weak growth and deflation’, it seems likely that the drivers impelling 
the expansion of the solidarity economy around food will be present for the 
foreseeable future.156 In the Coffs Coast region, the emergence of two community 
gardens in Bellingen, one in Coffs Harbour; two Permablitz groups (Bellingen and 
Coffs Harbour), and a seed savers’ network (Bellingen) are all expressions of this 
trajectory towards greater self-provision, self-reliance and an emerging solidarity 
economy. This solidarity economy is evidence of the organising principle of 
connectedness at work in the region, and suggests the movement in this region is 
slowly gaining in numerical strength, attracting public support and, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, attaining some measure of political credibility.  
The trend towards localisation is observable amongst commercial growers, albeit 
for different reasons, as Michael Burt of the NSW Farmers Association explains:  
I think you’ll see, and I’ve started to see it already, because of the changing 
demographics in the area, and the pressure on farm viability, there will be a strong 
trend towards local food and value adding. There will be a big role for the farmers’ 
markets, and the local supermarkets and retail outlets may have to look at it too, as a 
way of [distinguishing] themselves from the Coles and the Woolworths, by selling a lot 
of local produce. This is what the Coop in Macksville has been doing, after the opening 
of the Woolworths there last year. We’ve started to see a lot more local grown 
labelling in their veggie section. Which means there’ll be a [bigger] market for the 
local farmers.157  
At the same time, the central market system will continue to play a leading role in 
food supply chains, and the commercial growers and farmers, even as they supply 
more local outlets, will continue to use it, because the local market is just not big 
enough to absorb the volumes they produce.158 Thus, while existing distribution, 
                                                          
154 Datamonitor, 2010, ‘Gardening Blossoms in the Economic Downturn’, 15.3.10, available at: 
http://about.datamonitor.com/media/archives/3859, accessed 11.11.11.   
155 The former view is common in peak oil circles, with Richard Heinberg (2010, The End of Growth: 
Adapting to the New Economic Reality) being a leading exponent. The latter view, unsurprisingly, is 
embraced by mainstream economists and business leaders. For example, at the Annual World Economic 
Forum of the ‘New Champions’ of business and finance leaders, held in Dalian, China, in September 
2011, the participants expressed themselves to be ‘cautious but optimistic about the outlook for the 
global economy’: World Economic Forum, 2011, ‘Global Economic Outlook: Cautious Optimism – But 
Where Will Growth Come From?’ Available at: http://www.weforum.org/news/global-economic-
outlook-cautious-optimism-where-will-growth-come, accessed 11.11.11.  
156 Knight, E., 2011, ‘Europe’s Growing Crisis could Force Global Economy into ‘Lost Decade’’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 11.11.11, available at: http://www.smh.com.au/business/europes-growing-
crisis-could-force-global-economy-into-lost-decade-20111110-1n9gj.html, accessed 11.11.11.  
157 Interview with the author. 
158 I don’t think they can just supply Coffs and be sustainable in their own businesses. They have to sell to Sydney 
and Brisbane as well. For example, let’s say you have a Lebanense cucumber grower. And they might sell me 30 
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transport and supply networks will likely remain in place, demand for local food is 
growing. The question then becomes how can this demand be effectively met, and 
the emerging local food economy supported, in terms of marketing. As Michael Burt 
explains, farmers will be unable to cope with this burden:  
The problem for farmers is that they don’t have the time to do a lot of the direct 
marketing themselves. Farming is a full-time occupation. It’s hard for them to go down 
to the big growers’ market in Newcastle every fortnight. The central markets will stay 
the same – but there will be more and more marketing of local food to consumers. 
There’s just some logistical and practical aspects that need to be addressed. Farmers 
don’t have the time to do that themselves, and that’s why the central market system is 
there.159  
The ‘logistical and practical aspects’ are arguably key to the greater expansion of 
the local food economy; and I return to them in the Conclusion with a brief 
exploration of a new innovation emerging in the United States to address exactly 
these issues: the multifunctional food hub. Before moving on, however, I want to 
highlight two additional points regarding local food, in terms of my research 
questions. The first is the potential for it to be co-opted as simply another element 
of ‘consumer choice’ within the dominant supermarket system; and indeed this is 
already happening on the Coffs Coast, with one of the two major supermarkets 
sourcing directly from local growers and marketing the produce accordingly. Having 
regard to the largely negative role played by the supermarket ‘duopoly’ in 
Australia, the integrity and transformative potential of the local food movement 
will depend on its capacity to avoid the fate of being ‘just another shopping 
choice’.  
Secondly, another danger facing the local food movement is the potential for over-
zealous enforcement of food safety regulations that, according to some Food 
Sovereignty advocates in the United States, amounts to ‘harassment’ and 
‘criminalisation’ of small-scale and even home producers.160 At the same time, the 
fact that authorities in certain regions appear to be attempting to suppress the 
local food movement is arguably evidence of its growing popularity and appeal, and 
the extent to which it is perceived as a threat by corporate agribusiness that stands 
to lose market share as the local food economy grows in popularity. The perception 
of such harassment, and the desire to assert local autonomy in the face of a 
perceived over-mighty and corporate-biased bureaucracy, is clearly one of the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
boxes of Leb cucumbers, Mother Nature buys 30, Tutti Frutti 30 – but you can’t make a living on 100 boxes of Leb 
cucumbers, pay for all your water, your fertilisers, your electricity, your staff. So they have to send to the [central] 
market, they don’t have a choice. They’re yielding maybe 500 boxes a week. The local suppliers won’t take it – the 
supermarkets won’t take it, it has to go through their own supply system:  
Interview with Felipe, A & D Wholesalers, Coffs Harbour, 30.3.10. The same point is made by Michael 
Burt:  
Looking ahead – in the future there’ll always be a place for those wholesale mechanisms and central markets, 
because farmers with large volumes need those outlets. A friend of mine, a neighbour, is an organic garlic 
farmer, and it’s vital for him [to have access to the wholesalers] as a ‘bread and butter’ income. So there’s 
always going to be a role for them. In the cattle industry, you need those saleyards, and there’ll always be a 
place for that system within beef production”: interview with the author, 15.4.10.  
159 Interview with the author.  
160 Kinsman, J., 2012, ‘If You Want More Local Food, Stop Criminalizing Family Farmers’, 10.1.12, 
available at: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2012/01/10-0, accessed 12.1.12. 
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factors behind the recent passage in a number of US municipalities of ‘Local Food 
and Community Self-Governance’ Ordinances (reproduced as Appendix F).161 This 
growing politicisation of the food system in the core capitalist country points 
towards a shift in the balance of forces.  
Robert Pekin & Food Connect  
In Chapter 3, I discussed the theory and practice of Community-Supported 
Agriculture, and the particular form that it has taken in Australia under the 
leadership of Food Connect and its founder, Robert Pekin. In the final section of 
this chapter, I further consider some of the particular features of Food Connect, 
with a focus on exploring the connectivities it has established amongst participants 
in an emerging solidarity economy, and offer some provisional thoughts about its 
trajectory. I pursue these matters further in the Conclusion.  
Having been involved with Food Connect in a personal and professional capacity 
since 2009, and having observed the growth of the local and alternative food 
movement in Australia for a number of years, I believe it is no exaggeration to state 
that the existence of Community-Supported Agriculture (CSA) in this country is 
largely due to the energy, vision and commitment of one individual: Robert Pekin. 
This statement is not to eulogise or romanticise his personal achievements, 
considerable though they are. Rather, it is to recognise first, the capacity to effect 
broader social change that such individuals have; and secondly, that Food Connect 
as it exists today has been the culmination of many years of trial and error; a 
willingness to experiment, to fail, to observe; and to learn from mistakes.162 
One of the greatest strengths of Food Connect has from its earliest days lain in the 
quality and depth of the relationships that it has managed to foster. This was 
apparent in the emergence of the first iteration of Food Connect from the ashes of 
the multi-farmer Lockyer Valley CSA. Already in that first group of Brisbane-based 
subscribers to the failed CSA, a committed core of ‘mums’, as Robert Pekin calls 
them, met with him and insisted that the CSA be moved to Brisbane, and be set up 
as a dedicated business with Robert in charge, rather than the farmers.  
Through the contacts he had built up over the years, Robert managed to effect a 
seamless transition to the new business, and it expanded rapidly, to around 600 
boxes a week by October 2004. However, with the entire operation being run on a 
cash-basis out of Robert’s one-bedroom flat, matters quickly began to get out of 
hand and ‘the mums’, a number of whom were also working as part-time staff, 
stepped in once more to enforce a break of some months at the end of 2004. 
                                                          
161 As documented by the Food for Maine’s Future, whose mission is ‘to build a just, secure, sustainable 
and democratic food system to the benefit of all Maine farmers, communities and the environment’, the 
first of these Ordinances was motivated by state food safety rules which would prohibit the outdoor 
processing of poultry destined for sale, impacting smaller farmers. Amongst other matters, the Local 
Food & Community Self-Governance Ordinance purports to exempt from licensing and inspection 
requirements local food producers and processors where food is sold directly to the end consumer for 
the purposes of home consumption: Saving Seeds, Issue 12, Winter 2012, available at: 
https://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1221/images/Saving%20Seeds%20Winter%202012%20Web.pdf, 
accessed 10.1.12.  
162 The following discussion is based on a detailed semi-structured interview conducted with Robert 
Pekin on 2-3 November, 2011.  
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Despite working very long hours, Robert was not receiving any wage from the 
enterprise, and he pushed himself to the point of physical and mental exhaustion.163  
In 2005, Food Connect was re-launched, with the main drive coming once again 
from the subscriber ‘mums’, rather than the farmers.164 A business plan was 
prepared and Robert had an exploratory meeting with Bendigo Bank’s community 
arm, but no financing was available given the lack of previous business experience. 
So the enterprise was self-financed via a number of long-term (6-12 month) 
subscriptions. 
On its re-launch Food Connect had a website and an online ordering platform, which 
were significant improvements, but ‘it was still [very] hard work’, as Robert recalls. 
Because the business did not have warehouse premises that allowed large trucks to 
make deliveries, Robert himself had to arrange all deliveries of produce at the 
Brisbane central markets, through individual agreements with farmers and 
independent transport companies. Initially this meant Robert going to the markets 
from 2 am to 4 am, however the drivers then decided to make life easier for 
themselves and Robert by organising for Food Connect produce to be located on 
pallets ‘hidden’ within coolrooms.165  
In devising this system and building relationships around it, Robert speaks of the 
level of camaraderie and trust amongst truck operators and fork-lift drivers who 
were keen to help Food Connect get a start by staying ‘under the radar’ of the 
normal market rules:  
[W]e were all on the same team, and the forkies too, because they were getting 
shafted by their agents. In [the central markets] it’s cut-throat, [a] complete [free] 
market economy, just gone mad, no sense of co-operation. So there was this 
camaraderie…In that miasma of activity my stuff would be figured out, there’d be a 
pallet there and a pallet here, and I’d pay the forkies a carton of beer a month. It was 
really fascinating, this barter economy, we were helping each other out. They would 
let me know of farmers they knew who might fit the bill, and the transport companies 
were all involved too. They could see that it was growing, and they could help it, they 
could pick up from farmers like they used to do in the old days. So all those 
relationships were coming back, and this was something that was completely un-
thought of…it made me aware that this was another part of the local economy that had 
been completely routed. And it was a vital part of the link.
166  
Getting to know about the farmers who could potentially be suppliers of Food 
Connect was essential to developing the business and ensuring its long-term 
success. Often potential farmers were mentioned to Robert by word of mouth, and 
sometimes he would purchase good-looking produce from such agents purely in 
                                                          
163 When the break came, Robert says he ‘probably slept for about three weeks’: interview with the 
author. 
164 The farmers were interested and ready to get involved again, says Robert, but it wasn’t them pushing 
for the business to re-start. 
165 As Robert explains, to receive produce in the central markets as a seller, the normal practice is that 
you have to register with the market management, pay a license fee, and buy through one of the market 
agents. Because he was trying to minimise costs as a start-up business, and because he wanted to deal 
directly with the farmers, Robert decided to ignore these established norms.  
166 Interview with the author, 2.11.11.  
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order to get the farmer’s details on the box, and then he would contact the farmer 
directly.167  
Even despite the chaotic experience with the Lockyer Valley farmers, Robert and 
his staff still paid insufficient attention to putting sound financial management 
systems in place, right from the start of Food Connect. This was something they got 
‘badly wrong’, Robert acknowledges, and it took a ‘lot of time’ subsequently to get 
it properly resolved. Indeed as of early 2012, Food Connect still finds itself in a 
critical financial situation, with the need to raise tens of thousands of dollars to pay 
off accrued debts.168 
For Robert, the biggest single success of Food Connect is that it is still in existence, 
six years after its establishment. Despite its journey being a ‘really rocky road’, the 
reputation of Food Connect well exceeds any direct financial impact it may have 
made in terms of market share:  
We’re really well known. We’re still not doing as well financially as we hoped we would 
be by this stage, but beyond that, the successes are that we are almost an iconic part 
of Brisbane. So many people know of Food Connect, it’s become a Brisbane identity. 
It’s part of the fabric of food in Brisbane, this Food Connect thing, that’s up to 
something completely different to normal business models, and normal food business 
models.169 
Food Connect business models have been started in Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne 
and Bellingen; and Robert has been contacted numerous times by people in other 
towns and cities around Australia wanting to do the same thing. As he puts it, ‘the 
fact that so many people want to copy us is a pretty good indicator of our success’.  
When he started Food Connect, Robert wanted not only to bring ‘farmers and city 
folk’ closer together, but also to ‘cause a ripple movement beyond food’; and he 
has seen this achieved in the many relationships that have been formed by and 
through Food Connect. Again, connectedness is the organising principle. One 
example of this are the investments that Brisbane-based subscribers have made in 
some of the Food Connect farms, to enable them to build holiday homes and 
establish bed & breakfasts on the properties, ‘so farmers have another source of 
income through agri-tourism’. Another example of the depth of the relationships 
that the model has succeeded in creating is the network of City Cousins, the 
‘mums’ who have become ‘the backbone of the organisation’ and who, despite 
being to a certain extent neglected by the staff, have ‘really stuck at it’.  
A third major achievement is the construction of a ‘non-mainstream’ food 
enterprise that was based on a hybridised product, certified organic plus ‘chemical-
free, eco-friendly’ produce. Explaining the reasons for this combination ‘has been 
                                                          
167 After some months of ‘shady dodgy stuff’, Robert transitioned to paying a per-pallet fee to collect 
his produce via the Brisbane Market Unloading Service. Once Food Connect moved into premises large 
enough to accommodate semi-trailers, they started taking direct deliveries, always from the independent 
transport companies, with whom Robert has established a high degree of trust, such that the drivers let 
themselves in and out of the warehouse to make deliveries: interview with the author, 3.11.11.  
168 Personal conversations, September-November 2011.  
169 Interview with the author, 2.11.11.  
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an enormous load’ and ‘pure hard work’ to sell to potential new subscribers. 
Further, it has brought Robert into considerable conflict with the organic industry 
as a whole and many individuals within it, who have disagreed strongly with his 
decision not to sell only certified organic produce. However in his view this 
decision, and the commitment to stay with it, has been one of the key reasons for 
the impact Food Connect has achieved:  
A lot of farmers believe in us, just because of that [commitment]. We’re not excluding 
any farmers from our process, we’re here for all farmers, and for all people who want 
to have good nutritious food…If I’d segmented the market, and said, right, we’re only 
going to go with organic produce, I don’t think we’d have had anywhere near the ripple 
effect, or the impact we’re having within the farming community, and the health 
[sector], who know that affordability is not where organics is at. If you look at it from 
the social justice perspective, in terms of treating farmers fairly, and making food 
affordable…That’s been the hardest thing to do, but I’m so proud of it.170 
Thus the hybrid version has allowed Food Connect to keep its produce affordable, 
comparable, Robert says, with the prices of conventional produce being sold in the 
major supermarkets, and less than half what would typically be paid in 100% 
organic markets and shops. Making ‘good food affordable’ has been ‘a hallmark’ of 
Food Connect, says Robert, but holding to this commitment – returning 50% of the 
food dollar to the farmers, and keeping the business’s margins low to maximise 
affordability, has come at a financial cost to Food Connect itself.  
This spirit of sacrifice and dedication to a bigger cause can be observed throughout 
Robert’s career after losing his father’s dairy farm; and he has asked it not only of 
himself, but also of Food Connect and all who have worked for it. Arguably this 
reveals a contradiction in both Robert and Food Connect, because, on one level, 
the commitment to social justice for farmers and fairness for subscribers has been 
at the expense of decent terms and conditions for Food Connect staff, Robert 
included.  
In terms of challenges, Robert mentions two in particular: trying to marry his own 
expectations about internal workplace democracy with efficient business operation; 
and the failure to combat the perennial phenomenon of customer ‘churn’. Both are 
linked, and contribute, to, a third major challenge: ensuring that the business is on 
a sound financial footing.  
As someone who was strongly influenced by the values and history of the 
cooperative movement, Robert has also wanted to ‘be true to participatory 
decision-making in the running’ of Food Connect. While this was possible in the first 
couple of years with a very small and highly motivated staff, who were willing to 
spend unpaid time in after-hours meetings, he found that as the business grew, 
staff turned over and the motivations of the new staff changed, this became 
increasingly difficult. Many staff wanted to be paid to attend after-hours meetings, 
and since the financial situation of the business didn’t allow for this, Robert found 
that two dynamics were manifesting. One was that decision-making was becoming 
more centralised and autocratic, in the interests of business efficiency. The other 
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was that some members of staff (himself included) were working 80-hour weeks, to 
compensate for those who were ‘only doing their job’.  
With the third generation of staff now being recruited, the business has become 
much more professional, but at the same time is recovering some of the original 
spirit of volunteerism from its early days. Robert believes that with the combination 
of the two his original ideals of strong workplace democracy can be recovered, 
because all the staff will ‘contribute a small amount to the concept’, rather than a 
few contributing disproportionately.  
Customer ‘churn’, whereby a business has a high turnover of customers, has been a 
constant feature of Food Connect since its inception; and has yet to be ‘successfully 
addressed’, according to Robert:  
There’s probably 200 subscribers who have been with us over the long term, and will 
never leave us, and we probably have 1-2 of them join us each month. But 20 is our 
average new customers per week, and we only retain two of those 20. That’s been 
pretty constant over the years…It’s a 90% turnover, which is huge.171 
At first, Robert wasn’t concerned about this churn, because his belief was that 
amongst the one-million-plus residents of Brisbane, there had to be one thousand 
people who would ‘get’ the Food Connect model, and who would ‘buy into it 
without being a pain in the arse’:  
[T]hat was my entire plan. Those one thousand people would tell their friends, and 
over time the world would wake up…[After 3 years] we started to address the churn – 
through education, the farm letter, me talking at events. But [these measures] haven’t 
addressed the churn. Professionalism in the boxes was an issue – at the start they were 
highly variable, the produce sometimes wasn’t great, because I had big ideals. [I 
thought that] [i]f there was a grub in their apple, they would chop the grub out, like 
people did in the old days. But [city folk] have been so attuned to the industrialised, 
glamour-food system and appearance, [so much so that] even for people who 
understood and got it, couldn’t understand why there were pests on the cabbage.172 
Eating locally, eating seasonally, accepting food that tastes good but may not look 
perfect – changing the culture around food in Australia in these directions has been 
hard work for Food Connect, and clearly constitutes a substantial barrier to the 
further expansion of the local food economy in this country. Educating customers to 
expect year-round availability and hence seemingly endless choice; for food to be 
‘cheap’; and for it to look perfect, have become internalised as part of the 
contemporary common sense on which the capitalist food system rests. Challenging 
this now deeply-rooted culture, as Robert Pekin and Food Connect have discovered, 
is far from easy.  
In keeping with its growing professionalism, one way in which Food Connect is now 
trying to tackle churn is through sophisticated marketing techniques.173 In this 
                                                          
171 Interview with the author, 2.11.11  
172 Interview with the author, 3.11.11.  
173 A strategy currently being discussed is a promotional campaign that links Food Connect with an 
appeal to the ‘inner radical’ inside us all, under the banner that Food Connect represents ‘food with 
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respect, the enterprise is working within the prevailing market logic, and utilising 
its technologies and strategies, in order to expand its sphere of influence and 
impact. This is reflective of a ‘Gramscian way of thinking’: understanding the 
context in which one operates; and taking advantage of the gaps and opportunities 
that it offers to advance a progressive political-economic project. In the process, 
the common sense of the capitalist food system can be critiqued on its own terrain, 
and the contours of the new good sense around food (ethical, fair, sustainable, 
resilient, local, and so on) are being mapped out. Of course these contours are 
readily susceptible to co-optation by the large retailers, and so the challenge for 
Food Connect and similar enterprises is to maintain their ‘point of difference’ in 
the market-place, which derives (in my assessment) from the breadth and depth of 
the relationships they create: their capacity to create and sustain connectedness, in 
place of alienation and separation.  
Another strategy to become more financially viable is observable in the 
development of Food Connect itself, which has diversified from just supplying fruit 
and vegetable boxes to individual households (i.e. retailing), into wholesaling 
(supplying restaurants and cafes), catering and value-adding. In this, Food Connect 
is increasingly coming to resemble the emerging Food Hub sector, which, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 3, is rapidly growing in the United States.174 This sector 
emerged for two main reasons. First, in recognition of the need to scale up and 
diversify existing local food initiatives, which as discussed have been concentrated 
in forms of direct sales, to wholesaling and processing; and so achieve a much 
greater impact across the whole of the food economy. In the process, the social 
justice goals of improving the long-term viability of small and medium-sized 
farmers, and increasing the volume of good quality food reaching lower socio-
economic groups, will, it is anticipated, be further advanced. Secondly, the 
creation of Food Hubs helps deal with emerging bottlenecks in the local food 
system, especially as regards aggregation, storage, cooling and distribution of fresh 
produce.175  
Research conducted by the US Department of Agriculture suggests that start-up 
capital, particularly in the form of government and philanthropic grants, has been 
important to the establishment of a majority of the Food Hubs.176 The author of this 
research, James Barham, makes the important point that there is a significant 
distinction between the supply chain of the mainstream commodity food system, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
rev’:interview with the author, 3.11.11. 
174American Farm Bureau Federation, ‘Regional Food Hubs Poised to Become Burgeoning Trend’, 
1.6.11, http://www.fb.org/foodieblog/?p=409, accessed 23.11.11. 
175 Comments by John Fisk of the Wallace Centre, during a webinar conducted by the National Good 
Food Network (NGFN) on 19 May 2011, ‘Food Hubs: Viable Regional Distribution Centres’: 
http://ngfn.org/resources/ngfn-cluster-calls/food-hubs-viable-regional-distribution-solutions, accessed 
23.11.11. 
176 Kate Collier, manager of the Charlottesville Food Hub in West Virginia, stated that the $300,000 
start-up grant they received was not enough, even with the very substantial in-kind support they 
received (existing warehouse infrastructure and a 60-acre demonstration farm): NGFN webinar op cit. 
The significance of such support can be seen in the fact that fully a third of Food Hubs are operating 
without any paid staff, according to the USDA research: Barham, J., 2011, ‘Regional Food Hubs: 
Understanding the Scope and Scale of Food Hub Operations. Preliminary Findings from a National 
Survey of Regional Food Hubs’, United States Department of Agriculture Marketing Service.  
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and the value chain of the emerging local and regional food system. The former is 
transaction-based, one-off, commodity- and volume-driven, with suppliers being 
interchangeable and thus competing for market access; while the latter is 
relationship-based, has a longer time horizon, is centred on differentiated quality 
products, suppliers are more likely to be unique, and is driven by co-operation.177 In 
Barham’s words, ‘with a Food Hub there needs to be a much greater investment in 
relationships, and it accordingly presents a range of challenges, but the 
opportunities are great’.178 
This relationship-driven and co-operative nature of Food Hubs is illustrated by the 
experience of the Local Food Hub in Charlottesville, West Virginia.179 This not-for-
profit enterprise grew out of the local food movement which started in the region 
in 2006, and, according to its manager Kate Collier, its establishment was 
motivated in particular by the ‘fall-out of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008’.180 
Their goal is to support local farmers by increasing the public’s access to locally-
grown food; and they do this through supplying local businesses and institutions, 
about half of which are local public schools.181 Kate stresses that the establishment 
of ‘good personal relationships with suppliers and buyers’ has been essential to 
their success, as has diversification in terms of the numbers and types of clients and 
market outlets.182  
A significant innovation adopted by the Local Food Hub has been the introduction of 
a yearly ‘production planning meeting’ involving all their 50 small and medium-
sized family farmers, in which they plan out production schedules week-by-week 
over the coming year, taking into account ‘high and low periods so as to even out 
supply and avoid price collapses through gluts’.183 Following the meeting they 
produce a ‘demand document’ which allows each farmer to submit a request to 
supply a portion of the agreed production volume. Prices are determined following 
the meeting and through surveys of central markets and other outlets, and are 
agreed on a trust basis, rather than in a formal contract. This localised and 
participatory planning was introduced following recognition that demand for local 
food currently outstrips supply. The production planning innovation, together with 
the Food Hub freeing up farmers’ time to concentrate on growing food, by assuming 
responsibility for marketing the produce, has resulted, according to Kate, in a 30% 
increase in local food production during 2010 alone.184  
A further factor in the success of the Local Food Hub, whose sales have risen from 
$75,000 in 2009, to $375,000 in 2010, and an expected $600,000 in 2011, is its 
‘high-quality sales team’, who have access to a range of ‘sophisticated marketing 
                                                          
177 Comments made during the NGFN webinar, op cit.  
178 Op cit.  
179 http://www.localfoodhub.org, accessed 1.6.11.  
180 Comments made during the NGFN webinar, op cit. 
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materials that [Food Hub clients] can provide at point-of-sale to their customers, 
explaining the benefits of local food’. In Kate’s words, ‘We’re set up to make 
buying local as easy as possible’.185 Again, as with Food Connect, the Local Food 
Hub and similar emerging initiatives in the US and elsewhere are working within the 
market, using its tools and strategies, to re-orient the food system in quite radically 
different directions. As with Food Connect, these market-based approaches are 
built on the foundation of strong personal relationships.  
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have presented a model of the political economy of food 
sovereignty, and compared it to the political-economy of the globalising capitalist 
food system. I have examined the growing agro-ecology movement, and the trends 
towards re-peasantisation, as reflective of the effectiveness to date of the Food 
Sovereignty movement and its campaigns. I have also analysed efforts to build a 
local food economy in Australia, with a particular focus on Robert Pekin as a 
pioneer in this field through the establishment of Food Connect.  
A key theme which has emerged through this thesis is that, whereas the globalising 
capitalist food system runs according to the operating principle of alienation, the 
Food Sovereignty movement, as I have conceived it, is guided by the operating 
principle of connectedness. A key element of this connectedness is the quality and 
extent of the relationships on which the expressions of food sovereignty in agro-
ecology and local food, are based. It is the building of these relationships, in my 
assessment, which has enabled the Food Sovereignty movement to expand so 
rapidly.  
At the level of theory and critique, I have argued that food sovereignty is increasing 
in coherence in many respects, especially as regards agro-ecology. At the same time 
I have argued that there is a significant omission as regards the development of 
proposals addressing the needs of the majority of the working population in the 
core capitalist countries, rather than a singular focus on the needs of farmers. From 
the political perspective, this impedes the development of a convincing national-
popular strategy and the building of broad-based alliances aimed at broader social 
transformation. These omissions, however, far from being fatal to the long-term 
effectiveness of food sovereignty as a social movement, indicate instead directions 
for future theoretical development and political praxis, including multiple 
opportunities for building broader alliances. This assessment is confirmed by the 
perspective adopted by the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement for 2012 and 
beyond.  
The analysis undertaken in this chapter demonstrates that the Food Sovereignty 
movement clearly has momentum, which is important in terms of shifting the 
existing disposition of social, political and economic forces. The practices of agro-
ecology are in a dynamic stage of development across much of Latin America, and 
beyond. La Via Campesina’s claim that ‘small farmers cool the planet’ is solidly 
grounded in the science of agricultural energetics and the growing recognition of 
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the sheer wastefulness of the globalising capitalist food system.186 It could 
justifiably be complemented with the claim that ‘small farmers feed the world’. 
Not content with staying in the niche realms of small-scale community-supported 
agriculture and farmers’ markets, local food activists and entrepreneurs, who 
represent the third pillar of Food Sovereignty, want to scale up the local food 
economy, and to grow and expand its social, economic and environmental impact, 
as witnessed in the recent emergence of Food Hubs across multiple sites in the 
United States.  
At the same time, there remain significant challenges and barriers. In some places, 
peasants and small farmers may be ‘holding the ground’, but in many others they 
are not. Agrarian reform processes are stagnating, even where the peasantry is 
organised and mobilised. Capitalist monocultures destined for export, and therefore 
undermining of food sovereignty principles and aspirations, continue to expand in 
many countries. In the core regions of the capitalist food system, core elements of 
its common sense, notably an apparently deeply entrenched cultural preference for 
‘supermarket food’ amongst the majority of the population, appears to be holding 
firm despite growing critiques and creation of alternatives. The local food 
movement faces both the constant risk of co-optation of its progressive ambitions, 
as has already arguably occurred with organic and fair trade produce, and the 
threat of outright harassment and suppression.  
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Conclusion 
Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will 
Antonio Gramsci 
 
 
The task I set myself in this thesis was to determine whether the Food Sovereignty 
movement was engaging ‘deeply and constructively’ with these tensions. I carried 
out that task by means of proposing and testing a hypothesis: whether the emerging 
Food Sovereignty movement is a potential counter-hegemonic political force that is 
capable of effecting transformative change in the globalising capitalist food system.  
In this final chapter, I draw together and synthesise the previous seven chapters of 
the thesis, and set out my conclusions regarding the matter of the counter-
hegemonic potential of food sovereignty vis-à-vis the globalising capitalist food 
system. I examine first the extent to which food sovereignty has critically engaged 
with the common sense of the system, and the extent to which it has successfully 
articulated a coherent ‘good sense’ in the form of a compelling and unifying 
political project. Secondly, I evaluate the degree of success of the Food Sovereignty 
movement’s attempts to influence the political and institutional context which 
sustains the expansion of the globalising capitalist food system. Here I discuss in 
particular the reliance on human rights by La Via Campesina, and the early moves 
towards the institutionalisation of food sovereignty in Latin America. Thirdly, I offer 
an assessment of the extent to which the Food Sovereignty movement has disrupted 
the principal circuits of the globalising capitalist food system, particularly in terms 
of the creation of parallel and alternative forms of social exchange around food 
through diverse manifestations of the local food movement, by reference to my 
Australian case studies.  
These moments of evaluation will in turn allow me to arrive at an assessment of the 
existing balance of forces, as between the actors of the globalising capitalist food 
system and the proponents of food sovereignty. The analysis cannot, however, stop 
at that point. There are three further steps that I must undertake. The first, 
consistent with the perspective I have adopted with regard to social movement 
theory and analysis – namely, that the main focus concerns the trajectory of the 
movement under consideration, rather than a mechanistic assessment of what its 
‘outcomes’ have been to date – is to consider the likely and potential ‘vectors of 
expansion’ of the Food Sovereignty movement.1 The second is to consider its 
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shortcomings and contradictions. And finally, I need to briefly revisit the discussion 
of the context of the globalising capitalist food system, paying regard to its 
vulnerabilities and fragilities, and bearing in mind Gramsci’s insight that hegemony, 
far from being achieved and monolithic, is constantly in a process of being 
negotiated and renegotiated, according to changing historical conjunctures and 
opportunities.  
Only at the end of what is in effect a six-stage analysis can I confidently make my 
assessment as to what constitutes the ‘effective reality’, and from there state my 
conclusion regarding the counter-hegemonic potential of the Food Sovereignty 
movement. And this conclusion itself is at best tentative and provisional, having 
regard to the extreme state of fluidity and the rapid pace of change which 
characterises the global panorama at the beginning of 2012.  
Common sense and good sense  
In the case of the food system, Gramsci’s conceptualisation of ‘deep hegemony’ 
assumes particular significance in the mass consumer societies of the core capitalist 
countries. I have argued that the complex of ‘cheap food’ is integral to the common 
sense of the globalising capitalist food system; and have discussed recent critical 
scholarship which suggests that this complex is, and always has been, structural to 
the successful functioning of the capitalist economy as a whole.2 I discussed how 
there is a pervasive culture of cheap food in Australia, continually reinforced by 
supermarket ‘price wars’ and the proliferation of home brand product lines. This 
culture has been a key factor in the subjection of Australian farmers to the ‘cost-
price squeeze’ that has been so damaging to farm viability.3  
The common sense for many people runs even deeper, beyond price, to structure 
common understandings of where food comes from and how it is to be obtained. 
Consistent with a ubiquitous market ideology, it appears that the supermarket has 
become, for large numbers of people, the only place to buy food. Even when food 
at the supermarkets is much more expensive than other nearby outlets, it appears 
that many shoppers will prefer to purchase it there, whether for reasons of 
convenience, coupon inducements or other factors. As I discussed previously, a 
further element of this ‘deep’ common sense is the aesthetic standards of 
supermarkets, which privilege appearance over taste. What we see clearly at work 
here is the dynamic of contemporary, mass consumer capitalism towards 
homogenisation.4 For actors within the Food Sovereignty movement, such as Robert 
Pekin and Food Connect, these aspects of capitalist common sense – aesthetics, 
‘cheap food’, the perception of ‘unlimited choice’ and the convenience of the ‘one-
stop shop’ - are proving difficult to overcome. They constitute clear cultural and 
material barriers to the greater realisation of the transformative potential of the 
Food Sovereignty movement.  
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In the Introduction, I stated that the manner of framing the debate around food and 
agriculture determines to a significant extent the range of possible ‘solutions’ that 
might be proposed. In terms of the Gramscian method, how the debates are framed 
is key to underpinning the common sense of the system’s hegemony. Quite simply, 
the terms of the questions that are asked will be determinative of the range of 
possible answers.5 A central task of the Food Sovereignty movement has been to 
pose different types of questions – and to suggest different types of responses – to 
those typically asked by the leading actors within the globalising capitalist food 
system.  
Even prior to the asking of the questions is the conceptualisation of the key 
problematic of the field under consideration. In the case of food and agriculture, 
the analysis undertaken in this thesis reveals that, for the globalising capitalist food 
system, there are two principal problematics, on the macro level. The first is that 
of ‘food security’, conceived as the ‘challenge of feeding the world’s growing 
population’; and this has typically been reduced to a mathematical formula, 
whereby the world’s food supply must either double, or nearly double, over the 
next few decades in order to meet rising demand. Once the problematic is 
conceived as largely one of supply, then, as I have discussed at some length, the 
‘solution’ almost invariably is concentrated on boosting production.  
This focus on production conveniently marries with the second key problematic of 
the capitalist food system, which is concerned with the social, political and 
technological challenges about how to raise levels of productivity, profitability and 
growth within the system. Here the concern is with what Jason Moore terms the 
ongoing generation of the ‘ecological surplus’ via the ‘cheap food complex’ which, 
for reasons discussed in Chapter 6, has become integral to the successful 
functioning of the capitalist system as a whole.6 Historically, this surplus has been 
produced through the inseparable dynamic of ‘productivity and plunder’; and this 
dynamic is clearly observable today in the form of the ongoing processes of 
accumulation by dispossession that typify globalising capitalism; and the promise of 
technology-driven yield increases through inter alia genetically modified organisms. 
Whether the ecological surplus can be renewed in an era of falling yields, rising 
austerity, increasing cost of living pressures and the encountering of biophysical 
constraints and contradictions is, as I have indicated, an open question.  
The system’s heightened vulnerability because of this convergence of circumstances 
and internal dynamics is an issue that the Food Sovereignty movement ought to be 
emphasising at every opportunity. In focusing on this increasing vulnerability, the 
Food Sovereignty movement can draw attention to its own ontology of 
connectedness, contrasting this with the capitalist food system’s ontology of 
alienation, as evidenced in the ecological and social rifts. In the pan-indigenous 
cosmology of buen vivir, the Food Sovereignty movement has a potentially powerful 
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philosophical and politically unifying alternative to the arguably failing capitalist 
cosmology of ‘economic growth’ and GDP. The current efforts to sustain ‘global 
economic growth’ and restore profitability through austerity are coming 
increasingly into conflict with the quality of life of large numbers of people, thus 
further exposing the system’s foundational principle of alienation. The challenge 
for the Food Sovereignty movement is to find ways to communicate effectively 
these theoretical insights, which can form the core of its ‘good sense’, in order to 
expand its size and political capacities.  
The Food Sovereignty movement has made substantive progress in such directions. 
As I have shown through the thesis, a seminal achievement of food sovereignty 
activists and intellectuals has been to ‘problematize these problematics’: to disrupt 
the comfortable narrative that the challenge of ‘feeding the world’ is all about 
raising production, and that this must happen through the adoption of new 
technologies and via the imposition of the rigours of competition through the 
expansion of ‘free trade’ agreements.  
Of course people must be fed, say food sovereignty advocates: the issue is by 
whom, and by what methods and mechanisms, and according to what rules. Here La 
Via Campesina and the Food Sovereignty movement have set up a series of 
oppositions – the antitheses to the theses of the globalising capitalist food system – 
such as agro-ecology rather than industrialised, input-dependent monocultures; fair 
trade rather than free trade; small and peasant farmers rather than corporate agri-
business; and local food rather than ‘food from nowhere’. Some of these are more 
fully developed than others: the fair trade agenda, as I have discussed, has received 
relatively little attention from La Via Campesina, which has concentrated its efforts 
on opposing the free trade agenda being pursued by the United States and its 
allies.7 By contrast agro-ecology, as I discussed in Chapter 7, has now become a 
transnational movement in its own right with an impressive and growing literature 
substantiating its claims to represent a fair and sustainable set of agricultural 
practices and methodologies, which collectively have the capacity to ‘feed the 
world’.  
Food sovereignty proponents should observe the trajectory of the movement for 
agro-ecology, and seek to apply these lessons more broadly to other aspects of the 
food sovereignty agenda. The issue of trade has been, and continues to be, central 
to La Via Campesina and the broader Food Sovereignty movement. As yet, however, 
the Food Sovereignty movement has not really moved beyond its oppositional 
stance and rather vague generalities about the need for ‘fair trade’ based on 
relations ‘free of oppression and discrimination’ between men and women, and 
nation states. Yet a movement for fair trade, articulated and led by NGOs, has been 
                                                          
7 As discussed in Chapter 5, Nettie Wiebe of the Canadian National Farmers Union cites the ‘throwing 
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venues, most recently in the form of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, involving the United 
States, Australia, Vietnam, Chile, Peru, Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia: see 
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in existence for some time, and has incorporated many small farmers.8 There are 
legitimate questions regarding the extent to which ‘fair trade’ has genuinely 
transformative potential, or whether it has simply been reabsorbed into the 
dominant circuits of the capitalist food system, whereby ‘fair trade’ products do 
little more than occupy certain spaces on the shelves of the supermarkets that 
increasingly exercise dominant control over the system as a whole.9 Nevertheless, if 
the Food Sovereignty movement wishes to be genuinely transformative – and 
therefore counter-hegemonic – it must develop, propose and where possible 
implement its alternative agenda of fair, transparent and democratic trade. In this 
way it can make a substantive contribution, both to its own development, and to 
the wider Fair Trade movement. 
In Chapter 7, I demonstrated that the political economy of food sovereignty 
represents an authentic and in many respects a coherent alternative to the political 
economy of the globalising capitalist food system; and that through its ‘three 
pillars’ of redistributive agrarian reform, agro-ecology and food localisation, it 
genuinely responds to the key tensions of the capitalist food system. The authentic 
and transformative nature of the food sovereignty vision is given added weight 
through its explicit linkage to buen vivir, which arguably represents a more 
compelling alternative to the capitalist dependence on GDP growth than Northern-
originated concepts such as ‘steady state economy’ and ‘de-growth’.10 In any event, 
the emerging linkage of food sovereignty to developing post-growth theory and 
praxis means that it is beginning to tackle at a deep structural and theoretical level 
the central capitalist tensions of over-production, inequalities and ecological 
destructiveness.  
At the same time, there are certain key omissions and ambiguities in food 
sovereignty which detract from the cogency of its critique, as well as its coherence 
and the universality of its appeal as a paradigmatic alternative. In the first place, 
the focus on the needs and priorities of small farmers has meant that the needs and 
priorities of workers have been inadequately addressed. No effort has been made to 
                                                          
8 Raynolds, L.T., Murray, D.L., and Wilkinson, J. (eds.), 2007, Fair Trade: The Challenges of 
Transforming Globalization, Routledge, London.  
9 Goodman and Johnston 2006. The contributions to the volume edited by Laura Raynalds and her 
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Daly (1992, Steady-state Economics, Earthscan, London; 1996, Beyond Growth: The Economics of 
Sustainable Development, Beacon Press, Boston; 2007, Ecological Economics and Sustainable 
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Commission (2009, Prosperity with Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet, Earthscan, London). ‘De-
growth’ argues not only that Northern consumers do not need to consume more, but that societies and 
economies must be reconfigured so that we actively consume less: see Latouche, S., 2009, Farewell to 
Growth, Polity Press, Cambridge. Depending on one’s perspective, de-growth is either a necessary and 
more radical corrective to the impossibility of steady-state equilibrium theory, or simply the 
specification of a path by which the steady-state can be achieved: see Kerschner, C., 2010, ‘Economic 
De-growth vs the Steady State Economy: Complements or Contradiction’, available at: 
http://degrowthpedia.org/index.php?title=Economic_De-
growth_vs._the_Steady_State_Economy:_complements_or_contradiction, for a recent comparative 
analysis.   
288 
 
systematically integrate food sovereignty with broader movements for economic 
democracy and the commons. As a matter of political strategy, this is a significant 
omission in the core capitalist countries, where farmers constitute a tiny 
percentage of the population. Secondly, it is unclear whether food sovereignty 
explicitly aligns itself with post-capitalist movements, such as economic democracy, 
or whether it wishes to be part of a movement for a reformed capitalism. This 
ambiguity leads to a third weakness, which is the danger of passive revolution and 
co-option, especially as regards food localisation. I return to these matters in the 
final part of this chapter. 
Engaging with the political and institutional framework of the globalising 
capitalist food system: the efficacy of human rights 
In Chapter 5, I discussed at length the efficacy of human rights as vehicle for 
transformative social and political change, in the context of the considerable 
efforts being devoted by La Via Campesina to securing the approval of a new United 
Nations Declaration on the rights of peasants. I demonstrated that there are many 
reasons to be sceptical of the capacity of human rights to effect substantive 
change, in the context of a highly stratified global polity characterised by 
globalising capitalism. Sixty years of formal human rights ‘progress’ have not 
coincided with substantive steps towards the eradication of forms of mass suffering 
and oppression that continue to plague humanity. Hunger and malnutrition have 
worsened in recent decades, and are projected to worsen further; and at the same 
time the obesity pandemic has materialised as a new form of mass suffering which 
has strong structural and systemic elements. Human rights instruments do little or 
nothing to address these phenomena, in the absence of structural change in the 
global political economy.  
The experience with the institutionalisation of the human right to food at the 
national level has at best been highly variable. As I demonstrated by reference to 
the case of Guatemala, in countries where institutional capacity is weak, and where 
governments are oriented to meeting the needs of foreign capital above those of 
their own citizens, legislating for human rights is at risk of being reduced to mere 
symbolism. The legal formalism of human rights, in other words, does nothing to 
address or challenge the ontology of alienation that patterns capitalist social 
relations.  
Nevertheless the research on which this thesis is based, particularly interviews 
carried out with La Via Campesina and the Indonesian Peasant League staff in 
Jakarta, demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of these limitations, and a 
recognition that the real value of the attempt to secure a UN Declaration is to build 
and unify the movement at its grassroots, so that it becomes prepared to wage a 
long-term struggle to achieve political power at the national level. It is in this 
sense, I conclude, that the human rights strategy has value and is effective; both as 
a matter of political practice, and as a form of further diffusing and advancing the 
Food Sovereignty movement’s ontology of connectedness. At the global governance 
level, however, it has had little impact in altering the general trajectory of global 
governance meetings and policy formation (G20, G8, World Bank and so on) which 
289 
 
has been clearly supportive of creating more opportunities for the greater 
expansion of the globalising capitalist food system.  
A significant success for the Food Sovereignty movement has come in the form of 
the incorporation of food sovereignty principles into some national constitutions, 
and the enactment of laws to implement food sovereignty. In Chapter 5 I discussed 
the case of Ecuador, where this process of institutionalising food sovereignty is 
perhaps the furthest advanced. As one would expect, the institutionalisation of 
food sovereignty is not a simple and uncontested process. The conclusion to be 
drawn from the Ecuadoran experience to date is that, even where food sovereignty 
has been partially institutionalised, its full and substantive implementation requires 
a high degree of constant mobilisation and organisation by peasant, farmer and 
allied social movements. Vested interests opposed to the implementation of food 
sovereignty principles – above all, redistributive agrarian reform – are fully prepared 
in many different contexts to resort to violence to retain their privileges, and 
frequently do so.11  
Disrupting the circuits of capitalist production and consumption: the significance 
of local food economies 
By way of preface to this section, a distinction must be drawn between circuits of 
food production, distribution and consumption in different geographic regions. In 
the North (which arguably now includes some of the more prosperous urbanised 
regions of the South), the capitalist food system has achieved a high degree of 
penetration, and food circuits are highly commoditised and market-based. In much 
of the South, as I discussed in Chapter 6, non-capitalist, peasant-based and 
localised food systems still cater to the food needs of a substantial portion, if not 
the majority, of the populations of many countries.  
However, in the context of globalising capitalism, systemic and structural change 
must take place, as I have argued, in the core countries, particularly the United 
States. Here the early signs are encouraging. While still insignificant in terms of 
overall ‘market share’ and food provisioning for the mass of the population, 
multiple expressions of a growing local food economy are observable in many towns 
and cities, many of them financed and supported by federal and state governments, 
and philanthropic institutions, and motivated by health and local economic 
development concerns.12 Like Food Connect and farmers’ markets in Australia, 
                                                          
11 As I discussed by reference to Honduras. Even in Venezuela, which has arguably the most socially 
progressive government in all of Latin America in terms of advancing social, economic and democratic 
rights of ordinary citizens, the implementation of a land reform process has encountered violent 
resistance which the Chavez government has to date proved incapable of effectively addressing: 
Emersberger, J., and Sprague, J., 2011, ‘Impunity for Venezuela’s Big Landowners: Hundreds of Chavez 
Supporters have been Assassinated by Wealthy Landowners for Implementing New Land Policies’, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111810548458225.html, accessed 15.11.11. 
12 Hesterman, O.B., 2010, Fair Food: Growing a Healthy, Sustainable Food System for All, Public 
Affairs, New York. Hesterman discusses, for example, the ‘Fresh Food Financing Initiative in 
Pennsylvania, the first state policy that provides grants and loans to help develop and expand healthy 
food choices in grocery stores in underserved neighborhoods…In 2004…the Pennsylvania state 
government invested US$30 million in the program. This leveraged an additional US$90 million in 
economic development and private funding. In just over six years, the initiative helped finance the 
development of eighty-five new retail outlets, each of which offers healthier food choices…Estimates of 
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these elements of the local food economy are operating within the emerging cracks 
of the capitalist food system. By creating alternative spaces of social exchange, 
they are de-commodifying social relations around food, and have thus begun the 
slow work of transforming that system and the common sense that sustains it. These 
growing local food economies are ‘expanding the realm of the possible’, both at the 
level of imagination and in practice. They are increasing levels of consciousness 
that other means of organising social relations around food are feasible. In the 
process, a multiplicity of relationships is being established, through which the 
emerging ontology of connectedness is being diffused. At the same time, there are 
as I discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 7, ambiguities within the local food movement, 
questions regarding its transformative potential, and constant risks of co-option.  
The balance of forces: capitalist food system vis-à-vis food sovereignty 
I am now at the point where it is possible to state my conclusions regarding the 
balance of forces, synthesising the previous work in the thesis. In terms of their 
control over the political and institutional levers of the power, and the trajectory 
of economic expansion, as reinforced by the recent financialisation of the capitalist 
food system, there is little doubt that the political-economy of the globalising 
capitalist food system is dominant. The degree of its hegemony, however, in the 
ethical sense of being based more on consent rather than coercion, is rather less 
secure. The Food Sovereignty movement has successfully engaged with and 
disrupted key elements of the common sense underpinning the system’s hegemony; 
and has articulated what in many respects is a coherent and unifying new ‘good 
sense’ that is capable of replacing the common sense of the system. The 
movements for agro-ecology and food relocalisation are growing rapidly, and their 
multi-dimensional character and benefits are supported by a sizeable body of 
literature and scientific study. Even though redistributive agrarian reform has 
suffered reversals in many places, it appears to have still been sufficiently 
successful, when combined with agro-ecology and food relocalisation, to be bringing 
about some processes of re-peasantisation (in the South) and a ‘new agrarianism’ 
(in the North) which arguably show that the balance of forces is beginning, even 
slightly, to shift away from the main actors in the globalising capitalist food 
system.13 It will be remembered that, for these actors, the global peasantry (and, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the number of jobs either created or preserved due to this initiative stand at 5,000…In Philadelphia 
alone, 400,000 residents now have improved access to healthy food in retail grocery outlets…”: 52.  
13 One example of the impact that local food is having can be seen in the over-zealous policing of some 
local food events by food safety officials in the US. Thus, the owners of a CSA farm in Nevada were 
recently ordered to bleach and then destroy farm-sourced organic produce that they planned to serve to 
their invited guests at a ‘farm-to-fork’ dinner: Slavo, M, ‘Outrage: Government Forces Private Citizens 
to Pour Bleach on Home-Grown Organic Food’, http://www.shtfplan.com/headline-news/outrage-
government-forces-private-citizens-to-pour-bleach-on-home-grown-organic-food-video_11102011, 
accessed 23.11.11. The phenomenon has become so widespread that a documentary (‘Farmageddon’) 
about it was recently released, detailing, according to one review:  
[M]ilitary swat style raids are going on at farms and buying clubs around the country with families and 
children being held at gunpoint, sometimes for alleged misdemeanor offenses. Equipment, product, 
computers and animals are seized and often destroyed. In the case of James Stewart of Rawesome, his house 
was ransacked, his belongings confiscated and his locks were changed. This overreach of government is being 
guised under the name of food safety and regulation…. 
 http://localfoodfreedom-nevadacounty.org/blog/2011/08/farmageddon-at-the-vets-hall-aug-24/ , 
accessed 23.11.11, emphasis in original. A Farmer-to-Consumer legal defense fund was established in 
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by extension, independent small-scale farmers) have at best a future as contract 
labourers in the capitalist imaginary of ‘highly efficient’ large-scale industrialised 
farms along the lines of the southern cone’s ‘Republic of Soy’.14 
Food sovereignty – its ‘vectors of expansion’ 
Now I turn to the second, three-part stage of analysis. The discussion to date 
reveals that the balance of forces appears to be shifting in favour of the Food 
Sovereignty movement. What can be said about the trajectory of that movement, 
having regard to its history and development to date?  
In the first place, the trajectory is one of growth, expansion and momentum. The 
movement is young – barely 15 years old – and yet in that time it has expanded to 
include hundreds of millions of people in nearly every continent in the world. The 
expansion in expressions of local food in the North – community gardens, backyard 
gardening, farmers’ markets, community-supported agriculture, Food Hubs – has in 
some places (the United States especially) been exponential.  
Secondly, the contemporary conjuncture of economic and financial uncertainty and 
austerity means that these expansionary tendencies are likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future. As I have discussed, growing numbers of ordinary people are 
literally ‘taking matters into their own hands’ and establishing much more direct 
and personal relationships with the sources of their food. In the process, they are 
both raising their own levels of consciousness regarding food and agriculture, and 
transforming themselves from the role of passive ‘consumer’ to active and engaged 
‘food citizen’, as captured to an extent by the Slow Food’s terminology of ‘co-
producer’, or Hannah Wittman’s concept of ‘agrarian citizenship’. The ‘grow-your-
own’ trend is, as I discussed in Chapter 7, reinforcing a logic of de-commodification 
around food, and shifting the terrain of what is normal and natural. The trajectory 
is that social and political relations around food and agriculture are moving towards 
the direction of food sovereignty principles; and diffusing its ontology of 
connectedness.  
Thirdly, these tendencies are being supported, to varying degrees, by governments 
and other institutions. Food sovereignty is being formally incorporated into laws and 
constitutions in some places. Environmental drivers, notably climate change and 
emerging resource constraints, mean that some governments are, to varying 
degrees, supporting the movement for agro-ecological methods of production and 
sustainable agriculture. Local and state governments, in Australia and elsewhere, 
are supporting the local food movement. In the United States, the support from the 
Federal Department of Agriculture has been instrumental in the growth of this 
movement since 1990.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
2007 to ‘protect the rights of farmers and consumers to engage in direct commerce [and] protect the 
rights of farmers to sell the products of the farm and the rights of consumers to access the foods of their 
choice from the source of their choice’: http://www.farmtoconsumer.org/index.html, accessed 23.11.11. 
14 This is the perspective advanced by Oxford University’s Professor of Economics, Paul Collier, who 
attributes the ‘stubborn refusal of the peasantry to disappear’ to certain ‘giants of romantic populism’, 
including what he terms the ‘love affair’ between the middle classes and the peasantry: Collier, P., 2008, 
‘The Politics of Hunger: How Illusion and Greed Fan the Food Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, 87(6), 67-80.  
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New opportunities for further expansion continue to emerge. As I have discussed, 
one of the criticisms of local food has been that it is restricted to ‘niche’ markets 
serving the more prosperous layers of society; and that accordingly its impact on 
the mass provision of food has been, and will continue to be, minimal. In response, 
numerous individuals and groups in the United States have established multi-
functional ‘Food Hubs’ over the last five years, with the explicit aim of ‘scaling up’ 
and ‘mainstreaming’ the local food movement.15 As indicated in Chapter 7, Food 
Hubs act as a type of locally-based ethical wholesaler, with the explicit goal of 
aggregating local produce and channelling it to local businesses and institutions. 
Depending on the available resources, they can also value-add produce, run 
demonstration farms to boost the capacity and knowledge of local growers, and 
work with local educational and job training providers to development business and 
employment skills of local residents. Alongside the apparent renaissance of the food 
co-operative movement in the United States, Food Hubs reveal the potential of the 
local food movement to achieve an impact well beyond the niche venues of 
farmers’ markets and community-supported agriculture initiatives.  
Food sovereignty – limitations and contradictions 
Further work remains to be done in developing the coherence and universal appeal 
of food sovereignty as a genuinely compelling alternative to the globalising 
capitalist food system. The development of coherent and substantive proposals for 
a genuinely democratic and transparent fair international trading system, which is 
not merely directed at enhancing the ‘choice’ of ethically-minded supermarket 
shoppers in the North, would be a significant advance. Better still would be the 
implementation of such proposals, albeit on a small scale, as part of the 
internationalisation of the emergent ‘solidarity economy’.16  
I have mentioned at several points in the thesis the fact that the farmer-originated 
nature of food sovereignty means that relatively little theoretical or practical 
attention has been paid to the needs and priorities of workers, particularly in the 
Global North. This weakness must be addressed if the Food Sovereignty movement 
is to realise its transformative potential. It is however a significant opportunity, 
because the emerging theory and practice in fields such as the commons, the co-
operative movement and economic democracy all have natural affinities with food 
sovereignty. As I have noted previously, all of these movements are expressions of 
the solidarity economy, which Brazilian author Euclides Mance describes as being 
practiced daily by millions of people,  
[W]ho work and consume in order to produce for their own and other people’s welfare, 
rather than for profit. In a solidarity economy what matters is creating satisfactory 
economic conditions for all people. This means assuring individual and collective 
freedoms, generating work and income, abolishing all forms of exploitation, domination 
and exclusion, and protecting ecosystems as well as promoting sustainable 
development.17 
                                                          
15 See http://ngfn.org/resources/food-hubs/food-hubs (accessed 15.6.11) for a discussion of the number 
and type of Food Hubs in operation in the US.  
16 Mance, E.A., 2007, ‘Solidarity Economics’, Turbulence, 1.  
17 Mance 2007 op cit.  
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What distinguishes the actors within a solidarity economy is that they self-
consciously choose to support each other, to buy, sell and supply one another, in 
preference to dealing with capitalist businesses. In this way, the spheres of activity 
of the solidarity economy progressively expand; the networks it establishes grow; 
and this also has political effects, in terms of ‘transforming the State, creating and 
reinforcing mechanisms of popular participation’.18 Clearly, food sovereignty is a 
manifestation of this solidarity economy; and La Via Campesina members, such as 
the MST in Brazil, are leading exponents of its practice, with their networks of 
worker-run co-operatives food stores and schools.  
As I have indicated, forms of the solidarity economy are also being practiced in the 
most dynamic centres of the local food movement in the United States, such as 
Vermont, where producer and consumer co-operatives have been integral to the 
movement’s success.19 Interestingly, the effective and professional branding and 
marketing of local food have been another key element of its growth in Vermont. 
This confirms my argument that food sovereignty is able to work within the confines 
of the existing capitalist food system, expose its many shortcomings, and use its 
market-based tools to work towards transformative change, from within, in what I 
would regard as an authentic expression of Gramscian counter-hegemonic praxis.  
It should be relatively straightforward for La Via Campesina to embrace the 
solidarity economy perspective and the forms of practice that it offers to broaden 
the scope of the Food Sovereignty vision to include genuine alternatives for workers 
in the North. This would provide a basis on which to overcome the antagonism I 
identified earlier between the interests of farmers, who want a good price for their 
produce, and workers, who want cheap food.  
Part of the difficulty for La Via Campesina in explicitly embracing the theory of 
solidarity economics could perhaps lie in its explicitly post-capitalist nature, at 
least as it has been expounded by Mance. The originators of food sovereignty have 
been careful to stress that food sovereignty is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model, and 
therefore that it is not anti-capitalist per se, although they admit that it is certainly 
anti-corporate free trade, finance-driven capitalism.20 There is an ambiguity here. 
As I have discussed, food sovereignty in many places in the South, Latin America 
especially, is understood to form part of the development of ‘socialism for the 21st 
century’, as recent meetings of La Via Campesina’s agro-ecology trainers have 
made clear. That it cannot be explicitly discussed in such terms, for political and 
historical reasons, in countries such as Indonesia, does not, as I documented, alter 
the basic understanding of activists based in that country that food sovereignty 
points towards a new form of socialism. These developments provide a further 
opportunity for the theoretical and political development of food sovereignty, 
having regard to the difficulties in which the globalising capitalist food system – and 
the global capitalist economy more generally - finds itself.  
                                                          
18 Ibid.  
19 Knupp, R., 2010, Lifting the Yoke: Local Solutions to America’s Farm and Food Crisis,  
20 Interview with Nettie Wiebe, 15.9.10.  
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In developing his political theory, Gramsci paid particular attention to the risks of 
co-optation of progressive and potentially counter-hegemonic movements. Food 
sovereignty faces these risks, particularly as regards the growth of the local food 
movement in the North. The radical edge of organics has in many ways already been 
blunted, and arguably the same fate has befallen the Fair Trade movement. Certain 
forms of agro-ecology – such as ‘soil carbon farming’ – are readily susceptible to 
incorporation within the main circuits of the globalising capitalist food system and 
its continual search for the creation of new arenas of accumulation and speculation; 
in this case, the commodification of the atmosphere via the creation of emission 
trading schemes. As I have discussed, many agrarian reform processes have already 
been diverted in the ‘market-led agrarian reform’ promoted by the World Bank, a 
key objective of which is to establish land-titling processes to more readily 
facilitate the sale and purchase of land as a commodity.  
In all these spheres, the challenge for the Food Sovereignty movement and its 
proponents is to maintain a clear sense of purpose and direction, and to develop a 
strong capacity for reflexivity and self-awareness, so that the tendencies of co-
optation can readily be detected and guarded against. As Ricardo Intriago made 
clear in the Ecuadoran context of implementing food sovereignty in the face of a 
recalcitrant landed elite and a non-sympathetic executive branch, it is a question of 
maintaining high levels of consciousness and organisation, and constancy in what is 
inevitably a long-term process of change and struggle.  
The globalising capitalist food system – vulnerabilities and fragilities 
I have discussed these at length in Chapter 6, so I can be quite brief here. The 
globalising capitalist food system is facing crises of legitimacy, in terms of its 
manifest failure to eradicate hunger and in its simultaneous generation of an 
obesity pandemic; and crises of accumulation, in terms of severe difficulties in 
bringing about the conditions to generate a renewal of the ecological surplus. As 
Moore rightly indicates, the persistence of mass hunger is of little immediate 
consequence to the actors of the system; it is most certainly a humanitarian 
catastrophe for the people involved, but it has no bearing on the profitability of the 
system as a whole.21 The obesity pandemic creates difficulties of perception, but at 
worst is likely to mean tighter government restrictions on the freedom of 
corporations to advertise to children, and the quantities of salts, sugars and fats 
they can lawfully put into foods. Having regard to the history of the regulation of 
the tobacco industry, this process can take years, if not decades; and in any event 
other markets are becoming available where such restrictions are less likely to 
eventuate.  
The more serious crisis concerns the reproduction of the ecological surplus which 
underpins the cheap food complex. The promised yield increases from GM have yet 
to materialise; and the costs of the various petro-chemical inputs on which the 
system depends for its productivity have risen steeply in recent years. Systemic 
shocks, whether ‘natural’ or human-induced, would likely have severe 
consequences for the effective functioning of the ‘just-in-time’ globalising 
                                                          
21 2010 op cit.  
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capitalist food system.22 Even in the absence of such a shock, the maintenance of 
finance-driven capitalism in its current state through the imposition of austerity is 
encountering growing levels of opposition. These in turn are being repressed, in 
what may arguably be a growing confirmation of Polanyi’s warning that liberal 
capitalist utopianism can only be sustained through tyranny. The resort to 
repression, if it has to be sustained over a length of time, signals the rise of 
coercion over consent, and the end of hegemony. The system, in other words, is 
highly vulnerable and actually quite fragile, even though it appears robust and 
strongly hegemonic from the perspective of most conventional analyses.  
The existing ‘effective reality’: is food sovereignty a counter-hegemonic 
movement? 
For Gramsci, the ‘effective reality’ was ‘a relation of forces in continuous 
motion’.23 The hegemony of the globalising capitalist food system has been 
sustained by a combination of political and economic forces that have secured its 
expansion through time and space, and its penetration into increasing spheres of 
social and individual life. Its founding assumptions have become naturalised, and 
for many people its operation constitutes the limits of what is possible. 
However, the food sovereignty movement has disrupted this hegemony. Food 
sovereignty is a counter-hegemonic movement, with the qualification that its 
potential is only just beginning to be realised. In less than two decades it has 
brought together hundreds of millions of people from dozens of countries with 
diverse linguistic, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, all united under the vision of a 
fair, sustainable, and resilient food system, where relations around food are de-
commodified through more direct and localised exchanges. Its ontology of 
connectedness is being widely diffused, and daily enacted in a growing multiplicity 
of sites around the world.  
The objective economic and ecological conditions are highly conductive to the 
further development of food sovereignty; and it has begun to secure political and 
institutional support in many places. While there is an ebb and flow to the dynamics 
within the movement, with advances in some places and losses in others, the 
overall trajectory is one of a movement in the ascendancy, with increasing 
momentum. The balance of forces is shifting, albeit slowly, towards the food 
sovereignty direction.  
The development of food sovereignty is most advanced in the fields of agro-ecology 
and food relocalisation; and least advanced in relation to the development of 
alternatives to the employment relationship and free trade. There are, as I have 
indicated, significant opportunities for its further advancement here, as part of 
integrating food sovereignty into a wider emerging transformative movement that 
includes alternative forms of property, economy, finance and trade. The Food 
                                                          
22 Harvey, F., 2012, ‘‘Just-in-time’ Business Models put UK at Greater Risk in Event of Disasters, Warns 
Thinktank’, The Guardian, 6.1.12, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/06/just-in-
time-business-model-disaster-risk, accessed 10.1.12. 
23 1971 op cit., 172.  
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Sovereignty movement has engaged ‘deeply and constructively’ with the key 
tensions of the globalising capitalist food system. 
My assessment about the prospects for the realisation of food sovereignty perhaps 
contradicts, in some ways, the views of La Via Campesina founder Nettie Wiebe, 
one of the originators of the concept:  
I find myself less than optimistic when I note the current trend lines – but I am always 
hopeful...Optimism would have to be based on some realistic assessment of the trend 
lines, because optimism is based on looking forward on the basis of what you already 
know about, or can reasonably expect. Whereas hope is the imagined possibility of 
something better.  
So when we look at the trend lines, they don’t look very happy. We continue to lose 
biodiversity. We are continuing to have major and minor, but a multitude, of changes 
going on, very few of which look like they’re enriching and enhancing the life-systems, 
most of which look like they’re destroying and undermining the life-systems on earth. 
Whether it’s old-growth forests, or salmon runs, or soil degradation, or birds of prey, or 
buffalo herds – you pick your favourite item to see whether it’s flourishing or not. The 
database on all of this, including on the numbers of small farms and farmers, doesn’t 
give you much room for optimism.  
With echoes of Gramsci’s most famous aphorism (‘pessimism of the intellect, 
optimism of the will’), Wiebe eschews optimism, but embraces hope:  
On the other hand, every time you put a seed in the ground, and it comes up, and it 
flourishes, and you get far more from it than you had expected, that’s a kind of minor 
miracle. We live in a world that has those miracles around us, and that for me is an 
opening to imagine that we could do [better]…It’s not just in a biological world; every 
time I sit in a room full of people whom I have not known before, and whom I then 
discuss with, and hear, and sing with, and find common ground with, and I feel the 
power of our togetherness and the possibility that that offers, I say to myself, There’s 
so much hope. There’s such a huge prospect of imagining and working towards, and 
finding, sometimes by miracle, a better world.  
I can be pessimistic, but I can’t be despairing, I can’t be hopeless.24  
Returning once more to the understanding of food sovereignty as a ‘farmer-led’ 
epistemology, and ontology of connectedness, what is being expressed here is both 
the collective capacity to expand the realm of what is possible, and to embrace 
ways of knowing that are beyond the purely rational: that are emotional, intuitive, 
even spiritual:  
Q: Do we need to move beyond rationality, towards the realm of faith? 
A: Insofar as rationality is often conflated with prudence, and prudence is often 
narrowed down to that which is profitable, or serves me well, yes I think we do have to 
move beyond that narrow view of productivity, and management, and control. I think 
we do have to move beyond that. For one, that system is remarkably short-sighted, and 
                                                          
24
 Wiebe’s comments here point to her understanding of La Via Campesina and food sovereignty as a 
‘hope movement’: see Dinerstein,A.C., and Deneulin, S., 2012, ‘Hope Movements: Naming 
Mobilization in a Post-development World’, Development and Change 43(2), 585-602. 
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remarkably cruel in many ways. So, insofar as one is not just a rational being, but also a 
compassionate being, and a living being, and an imaginative being, holding ourselves 
and our plans strictly within that which is prudent, seems to me that we’re short-
changing ourselves. We’re limiting ourselves as human beings in terms of what we’re 
really capable of.  
Ultimately, the strength of food sovereignty lies within this multi-dimensional, 
emergent and collectively-formed epistemology and ontology; and a diverse, 
expanding praxis. While the globalising capitalist food system is limited to a 
narrowly self-calculating – and increasingly self-destructive - rationality focused on 
accumulation and profit, food sovereignty is a project of creative and collaborative 
construction that is not so constrained, and is being actively undertaken by millions 
around the world.25 In a conjuncture of deepening crisis, when growing numbers of 
individuals and institutions are already embracing its principles and practices as the 
new good sense, food sovereignty’s prospects for transformative change, though far 
from assured, are promising.  
                                                          
25 Perhaps anticipating the Zapatista political epithet that ‘we make the road by walking’, Vicki 
Birchfield notes how ‘Gramsci railed against the notion of permanence or an end point to politics, and 
instead envisioned politics as an open-ended, continuously transformative process through which 
thought and action become unified’: 1999 op cit., 43.  
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APPENDIX A 
DECLARATION OF THE FORUM FOR FOOD 
SOVEREIGNTY, VILLAGE OF NYÉLÉNI,  
SÉLINGUÉ, MALI, 27 FEBRUARY 2007 
We, more than 500 representatives from more than 80 countries, of organizations of 
peasants/family farmers, artisanal fisherfolk, indigenous peoples, landless peoples, 
rural workers, migrants, pastoralists, forest communities, women, youth, consumers 
and environmental and urban movements have gathered together in the village of 
Nyéléni in Sélingué, Mali to strengthen a global movement for food sovereignty. We 
are doing this, brick by brick, as we live here in huts constructed by hand in the local 
tradition, and eat food that is produced and prepared by the Sélingué community. We 
give our collective endeavor the name “Nyléni” as a tribute to and inspiration from a 
legendary Malian peasant woman who farmed and fed her peoples well. 
Most of us are food producers and are ready, able and willing to feed all the world’s 
peoples. Our heritage as food producers is critical to the future of humanity. This is 
specially so in the case of women and indigenous peoples who are historical creators 
of knowledge about food and agriculture and are devalued. But this heritage and our 
capacities to produce healthy, good and abundant food are being threatened and 
undermined by neo-liberalism and global capitalism. Food sovereignty gives us the 
hope and power to preserve, recover and build on our food producing knowledge and 
capacity. 
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who 
produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather 
than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of 
the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate 
trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems 
determined by local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritises local and 
national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven 
agriculture, artisanal - fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, 
distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic 
sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just 
incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their food and 
nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, waters, seeds, 
livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food 
sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between 
men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations. 
In Nyéléni, through numerous debates and interactions, we are deepening our 
collective understanding of food sovereignty and learning about the realities of the 
struggles of our respective movements to retain autonomy and regain our powers. We 
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now understand better the tools we need to build our movement and advance our 
collective vision. 
 
What are we fighting for? 
A world where… 
…all peoples, nations and states are able to determine their own food producing 
systems and policies that provide every one of us with good quality, adequate, 
affordable, healthy and culturally appropriate food; 
...there is recognition and respect of women’s roles and rights in food production, and 
representation of women in all decision making bodies; 
…all peoples in each of our countries are able to live with dignity, earn a living wage 
for their labour and have the opportunity to remain in their homes, if they so choose; 
...food sovereignty is considered a basic human right, recognised and implemented by 
communities, peoples, states and international bodies; 
…we are able to conserve and rehabilitate rural environments, fish populations, 
landscapes and food traditions based on ecologically sustainable management of land, 
soils, water, seas, seeds, livestock and all other biodiversity; 
…we value, recognize and respect our diversity of traditional knowledge, food, 
language and culture, and the way we organise and express ourselves; 
…. there is genuine and integral agrarian reform that guarantees peasants full rights to 
land, defends and recovers the territories of indigenous peoples, ensures fishing 
communities’ access and control over their fishing areas and eco-systems, honours 
access and control by pastoral communities over pastoral lands and migratory routes, 
assures decent jobs with fair remuneration and labour rights for all, and a future for 
young people in the countryside;...where agrarian reform revitalises inter-dependence 
between producers and consumers, ensures community survival, social and economic 
justice, ecological sustainability, and respect for local autonomy and governance with 
equal rights for women and men...where agrarian reform guarantees rights to territory 
and self-determination for our peoples; 
...share our lands and territories peacefully and fairly among our peoples, be we 
peasants, indigenous peoples, artisanal fishers, pastoralists, or others; 
…in the case of natural and human-created disasters and conflict-recovery situations, 
food sovereignty acts as a form of “insurance” that strengthens local recovery efforts 
and mitigates negative impacts... where we remember that communities affected by 
disasters are not helpless, and where strong local organization for self-help is the key 
to recovery; 
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...peoples’ power to make decisions about their material, natural and spiritual heritage 
are defended; 
...all peoples have the right to defend their territories from the actions of transnational 
corporations; 
 
What are we fighting against? 
Imperialism, neo-liberalism, neo-colonialism and patriarchy, and all systems that 
impoverish life, resources and eco-systems, and the agents that promote the above 
such as international financial institutions, the World Trade Organisation, free trade 
agreements, transnational corporations,and governments that are antagonistic to their 
peoples; 
The dumping of food at prices below the cost of production in the global economy; 
The domination of our food and food producing systems by corporations that place 
profits before people, health and the environment; 
Technologies and practices that undercut our future food producing capacities, damage 
the environment and put our health at risk. These include transgenic crops and 
animals, terminator technology, industrial aquaculture and destructive fishing 
practices, the so-called White Revolution of industrial dairy practices, the so-called 
‘old’ and ‘new’ Green Revolutions, and the “Green Deserts” of industrial bio-fuel 
monocultures and other plantations; 
The privatisation and commodification of food, basic and public services, knowledge, 
land, water, seeds, livestock and our natural heritage; 
Development projects/models and extractive industries that displace people and 
destroy our environments and natural heritage; 
Wars, conflicts, occupations, economic blockades, famines, forced displacement of 
peoples and confiscation of their lands, and all forces and governments that cause and 
support these; 
Post disaster and conflict reconstruction programmes that destroy our environments 
and capacities; 
The criminalization of all those who struggle to protect and defend our rights; 
Food aid that disguises dumping, introduces GMOs into local environments and food 
systems and creates new colonialism patterns; 
The internationalisation and globalisation of paternalistic and patriarchal values, that 
marginalise women, and diverse agricultural, indigenous, pastoral and fisher 
communities around the world; 
301 
 
What can and will we do about it? 
Just as we are working with the local community in Sélingué to create a meeting space 
at Nyéléni, we are committed to building our collective movement for food 
sovereignty by forging alliances, supporting each others’ struggles and extending our 
solidarity, strengths, and creativity to peoples all over the world who are committed to 
food sovereignty. Every struggle, in any part of the world for food sovereignty, is our 
struggle. 
We have arrived at a number of collective actions to share our vision of food 
sovereignty with all peoples of this world, which are elaborated in our synthesis 
document. We will implement these actions in our respective local areas and regions, 
in our own movements and jointly in solidarity with other movements. We will share 
our vision and action agenda for food sovereignty with others who are not able to be 
with us here in Nyéléni so that the spirit of Nyéléni permeates across the world and 
becomes a powerful force to make food sovereignty a reality for peoples all over the 
world. 
Finally, we give our unconditional and unwavering support to the peasant movements 
of Mali and ROPPA in their demands that food sovereignty become a reality in Mali 
and by extension in all of Africa. 
Now is the time for food sovereignty! 
Reproduced from http://www.nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290  
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APPENDIX B  
PEOPLE’S AGREEMENT OF COCHABAMBA, BOLIVIA 
World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the 
Rights of Mother Earth 
Cochabamba, 22nd April 2010 
Today, our Mother Earth is wounded and the future of humanity is in danger. 
If global warming increases by more than 2 degrees Celsius, a situation that the 
“Copenhagen Accord” could lead to, there is a 50% probability that the damages 
caused to our Mother Earth will be completely irreversible. Between 20% and 30% of 
species would be in danger of disappearing. Large extensions of forest would be 
affected, droughts and floods would affect different regions of the planet, deserts 
would expand, and the melting of the polar ice caps and the glaciers in the Andes and 
Himalayas would worsen. Many island states would disappear, and Africa would 
suffer an increase in temperature of more than 3 degrees Celsius. Likewise, the 
production of food would diminish in the world, causing catastrophic impact on the 
survival of inhabitants from vast regions in the planet, and the number of people in the 
world suffering from hunger would increase dramatically, a figure that already 
exceeds 1.02 billion people.The corporations and governments of the so-called 
“developed” countries, in complicity with a segment of the scientific community, have 
led us to discuss climate change as a problem limited to the rise in temperature without 
questioning the cause, which is the capitalist system. 
We confront the terminal crisis of a civilizing model that is patriarchal and based on 
the submission and destruction of human beings and nature that accelerated since the 
industrial revolution. 
The capitalist system has imposed on us a logic of competition, progress and limitless 
growth. This regime of production and consumption seeks profit without limits, 
separating human beings from nature and imposing a logic of domination upon nature, 
transforming everything into commodities: water, earth, the human genome, ancestral 
cultures, biodiversity, justice, ethics, the rights of peoples, and life itself. 
Under capitalism, Mother Earth is converted into a source of raw materials, and human 
beings into consumers and a means of production, into people that are seen as valuable 
only for what they own, and not for what they are. 
Capitalism requires a powerful military industry for its processes of accumulation and 
imposition of control over territories and natural resources, suppressing the resistance 
of the peoples. It is an imperialist system of colonization of the planet. 
303 
 
Humanity confronts a great dilemma: to continue on the path of capitalism, 
depredation, and death, or to choose the path of harmony with nature and respect for 
life. 
It is imperative that we forge a new system that restores harmony with nature and 
among human beings. And in order for there to be balance with nature, there must first 
be equity among human beings. We propose to the peoples of the world the recovery, 
revalorization, and strengthening of the knowledge, wisdom, and ancestral practices of 
Indigenous Peoples, which are affirmed in the thought and practices of “Living Well,” 
recognizing Mother Earth as a living being with which we have an indivisible, 
interdependent, complementary and spiritual relationship. To face climate change, we 
must recognize Mother Earth as the source of life and forge a new system based on the 
principles of: 
 harmony and balance among all and with all things; 
 complementarity, solidarity, and equality; 
 collective well-being and the satisfaction of the basic necessities of all; 
 people in harmony with nature; 
 recognition of human beings for what they are, not what they own; 
 elimination of all forms of colonialism, imperialism and interventionism; 
 peace among the peoples and with Mother Earth; 
The model we support is not a model of limitless and destructive development. All 
countries need to produce the goods and services necessary to satisfy the fundamental 
needs of their populations, but by no means can they continue to follow the path of 
development that has led the richest countries to have an ecological footprint five 
times bigger than what the planet is able to support. Currently, the regenerative 
capacity of the planet has been already exceeded by more than 30 percent. If this pace 
of over-exploitation of our Mother Earth continues, we will need two planets by the 
year 2030. In an interdependent system in which human beings are only one 
component, it is not possible to recognize rights only to the human part without 
provoking an imbalance in the system as a whole. To guarantee human rights and to 
restore harmony with nature, it is necessary to effectively recognize and apply the 
rights of Mother Earth. For this purpose, we propose the attached project for the 
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth, in which it’s recorded that: 
 The right to live and to exist; 
 The right to be respected; 
 The right to regenerate its bio-capacity and to continue it’s vital cycles and 
processes free of human alteration; 
 The right to maintain their identity and integrity as differentiated beings, self-
regulated and interrelated; 
 The right to water as the source of life; 
 The right to clean air; 
 The right to comprehensive health; 
 The right to be free of contamination and pollution, free of toxic and 
radioactive waste; 
 The right to be free of alterations or modifications of it’s genetic structure in a 
manner that threatens it’s integrity or vital and healthy functioning; 
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 The right to prompt and full restoration for violations to the rights 
acknowledged in this Declaration caused by human activities. 
The “shared vision” seeks to stabilize the concentrations of greenhouse gases to make 
effective the Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, which states that “the stabilization of greenhouse gases concentrations in the 
atmosphere to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic inferences for the climate 
system.” Our vision is based on the principle of historical common but differentiated 
responsibilities, to demand the developed countries to commit with quantifiable goals 
of emission reduction that will allow to return the concentrations of greenhouse gases 
to 300 ppm, therefore the increase in the average world temperature to a maximum of 
one degree Celsius. 
Emphasizing the need for urgent action to achieve this vision, and with the support of 
peoples, movements and countries, developed countries should commit to ambitious 
targets for reducing emissions that permit the achievement of short-term objectives, 
while maintaining our vision in favor of balance in the Earth’s climate system, in 
agreement with the ultimate objective of the Convention. 
The “shared vision for long-term cooperative action” in climate change negotiations 
should not be reduced to defining the limit on temperature increases and the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, but must also incorporate in a 
balanced and integral manner measures regarding capacity building, production and 
consumption patterns, and other essential factors such as the acknowledging of the 
Rights of Mother Earth to establish harmony with nature. 
Developed countries, as the main cause of climate change, in assuming their historical 
responsibility, must recognize and honor their climate debt in all of its dimensions as 
the basis for a just, effective, and scientific solution to climate change. In this context, 
we demand that developed countries: 
• Restore to developing countries the atmospheric space that is occupied by their 
greenhouse gas emissions. This implies the decolonization of the atmosphere through 
the reduction and absorption of their emissions; 
• Assume the costs and technology transfer needs of developing countries arising from 
the loss of development opportunities due to living in a restricted atmospheric space; 
• Assume responsibility for the hundreds of millions of people that will be forced to 
migrate due to the climate change caused by these countries, and eliminate their 
restrictive immigration policies, offering migrants a decent life with full human rights 
guarantees in their countries; 
• Assume adaptation debt related to the impacts of climate change on developing 
countries by providing the means to prevent, minimize, and deal with damages arising 
from their excessive emissions; 
• Honor these debts as part of a broader debt to Mother Earth by adopting and 
implementing the United Nations Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother 
Earth. 
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The focus must not be only on financial compensation, but also on restorative justice, 
understood as the restitution of integrity to our Mother Earth and all its beings. 
We deplore attempts by countries to annul the Kyoto Protocol, which is the sole 
legally binding instrument specific to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 
developed countries. 
We inform the world that, despite their obligation to reduce emissions, developed 
countries have increased their emissions by 11.2% in the period from 1990 to 2007. 
During that same period, due to unbridled consumption, the United States of America 
has increased its greenhouse gas emissions by 16.8%, reaching an average of 20 to 23 
tons of CO2 per-person. This represents 9 times more than that of the average 
inhabitant of the “Third World,” and 20 times more than that of the average inhabitant 
of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
We categorically reject the illegitimate “Copenhagen Accord” that allows developed 
countries to offer insufficient reductions in greenhouse gases based in voluntary and 
individual commitments, violating the environmental integrity of Mother Earth and 
leading us toward an increase in global temperatures of around 4°C. 
The next Conference on Climate Change to be held at the end of 2010 in Mexico 
should approve an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment 
period from 2013 to 2017 under which developed countries must agree to significant 
domestic emissions reductions of at least 50% based on 1990 levels, excluding carbon 
markets or other offset mechanisms that mask the failure of actual reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
We require first of all the establishment of a goal for the group of developed countries 
to achieve the assignment of individual commitments for each developed country 
under the framework of complementary efforts among each one, maintaining in this 
way Kyoto Protocol as the route to emissions reductions. 
The United States, as the only Annex 1 country on Earth that did not ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, has a significant responsibility toward all peoples of the world to ratify this 
document and commit itself to respecting and complying with emissions reduction 
targets on a scale appropriate to the total size of its economy. 
We the peoples have the equal right to be protected from the adverse effects of climate 
change and reject the notion of adaptation to climate change as understood as a 
resignation to impacts provoked by the historical emissions of developed countries, 
which themselves must adapt their modes of life and consumption in the face of this 
global emergency. We see it as imperative to confront the adverse effects of climate 
change, and consider adaptation to be a process rather than an imposition, as well as a 
tool that can serve to help offset those effects, demonstrating that it is possible to 
achieve harmony with nature under a different model for living. 
It is necessary to construct an Adaptation Fund exclusively for addressing climate 
change as part of a financial mechanism that is managed in a sovereign, transparent, 
and equitable manner for all States. This Fund should assess the impacts and costs of 
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climate change in developing countries and needs deriving from these impacts, and 
monitor support on the part of developed countries. It should also include a 
mechanism for compensation for current and future damages, loss of opportunities due 
to extreme and gradual climactic events, and additional costs that could present 
themselves if our planet surpasses ecological thresholds, such as those impacts that 
present obstacles to “Living Well.” 
The “Copenhagen Accord” imposed on developing countries by a few States, beyond 
simply offering insufficient resources, attempts as well to divide and create 
confrontation between peoples and to extort developing countries by placing 
conditions on access to adaptation and mitigation resources. We also assert as 
unacceptable the attempt in processes of international negotiation to classify 
developing countries for their vulnerability to climate change, generating disputes, 
inequalities and segregation among them. 
The immense challenge humanity faces of stopping global warming and cooling the 
planet can only be achieved through a profound shift in agricultural practices toward 
the sustainable model of production used by indigenous and rural farming peoples, as 
well as other ancestral models and practices that contribute to solving the problem of 
agriculture and food sovereignty. This is understood as the right of peoples to control 
their own seeds, lands, water, and food production, thereby guaranteeing, through 
forms of production that are in harmony with Mother Earth and appropriate to local 
cultural contexts, access to sufficient, varied and nutritious foods in complementarity 
with Mother Earth and deepening the autonomous (participatory, communal and 
shared) production of every nation and people. 
Climate change is now producing profound impacts on agriculture and the ways of life 
of indigenous peoples and farmers throughout the world, and these impacts will 
worsen in the future. 
Agribusiness, through its social, economic, and cultural model of global capitalist 
production and its logic of producing food for the market and not to fulfill the right to 
proper nutrition, is one of the principal causes of climate change. Its technological, 
commercial, and political approach only serves to deepen the climate change crisis and 
increase hunger in the world. For this reason, we reject Free Trade Agreements and 
Association Agreements and all forms of the application of Intellectual Property 
Rights to life, current technological packages (agrochemicals, genetic modification) 
and those that offer false solutions (biofuels, geo-engineering, nanotechnology, etc.) 
that only exacerbate the current crisis. 
We similarly denounce the way in which the capitalist model imposes mega-
infrastructure projects and invades territories with extractive projects, water 
privatization, and militarized territories, expelling indigenous peoples from their lands, 
inhibiting food sovereignty and deepening socio-environmental crisis. 
We demand recognition of the right of all peoples, living beings, and Mother Earth to 
have access to water, and we support the proposal of the Government of Bolivia to 
recognize water as a Fundamental Human Right. 
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The definition of forests used in the negotiations of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which includes plantations, is unacceptable. 
Monoculture plantations are not forests. Therefore, we require a definition for 
negotiation purposes that recognizes the native forests, jungles and the diverse 
ecosystems on Earth. 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples must be fully 
recognized, implemented and integrated in climate change negotiations. The best 
strategy and action to avoid deforestation and degradation and protect native forests 
and jungles is to recognize and guarantee collective rights to lands and territories, 
especially considering that most of the forests are located within the territories of 
indigenous peoples and nations and other traditional communities. 
We condemn market mechanisms such as REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and its versions + and + +, which are violating 
the sovereignty of peoples and their right to prior free and informed consent as well as 
the sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples, and the Rights of Nature. 
Polluting countries have an obligation to carry out direct transfers of the economic and 
technological resources needed to pay for the restoration and maintenance of forests in 
favor of the peoples and indigenous ancestral organic structures. Compensation must 
be direct and in addition to the sources of funding promised by developed countries 
outside of the carbon market, and never serve as carbon offsets. We demand that 
countries stop actions on local forests based on market mechanisms and propose non-
existent and conditional results. We call on governments to create a global program to 
restore native forests and jungles, managed and administered by the peoples, 
implementing forest seeds, fruit trees, and native flora. Governments should eliminate 
forest concessions and support the conservation of petroleum deposits in the ground 
and urgently stop the exploitation of hydrocarbons in forestlands. 
We call upon States to recognize, respect and guarantee the effective implementation 
of international human rights standards and the rights of indigenous peoples, including 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples under ILO 
Convention 169, among other relevant instruments in the negotiations, policies and 
measures used to meet the challenges posed by climate change. In particular, we call 
upon States to give legal recognition to claims over territories, lands and natural 
resources to enable and strengthen our traditional ways of life and contribute 
effectively to solving climate change. 
We demand the full and effective implementation of the right to consultation, 
participation and prior, free and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all 
negotiation processes, and in the design and implementation of measures related to 
climate change. 
Environmental degradation and climate change are currently reaching critical levels, 
and one of the main consequences of this is domestic and international migration. 
According to projections, there were already about 25 million climate migrants by 
1995. Current estimates are around 50 million, and projections suggest that between 
200 million and 1 billion people will become displaced by situations resulting from 
climate change by the year 2050. 
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Developed countries should assume responsibility for climate migrants, welcoming 
them into their territories and recognizing their fundamental rights through the signing 
of international conventions that provide for the definition of climate migrant and 
require all States to abide by abide by determinations. 
Establish an International Tribunal of Conscience to denounce, make visible, 
document, judge and punish violations of the rights of migrants, refugees and 
displaced persons within countries of origin, transit and destination, clearly identifying 
the responsibilities of States, companies and other agents. 
Current funding directed toward developing countries for climate change and the 
proposal of the Copenhagen Accord are insignificant. In addition to Official 
Development Assistance and public sources, developed countries must commit to a 
new annual funding of at least 6% of GDP to tackle climate change in developing 
countries. This is viable considering that a similar amount is spent on national defense, 
and that 5 times more have been put forth to rescue failing banks and speculators, 
which raises serious questions about global priorities and political will. This funding 
should be direct and free of conditions, and should not interfere with the national 
sovereignty or self-determination of the most affected communities and groups. 
In view of the inefficiency of the current mechanism, a new funding mechanism 
should be established at the 2010 Climate Change Conference in Mexico, functioning 
under the authority of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and held accountable to it, with significant 
representation of developing countries, to ensure compliance with the funding 
commitments of Annex 1 countries. 
It has been stated that developed countries significantly increased their emissions in 
the period from 1990 to 2007, despite having stated that the reduction would be 
substantially supported by market mechanisms. 
The carbon market has become a lucrative business, commodifying our Mother Earth. 
It is therefore not an alternative for tackle climate change, as it loots and ravages the 
land, water, and even life itself. 
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that the market is incapable of regulating 
the financial system, which is fragile and uncertain due to speculation and the 
emergence of intermediary brokers. Therefore, it would be totally irresponsible to 
leave in their hands the care and protection of human existence and of our Mother 
Earth. 
We consider inadmissible that current negotiations propose the creation of new 
mechanisms that extend and promote the carbon market, for existing mechanisms have 
not resolved the problem of climate change nor led to real and direct actions to reduce 
greenhouse gases. It is necessary to demand fulfillment of the commitments assumed 
by developed countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change regarding development and technology transfer, and to reject the “technology 
showcase” proposed by developed countries that only markets technology. It is 
essential to establish guidelines in order to create a multilateral and multidisciplinary 
mechanism for participatory control, management, and evaluation of the exchange of 
309 
 
technologies. These technologies must be useful, clean and socially sound. Likewise, it 
is fundamental to establish a fund for the financing and inventory of technologies that 
are appropriate and free of intellectual property rights. Patents, in particular, should 
move from the hands of private monopolies to the public domain in order to promote 
accessibility and low costs. 
Knowledge is universal, and should for no reason be the object of private property or 
private use, nor should its application in the form of technology. Developed countries 
have a responsibility to share their technology with developing countries, to build 
research centers in developing countries for the creation of technologies and 
innovations, and defend and promote their development and application for “living 
well.” The world must recover and re-learn ancestral principles and approaches from 
native peoples to stop the destruction of the planet, as well as promote ancestral 
practices, knowledge and spirituality to recuperate the capacity for “living well” in 
harmony with Mother Earth. 
Considering the lack of political will on the part of developed countries to effectively 
comply with commitments and obligations assumed under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and given the lack 
of a legal international organism to guard against and sanction climate and 
environmental crimes that violate the Rights of Mother Earth and humanity, we 
demand the creation of an International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal 
that has the legal capacity to prevent, judge and penalize States, industries and people 
that by commission or omission contaminate and provoke climate change. 
Supporting States that present claims at the International Climate and Environmental 
Justice Tribunal against developed countries that fail to comply with commitments 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol including commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. 
We urge peoples to propose and promote deep reform within the United Nations, so 
that all member States comply with the decisions of the International Climate and 
Environmental Justice Tribunal. 
The future of humanity is in danger, and we cannot allow a group of leaders from 
developed countries to decide for all countries as they tried unsuccessfully to do at the 
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen. This decision concerns us all. Thus, it is 
essential to carry out a global referendum or popular consultation on climate change in 
which all are consulted regarding the following issues; the level of emission reductions 
on the part of developed countries and transnational corporations, financing to be 
offered by developed countries, the creation of an International Climate Justice 
Tribunal, the need for a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, and the 
need to change the current capitalist system. The process of a global referendum or 
popular consultation will depend on process of preparation that ensures the successful 
development of the same. 
In order to coordinate our international action and implement the results of this 
“Accord of the Peoples,” we call for the building of a Global People’s Movement for 
Mother Earth, which should be based on the principles of complementarity and respect 
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for the diversity of origin and visions among its members, constituting a broad and 
democratic space for coordination and joint worldwide actions. 
To this end, we adopt the attached global plan of action so that in Mexico, the 
developed countries listed in Annex 1 respect the existing legal framework and reduce 
their greenhouse gases emissions by 50%, and that the different proposals contained in 
this Agreement are adopted. 
Finally, we agree to undertake a Second World People’s Conference on Climate 
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in 2011 as part of this process of building the 
Global People’s Movement for Mother Earth and reacting to the outcomes of the 
Climate Change Conference to be held at the end of this year in Cancun, Mexico. 
 
Reproduced from http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/  
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APPENDIX C  
THE SIX ‘PRIMARY MEDIATIONS BETWEEN HUMANITY 
AND NATURE REQUIRED FOR SOCIAL LIFE’ 
 
1. The necessary, more or less spontaneous, regulation of biological reproductive activity and 
the size of the sustainable population, in conjunction with available resources;  
 
2. The regulation of the labor process through which the given community’s necessary 
interchange with nature can produce the goods required for human gratification, as well as 
the appropriate working tools, productive enterprises, and knowledge by means of which the 
reproductive process itself can be maintained and improved;  
 
3. The establishment of suitable exchange relations under which the historically changing 
needs of human beings can be linked together for the purpose of optimizing the available 
natural and productive – including the culturally productive – resources;  
 
4. The organization, coordination, and control of the multiplicity of activities through which 
the material and cultural requirements of the successful social metabolic reproduction 
process of progressively more complex human communities can be secured and safeguarded; 
 
5. The rational allocation of the available material and human resources fighting against the 
tyranny of scarcity through the economic (in the sense of economizing) utilization of the 
given society’s ways and means of reproduction: and 
 
6. The enactment and administration of the rules and regulations of the given society as a 
whole, n conjunction with the other primary mediatory functions and determinations.  
 
Reproduced from István Mészáros, 2008, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time: 
Socialism in the 21st Century, Monthly Review Press, New York, 44, emphasis in original.   
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APPENDIX D 
DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF PEASANTS – 
WOMEN AND MEN 
LA VIA CAMPESINA, SEOUL, MARCH 2009 
Peasants of the World need an International Convention on the Rights of 
Peasants 
 
I. Introduction 
Almost half of the people in the world are peasants. Even in the high‐tech world, people eat 
food produced by peasants. Small‐scale agriculture is not just an economic activity; it means 
life for many people. The security of the population depends on the well‐being of peasants 
and sustainable agriculture. To protect human life it is important to respect, protect and 
fulfill the rights of the peasants. In reality, the ongoing violations of peasants' rights threaten 
human life. 
 
II. Violations of Peasants' Rights 
‐ Millions of peasants have been forced to leave their farmland because of land grabs 
facilitated by national policies and/or the military. Land is taken away from peasants for the 
development of large industrial or infrastructure projects, extracting industries like mining, 
tourist resorts, special Economic zones, supermarkets and plantations for cash crops. As a 
result, land is increasingly concentrated in a few hands. 
‐ States neglect the farm sector and peasants receive inadequate income from their 
agriculture production. 
‐ Monocultures for the production of agrofuels and other industrial uses are promoted in 
favor of agribusiness and transnational capital; this has devastating impacts on forests, 
water, the environment and the economic and social life of peasants. 
‐ There is an increasing militarization and a number of armed conflicts in rural areas with 
severe impacts on the full realization of civil rights of peasants. 
‐ As they lose their land, communities also lose their forms of self‐government, sovereignty 
and cultural identity. 
‐ Food is increasingly used for speculation purposes. 
‐ The peasants' struggle is criminalised. 
‐ Slave labor, forced labor and child labor are still found in rural areas. 
‐ Women's and children's rights are the most affected. Women are victims of psychological, 
physical and economic violence. They are discriminated in their access to land and productive 
resources, and marginalized in decision making. 
‐ Peasants have lost many local seeds. Biodiversity is destroyed by the use of chemical 
fertilizers, hybrid seeds and genetically modified organisms developed by the transnational 
corporations. 
‐ Access to health services and to education is decreasing in rural areas and peasants’ 
political role in society is undermined. 
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‐ As a result of these violations of peasants' rights, today millions of peasants live in hunger 
and suffer malnutrition. This is not because there is not enough food in the world, but 
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because food resources are dominated by transnational corporations. Peasants are forced to 
produce for export instead of producing food for their communities. 
‐ The crisis in the agricultural sector causes migration and the massive displacement and 
disappearance of peasants and indigenous people. 
 
 
III. The policies of neo‐liberalism worsen the violations of Peasants' Rights 
The violations of peasants' rights are on the rise because of the implementation of neoliberal 
policies promoted by the World Trade Organisation, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), other 
institutions and many governments in the North as well as in the South. The WTO and FTAs 
force the opening of markets and prevent countries from protecting and supporting their 
domestic agriculture. They push for the deregulation in the agriculture sector. 
Governments of developed countries and transnational corporations are responsible for 
trade dumping practices. Cheap subsidised food floods local markets thus forcing peasants 
out of business. 
The WTO and other institutions force the introduction of food such as GMOs and the unsafe 
use of growth hormones in meat production. Meanwhile, they prohibit the marketing of 
healthy products produced by peasants through sanitary barriers. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has implemented structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) leading to massive cuts in subsidies for agriculture and social services. Countries have 
been forced to privatize state companies and to dismantle support mechanisms in the 
agricultural sector. 
National and international policies directly or indirectly give priority to transnational 
corporations or food production and trade. TNCs also practice biopiracy and destroy genetic 
resources and biodiversity cultivated by peasants. The capitalist logic of accumulation has 
dismantled peasant agriculture. 
 
IV. The struggle of the Peasants to uphold and protect their Rights 
Facing these realities, peasants all over the world are struggling to live. All over the world, 
thousands of peasant leaders are being arrested because they are fighting to protect their 
rights and livelihood. They are being brought to court by unfair justice systems, incidents of 
massacre, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, and political persecution and 
harassment are common. 
The global food crisis in 2008 precipitated and exacerbated by policies and transnational 
corporations (which unilaterally act according to their own self‐interest) clearly shows the 
failure in promoting, respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of peasants. This affects 
all people in the world, in developed and developing countries. While peasants work hard to 
ensure the sustainability of seeds and food, the violation of the rights of peasants damages 
the world’s capability to feed itself. 
The struggle of the Peasants is fully applicable to the framework of international human 
rights which includes instruments, and thematic mechanisms of the Human Rights Council, 
that address the right to food, housing rights, access to water, right to health, human rights 
defenders, indigenous peoples, racism and racial discrimination, women’s rights. These 
international instruments of the UN do not completely cover nor prevent human rights 
violations, especially the rights of the peasants. We see 
some limitations in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) as an instrument to protect peasants' right. Also, the Charter of the Peasant 
produced by the UN in 1978, was not able to protect peasants from international 
liberalization policies. The other international conventions, which also deal with peasants' 
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rights, can not be implemented either. These conventions include: ILO Convention 169, 
Clause 8‐J Convention on Biodiversity, Point 14.60 Agenda 21, and Cartagena Protocol. 
 
V. The Peasants need an International Convention on the Rights of Peasants 
Because of the limitations of those conventions and resolutions, it is important to create an 
international instrument to respect, protect, fulfill, and uphold peasants' rights ‐‐ the 
International Convention on the Rights of Peasants (ICRP). There are already conventions to 
protect vulnerable groups of people, such as indigenous peoples, women, children and 
migrant workers. The ICRP will articulate the values of the rights of peasants, which will have 
to be respected, protected and fulfilled by governments and international institutions. The 
ICRP will be supplemented by 
optional protocols to ensure its implementation. 
During the Regional Conference on Peasants' Rights in April 2002, Via Campesina formulated 
the Declaration of the Rights of Peasants through the process of a series of activities, 
including the Workshop on Peasants' Rights in Medan North Sumatra on 2000, the 
Conference of Agrarian Reform in Jakarta April 2001, the Regional Conference on Peasants' 
Rights held in Jakarta in April 2002 and the International Conference of Via Campesina also 
held in Jakarta, in June 2008. The text of the 
declaration is attached to this document. It should form the basis of the ICRP, to be 
elaborated by the United Nations, with the full participation of Via Campesina and other 
representatives of civil society. 
We are looking forward to the support of the people who are concerned with the peasants' 
struggle and the promotion and protection of the rights of peasants. 
Declaration of Rights of Peasants ‐ Women and Men 
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Peasants of the World need an International Declaration on the Rights of Peasants 
 
The Declaration 
Affirming that peasants, men and women, are equal to all other people and, in the exercise 
of their rights, should be free from any form of discrimination, including discrimination based 
on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or Affirming that 
peasants, men and women, are equal to all other people and, in the exercise of their rights, 
should be free from any form of discrimination, including discrimination based on race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, wealth, 
birth or other status, 
Acknowledging that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, as well as the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, affirm the universality, 
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, civil, cultural, economic, political and 
social, 
Emphasizing that in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
States have undertaken to ensure the realization of the right to an adequate standard of 
living for ourselves and our family, including the right to food, and our right to be free from 
hunger through the genuine agrarian reform, 
Emphasizing that according to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, all Indigenous peoples, including peasants, have the right to selfdetermination and 
that by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development, having the right to autonomy or self‐government 
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in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing 
their autonomous functions, 
Recalling that many peasants all over the world have fought throughout history for the 
recognition of the rights of peasants and for just and free societies, 
Considering that the current agricultural conditions threaten the lives of peasants, worsening 
the environment, decreasing peasants' productivity and decreasing the livelihood of the 
peasants, 
Considering that peasants’ conditions are worsening because of governments’ exclusion of 
peasants from policy decision making, because of the use of military, and/or paramilitary 
groups to displace peasants and allowing transnational corporations to exploit natural 
resources, 
Considering that capitalist globalization imposed through some international agreements has 
had a strong negative impact on the peasant sector, 
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Considering that peasants struggle with their own resources and with other groups who 
support the peasants’ demands for life, environmental protection and increasing productivity 
Considering the increasing concentration of the food systems in the world in the hands of 
few transnational corporations 
Considering that peasants constitute a specific social group which is vulnerable so that the 
realization of the rights of peasants require special measures to truly respect, protect and 
fulfill the human rights of peasants enshrined in international human rights law; 
Acknowledging that small‐scale peasant agriculture, fishing, livestock rearing can contribute 
to mitigate the climate crisis and to secure a sustainable food production for all; 
Reminding States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply 
to peasants under international instruments, in particular those related to human rights, in 
consultation and cooperation with the peasants, 
Believing that this Declaration is an essential step forward the recognition, promotion and 
protection of the rights and freedoms of peasants, including the elaboration and adoption of 
an International Convention on the Rights of Peasants, 
Recognizing and reaffirming that peasants are entitled without discrimination to all human 
rights recognized in international law, 
Solemnly adopts the following Declaration on the Rights of Peasants: 
 
Article I 
Definition of peasants: rights holders 
A peasant is a man or woman of the land, who has a direct and special relationship with the 
land and nature through the production of food and/or other agricultural products. Peasants 
work the land themselves, rely above all on family labour and other small‐scale forms of 
organizing labour. Peasants are traditionally embedded in their local communities and they 
take care of local landscapes and of agro‐ecological systems. 
The term peasant can apply to any person engaged in agriculture, cattle‐raising, pastoralism, 
handicrafts‐related to agriculture or a related occupation in a rural area. This includes 
Indigenous people working on the land. 
Declaration of Rights of Peasants ‐ Women and Men 
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The term peasant also applies to landless. According to the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO 1984) definition[1], the following categories of people are considered to 
be landless and are likely to face difficulties in ensuring their livelihood:  
1. Agricultural labour households with little or no land; 
2. Non‐agricultural households in rural areas, with little or no land, whose members are 
engaged in various activities such as fishing, making crafts for the local market, or providing 
services;  
3. Other rural households of pastoralists, nomads, peasants practising shifting cultivation, 
hunters and gatherers, and people with similar livelihoods. 
 
 
Article II 
Rights of peasants 
1. Women peasants and men peasants have equal rights. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as 
individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights 
law. 
3. Peasants (women and men) are free and equal to all other people and individuals and have 
the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in 
particular to be free from discriminations based on their economic, social and cultural status. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to actively participate in policy design, decision 
making, implementation, and monitoring of any project, program or policy affecting their 
territories. 
 
Article III 
Right to life and to an adequate standard of living 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to physical integrity, to not be harassed, 
evicted, persecuted, arbitrarily arrested, and killed for defending their rights. 
2. Women peasants have the right to be protected from domestic violence(physical, sexual, 
verbal an psychological) 
3. . Women have the right to control their own bodies and to reject the use of their bodies 
for commercial purposes. All forms of human (women and girls) trafficking are inhuman and 
have to be condemned. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to live in dignity. 
5. Peasants (women and men) have the right to adequate, healthy, nutritious, and affordable 
food, and to maintain their traditional food cultures. 
6. Peasants (women and men) have the right to the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. Therefore, they have the right to have access to health services and 
medicine, even when they live in remote areas. They also have the right to use and develop 
traditional medicine.Declaration of Rights of Peasants ‐ Women and Men 
7. Peasants (women and men) have the right to live a healthy life, and not be affected by the 
contamination of agrochemicals (such as chemical pesticides and fertilisers that are creating 
fertility problems and contaminating breast milk). 
8. Peasant (women and men) have the right to decide about the number of children they 
want to have, and about the contraceptive methods they want to use. 
9. Peasants (women and men) have the right to the full realization of their sexual and 
reproductive rights.  
317 
 
10. Peasants (women and men) have the right to safe water, transportation, electricity, 
communication and leisure. 
11. Peasants (women and men) have the right to education and training.  
12. Peasants (women and men) have the right to an adequate income to fulfill their basic 
needs and those of their families. 
13. Peasants (women and men) have the right to adequate housing and clothing. 
14. Peasants (women and men) have the right to consume their own agricultural production 
and to use this to satisfy their families’ basic needs, and the right to distribute their 
agriculture production to other people. 
15. The right of peasants (women and men) to life and the fulfillment of their basic needs 
should be protected by the law and by the state, with the assistance and cooperation of 
others, without discrimination of any kind. 
 
Article IV 
Right to land and territory 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to own land, collectively or individually, for 
their housing and farming. 
2. Peasants (women and men) and their families have the right to toil on their own land, and 
to produce agricultural products, to rear livestock, to hunt and gather, and to fish in their 
territories 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to toil and own the non‐productive state land 
on which they depend for their livelihood. 
4. Peasants(women and men) have the right to safe water and adequate sanitation. 
5. Peasants (women and men) have the right to water for irrigation and agricultural 
production in sustainable production systems controlled by local communities. 
6. Peasants (women and men) have the right to manage the water resources in their region. 
7. Peasants (women and men) have the right to support, by way of facilities, technology and 
funds, from the state to manage the water resources. 
8. Peasants (women and men) have the right to manage, conserve, and benefit from the 
forests. 
9. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject all kinds of land acquisition and 
conversion for economic purpose. 
10. Peasants (women and men) have the right to security of tenure and not to be forcibly 
evicted from their lands and territories. 
11. Peasants (women and men) have the right to agricultural land that can be irrigated to 
ensure food sovereignty for growing population.Declaration of Rights of Peasants ‐ Women 
and Men 
12. Peasants (women and men) have the right to benefit from land reform. Latifundia must 
not be allowed. Land has to fulfill its social function. Land ceilings to land ownership should 
be introduced whenever necessary in order to ensure an equitable access to land. 
13. Peasants (women and men) have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct 
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to 
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the 
State. 
 
Article V 
Right to seeds and traditional agricultural knowledge and practice 
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1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to determine the varieties of the seeds they 
want to plant. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject varieties of the plant which they 
consider to be dangerous economically, ecologically, and culturally. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject the industrial model of agriculture. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to conserve and develop their local knowledge 
in agriculture, fishing, livestock rearing. 
5. Peasants (women and men) have the right to use the agriculture, fishing, livestock rearing 
facilities. 
6. Peasants (women and men) have the right to choose their own products, varieties, 
amount, quality and the ways of farming, fishing, livestock rearing, individually or collectively. 
7. Peasants (women and men) have the right to use their own technology or the technology 
they choose guided by the principle of protecting human health and environmental 
conservation. 
8. Peasants (women and men) have the right to grow and develop their peasants varieties 
and to exchange, to give or to sell their seeds 
9. Peasants (women and men) have the right to food sovereignty. 
 
Article VI 
Right to means of agricultural production 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to obtain funds from the State to develop 
agriculture. 
2. Peasants (women and men) should have access to credit for their agricultural activity. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to obtain the materials and tools for agriculture. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to water for irrigation and agricultural 
production in sustainable production systems controlled by local communities. Women and 
Men 
5. Peasants (women and men) have the right to transportation, drying, and storage facilities 
in marketing their products. 
6. Peasants (women and men) have the right to be actively involved in planning, formulating, 
and deciding on the budget for national and local agriculture. 
 
Article VII 
Right to information and agriculture technology 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to obtain impartial and balanced information 
about capital, market, policies, prices, technology, etc, related to peasants’ needs. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to obtain information about national and 
international policies. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to obtain technical assistance, production tools 
and other appropriate technology to increase their productivity, in ways that respect their 
social, cultural and ethical values. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to full and impartial information about goods 
and services, and to decide what and how they want to produce and consume. 
5. Peasants (women and men) have the right to obtain adequate information at the national 
and international levels on the preservation of genetic resources. 
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Article VIII 
Freedom to determine price and market for agricultural production 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to prioritize their agricultural production for 
their families and societies’ needs. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to store their production to ensure the 
satisfaction of their basic needs and those of their families. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to foster traditional local markets. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to get beneficial price for their production. 
5. Peasants (women and men) have the right to determine the price, individually or 
collectively. 
6. Peasants (women and men) have the right to get a fair payment for their work, to fulfill 
their basic needs and those of their families. 
7. Peasants (women and men) have the right to get a fair price for their production. 
8. Peasants (women and men) have the right to a fair system of evaluation of the quality of 
their product, nationally and/or internationally. 
9. Peasants (women and men) have the right to develop community‐based commercialization 
systems in order to guarantee food sovereignty. 
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Article IX 
Right to the protection of agriculture values 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to the recognition and protection of their 
culture and local agriculture values. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to develop and preserve local knowledge in 
agriculture. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject interventions that can destroy local 
agricultural values. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to be respected for their spirituality as 
individuals and as peoples. 
 
Article X 
Right to biological diversity 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to the protection and preservation of biological 
diversity. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to plant, develop and conserve biological 
diversity, individually or collectively. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject patents threatening biological 
diversity, including on plants, food and medicine. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject intellectual property rights of goods, 
services, resources and knowledge that are owned, maintained, discovered, developed or 
produced by the local community. They can not be forced to implement those intellectual 
property rights. 
5. Peasants (women and men), individually or collectively, have the right to maintain, 
exchange, and preserve genetic and biological diversity as the richness of resources from the 
local community and the indigenous community. 
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6. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject certification mechanisms established 
by transnational corporations. Local guarantee schemes run by peasants’ organizations with 
government support should be promoted and protected. 
 
Article XI 
Right to preserve the environment 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to a clean and healthy environment. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to preserve the environment according to their 
knowledge. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reject all forms of exploitation which cause 
environmental damage. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right to sue and claim compensation for 
environmental damage.Declaration of Rights of Peasants ‐ Women and Men 
5. Peasants (women and men) have the right to reparation for ecological debt and the 
historic and current dispossession of their territories. 
 
Article XII 
Freedoms of association, opinion and expression 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to freedom of association with others, and to 
express their opinion, in accordance with traditions and culture, including through claims, 
petitions, and mobilizations, at the local, regional, national and international levels. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right to form and join independent peasants’ 
organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, or any other organizations or associations, for the 
protection of their interests. 
3. Peasants (women and men), individually or collectively, have the right to expression in 
their local customs, languages, local culture, religions, cultural literature and local art. 
4. Peasants (women and men) have the right not to be criminalized for their claims and 
struggles. 
5. Peasants (women and men) have to right to resist oppression and to resort to peaceful 
direct action in order to protect their rights  
 
 
Article XIII 
Right to have access to justice 
1. Peasants (women and men) have the right to effective remedies in case of violations of 
their rights. They have the right to a fair justice system, to have effective and 
nondiscriminatory access to courts and to have legal aid. 
2. Peasants (women and men) have the right not to be criminalized for their claims and 
struggles. 
3. Peasants (women and men) have the right to be informed and to legal assistance.  
 
To have a proper Convention, there is a need to include chapters/parts on “state obligation” 
and “monitoring mechanism or mechanisms related to measures”, and other provisions 
similar to other international conventions. 
 
Document adopted by the Via Campesina International Coordinating Committee in Seoul, March 2009 
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APPENDIX E 
THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE AND ACCESS TO LAND  
POSITION STATEMENT OF LA VIA CAMPESINA TO THE 
WORLD FOOD SUMMIT, ROME, 1996 
Food Sovereignty: A Future without Hunger 
 
We, the Via Campesina, a growing movement of farm workers, peasant, farm and 
indigenous peoples’ organizations from all the regions of the world know that food 
security cannot be achieved without taking full account of those who produce 
food. Any discussion that ignores our contribution will fail to eradicate poverty and 
hunger. 
 
Food is a basic human right. This right can only be realized in a system where 
food 
sovereignty is guaranteed. Food sovereignty is the right of each nation to maintain 
and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and 
productive diversity. We have the right to produce our own food in our own 
territory. Food sovereignty is a precondition to genuine food security. 
 
We, the Via Campesina reject the economic and political conditions which destroy 
our 
livelihoods, our communities, our cultures and our natural environment. The 
liberalization of trade and its economic policies of structural adjustment have 
globalized poverty and hunger in the world and are destroying local productive 
capacities and rural societies. This corporate agenda takes no account of food 
security for people. It is an inequitable system that treats both nature and people 
as a means to an end with the sole aim of generating profits for a few. Peasants 
and small farmers are denied access to and control over land, water, seeds and 
natural resources. Our response to the 
increasingly hostile environment is to collectively challenge these conditions and 
develop alternatives. 
 
We are determined to create rural economies which are based on respect for 
ourselves and the earth, on food sovereignty and fair trade. Women play a central 
role in household and community food sovereignty. Hence they have an inherent 
right to resources for food production, land, credit, capital, technology, education 
and social services, and equal opportunity to develop and employ their skills. We 
are convinced that the global problem of food insecurity can and must be 
resolved. Food sovereignty can only be achieved through solidarity and the 
political will to implement alternatives. 
Long-term food security depends on those who produce food and care for the 
natural 
environment. As the stewards of food producing resources we hold the following 
principles as the necessary foundation for achieving food security. 
 
Food - a Basic Human Right 
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Food is a basic human right. Everyone must have access to safe, nutritious and 
culturally appropriate food in sufficient quantity and quality to sustain a healthy life 
with full human dignity. 
 
Each nation should declare that access to food is a constitutional right and 
guarantee the development of the primary sector to ensure the concrete 
realization of this fundamental right. 
 
Agrarian Reform for Food Sovereignty 
We demand genuine agrarian reform which gives landless and farming people – 
especially women -- ownership and control of the land they work and returns 
territories to Indigenous peoples. The right to land must be free of discrimination 
on the basis of gender religion, race, social class or ideology; land belongs to 
those who work it. 
 
Peasant families, especially women, must have access to productive land, credit, 
technology, markets and extension services. Governments must establish and 
support decentralized rural credit systems that priorize the production of food for 
domestic consumption to ensure food sovereignty. 
 
Production capacity rather than land should be used as security to guarantee 
credit. 
To encourage young people to remain in rural communities as productive citizens, 
the work of producing food and caring for the land has to be sufficiently valued 
both economically and socially. Governments must make long-term investments 
of public resources in the development of socially and ecologically appropriate 
rural infrastructure. 
 
Food Sovereignty: Protecting Natural Resources 
Food sovereignty entails the sustainable care and use of natural resources 
especially land, water and seeds. We, who work the land, must have the right to 
practice sustainable managment of natural resources and to preserve biological 
diversity. This can only be done from a sound economic basis with security of 
tenure, healthy soils and reduced use of agro-chemicals. 
 
Long-term sustainability demands a shift away from dependence on chemical 
inputs, on 
cash-crop monocultures and intensive, industrialized production models. 
Balanced and diversified naturals systems are required. 
 
Genetic resources are the result of millenia of evolution and belong to all of 
humanity. They represent the careful work and knowledge of many generations of 
rural and indigenous peoples. The patenting and commercialization of genetic 
resources by private companies must be prohibited.  
 
The World Trade Organization’s Intellectual Property Rights Agreement is 
unacceptable. Farming communities have the right to freely use and protect the 
diverse genetic resources, including seeds, which have been developed by them 
throughout history. This is the basis for food sovereignty. 
 
Food sovereignty: Reorganizing the Food Trade 
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Food is first and foremost a source of nutrition and only secondarily an item of 
trade. 
National agricultural policies must priorize production for domestic consumption 
and food selfsufficiency. 
 
Food imports must not displace local production nor depress prices. This means 
that 
export dumping or subsidized export must cease. Peasant farmers have the right 
to produce essential food staples for their countries and to control the marketing 
of their products. 
 
Food prices in domestic and international markets must be regulated and reflect 
the true 
costs of producing that food. This would ensure that peasant families have 
adequate incomes. It is unacceptable that the trade in foodstuffs continues to be 
based on the economic exploitation of the most vulnerable -- the lowest earning 
producers -- and the further degradation of the environment. 
 
It is equally unacceptable that trade and production decisions are increasingly 
dictated by the need for foreign currency to meet high debt loads. These debts 
place a disproportionate burden on rural peoples. We demand that these debts be 
forgiven. 
 
Food Sovereignty: Ending the Globalization of Hunger 
Food sovereignty is undermined by multilateral institutions and by speculative 
capital. The growing control of multinational corporations over agricultural policies 
has been facilitated by the economic policies of multilateral organizations such as 
WTO, Work Bank and the IMF. We demand the regulation and taxation of 
speculative capital and a strictly enforced Code of Conduct for transnational 
corporations. 
 
Social Peace: a Pre-requisite to Food Sovereignty 
Everyone has the right to be free from violence. Food must not be used as a 
weapon. 
Increasing levels of poverty and marginalization in the countryside, along with the 
growing oppression of ethnic minorities and indigenous populations aggravate 
situations of injustice and hopelessness. The ongoing displacement, forced 
urbanization and repression of peasants cannot be tolerated. We denounce the 
increasing incidence of racism in the countryside. 
 
Food Sovereignty: Democratic control 
Peasants and small farmers must have direct input into formulating agricultural 
policies at all levels. This includes the current FAO World Food Summit from 
which we have been excluded. 
 
The United Nations and related organizations will have to undergo a process of 
democratization to enable this to become a reality. Everyone has the right to 
honest, accurate information and open and democratic decision-making. These 
rights form the basis of good governance, accountability and equal participation in 
economic, political and social life, free from all forms of discrimination. 
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Rural women, in particular, must be granted direct and active decision-making on 
food and rural issues. 
 
Via Campesina 
November 11-17, 1996 in Rome, Italy  
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APPENDIX F  
MODEL LOCAL FOOD AND COMMUNITY SELF-
GOVERNANCE ORDINANCE, MAINE, 2011 
AN ORDINANCE TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND INTEGRITY OF THE LOCAL FOOD 
SYSTEM 
IN THE TOWN OF (NAME OF TOWN) , _ (NAME OF COUNTY) COUNTY, MAINE. 
 
Section 1. Name. This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the “Local 
Food and 
Community Self-Governance Ordinance.” 
 
Section 2. Definitions. 
As used in this ordinance: 
(a) “Patron” means an individual who is the last person to purchase any product or 
preparation directly from a processor or producer and who does not resell the product 
or preparation. 
(b) “Home consumption” means consumed within a private home. 
(c) “Local Foods” means any food or food product that is grown, produced, or 
processed by individuals who sell directly to their patrons through farm-based sales or 
buying clubs, at farmers markets, roadside stands, fundraisers or at community social 
events. 
(d) “Processor” means any individual who processes or prepares products of the soil or 
animals for food or drink. 
(e) “Producer” means any farmer or gardener who grows any plant or animal for food 
or drink. 
(f) “Community social event” means an event where people gather as part of a 
community for the benefit of those gathering, or for the community, including but not 
limited to a church or religious social, school event, potluck, neighborhood gathering, 
library meeting, traveling food sale, fundraiser, craft fair, farmers market and other 
public events. 
 
Section 3. Preamble and Purpose. We the People of the Town of (name of 
town) , 
(name of county) County, Maine have the right to produce, process, sell, purchase 
and consume local foods thus promoting self-reliance, the preservation of family 
farms, and local 
food traditions. We recognize that family farms, sustainable agricultural practices, and 
food 
processing by individuals, families and non-corporate entities offers stability to our 
rural way of life by enhancing the economic, environmental and social wealth of our 
community. As such, our right to a local food system requires us to assert our inherent 
right to self-government. We recognize the authority to protect that right as belonging 
to the Town of (name of town) . 
 
We have faith in our citizens’ ability to educate themselves and make informed 
decisions. We 
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hold that federal and state regulations impede local food production and constitute a 
usurpation of our citizens’ right to foods of their choice. We support food that 
fundamentally respects human dignity and health, nourishes individuals and the 
community, and sustains producers, processors and the environment. We are therefore 
duty bound under the Constitution of the State of Maine to protect and promote 
unimpeded access to local foods. 
 
The purpose of the Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance is to: 
(i) Provide citizens with unimpeded access to local food; 
(ii) Enhance the local economy by promoting the production and purchase of local 
agricultural products; 
(iii) Protect access to farmers’ markets, roadside stands, farm based sales and direct 
producer to patron sales; 
(iv) Support the economic viability of local food producers and processors; 
(v) Preserve community social events where local foods are served or sold; 
(vi) Preserve local knowledge and traditional foodways. 
 
Section 4. Authority.  
This Ordinance is adopted and enacted pursuant to the inherent, inalienable, and 
fundamental right of the citizens of the Town of (name of town) to self-government, 
and under the authority recognized as belonging to the people of the Town by all 
relevant state and federal laws including, but not limited to the following: 
 
The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, which declares that 
governments are instituted to secure peoples’ rights, and that government derives its 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
 
Article I, § 2 of the Maine Constitution, which declares: “all power is inherent in the 
people; all free governments are founded in their authority and instituted for their 
benefit, [and that] they have therefore an unalienable and indefensible right to institute 
government and to alter, reform, or totally change the same when their safety and 
happiness require it.” 
 
§3001 of Title 30-A of the Maine Revised Statutes, which grants municipalities all 
powers necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the Town 
of (name of town) . 
 
§211 of Title 7 of the Maine Revised Statutes which states: “it is the policy of the State 
to encourage food self-sufficiency for the State.” 
 
Section 5. Statements of Law. 
 
Section 5.1. Licensure/Inspection Exemption.  
Producers or processors of local foods in the Town of (name of town) are exempt 
from licensure and inspection provided that the transaction is only between the 
producer or processor and a patron when the food is sold for home consumption. This 
includes any producer or processor who sells his or her products at farmers’ markets or 
roadside stands; sells his or her products through farm-based sales directly to a patron; 
or delivers his or her products directly to patrons. 
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Section 5.1.a. Licensure/Inspection Exemption.  
Producers or processors of local foods in the Town of (name of town) are exempt 
from licensure and inspection provided that their products are prepared for, consumed, 
or sold at a community social event. 
 
Section 5.2. Right to Access and Produce Food.  
(name of town) citizens possess the right to produce, process, sell, purchase, and 
consume local foods of their choosing. 
 
Section 5.3. Right to Self-Governance.  
All citizens of (name of town) possess the right to a form of governance which 
recognizes that all power is inherent in the people, that all free governments are 
founded on the people’s authority and consent. 
 
Section 5.4. Right to Enforce.  
(name of town) citizens possess the right to adopt measures which prevent the 
violation of the rights enumerated in this Ordinance. 
 
Section 6. Statement of Law. Implementation.  
The following restrictions and provisions serve to implement the preceding statements 
of law. 
 
Section 6.1. State and Federal Law.  
It shall be unlawful for any law or regulation adopted by the state or federal 
government to interfere with the rights recognized by this Ordinance. It shall be 
unlawful for any corporation to interfere with the rights recognized by this Ordinance. 
The term “corporation” shall mean any business entity organized under the laws of any 
state or country. 
 
Section 6.2. Patron Liability Protection.  
Patrons purchasing food for home consumption may enter into private agreements 
with those producers or processors of local foods to waive any liability for the 
consumption of that food. Producers or processors of local foods shall be exempt from 
licensure and inspection requirements for that food as long as those agreements are in 
effect. 
 
Section 7. Civil Enforcement.  
The Town of (name of town) may enforce the provisions of this Ordinance through 
seeking equitable relief from a court of competent jurisdiction. Any individual citizen 
of the Town of (name of town) shall have standing to vindicate any rights secured by 
this ordinance which have been violated or which are threatened with violation, and 
may seek relief both in the form of injunctive and compensatory relief from a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
 
Section 8. Town Action against Pre-emption.  
The foundation for making and adoption of this law is the peoples’ fundamental and 
inalienable right to govern themselves, and thereby secure their rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. Any attempt to use other units and levels of government 
to preempt, amend, alter or overturn this Ordinance or parts of this Ordinance shall 
require the Town to hold public meetings that explore the adoption of other measures 
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that expand local control and the ability of citizens to protect their fundamental and 
inalienable right to self-government. It is declared that those other measures may 
legitimately include the partial 
or complete separation of the Town from the other units and levels of government that 
attempt to preempt, amend, alter, or overturn this Ordinance. 
 
Section 9. Effect.  
This Ordinance shall be effective immediately upon its enactment. 
 
Section 10. Severability Clause.  
To the extent any provision of this Ordinance is deemed invalid by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, such provision will be removed from the Ordinance, and the 
balance of the Ordinance shall remain valid. 
 
Section 11. Repealer.  
All inconsistent provisions of prior Ordinances adopted by the Town of (name of 
town) are hereby repealed, but only to the extent necessary to remedy the 
inconsistency,  
 
Ordinance adopted by the towns of Sedgwick (5 March 2011), Penobscot (7 March 2011), 
Blue Hill (2 April 2011), Trenton (21 May 2011), Hope (8 November 2011) 
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